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This thesis, through a comparative study of Kosovar Albanian refugees in the UK and 
Italy, develops an understanding of refugees' attitudes towards return and identifies 
the factors that influence their decision-making process through the analysis of their 
interaction with the country of origin and the society of reception. 
It formulates a theoretical approach to the study of refugee repatriation based on 
Archer's form of sociological realism and her morphogenetic model, while also draw-
ing on previous studies of refugee flight, settlement and return, which argue for the 
advantage of studying refugee specific issues as part of the whole chain of events that 
characterise the experience of exile. As such, it represents a contribution towards the 
theoretical understanding of refugees in general and refugee repatriation in particular. 
The case study is grounded on this theoretical approach and analyses refugees' perspec-
tives on return within the proposed frame. It is based upon a qualitative study through 
fieldwork with refugees in both countries of exile and in this respect marks a distinctive 
contribution to the study of refugees in the UK and in Italy in general, and to the study 
of refugees' approach to return in particular. 
The thesis dismisses the predominant assumption of governments that' all refugees want 
to return' and concludes that refugees' attitudes towards return depend on a range of 
factors: their relationship with the country of origin, their interaction with the country 
of exile and their personal background. More significantly, it demonstrates the linkages 
between these factors and the time and modality of their flight, their interaction with the 
reception, integration and repatriation policies of the country of exile and their relation-
ship with the conflict and society in the country of origin. In this respect, it represents 
a contribution to existing studies of refugee repatriation through the development of a 
more sophisticated account of what influences the decision-making process of refugees 
vis-a.-vis return. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
"We cannot ignore the fact that the voluntary nature of repatriation is in-
creasingly being undermined by a mounting number of forcible returns in 
situations which are far from safe." (Ogata, 1997) 
From the early 1980s onwards, repatriation has been increasingly promoted, by both 
governments and United Nations' agencies, as the main solution to refugees' displace-
ment. However, such views were not merely reflected in the efforts invested in supporting 
return but also in the efforts directed towards limiting the possibilities for permanent 
settlement through the introduction of a series of restrictive changes to the asylum 
regime. This confluence of approaches has led to new forms of repatriation, which take 
place under premature and violent conditions and are characterised by large numbers of 
refugees returning to their country while the conflict is still unresolved. Indeed, as Stein 
points out, "today we talk of premature repatriation, rescue repatriation and violent 
repatriation as well as expulsion, deportation and refoulemen-e' (Stein, 1997, p.3). In 
short, repatriation has come to be considered as the inevitable final phase of a refugee's 
experience, rather than just one of the possible solutions. 
These issues repeatedly came to the fore of the European political and public debate 
throughout the 1990s, which was defined as the 'decade of repatriation' by former United 
Nations High Commissioner Sadako Ogata. During this time, the crisis in the former 
Republic of Yugoslavia brought the horrors of war back into the heart of Europe and 
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caused the dramatic exodus of millions of refugees, mainly seeking asylum within the 
continent. This corresponded to the development of a new restrictive approach to the 
problem of immigration and asylum in western European countries. In fact, many 
goverments adopted, for the first time, temporary forms of protection for refugees from 
the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. Repatriation played a major role in the new asylum 
regime as it was seen as the 'natural' outcome of temporary protection and as the 
general desire of 'all' refugees. In particular, in the late 1990s the case of Kosovar 
Albanian refugees was flagged as proof of the success of refugee repatriation policies, 
due to the high number of returns, and still acts as an example to justify the views held 
by governments. 
In this context, where return as a final outcome is taken for granted and asylum policies 
are increasingly restrictive, it is vital that we carefully re-examine the validity of such 
an approach. Such a need is made all the more relevant if we also consider that refugee 
repatriation is one of the most understudied issues within the general field of refugee 
studies. In this thesis I attempt to address these issues through a study of refugees' 
attitudes towards return and the impact of repatriation policies on their decision-making 
process. This is done through the study of Kosovar Albanian refugees, which are often 
presented as the 'success story'. 
N ext I provide a detailed outline of my research aims and how I intend to go about 
achieving them, before presenting an outline of the entire thesis and a brief note on the 
terminology used throughout. 
1.1 Research aims 
The thesis has four main aims, outlined below. 
• Firstly, this thesis attempts to gain an understanding of the main factors that 
inform refugees' position vis-a.-vis return. This enables the identification of the 
factors that lead to the decision to return or not, and by consequence the role 
government policies play in this context. 
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• Secondly, it aims to examine the validity of the assumption that 'all' refugees want 
to go back to their country of origin. Since this is a central tenet of government 
rhetoric on refugee issues, it should be carefully questioned and the understanding 
provided by the first aim will facilitate this. 
• Thirdly, in order to inform both debate and policy formation, this thesis aims to 
identify what are the optimal conditions under which a refugee can choose what 
to do with regards to return. 
• Finally, in response to the lack of research in refugee repatriation, and in partic-
ular research that places a study of policies within the context of a theoretical 
framework, this thesis aims to develop a theoretical approach to the study of 
repatriation that is able to capture the complexity of the issues involved. This 
theoretical approach will underpin the other aims. 
Now, in order to achieve these aims the thesis develops along two main lines: 
1. the development of a theoretical framework that is informed by an analysis of 
existing theories of return migration and studies of refugees' choice and is based 
on a sociological realist approach to the debate on structure and agency; 
2. the qualitative empirical research of refugees' interaction with repatriation policies, 
examining specifically the case of Kosovar Albanians in the UK and Italy. 
These two lines of research are reflected in the broad division of the thesis. In the first 
part, I argue that refugees' position vis-a.-vis return is informed by the whole experience 
of exile and by their interaction with both the country of origin and the country of exile. 
Consequently, I develop a theoretical approach to the study of refugee repatriation that 
is based on Archer's form of sociological realism and her morphogenetic scheme. This 
approach supports my aim of enabling the analysis of the interaction between refugees 
and the situation in the country of exile and country of origin, while acknowledging the 
complexity of the topic. As I mentioned, the development of a theoretical framework 
is necessary, since repatriation is one of the least researched areas in refugee studies. 
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This remains so despite an increase in effort during the 1990s by scholars attempting to 
remedy it. There are still very few attempts to develop theories of refugee repatriation, 
with the existing ones being dominated by attempts to study the issue through rational 
choice theory. Moreover, there is a lack of significant research into the refugees' approach 
with regard to return. 
The second part of the thesis is an analysis of the data collected during fieldwork in the 
UK and Italy, aimed at studying the case of Kosovar Albanian refugees. This case is 
particularly interesting because of the large number of refugees who returned since the 
end of the war in June 1999, either independently or through repatriation programmes 
set up by European governments. The speed and the number of refugees which have 
returned to Kosovo is used to support the claim that all refugees wish to return and pro-
vides politicians with a good example in favour of their repatriation policies. However, 
despite the success of repatriation rates, not all Kosovar Albanians have repatriated and 
others are still fleeing to seek asylum, offering an interesting opportunity to question the 
idea that all refugees want to repatriate and investigate the factors that influence their 
choice vis-a-vis return. 
Since my aim is to understand the impact of different asylum policies and socio-economic 
conditions in exile on the decision to repatriate I examined this case within a compara-
tive study of Kosovar Albanian refugees in the UK and Italy. These countries represent 
two different European realities due to their geopolitical position, their history of mi-
gration, their political developments on the issue of asylum and their approach to the 
conflict in Kosovo. Moreover, in order to better contrast the impact of differing asylum 
policies on refugees' decision about return, I also compare differences between the case 
of Kosovar Albanian refugees who arrived in the UK and Italy spontaneously through-
out the 1990s and those who came with the Humanitarian Evacuation Programme set 
up by the UNHCR during the 1999 refugee crisis. The flight of these two groups of 
refugees was clearly different as were the reception conditions they experienced in both 
countries. Therefore, analysing them separately and comparing the findings provides a 
further example of how the context in exile affects refugees' decision-making process and 
their attitudes vis-a-vis return. 
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1.2 Thesis Outline 
In order to place the topic of the thesis within the current debate on repatriation as the 
best solution to refugee displacement, the thesis presents in Chapter 2 a brief overview 
of the changing role of repatriation over the last fifty years of the twentieth century. I 
distinguish three different historical phases and I analyse the main historical, economic, 
political and social developments that have contributed to the increasing interest in 
repatriation as the most favourable answer to the refugee problem and to the current 
controversies about its role. Having set the background, I delve into the core of the 
research on refugees' position vis-a-vis return. 
In Chapter 3 I review the general literature on return migration and refugee repatriation 
and highlight the need for further research on the issue. Through the review I argue 
that refugee repatriations are a special case of return migrations which must be analysed 
while taking into account their particular nature. I also identify the elements that exist-
ing studies have to offer and pitfalls that I should avoid. I conclude that previous studies 
indicate the gains of researching the topic as part of refugees' whole experience of exile 
and stress the importance of considering the influence of time and space when analysing 
refugees' position vis-a-vis return. On the other hand, the review also highlights the 
limitations of using models based on rational choice theory when researching refugees' 
decision-making processes on return and of using generic definitions such as 'voluntary' 
and 'involuntary' repatriation. The chapter concludes with the explanation of the ad-
vantages of researching refugees' choice on return within Archer's understanding of the 
problem of structure and agency. Her methodology, based on analytical dualism, enables 
researchers to explore the way in which refugees interact with the developing situation 
in the country of origin and the asylum context in the country of exile and examine how 
these interactions affect their decision-making process. In Chapter <1 I provide a more 
detailed explanation of her methodology focusing on the concept of analytical dualism, 
the idea of morphogenetic/static cycles, the conceptualisation of freedom and constraint, 
and the stratified view of agency. These ideas form the basis of my methodology and 
shape the selection of research methods as explained in the second part of Chapter 4. 
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The two main assumptions emerging from the analysis in Chapter 3 and 4 are that 
in order to study refugees' position vis-a.-vis return and the factors that influence the 
decision-making process we need to examine their interaction with both the country of 
origin and the country of exile and consider their attitudes on return in relation to the 
whole chain of events that characterised the exile experience. As such, it is necessary 
to examine two parallel cycles of interaction: the one with the conflict in the country of 
origin and the one with the country of exile. 
The succession of the following chapters reflects these assumptions. 
In Chapter 5 I set the background in order to understand the refugees' relationship with 
the country of origin. In the first part, I provide an overview of the historical development 
of the conflict and an analysis of refugees' interaction with it. In the second part, I 
explore the moment and the reasons for their flight and distinguish between refugee 
movements, based on the time and the mode of the flight. 
In Chapter 6, 7 and 8 I examine the refugees' experience in the country of exile and 
compare the case of Kosovar Albanians in the UK and Italy. In Chapter G and 7, I 
study the mode of settlement of those who arrived independently and analyse the way in 
which various waves of refugees interacted with the different asylum systems they found 
in place. I also analyse the way in which their personal background, the particular 
relationship they had with the conflict in Kosovo and the time of their arrival influenced 
their interaction with both countries of exile. 
In Chapter 8 I focus specifically on the case of Kosovar Albanian refugees who were 
evacuated during NATO's bombing campaign in 1999 to the UK or Italy through the 
Humanitarian Evacuation Programme set up by the UNHCR. These refugees are a 
particular case given that they were admitted on the explicit assumption that they 
would return as soon as possible. They received temporary forms of protection and 
special reception conditions, and were the main recipients of repatriation programmes 
supported by the respective governments after the end of the war. 
The analysis of these two different reception contexts is particularly useful in the follow-
ing chapter on return since it enables me to understand the impact of differing reception 
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conditions and repatriation policies on the refugees' choice on return. 
This is in fact the main subject of investigation of Chapter 9 where I attempt to achieve 
three of the initial aims of this thesis: understand which factors influence refugees' 
position vis-a.-vis return; examine the validity of the claim that every refugee wants 
to return and identify the optimal conditions for refugees' choice about return. Given 
my theoretical framework and initial assumptions I examine refugees' attitudes towards 
return by analysing three different elements: the post-war conditions in the country of 
origin, the repatriation policies of the countries of exile and the refugees' opinions on 
return. In the chapter I conclude that three main factors affect refugees' decision-making 
process vis-a.-vis return: country of origin factors (their relationship with the country of 
origin in general, and the conflict in particular, and its conditions after the war), country 
of exile factors (their interaction with conditions in the country of exile, their degree of 
integration, the specific repatriation policies in place) and personal factors (the personal 
socio-economic background, their whole experience of exile, their plans and aspirations 
for the future). In the chapter, I also discuss the advantages and difficulties related to 
the use of the theoretical and methodological framework that I developed in the first 
part of the thesis. 
1.3 Terminology 
In the thesis I use the term 'refugee' or 'de facto refugee' in a broad sociological sense 
and I refer distinctly to repatriation and return as the process of going back to the land 
of origin. Any other specific definition of refugee or repatriation is explained in the 
context of the text. 
The name 'Kosovo' is considered by Kosovar Albanians to be the Serb version of the 
Albanian 'Kosova'. However, this spelling is also the official international version and, 
therefore, I decided to use Kosovo throughout the thesis. I use the Albanian spelling 
'Kosova' only when quoting from other authors who use it or directly from the interviews 
with Kosovar Albanian respondents. 
With the term 'Kosovars' I refer to the whole population of Kosovo independently of the 
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specific ethnic groups while some direct quotations from other authors use 'Kosovans'. 
I use 'Kosovar Albanians' to refer to the ethnic Albanian population of Kosovo. 
Chapter 2 
Setting the background: the 
changing role of repatriation 
2 .1 Introduction 
The role of repatriation as a solution to refugee displacement has passed through different 
representative phases during the last fifty years of the twentieth century. It is possible 
to distinguish three main historical ones: the first decades of the Cold War until the 
1980s, when repatriation did not represent a possible solution for refugee displacement; 
the 1980s, a time of transition when it began to be increasingly promoted as the best 
solution; the post-Cold War era, when it gained a new political meaning. 
In this chapter, I examine the features of these three different phases and investigate the 
reasons behind the progressive shift in the political role and meaning of repatriation. 
This provides the necessary background to place the topic of the thesis within the current 
debate on whether repatriation is the best solution to refugee displacement. 
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2.2 
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The shifting significance of repatriation in the interna-
tional political scene 
During the first half of the twentieth century the possibility that refugees might repa-
triate was not considered as a feasible solution, since their displacement was generally 
considered permanent (Rogge, 1994). However, immediately after the end of the Second 
World War, millions of refugees returned to their homes and their return opened up 
an important political debate which led to the definition of voluntary repatriation as 
the most desirable solution to refugee displacement (Stein, 1990; Zieck, 1997). Never-
theless, this definition turned, almost immediately, into an unfeasible and impracticable 
principle due to the environment created by the Cold War. During that time, resettle-
ment and local integration were broadly promoted and considered as more appropriate 
responses (Chimni, 1999). Even though the Geneva Convention of 1951 [article 1 ( c) (5)] 
considered the possibility of revoking refugee status if the circumstances in the country 
of origin changed, European governments' policies were oriented towards granting per-
manent resident status to refugees. The right to revoke the status due to the change 
of circumstance cessation rule, eventually, fell into disuse (Hathaway, 1997). These de-
velopments led some early refugee theorists to suggest that repatriation was unlikely to 
have an important role in the solution of refugee migrations, particularly those in Eu-
rope (Holborn, 1975). However, in the post-colonial era, the frequency and magnitude of 
repatriations, especially in Africa, has defied the postulations of these early researchers. 
In fact, since the early 1970s, repatriation, once again, represented 'the solution' for 
many refugees after the end of struggles for independence and liberation from colonial 
rule (Cuny and Stein, 1991). On the international scene, it is only during the 1980s that 
repatriation became the favoured solution of choice for governments, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and United Nations (UN) agencies (Allen and l'v1orsink, 1994). 
The debate within the UNHCR, between the early 1980s and early 1990s, offers a good 
example for explaining the development of the meaning and role of repatriation in the 
political arena in those years. 
In 1980, a UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion on Voluntary Repatriation recog-
nised that voluntary repatriation constitutes, generally, the most appropriate solution 
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for the problems of refugees (UNHCR, 1980). Nevertheless, in the conclusion it is stated 
that: 
"( d) Considered that when refugees express the wish to repatriate [emphasis 
added], both the government of their country of origin and the government 
of their country of asylum should, within the framework of their national 
legislation and, whenever necessary, in co-operation with UNHCR take all 
requisite steps to assist them to do so." (UNHCR, 1980) 
The protasis that I emphasized above and its ensuing considerations clarify how, in this 
phase, the return to the homeland was strictly concerned with the refugees' own decision 
to return; the switch from spontaneous repatriation to the programmed and assisted 
repatriation wished by the committee had the character of a simple recommendation 
claiming the desirability of appropriate arrangements. 
Five years later, in 1985, UNHCR, in co-operation with the International Institute of 
Humanitarian Law, organised a round table on Voluntary Repatriation in San Remo 
(Italy). The aim of the meeting was to consider a study on the subject prepared by 
an expert for the UNHCR and provide the Executive Committee with observations and 
considerations for possible follow-up action. The final report of the round table shows 
clear signs that further steps had been taken in approaching the subject of repatriation: 
facilitating voluntary repatriation was not considered as a sufficient engagement for the 
UNHCR anymore, a stronger involvement in encouraging repatriation was thought to 
be 'desirable and opportune'. In the report it is stated that: 
"The Round Table reaffirmed that voluntary repatriation was, in princi-
ple, the best solution to a refugee problem, and that it was desirable and 
opportune to emphasise the importance of this solution and to develop in-
ternational co-operation in effecting it." (UNHCR, 1985a, p.2) 
Moreover, the report and the conclusion clearly introduced a new concept: "promotion 
of voluntary repatriation" (UNHCR, 1985a, p.7-9). According to the outcome of the 
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round table the importance of UNHCR's role in facilitating the movements had to be 
coupled with an active promotion and encouragement of voluntary repatriation through 
the creation of a multilateral framework involving the international community as a 
whole (UNHCR, 1985a). 
The Executive Committee Conclusions on Voluntary Repatriation of 1985 reflected the 
idea elaborated in San Remo and introduced the ideas of promoting repatriation in 
several points of its final text (UNHCR, 1985b). In an inter-office memorandum of 1987 
on the principles and guidelines for action in voluntary repatriation, the principle of 
promoting the movement had already been discussed in its practical aspects: 
"It is now recognised that UNHCR, in addition to facilitating voluntary 
repatriation, also has a legitimate role and in fact a responsibility to promote 
voluntary repatriation." (UNHCR, 1987, p.3) 
The increasing importance of repatriation in the UNHCR's agenda culminated in the 
1991 official declaration of former United Nations High Commissioner Sadako Ogata 
who stated that 1992 should be seen as the first year of a decade of voluntary repatri-
ation (Allen and Morsink, 1994; Gallagher, 1994; Takahashi, 1997; Zeager and Bascom, 
1996). In fact during the 1990s, the modality and role of repatriation underwent some 
fundamental changes. Firstly, the 1990s witnessed a tremendous increase in the number 
of refugee movements. Of course, statistics concerned with repatriation movements only 
provide us with approximate figures since there are great difficulties in keeping com-
prehensive records including those on self-repatriation movements that take place out of 
organised monitored programmes (Stein, 1992). Nevertheless, it is possible to refer to an 
estimation that can provide a rough idea of the changing magnitude of the phenomenon. 
From 1975 through 1989 less than 4 million refugees returned to their country of ori-
gin, while between 1990 and 1996 the number reached 14 million (Stein, 1997; UNHCR, 
1993). Secondly, the nature of repatriation has taken a more sinister dimension. In fact, 
contemporary repatriation movements take place, mostly, under premature and violent 
conditions and are characterised by a large number of refugees returning while the con-
flict in the country of origin is still ongoing (Stein, 1997). Finally, the new political 
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approach to the refugee problem has influenced the phenomenon of repatriation in its 
essential paradigm, that of voluntary movements of people. This point is clarified again 
by a declaration of former High Commissioner Ogata saying that: 
"We cannot ignore the fact that the voluntary nature of repatriation is in-
creasingly being undermined by a mounting number of forcible returns in 
situations which are far from safe." (Ogata, 1997). 
Therefore, the last decade has been characterised by a growing interest, from academics 
and practitioners alike, in cases of repatriation under conflict and, especially, on the 
pivotal issue of involuntary/forced repatriation. 
In conclusion, from self-repatriation to assisted repatriation and forcible repatriation, 
three phases can be roughly distinguished according to the meaning, nature and role 
of repatriation movements: the Cold War time until 1980s, when repatriation was not 
considered as a possible solution for refugees' displacement; the 1980s, when the role of 
repatriation began to change and acquire a renewed importance; the 1990s, the decade 
of repatriation. In the following sections I examine the causes that brought about these 
changes by referring to some of the existing academic studies that investigated the 
political dynamics at their roots. 
2.3 The Cold War: time for settlement 
Despite the fact that during the years immediately following the end of the Second 
World War mass returns had occurred in Europe and that even the initial UN resolu-
tions on refugees had explicitly mentioned voluntary repatriation as the first solution, 
through most of the Cold War period, roughly from 1947 till the 1970s, repatriation was 
effectively excluded as a solution to refugees' displacement from the public agenda. The 
reason for this is explained by Chimni's words: "within a year of the end of the Second 
World War the question of a solution to the refugee problem had become an integral 
part of the Cold War" (Chimni, 1999, p.2). 
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Of course, the new political situation altered the frame within which the whole refugee 
question was discussed and the way in which the problem was dealt with (Joly, 1996). 
Consequently, the approach to repatriation changed in nature due to the tension be-
tween the Eastern and Western blocs. In fact, during the Cold War, refugees' flights 
associated with the escape from communism were automatically accepted by Western 
European governments or by the United States, Canada or Australia (Black and Koser, 
1999). This was the case with thousands of refugees who had been given permission 
to leave Czechoslovakia in 1948, with some Hungarians who had, suddenly, flown into 
Austria in 1956 or thousands of Cubans who had escaped from Castro's regime and 
were unreservedly accepted by the United States during the 1950s and the 1960s (Gal-
lagher, 1994; Joly, 1996). Conversely, refugees fleeing from countries that entertained 
good relations with the host countries' governments encountered many obstacles and 
difficulties in their search for asylum. For example, this was the case of refugees coming 
from non-communist states such as EI Salvador, Guatemala and Haiti (Gallagher, 1994; 
Joly, 1996). 
The age of the Cold War witnessed mass refugee movements from one very poor coun-
try to another. The international community approached these movements using the 
same meter that had been calibrated on the political alignment of the government in 
the country of origin. The main attention and concern was focused on those cases of 
displacement caused by conflicts conducted by proxy by the two Superpowers (Black and 
Koser, 1999). In fact, between the 1960s and the 1970s, in many third world countries 
the mass movements of refugees who had fled from independence struggles not directly 
linked to the two blocs' tensions, were offered two solutions for their displacement once 
the conflict was over: integration in the areas they had moved to or repatriation (Gal-
lagher, 1994). Nevertheless, when the conflicts were entwined with Cold War politics, 
as in the case of Afghanistan, Somalia, Vietnam, Nicaragua, etc., solutions to the strug-
gle were harder to find and, consequently, repatriation was not considered as a feasible 
near-term solution (Gallagher, 1994). 
In the specific case of Western powers, repatriation had lost its role as a feasible durable 
solution for the refugee problem for different reasons mainly linked to the Cold War 
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political tensions. Gallagher (1994) indicates three main factors: 
1. Western powers were not worried about the possible mass influx of people from 
Eastern Europe, since they knew Eastern European governments forbade and hin-
dered people's exit and put pressure to encourage the return of those who had 
already claimed asylum in Western European countries. 
2. In this political frame, the idea that the causes of the flight, in a word 'communism', 
could have an end was not considered as a possible option in the foreseeable future. 
3. In the bipolar dimension of the Cold War, refugees fleeing from communist regimes 
acquired a particular political value for the host countries national and interna-
tional policy. 
Moreover, Chimni (1999) explores the economic reasons that lie behind the eclipse of 
repatriation from the triad of proposed solutions to refugees' displacement. After the 
Second World War, Western European states recovered rapidly from the economic dis-
asters caused by the war. In this process of reconstruction refugees acquired a very 
important role, since they compensated for the labour force lost in the war. He ex-
plains that this reality had an important impact on the European states' preference for 
resettlement as a solution to the problem of the 1,000,000 refugees remaining in Europe. 
Allen and Morsink (1994) highlight another factor in this picture: the creation of the 
state of Israel. The mass flight of Palestinians leaving their homes after the Israeli 
victories in the 1948 and 1967 wars, presented peculiar features that influenced the 
general political discourses on repatriation. In fact, on the one hand, Israel consistently 
refused to allow Palestinians to repatriate while encouraging other Jews, from anywhere 
else in the world, to 'return' to the 'Promised Land'. On the other hand, Palestinian 
refugees did not abandon their desire to return to their homes, rejecting any suggestions 
of resettlement (Barakat, 1973). Obviously, considering the importance of the issue 
for regional and international politics and its possible repercussions on international 
diplomacy, "Zionist demands for the right of repatriation to a Biblical homeland, and 
competing Palestinian demands to repatriate from their refugee camps, made debate 
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about the general issue of returning refugees very sensitive" (Allen and l\iorsink, 1994, 
p.2-3). 
Therefore, repatriation was not used or promoted as a response to the refugee problem 
throughout the Cold War period and remained only formally regarded as one of the best 
solutions to the problem, because of the Soviet Union and other communist countries' 
pressure to encourage refugees to return. This is reflected in the fact that, in practice, 
between 1947 and 1950, the International Refugee Organisation (IRO) repatriated 72,834 
refugees, only 5% of the number of displaced people registered with the organisation and 
the majority of repatriation movements took place in Third World countries following 
the end of struggles for decolonization (Chimni, 1999). 
In the following section I analyse the general reasons for the progressive switch towards 
a higher political consideration of repatriation on the international scene that took place 
during the 1980s. 
2.4 1980s: a decade of transition 
During the 1980s some fundamental changes on the international scene reshaped the 
whole problem of displacement and its legal, economic, political and social aspects and, 
of course, this process also involved the political value of repatriation. 
With the colonial wars having largely come to an end by 1980, most of the refugee-
producing conflicts involved independent states and arose, mainly, because of internal 
nation-building problems, revolutionary changes, conflict with neighbours, ideological 
and ethnic conflicts, secessionism and ecological disasters (Zeager and Bascom, 1996). 
During this decade, the number of people seeking asylum began to increase: in the early 
1980s the global refugee total exceeded 10 million people, slightly diminishing in 1983 and 
growing again to reach 17 million by the end of the decade (Zeager and Bascom, 1996). 
Generally, people fled from poor countries to other low-income states although some 
of them directed their flight towards industrialised countries. This was the time when 
the latter began to orientate their asylum policies towards a more restrictive approach. 
Gallagher describes 'richer states' "fear of being overwhelmed with people trying to 
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gain entry by using lengthy and costly procedures for making determinations as to who 
will receive political asylum" (Gallagher, 1994, p.ll). The rhetoric of this new political 
approach took into consideration the fact that refugees from the South were now making 
their way to the North in a time when there was no shortage of labour, thus impelling 
governments to reconsider the issue in other than the Cold War context (Chimni, 1999). 
In this changing political atmosphere, repatriation began to take on a new practical 
value for both countries of exile and countries of origin. No more relegated to the level 
of a theoretical paradigm of durable solutions to refugee displacement, it became the 
most convenient solution for those countries that were restricting their asylum policies. 
Thus, Chimni explains that: "the advocates of voluntary repatriation simply assumed 
that all refugees desired to go home. It was not seen as a 'hypothesis to be tested', but 
as a statement of fact which presumed knowledge of refugees" (Chimni, 1999, p.4). 
However, while countries of exile were beginning to turn repatriation from a possible 
solution in principle into a feasible one in practice, on the other side, many governments 
in the home countries had no interest in facilitating the process of repatriation for several 
reasons: attempting to keep certain groups of refugees out of the country; preventing 
all those political and economic problems linked to forms of mass repatriation inflows 
or using repatriation as a bargaining tool to obtain a more substantial financial support 
from the international community (Zeager and Bascom, 1996). 
Obviously, the UNHCR was involved in these changes and, had to both respond to new 
political pressures and to the new exigencies of the refugees. Therefore, the lively debate 
on refugee repatriation that began to take place within the organisation at the beginning 
of the 1980s, which I described earlier, represented the first important attempt to estab-
lish guidelines to be followed on matters of assisted refugee repatriation movements. The 
difficult task was that of establishing basic principles that while not operating against 
the refugees' basic rights and interests, would not 'discourage' UNHCR's donors and 
succumb to the countries of origins' requests. 
Therefore, the 1980s can be seen as an important period of transition in the international 
political approach to repatriation leading to the 1990s being defined as the 'decade of 
voluntary repatriation'. Of course, there is still a pivotal historical moment to be taken 
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into consideration in refugee studies, which is the end of the Cold War. This was an 
event that opened a new chapter for the world refugee problem in general and a new 
page for the specific chapter of repatriation in particular. 
2.5 19908: the decade of repatriation 
Joly affirms that "the end of the Cold War has freed asylum policies from the straight-
jacket of the two blocs" (Joly, 1996, p.41). She explains how the new political scenario, 
though disentangled from the disparities of treatment reserved for refugees according to 
their provenance from communist or non-communist countries, did not lead to a more 
balanced asylum policy, as could be expected. On the contrary, the process leading to 
a more restrictive tendency in asylum policies, which had already taken its first steps 
during the 1980s, came to be exacerbated by the end of the Cold War, having a serious 
impact on refugee repatriation. 
Briefly, it is the interplay of three new elements that changed the face of 'repatriation' in 
the 1990s: the new restrictive asylum policies of the receiving countries, the introduction 
of new forms of temporary permission to stay for the refugees and the entry of the 
concepts of 'prevention' and 'intervention' into the paradigm for durable solutions in 
the name of a new 'militarised humanitarianism' (Allen and Turton, 1996). 
Firstly, we have to consider that in the light of the new political situation it could no 
longer be assumed that the restriction by the communist governments of people's exit 
from their countries would prevent mass movements into Western Europe. In fact, the 
first large influx of migrants between 1989 and 1991 confirmed the new reality (Gallagher, 
1994). Moreover, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, borders that had been stable 
throughout the Cold War period began to crumble and with it came the end of a strong 
ideological contrast, giving way to the rise of refugee-generating conflicts linked to ethnic, 
religious and national rivalries that had been suffocated at the time of the iron-curtain. 
In this important historical period the questions of borders, citizenship, sovereignty, 
security and movements across frontiers gathered momentum and 'migration' became an 
issue of great importance at both international and national level. Especially in Western 
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Europe, migration acquired an increasing role in the political debate and its political 
and economic utility began to be questioned. As a consequence of this, politicians began 
to foster restrictive, rigorous norms as a solution to the problem (Joly, 1992). Of course, 
the new era of 'restrictionism' included asylum policies too. In a post bipolar system 
refugees lost their political and economic value and began to represent a drain for the 
local economy and a social threat to national societies. Abramowitz (1994) remarks 
that while it became clear that the end of the Cold War would have not put an end to 
the rapid rise in refugee numbers at the same time the world's interest in refugees had 
declined. 
As Hathaway remarks: 
"The demise of the post-War interest-convergence between many States and 
refugees has generated a combination of 'non-entre' tactics and confinement 
of refugees in their own countries. Even when the arrival of refugees is 
logistically or politically impossible to avoid, most developed States today 
see little reason to grant refugees more than the bare minimum entitlements 
required by law" (Hathaway, 1997, p.553). 
In fact, in the 1990s, the political tension between an international humanitarian duty 
of giving shelter to asylum seekers and national pressures to restrict their access to 
the status of 'convention refugees', led many industrialised countries to introduce new 
designations short of full refugee status such as 'temporary protection' or 'exceptional 
leave to remain'. This has enormously influenced the whole refugee experience and has 
given a new meaning to refugee repatriation. 
The political debate on 'temporary protection' represents an emblematic example of the 
new political approach to repatriation. In fact, the expression 'temporary protection' 
obviously indicates a determined period of time and represents a moment of transition to 
'something else'. As Black et al. (1998) suggest, the 'temporariness' implies the condition 
of being either en route to a more permanent status or en route to return. Neverthe-
less, in the 1990s politicians favoured the interpretation of the meaning of temporary 
protection as en route to repatriation. For example, in the debate around temporary 
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protection in the Bosnian refugee case in Europe, political discourses about policies of 
settlement either in favour of refugees' 'integration/inclusion' or 'isolation/exclusion' 
turned around repatriation. The authors distinguish two general opposing arguments 
sharing the same aim of 'sending people back': "the integration of persons given tem-
porary refuge will forestall or complicate return" or "integration is best preparation for 
repatriation" (Black et al., 1998, p.458). 
Despite the fact that in practice, most EU member states did not force Bosnian refugees 
to repatriate l (with the exception of Germany), it is relevant to notice that opposite 
political discourses focused on the best form of reception that might ensure the final 
repatriation of temporarily protected refugees. This point is particularly relevant for 
the understanding of the response of Western European governments to the following 
Balkan refugee crisis in Kosovo which is the main focus of this thesis. 
Joly (1996) indicates another important post Cold War element of change, which is the 
awareness of the international community that there is now a wider space for action and 
intervention in the countries of origin that could legitimize less open asylum policies. 
Under the new frame of 'humanitarism' it became possible to intervene directly "against 
violations of human rights, generalised violence and severe deprivations, as international 
co-operation is not as in the past hampered by the two blocs jealously guarding their 
sphere of influence" (Joly, 1996, p.41). This has influenced enormously the whole de-
bate on refugee repatriations and, generally, has led politicians to consider it as part of 
the protection paradigm with serious consequences for the refugees' freedom of choice 
whether or not to repatriate. The new pro-intervention rhetoric together with the resur-
gence of interest in forms of temporary protection has led to Hathaway's consideration 
that: 
"[ ... ]if refugees are to be guaranteed access to meaningful protection until and 
unless it is safe to go home, it cannot be asserted that they should routinely 
be entitled to stay in the host State once the harm in their own country has 
been brought to an end." (Hathaway, 1997, p.554) 
lSome countries transferred the majority of Bosnians with temporary protection en group to a more 
permanent status (Austria, Finland, Luxemburg) while others assessed individual people asylum appli-
cation under the national asylum policy (Denmark, Netherland). 
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Therefore, his argument follows: 
"[ ... J governments will have to follow through on their rhetorical commitment 
to 'root causes' intervention by acting to eradicate the harms that force 
refugees to escape." (Hathaway, 1997, p.557) 
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Therefore, according to this logic, by eliminating or suffocating the causes of the con-
flicts that generate refugees, states acquire the 'right' to repatriate people on the basis of 
humanitarian discourses and on the assumption that all refugees want to go back to their 
country of origin. Moreover, in the absence of clear internationally recognized parame-
ters for defining a country as safe, states have also gained the 'right' to arbitrarily declare 
when it is 'safe' for refugees to return even when the original problems that were the 
'root causes' of exile have not been fully resolved yet. As a result, nowadays, repatriation 
has often been connected with international peace-keeping efforts. Many repatriation 
programmes are intertwined with peace accords and multi-dimensional peace-building 
efforts and often take place under premature conditions leading to forms of 'militarised 
repatriation'. Later in the thesis, I discuss the consequences of this kind of a scenario 
in the specific case of Kosovar Albanian refugees. 
Overall, these new political practices have called into question how 'voluntary' some 
repatriation programs really are and raised doubts about repatriation as a durable 
solution to refugee displacement. Sadako Ogata, warned that compelling refugees to 
'repatriate too early' may give relief to the asylum countries through "a dangerous shift-
ing of the burden back to the country of origin. Premature repatriation puts refugees 
at risk and may jeopardise a successful transition from war to peace" (Ogata, 1997). 
Nevertheless, politicians still promote the idea of repatriation as the first solution for 
refugees. They support this position by stressing the importance of the country of ori-
gin in refugees' lives and promoting an idealised image of return able to legitimatise 
measures taken to compell refugees to go back to their country of origin. The political 
emphasis on repatriation influences the asylum debate and justifies the elaboration of 
new restrictive asylum policies. This shapes, unavoidably, the current situation many 
refugees are facing in Western countries. 
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2.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter I argued that the emergence of repatriation on the political agenda and 
the different phases the modalities of repatriation have been through are directly con-
nected and depend on the progressive changes in the host countries' policies of asylum. 
During the Cold War repatriation fell into disuse because the general political con-
text rendered it an unfeasible solution. Moreover, in Western Europe, settlement was 
encouraged as refugees paid a valuable contribution to the post-Second World War re-
construction and the international Palestinian question made return a diplomatic taboo. 
However, during the 1980s, governments began to introduce restrictive immigration and 
asylum measures which contributed to a progressive switch towards a higher political 
consideration of repatriation on the international agenda. This situation was exacer-
bated by the end of the Cold War which led many Western countries to adopt measures 
that could restrict access to asylum procedures, reduce support for asylum seekers and 
introduce temporary forms of protections with the aim of discouraging the refugees' long 
term integration. Moreover, by promoting a new pro-intervention rhetoric of eliminating 
root causes, governments acted as also having the 'right' to establish when the country 
of origin is 'safe' for refugees to return to. This is the context within which Kosovar 
Albanian refugees experienced exile throughout the 1990s, and in particular during the 
1999 refugee crisis that developed alongside NATO's intervention in Kosovo. In this 
thesis I examine this specific case in the attempt to understand the impact of the new 
face of repatriation on their attitudes toward return and their decision-making process. 
Before focusing on the case study, though, in the next two chapters I develop a theoret-
ical and methodological approach that can enable me to examine the complexity of the 
issue. 
Chapter 3 
Theoretical Background 
3 .1 Introduction 
Return migration is one of the least researched areas in the study of human migration, 
despite the fact that several scholars have underlined the importance of this aspect of 
migration and advocated for further studies in this area. This dearth in research has 
been attributed to the difficulties in obtaining satisfactory data due to the individual or 
family nature that characterised the majority of return movements in the past (Arowolo, 
2000; King, 1986). King affirms that "the nets cast out in migration surveys and national 
census usually allow return migration to slip through" and he states that, therefore, "it 
is not surprising, though not entirely excusable, that so many studies of migration pro-
ceeded as if no returns ever took place" (King 1986, p.1). Before the 1960s, he explains, 
the literature on migration had dismissed the phenomenon of return migration. In the 
few cases where the issue was mentioned it was often to lament that so little material ex-
isted (King, 1986). Even though during the 1970s the research on return migration was 
somewhat intensified (Cerase and Rosoli, 1983), almost twenty years later many authors 
are still pointing at the same dearth in research (King, 2000). Ghosh (2000) affirms that 
the "return movement [ ... ] has so far remained inadequately unravelled in the migration 
debate" and King (2000) reaffirms that "return migration is the great unwritten chapter 
in the history of migration". He explains that the great majority of studies on return 
migration have an empirical or descriptive nature and locates the main pitfalls of the 
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existing literature in the tendency to examine each group of return migrants as a distinct 
entity. Moreover, he points out the lack of cross-national comparisons and theoretical 
synthesis. Similarly, another area of migration research which has been neglected is that 
of refugee migration (Joly, 2000). This is due to the fact that for several years, after 
the Second World War, the issue was studied mainly from a legal perspective in relation 
to the right of asylum, while the study of the subject from the perspective of other 
disciplines is relatively recent. Overall, although the field has grown considerably over 
the end of the twentieth century, in parallel with the significance of the phenomenon of 
forced migration itself (Black, 2001), we still find a wide gulf between the literature on 
refugee studies and that on migration studies (Bakewell, 2000). 
The general remarks about the paucity of research at the level of both return migration 
and refugee studies are even more markedly accentuated when one begins to deal with 
the issue of return in relation to refugees. During the second half of the twentieth century 
refugee repatriation movements have increasingly gained a more important role in the 
political and academic debate about refugee displacement. This culminated in the ideas 
that were developed during the eighties by academics and practitioners who identified 
repatriation as one of the three durable solutions to refugee situations together with 
resettlement to a third country and local integration (Adelman, 1988; Chimni, 1991; 
Gallagher, 1994; Goodwin-Gill, 1990; Rogge, 1994; Takahashi, 1997). 
In the main, the academic interest on refugee repatriation has grown in parallel to the 
growing political interest on the topic during the 1980s and the 1990s. However, in 
the 1980s scholars were still warning the international community of the serious lack 
of studies on the subject. For example, in 1989, Harrell-Bond (1989) writes about the 
lack of published research data and emphasises how necessary this was for enabling 
researchers to test the assumptions about return that govern policies and practices of 
governments and international agencies. 
Coles highlights the same dearth in research in a report prepared for the UNHCR's 
Round Table on voluntary repatriation held in San Remo in 1985, where he writes that: 
"Although voluntary repatriation has been proclaimed as, in principle, the 
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most desirable solution to a refugee situation, it has so far not been examined 
in any depth by experts or scholars." (Coles, 1985) 
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Allen and Morsink (1994), referring to a survey of the literature between developing 
countries conducted by Crisp in 1987 for UNRlSD, highlight that the survey revealed 
the existence of a slightly wider body of literature, compared to what Coles had presented 
in his report, and indicated that the majority of the studies on repatriation had mainly 
focused on three aspects of the phenomenon: international law, political motivations 
and logistics. With regard to international law the issues emphasised by research were 
the international approach to legal matters, the basic rights for refugees to return to 
their country of origin and UNHCR's position in the repatriation process. The studies 
on political motivations focused on specific population movements. Finally, studies on 
logistics described the organisation of specific operations (Allen and 110I'sink, 1994). 
Allen and Morsink conclude by stating that: 
"A few of these publications and reports were of high quality, but many 
large-scale repatriations had hardly been examined at all, and few authors 
had made any serious attempt to investigate the experiences of the returnees 
themselves." (Allen and Morsink, 1994, p.2). 
A more recent overview of the academic studies on repatriation is provided by Preston 
(1999), Referring to a broad range of literature she explains that the studies conducted 
before 1999 revolved around three main stages of the repatriation process: the decision 
and preparation phase, the actual back-home movement and the post arrival integration 
and reconstruction stage. In the analysis of each of these phases, scholars have looked 
at a range of micro, meso, macro and meta-level factors, For example: "the characteris-
tics of the groups involved; their community, organisational, national and international 
policy environments; global, legal, social and economic trends; and language, ideol-
ogy and theory" (Preston, 1999, p.21). She states that the bulk of academic research 
consists of case studies of particular groups, field-based studies, geographical and legal 
approaches to the movements and economic, anthropological and psychological research 
on reintegration and reconstruction in the country of origin and there is still a dearth 
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of theoretical developments on the subject. 
This chapter deals with the major theoretical issues related to the study of refugee 
repatriation. I investigate the arguments for and against studying refugee repatriation 
as a separate case within the general context of return migration. Having established the 
need for specific research, I then examine existing theoretical frameworks that deal with 
the issue, identifying their limitations as well as their positive contributions. Finally, I 
argue for the consideration of refugees' choice vis-a.-vis return within Archer's approach 
to the classic theoretical debate on structure and agency. 
3.2 The uniqueness of refugee repatriation 
Given that the majority of theories on return are mostly concerned with labour migration 
I examine here more closely the question of whether such theories are sufficient to explain 
refugee repatriation as well or whether there is a real need for a specific approach to 
refugee repatriation. 
Koser (1993) states that when studying repatriation we can view refugees as special 
migrants and explains that, like return migrants, they go back to the country of origin 
as a result of a balanced decision depending on their personal aspirations and information 
available on wider structural conditions. His ideas suggest that repatriation can be better 
understood if return refugees are considered as any other return migrants. This assertion 
places the issue firmly within the theoretical debate inside migration studies questioning 
whether it is possible to differentiate refugees from labour migrants. Therefore, the 
answer to our initial question is directly related to whether we can distinguish refugees 
from economic migrants or not and, if we can, to which extent do the two groups differ 
from each other with respect to return. 
3.2.1 The distinction between refugees and labour migrants 
The academic debate on this issue has developed in relation to the causes of departure 
and revolves around two main points: the 'political' versus 'economic' nature of the 
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factors causing the flight and the 'voluntary' versus 'involuntary' character of it (Joly, 
2002). Some scholars claim that refugee migrations can be distinguished from labour mi-
grations because the first are primarily involuntary movements caused by political factors 
while the second are generally voluntary movements driven by economic factors. These 
considerations are the basis of the standard dichotomy of the 'involuntary-political-
refugee' versus the 'voluntary-economic-migrant' (Schuster, 1998). Other scholars reject 
this sharp distinction between economic and political factors since they consider that 
" ... state policy in relation to migration generally, and refugees and asylum seekers in 
particular, is constructed in response to political as well as economic factors, and the 
two are most frequently intimately interwoven" (Schuster, 1998, p.31). Of course, the 
two categories should not be perceived under a static and rigid division since a refugee 
could also find better economic opportunities while in exile or an economic migrant could 
suddenly become a refugee in relation to the political events occurring in his country of 
origin. Castles states that: 
"the distinctions between the various types of migrations [ ... J are only rela-
tive [ ... ] fundamental societal changes lead both to economically motivated 
migration and to politically motivated flight and that at times it becomes 
difficult to distinguish between the two" (Castles and Miller, 1993, p.25-26). 
The Kinetic Model of Kunz (1973) about flight and settlement patterns of refugee settlers 
divides refugees into two categories which can explain the reason why in certain cases 
some refugees can be considered as labour migrants. He distinguishes two kinetic types 
of refugee movements: 'anticipatory refugee movement' and 'acute refugee movements'. 
In the first case, the anticipatory refugee leaves the home country before the deterio-
ration of the military or political situation. Depending on the perceived approaching 
danger the person will have more or less time to decide and plan their flight. The refugee 
may have preferences on where to go, but other factors, outside personal wishes, will 
eventually determine the destination. In the second case, acute refugee movements are 
a consequence of great political changes or movements of armies. In this case people flee 
in mass or in groups, in order to escape the immediate danger and run to safety in a 
28 Chapter 3 Theoretical Background 
neighbouring country or nearby country willing to grant them asylum. If the situation 
deteriorates, further migration to a different country might follow. According to K unz 
(1973), in the case of anticipatory refugee movements, it is not unusual that the loss of 
freedom in the country of origin or the danger to life is preceded by gradual economic re-
strictions thus leading to an anticipatory refugee being mistaken for a voluntary migrant 
seeking better economic opportunities. In this case he suggests that: 
" ... the fact that some anticipatory refugee moves superficially resemble vol-
untary migrations should not deter us from classifying these as refugee move-
ments. To correctly identify these movements, knowledge of the historical 
background becomes indispensable." (Kunz, 1973, p.132) 
Joly (2002), also, explains that when distinguishing between the two groups, we are not 
dealing with watertight categories since many migration flows include both economic 
migrants and refugees coming from the same place of origin and arriving in the same 
country of migration or exile. 
Overall, it is evident that basic differences characterise and distinguish the refugees' 
experience from that of labour migrants that cannot either be dismissed, or reduced to 
the pre-migration phase and to the causes of the flight. The acceptance of a fundamental 
distinction between refugees and economic migrants cannot be confined to their reasons 
for the flight, as suggested by Koser (1993), since it is most likely that those initial 
differences also affect the following phases of a refugee's life. The psychological, legal, 
social conditions continue to have a different impact on the way people cope with their 
life in the country of migration or exile, and affect the way in which they face the 
possibility of repatriating. 
3.2.2 Refugees and general typologies of return migration 
It is possible to highlight some of the specificities that distinguish the case of refugee 
repatriation from that of other types of migrants by looking at some typologies of return 
migration as presented in the overview of return migration theories by King (2000) and 
relating them to the case of refugees. 
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The first typology is based on the levels of development of both the receiving and sending 
countries and relies on neoclassical economic theories of migration (King, 2000), which, 
in essence, argue that the difference in wages causes workers from a low-wage country to 
move to a high-wage country (Massey et al., 1993). In the case of refugees it would be 
necessary to take into account the peculiarity of a post-conflict situation where personal 
economic interests come after the need for safety and where the relationship between 
country of origin and country of migration is determined by the aftermath of a conflict. 
The second typology takes into account the time spent back in the country of origin dis-
tinguishing between 'occasional returns' during holidays or for family events, 'seasonal 
returns' dictated by the periodical temporary nature of the work activities abroad, 'tem-
porary returns' when the migrant stays in the country of origin for a significant period 
of time retaining the intention to migrate abroad and 'permanent returns' with a re-
settlement in the country of origin for good (King, 2000). King (2000) maintains that 
"there is a symbolic relationship between these return periods and the types of migra-
tion that lead up to, or are co-involved with, the return moves". In the case of refugees, 
the general context imposes a very different experience. It is often impossible to visit 
the country of origin while being in exile and it can be extremely difficult to maintain 
contacts with families and friends. When talking about temporary short visits in this 
case we are mainly dealing with return under conflict or post-conflict explorative visits 
which entail a completely different scenario. 
The third and fourth typologies can be considered jointly in relation to refugee issues. 
The third typology presented by King is the one proposed by Bovenkerk (1974) and 
developed by Gmelch (1980). It is based on the analysis of observed behaviour by 
comparing the initial intentions of the migrants with the eventual migration outcome. 
Four possible cases are distinguished: 1) migrants who emigrate with the intention of 
returning and who do in fact return; 2) intended temporary migration without return; 
3) intended permanent migration followed by return; 4) intended permanent migration 
without return (King, 2000). The fourth typology was developed by Cerase (197c.l) on 
the thesis that "the type of return and the post-return impact of migrants depend largely 
on the stage in the process of acculturation that the migrant has reached in the country 
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of emigration" (King, 1986, p.14). Among the causes for return migrations he highlights 
some contrasting situations that might lead to the same decision to return such as: a 
sense of failure for not having achieved the initial goals or the anticipated successful 
experience in the receiving country, the conservative attachment to the values of the 
society of origin or the spirit of innovation and, finally, the wish to retire in the country 
of origin (Richmond, 1983). In the case of refugees the use of either the approach of 
Bovenkerk (1974) and Gmelch (1980), which calls for comparing people's initial inten-
tions with the eventual outcome of migration, or the evaluation of the migration process 
by Cerase (1974) is possible only if we consider the specific political nature of the refugee 
movements out of their country of origin and its influence on the whole experience of 
exile abroad and on the refugees' decision to stay abroad or repatriate. 
3.2.3 Refugee return: a special case 
The analysis of these general typologies of repatriation in relation to refugee repatriation 
supports the opinion that although many aspects of the return process apply equally to 
both refugees and other migrants, the different kinds of events that led to the flight are 
likely to pervade the qualitative nature of the mode of repatriation from the decision-
making phase to the actual return movement and reintegration phase in the country of 
origin. Refugees who have to decide to go back to their country of origin do not have 
to ponder solely their 'personal aspirations' in the light of the information available on 
wider structural conditions as suggested by Koser (1993) and their repatriation process 
cannot be explained in its complexity applying the 'push-pull' rational to the return 
phase. 
In conclusion, there are several elements that differentiate a refugee from a labour mi-
grant in the experience out of the country of origin that are then reflected in the process 
of repatriation. For example, the refugee faces personal traumas and a constant fear of 
returning to a still hostile environment; a sharp division often separates those who went 
in exile and those who 'compromised' and stayed at home (Arowolo, 2000); during the 
time spent out of the country of origin the ongoing conflict makes any attempt to keep 
in touch with the community at home quite difficult; the conflict prevents the refugee 
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from visiting friends and families and its aftermath, often, redefines the whole concept 
of home. Moreover, the term 'refugee' is generally used to describe people fleeing from 
different sorts of persecutions, with different positions within a given conflict and with 
various legal, social and political experiences during their exile. Thus, when it comes to 
return, we can expect a more differentiated range of reactions and behaviours peculiar 
to the different types of refugees involved. 
All these elements indicate the need for the study of refugee repatriation as a distinct 
issue within return migration. Therefore, the paucity of theoretical developments in con-
trast to a predominant growing body of literature on specific cases and aspects of the 
issue needs to be tackled. The studies currently available are, in the main, focused on 
repatriation movements from/to/in specific geographic locations (often African refugee 
repatriations); exploring the legal implications, evaluating projects run by governments 
and international organisations, studying the phenomenon in the context of conflict res-
olutions and so on. There is a collection of various data, with a mainly descriptive 
nature, whose sociological value is highly questionable if "they remain in the form of 
particulars and are not brought into the framework of substantive theory" (McKinney, 
1966, p.88). In this respect, UNHCR 's statement in the 1993 State of the World's 
Refugees affirming that "although every repatriation movement is unique, they all share 
some common characteristics" (UNHCR, 1993) can be considered as encouraging for 
work aiming to provide more generalised explanations of refugee repatriation issues. 
While remarking on the peculiarity and the very specific character of each repatriation 
movement, the UNHCR' s statement stresses the existence of common features that can 
provide fertile grounds for theoretical elaboration on the subject. Academic develop-
ments in this area could contribute to a clearer understanding of refugee repatriation 
and provide key interpretative tools able to promote a better approach to the phe-
nomenon. Among the few academic attempts in this direction the most relevant studies 
are: the typologies of repatriation of Cuny and Stein (1992); the work of Koser (1993) 
on repatriation and information system; the typology of repatriation of Collins (1996). 
These studies are reviewed in the following sections and their contribution to the study 
of refugee repatriation is explored in relation to certain key aspects of the research topic 
such as the development of typologies of repatriation, its relation to other aspects of 
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the exile experience, the time and space factors, the decision-making process and the 
voluntary / involuntary repatriation paradigm. 
3.3 Repatriation within the larger context of the exile ex-
perience: learning from existing typologies 
Repatriation can be approached from different perspectives and the development of 
types and models depends, of course, on the aspects of the phenomenon that are being 
analysed. Certain models or typologies focus on the operational aspects of the process 
and are useful tools for the description and comparison of different movements, while 
others try to investigate the reasons behind certain patterns of repatriation in an attempt 
to develop more interpretative tools. A good example is that of Cuny and Stein's two 
typologies of repatriation that reflect these two alternative routes. The first typology is 
a good tool for describing and comparing different operational aspects of repatriation 
movements, while the second provides the basis for a deeper understanding of the reasons 
behind the ways in which certain repatriation processes take place and emphasises the 
importance of the larger context of the whole exile experience. 
Cuny and Stein criticise any rigid division into categories of repatriation stating that: 
"to a certain degree, it is better to avoid labelling types of repatriation and to con-
centrate instead on examining the range of repatriation experiences" (Cuny and Stein, 
1991, p.4). The approach suggested by the two authors considers that it is "useful to 
describe a repatriation experience with respect to where it falls along one or more con-
tinuums or spectrums" (Cuny and Stein, 1991, p.4). In line with this, they distinguish 
different fundamental variables, necessary to the study of repatriation, such as the level 
of organisation, the number of refugees involved in the movement and the refugees' level 
of participation in the decision-making process. These variables label the two ends of a 
continuum. 
Referring to the description of each variable considered in Cuny and Stein's study I 
propose below a graphic representation of what could be called a 'spectrum model of 
repatriation' . 
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In order to provide an example I refer to the authors' analysis of the level of organisation 
in the process of repatriation. Their own words can explain Figure 3.1: 
"[ ... ] one continuum might begin with unorganised, unassisted repatriation 
at one end and continue to organised, internationally assisted repatriation at 
the other end. In between are repatriations which are organised or assisted to 
varying degrees by the refugees themselves or various local or international 
actors." (Cuny and Stein, 1991, p.4) 
unorganised, 
unnassisted 
repatriation 
Repatriation organised by: 
organised 
internationally assisted 
repatriation 
Refugees themselves, various local or international actors 
FIGURE 3.1: Spectrum of the level of organisation in refugee repatriation movements 
Similarly, it is possible to represent the multiple shadows of possibilities described by 
Cuny and Stein (1991) when they refer to the number of refugees involved in a repatria-
tion movement (individual, families, small groups, collective movement) or to the degree 
of'voluntariness' (voluntary, encouraged, induced, forced) in the decision to repatriate. 
This approach has been developed following a bipolar type of formulation based on the 
idea that it is useful to distinguish opposite types of social organisations in order to 
establish a range within which intermediate forms can be comprehended (McKinney, 
1966). The development of such a typology though does not avoid labelling types of 
repatriation as the authors seem to suggest, thus overcoming the general use of ideal 
types in the analysis of repatriation, since the two extremes are, in fact, ideal or con-
structed types themselves. In this case McKinney explains: 
"The types establish the outer limits, or standards, by means of which the 
processes of change or intermediate structural forms can be comprehended 
from the perspective of the continuum. It is in this sense that general types, 
[ ... J continue to play an important role in sociological analysis." (McKinney, 
1966, p.101) 
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The advantage of using polar typologies is that the notion of social continuum represents 
a crucial criterion for the advancement of comparative studies (1JlcKinney, 1966). The 
model derived from Cuny and Stein's analysis can facilitate the task of describing specific 
cases of refugee repatriation, it can simplify comparative studies of different movements 
and it can provide the necessary elements to construct more detailed categories of modes 
of repatriation. However, this kind of typology can only be a starting point for research 
in the field since it can only provide a descriptive analysis of the movements and cannot 
give an account of the dynamics lying behind a specific case or determine the reasons 
why a given repatriation movement takes place under certain modalities and presents 
certain characteristics. 
These problems are partly overcome by the authors at a later stage in the same study 
(Cuny and Stein, 1991) where they propose another kind of differentiation of repatriation 
movements. The categories are now distinguished by positioning the phenomenon within 
the entire chain of events that characterise the refugee's experience. The authors identify 
four patterns of repatriation: ricochet repatriation; relocation-stimulated repatriation; 
community and alienation; major repatriation. In their explanation and definition of 
each category they first analyse the way refugees related to the conflict before the flight, 
and subsequently evaluate the situations under which they fled, finally, they examine the 
conditions of settlement in exile and their relationship with the entire refugee community. 
Through such a broader view of the issue they are able to draw some general conclusions 
and suggest the way in which a specific group of people is more likely to repatriate. For 
example, when defining what is intended by 'ricochet' repatriation they notice that in 
cases where the exodus is sudden, usually due to military action, some refugees, who 
have not felt personally threatened or persecuted and whose ideas do not coincide with 
those of the majority of refugees, will immediately seek ways to return. Moreover, in 
these cases the initial repatriations will be spontaneous and mostly unassisted. 
Another example is given by the explanation for the category 'community and alien-
ation', where they analyse a common case among refugee groups that is the "formation 
of politically organised communities by uprooted peoples" (Cuny and Stein, 1991, p.6). 
Often perceived by the host governments as part of homogeneous groups, people are 
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"placed in unaccustomed communal situations which may change their way of life and 
crowd them in with strangers" (Cuny and Stein, 1991, p.6). In this context some refugees 
will feel alienated from the values and the cause of the emerging community. They will 
be "seeking control over their own lives" and they "are likely to move away from the 
camp or settlement or to repatriate" (Cuny and Stein, 1991, p.6). 
The examples, offered by Cuny and Stein's work, show the significance of both an 
individual and a collective background in the study of repatriation and highlight the 
fact that a group of refugee escaping from the same conflict and fleeing under the same 
conditions is composed of individuals whose diverse ideas and reactions in front of a 
given situation cause them to deal with exile and repatriation (when this is the case) in 
different ways. 
These views offer an alternative to the vast majority of research approaches to refugee 
return whose pitfalls are summarised by Sepulveda: "Repatriation in policy, practice 
and research tends to be treated as a unified, monolithic experience" thus "[ ... ] unable 
to accommodate the complexities of actors, means and ends - central components of any 
contemporary repatriation movement" (Sepulveda, 1995, p.84). 
From a methodological point of view Cuny and Stein's study stresses the importance of 
connecting repatriation to the chain of events that preceded it and to those that follow 
it. Linking the process of the flight to the experience in the country of reception or 
settlement represents the basis for a comprehensive research on refugees in general and 
on refugee repatriation in particular. Until recently, researchers studied refugees either 
in the country of origin and in flight or in their experience in the land of exile (K unz, 
1973; Joly, 2002)]. Joly argues that this kind of approach makes it impossible to progress 
in the understanding of the refugees' situation (Joly, 2002). As she points out, Kunz 
was the first scholar in refugee studies who addressed his research towards this direction. 
In his article on exile and resettlement, Kunz stresses that "in the resettlement phase 
many of the refugees' problems could be traced back to their emotional links with and 
dependence on their past" (Kunz, 1981, p.42). In fact, in the article he classifies refugees 
into two groups derived from refugees' attitudes towards their displacement: "reactive 
fate groups and purpose groups which include self-fulfilling groups and revolutionary 
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activists" (.Joly, 2002, p.8). 
Using a similar historical approach, Zolberg et al. (1989) develop a typology of refugees 
based on the hypothesis that refugees are a result of social conflicts. He looks at the 
refugees' position within a conflict and distinguishes three categories: activists, targets 
and victims. The first type, 'the activist', refers to refugees who are engaged in "some 
politically significant activity that the state seeks to extinguish" , the second type, 'the 
target', refers to those refugees that by misfortune belong "to a social or cultural group 
that has been singled out for the abuse of state power" and the third type, 'the victim', 
includes the "persons displaced by societal or international violence that is not neces-
sarily directed to them as individuals but makes life in their own country impossible". 
Accepting this hypothesis and beginning from these initial considerations, Joly (2002) 
proposes an analysis of the modes of settlement in relation to the refugees' position 
within the conflict that caused their exile. She looks at them as social actors and stud-
ies the way their attitude and their subjective relation towards the conflict influence the 
reformulation of their position in the country of reception. She distinguishes two types 
of refugees in the land of exile: Odyssean and Rubicon refugees. The first type refers to 
actors who were positively involved in the political struggle and committed to a project 
of society in the country of origin. This group carries the project in exile and shapes 
settlement around a strong homeland oriented project. The second type refers to those 
actors who are very attached to the culture of origin and to their kin still living in the 
country of origin but are not committed to a common home oriented project. These 
refugees perceive exile as something definitive and are most likely to engage in projects 
oriented towards improving the conditions of settlement and maintaining solid group 
identity in the host country. By looking at the correlation between the circumstances 
preceding and following exile, the author identifies the different paths and strategies 
followed by the two groups in their patterns of group formation and social interaction 
with the society of the host country. Moreover, she captures the reasons behind the 
different ways in which the two types are influenced by the structure of the reception 
society and she remarks that the two main categories are not static as particular groups 
and individuals from any group may change category because of a number of factors. 
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Considering the process of repatriation as a further step beyond the settlement in the 
host country, it is possible to analyse the issue in the light of this framework. This 
theoretical approach could be an effective starting point towards a more comprehensive 
study of repatriation. I am not simply suggesting that Odyssean refugees want to and 
do repatriate, while Rubicon refugees do not want to and do not repatriate, I am more 
interested in the general idea of analysing the impact of the relationship between the 
refugees and the conflict they escaped from with their mode of settlement in exile and 
their decision about return. 
Therefore, I am advocating for the use of the theoretical grounding provided by Cuny 
and Stein (1991), Kunz (1973), Zolberg et al. (1989) and Joly (2002) when analysing 
the phenomenon of refugee repatriation by studying it within the larger context of the 
experience of exile. Within this frame the question 'Who is returning Where?' becomes 
crucial before analysing any return movement. It is important to consider how the 
conditions of the country of origin have been changed by the conflict and how the 
experience of exile has changed and influenced the refugees as groups and as individuals. 
Therefore, the indispensable variables of time and space should be considered in their 
qualitative impact on people's lives. 
3.3.1 The Impact of Time and Space on the experience of exile 
Human geographers have dealt with the factors of 'Time and Space' in the study of 
return migration. Velikonja indicates how "the time related assessment and the ter-
ritorial impact of return migration reflects the impact of separation either by time or 
by spatial distance" and adds that "the probability of interaction declines with time or 
space distance and the impact of separation similarly increases with either time or space 
interval" (Velikonja, 1983, p.247). 
These considerations must also be explored when analysing refugee repatriation move-
ments. If we simplify the process of exile to a single-step move from the land of origin 
(A) to the land of settlement (B) we could represent the move as in Figure 3.2 
Consequently, we might assume that repatriation constitutes the opposite move from the 
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A = country of origin 
A B B = country of settlement 
FIGURE 3.2: Return: a simplified single-step move 
country of settlement (B) to the country of origin (A) as the dashed arrow in Figure 3.3 
shows: 
~--------- A = country of origin 
A B B = country of settlement 
FIGURE 3.3: Return and space: simplified repatriation movement 
However the place where refugees are returning to is not in the same conditions as it 
was when they left. We must keep into account the crucial effects of time on the process 
that is more realistically represented in Figure 3.4 where the indispensable dimension of 
time is considered. 
®---------@ 
/ ~ 
A = country of origin 
B = country of settlement 
o 0 
FIGURE 3.4: Return, time and space 
The above figure shows that repatriation cannot be described as a return to 'before the 
conflict took place' and as a way to cancel the past and forget about the traumas of ex-
ile. Neither the society that the refugees have left behind has remained static (Chepulis, 
1983), nor have the returnees remained uninfluenced by the experience of exile, which 
implies a change in life style and living conditions, to say the least (Arowolo, 2000). 
Consequently, the phenomenon should be examined from a different perspective consid-
ering the changes brought by the conflict in the country of origin and in the refugees' 
life experience during a determined duration of time. 
Refugee repatriation is part of a chain of events, some of which preceded and influ-
enced it others that followed and are influenced by it. Chepulis (1983) suggests that , 
when studying return migrations, in general, it is crucial to consider the historical con-
text, since return migration is only one part of the whole migration process, which is 
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interlinked to much larger transnational processes and it is, therefore, necessary to un-
derstand the articulation and disarticulation between the various levels in producing the 
causes and effects of both migration and return migration. 
3.4 Analysing theoretical models of refugee repatriation 
decision-making processes 
So far I have argued for the need to investigate refugee repatriation as a distinct case 
of return migration. Moreover, based on the review of existing work I identified the 
advantages of studying refugee repatriation within the general context of the experience 
of exile, paying particular attention to the temporal and spatial dimensions involved. In 
this section I focus on the specific study of refugee decision-making processes vis-a.-vis 
return starting with a review of the information and decision-making models of Koser 
(1993) and Collins (1996), and analysing the implications of using rational choice theory 
approaches to explain the process. 
Hammond has criticized the academic focus on the study of refugees' decision-making 
processes in relation to return. She remarks that: 
"In the study of repatriation, the lion's share of attention has been placed 
on examining either the decision to repatriate (particularly identifying the 
factors that go into electing to return and determining whether such decisions 
are voluntary), or the actual repatriation movement from the country of 
exile to the country of origin. While such areas of enquiry are obviously 
valid, there has been a virtual neglect of the later stages of repatriation, in 
which returnees attempt to establish themselves socially, economically and 
politically in their areas of return." (Hammond, 1999, p.227) 
While these words support the opinion that more aspects of refugee repatriation need 
to be researched and that overall the subject needs to be approached from new per-
spectives, they do not imply that other aspects have been thoroughly and satisfactorily 
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investigated. In fact, while the studies on the refugee's decision-making process about 
repatriating have taken the first steps towards a better theoretical understanding of the 
issue, they are still far from finding satisfactory answers. 
The study of the dynamics lying behind refugees' decisions to repatriate or settle in 
the country of exile is necessary when trying to understand whether integration or 
repatriation can enable them to escape what I call the 'doubleE-condition', that is the 
condition of being refugees or returnees, and let them enter a more stable life as any 
citizen of any state. Only a deep understanding of the dynamics leading to the decision 
to return can offer the indispensable key to the complexity of the post-repatriation world. 
The decision to repatriate is the starting point of a new drastic change in a refugee's 
life. It represents the choice of a new migration whose influencing factors are most likely 
to shape the moment of transition and the modes of settlement in the 'new' country of 
origin. 
3.4.1 Koser's information and decision-making model 
Koser (1993) develops a model of refugee information system based on some of the key 
concepts of rational choice theory. The model aims at providing "a possible framework 
with which to analyse whether and how potential repatriates are receiving information 
about safe areas at home upon which to base their own decision to return" (Koser, 1993, 
p.180). 
The model presented in Figure 3.5, considers: 
• the conditions in the country of origin as sources of information; 
• the agents transmitting the information to the refugees in exile and 
• the refugees' reception of the information in the host country. 
In the process of deciding whether to repatriate or not, the refugee compares the flows 
of information received about the country of origin with the situation in exile. When 
the benefits of going back to the country of origin outweigh those of staying in exile 
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FIGURE 3.5: Koser's Model of Refugee Information System 
repatriation takes place. Koser himself points at some fundamental weaknesses in the 
model, namely: "a) refugees passively receive information; b) refugees are static in exile; 
c) refugees receive information as individuals and d) refugees want to return to the place 
from which they came" (Koser, 1993, p.176). Moreover, through his self-criticism the 
author brings examples that contradict each of these assumptions. 
Koser's model has been analysed, criticised and further developed by Collins (1996) in 
his work on repatriation in Africa. Collins appreciates Koser's pioneering contribution to 
the study of the decision-making process in refugee repatriation movements. However, 
he agrees with the author's self-critique about the limits presented by the model and 
adds two further considerations: 1) the model ignores the fact that some refugees go back 
temporarily for exploratory trips to the country of origin in order to assess personally 
the conditions in the country before the final repatriation; 2) the model does not explore 
the issue of 'free/not free' choice in the refugees' decision to return. 
3.4.2 Collins's information and decision-making model 
Collins (1996) develops an alternative model, illustrated in Figure 3.6 in an attempt to 
overcome some of the limitations discussed above. 
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FIGURE 3.6: Collins's Information and Decision-Making model 
Events 
in Exile 
The first important innovation introduced by this model is the differentiation between 
direct and indirect flows of information. It is imagined that different levels of accuracy 
and trustworthiness characterise these two different kinds of information. Official in-
direct sources are more likely to be of a general nature and to be suspected of hiding 
all sorts of political interests while the news derived from a direct experience (early re-
turnees, explorative trips, contacts with those who did not leave, etc.) allow the refugees 
to verify the authenticity and reliability of the official news and provide them with more 
specific targeted information (the specific condition of the area, town or village of ori-
gin, the conditions of friends and relatives, job opportunities, etc.). Although Collins's 
model does not tackle the distinction of the different impact of the two types of infor-
mation on the decision-making process from a qualitative point of view, it represents an 
important step forward in this theoretical development. With his model, he brings into 
question the concept of freedom of refugees' choice to return, considering the debate 
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about voluntary and involuntary repatriation of crucial importance for the analysis of 
the dynamics underpinning the decision-making process. 
Overall, Koser's assumptions that refugees are static in exile and receive information 
in a passive way are partly overcome by Collins's work. However, the main limitations 
of both models are actually given by the application of some of the basic concepts of 
rational choice theory to this issue as I explain below in more detail. 
3.4.3 Rational choice theory and refugees' choice 
Although there are several versions of this theory (the classical maximization approach, 
the stochastic game theory model, the theory of bounded rationality), the overarching 
principle is that individuals act for a particular purpose and have hierarchically ordered 
sets of utilities. Consequently, they make rational calculations in regard to: the utility of 
alternative behaviour with reference to the preference hierarchy; the costs of each alter-
native in terms of lost utilities; the best way to maximize utility. It follows that emergent 
social phenomena - social structures, collective decisions, and collective behaviour - are 
the outcome of rational choices made by utility-maximizing individuals (Turner, 1997). 
Originally derived from the British utilitarian tradition, rational choice theory developed 
in statistical decision theory and economics and has spread to many other disciplines 
over the last five decades (e.g. political science, anthropology, organisation theory, crim-
inology, social psychology). Its application in sociological studies is not new and it is 
"one of the most significant and controversial developments in contemporary sociolog-
ical theory" (Zafirovski, 1999, p.1). Therefore, the use of this theoretical approach in 
the analysis of refugees' decision-making processes in relation to return brings along the 
limitations and the controversies that have already stemmed from the application of 
rational choice theory in sociological analysis. As Martinelli explains: 
"[ ... Jon the one hand, it is recognized that rational choice can describe, anal-
yse and predict individual behaviour in a wide array of different situations 
and contexts of action. [ ... ] On the other hand, rational choice is criticized as 
too unilateral and incapable of accounting for the basic sociological questions 
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of social order and social change; and it is judged hardly useful when col-
lectivities instead of individuals, and macro-level structures and institutions 
instead of micro-level action, are to be analysed." (1tlartinelli, 2004) 
A prominent example of how the rational choice paradigm has been used to set the 
basis of a general sociological theory is Coleman's work. For Coleman the 'individual 
person' (or 'natural person', 'concrete person', or 'personal actor'), that he considers to 
be the natural unit of observation, acts purposively, rationally, and 'unconstrained by 
norms', with the aim of pursuing his self-interest and seeking pleasure (Martinelli, 2004). 
Starting from these assumptions, Coleman develops a general theory of social action and 
pushes it so far as to cover all empirical cases. This is one of the most criticised points 
of his work, along with what his critics consider a double neglect of historical and social 
differences and the underestimated role of norms and collective identities (Martinelli, 
2004). The general critiques are summarised by Himmelweit when she states that it 
should be recognised "that rational choice models are not the best way to analyse 'non-
economic' phenomena" (Himmelweit, 1999, p.1). 
The main question is 'Can we legitimately apply rational choice theory to all research 
issues and to all problems?' Boudon answers by pointing out that: 
"Rational choice theory assumes that individual action is instrumental, namely 
that it has to be explained by the actors' will to reach certain goals. Now, 
action can be noninstrumental, as most sociologists have recognised. Schutz, 
through his distinction between Weil and Wozu motive, and Weber, through 
his distinction between instrumental and axiological rationality, have stressed 
that action is not always instrumental. If the instrumentality of action is in-
deed limited, then rational choice theory cannot claim to be a general theory 
of action." (Boudon, 1998, p.818) 
For example, in his work Coleman goes so far as to explain slavery within the rational 
choice paradigm; according to him it is rational to accept slavery, since it is a condi-
tion preferable to death. Coleman's account of slavery is based on the assumption that 
remaining alive is the ultimate goal for an individual and that therefore any condition 
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keeping him/her alive is preferable to death (Martinelli, 2004). Once we accept this as-
sumption we can validate the use of rational choice theory to explain the fact that being 
a slave is preferable to death. However, we are aware of several historical cases when 
for instance suicide has been considered as a preferable alternative to slavery: suicide is 
clearly prohibited by Judaism, however, the mass suicides occurred in 73 AD at rvlasada 
when 960 Jews killed themselves rather than face enslavement by Roman captors is still 
regarded as an enduring symbol of the Jewish struggle for national independence. More-
over, other instances show that life is not always a priority for individuals: in ancient 
Egypt people considered suicide a humane way to escape intolerable conditions; for cen-
turies in Japan people respected instances of hara-kiri (ritual suicide with a dagger) as 
a way for a shamed individual to make amends for failure or desertion of duty; during 
World War II Japanese Kamikaze pilots considered it an honour to perform suicidal 
missions by crashing their airplanes into an enemy target; and more recently we have 
witnessed cases of suicide bombers in Israel, Russia, Morocco or in the United States to 
name a few. 
These simple considerations indicate that once we know what the set of priorities of an 
individual is we can analyse his/her actions and decisions by applying the rational choice 
paradigm and explain that subject X has done Y rather than Y' because Y was more 
advantageous. However, this approach does not tell us how this individual has come to 
decide about those priorities and determine the ultimate goals. 
Boudon (1998) observes that it is not possible to apply rational choice theory in all 
those cases when "an actor does X because he believes in Z and Z implies his doing X 
independently of the consequences of X" (Boudon, 1998, p.817). Even in those instances 
when action is instrumental, it has to be admitted that it can mobilize beliefs that need 
to be explained and that normally will not be explained by rational choice theory. 
This is the case of refugee decision-making processes vis-a-vis the choice of repatria-
tion. I consider Koser and Collins's models important steps towards a better theoretical 
understanding of the topic and interesting starting points for the development of the 
theoretical debate on the subject. However, in the case of refugee repatriation the ap-
plication of the rational choice paradigm to the decision-making process carries all the 
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limitations discussed above and fails in considering all those instances when the individ-
ual might choose the less 'beneficial' options simply because of beliefs, fears, emotional 
factors and other elements that cannot be explained in terms of rational utilitarianism. 
When dealing with political activists with strong faith in their cause, with people who 
have lost their beloved and their belongings or with those traumatised by violence, we 
are most likely to find rational choice theory of little help. 
As Martinelli remarks: 
"Rational choice theory should be seen as just one of the theoretical frame-
works which can be employed in the interpretation and explanation of con-
crete social phenomena, alongside others, such a variety of institutionalist, 
culturalist and structuralist approaches. Sociological theorizing should pro-
ceed according to a 'toolkit view' rather than a 'general theory' perspec-
tive." (Martinelli, 2004) 
I propose later in this chapter a different approach to the study of refugees' decision-
making processes with regard to return. However, before doing this, I explore the 
distinction between voluntary and involuntary repatriation which plays a central role 
in the debate about refugees' repatriation decision-making processes and the complex 
nature of the reasons behind the choice to settle or repatriate. The following section 
deals with this distinction and the research problems related to it. 
3.5 Voluntary or involuntary repatriation 
One of the most problematic issues related to refugee repatriation is the differentiation 
of refugee return movements into 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' repatriations. 
It is commonly understood that 'voluntary repatriation' indicates those cases when a 
person chooses to return to the home country of his/her own will and that, on the 
contrary, 'involuntary repatriation' indicates the instances when a person is forced to 
return to the home country against his/her will. This simple distinction is commonly 
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used in politics, in the media and in the jargon of national and international humani-
tarian agencies. However, there are obvious questionmarks related to the definition of 
'voluntariness', since there is no single working definition held by all agencies. Consid-
ering the existing use of the expression 'voluntary repatriation', Morris states that there 
are approximately three gradations of what 'voluntariness' is considered to mean: 
"Definition one: Voluntary return represents a clear and open choice on 
behalf of the refugee to either return to their country of origin or stay 
and more permanently integrate into the host society. 
Definition two: Voluntary return represents a choice between returning to 
the country of origin in a voluntary fashion now (perhaps with financial 
or other incentives) versus staying and risking forcible return by the 
host Government. 
Definition three: Voluntary return represents the absence of force. 'Volun-
tariness' exists when the migrant's free will is expressed at least through 
the absence of refusal to return, e.g. by not resisting to board trans-
portation or not otherwise manifesting disagreement." 
(Morris, 2000, p.9) 
Therefore, the problem of a common definition exists and it is also undermined by some 
more general questions: What do we mean by 'free choice'? And more precisely, how 
can we distinguish a 'voluntary' action from an 'involuntary' one? 
These questions pervade the whole debate around refugee repatriation and have po-
litical, legal and social implications linked to the difficulties of understanding whether 
the refugee is at risk and needs to be protected from refoulement when dealing with 
voluntary /involuntary repatriation (Takahashi, 1997). 
Consequently, most of the humanitarian agencies involved in refugee repatriation move-
ments have felt the need to define what they meant by 'voluntary repatriation' and have 
often put together definitions, rules and requirements in official documents, guidelines, 
policy papers and handbooks in the attempt to set the boundaries of their actions and 
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avoid the accusation of forcibly returning refugees. The most significant guide is the 
UNHCR's Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation promoting the idea of repatriation tak-
ing place on a 'wholly voluntary basis' in conditions of 'safety and dignity' (UNHCR, 
1996). 
3.5.1 The academic debate on Voluntary/Involuntary repatriation 
The academic debate presents different approaches to the problem. For instance, the 
legal approach to the subject focuses on the delicate debate about the distinction between 
the right to return and the right to non-refoulement. 
From a sociological point of view the question is more complicated since the task is 
not that of establishing useful operational or legal definitions, but that of studying 
and understanding the phenomenon in its various developments. It is not possible in 
sociology to refer to concepts such as 'freedom and will' as terms with static clear-
cut meanings. As Cuny and Stein point out, even in cases of spontaneous refugee 
return movements "although many people think of voluntary repatriation as a purely 
'voluntary' act reflecting the individual will of the refugee, in practice the decision to 
return is often initiated from outside - is brought about by outside persuasion, influence, 
and even pressure" (Cuny and Stein, 1990, p.307). 
3.5.2 Collins's Typology of repatriation 
Collins has explored the complex dilemma of defining voluntary and involuntary repa-
triation by developing a typology of repatriation based on his study of repatriation in 
Africa. His analysis of the definition of voluntary and involuntary types of repatriation 
is based on the dialectic of relationship between what he calls a 'free' or 'controlled' 
refugee's 'social context' and a 'free' or 'controlled' refugee's 'external' context. He 
explains that the two measures, free and controlled, "are not absolute and can vary 
between individual refugees and between individual contexts" (Collins, 1996, p.58). 
With the term 'social context', Collins refers to the events in exile and especially to the 
combination of three variables: kinship ties, economic status in exile, security in exile. 
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FIGURE 3.7: Collins: Social Context 
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In order to explain what is meant by the two opposite conditions, 'free' and 'controlled' 
as illustrated in Figure ~~.7, he argues that: 
"When, on balance, refugees have control over their own economic security 
and family life, then their social context can be considered free. On the 
other hand, when external agencies or forces have the most input into all 
aspects of the refugees' lives, then their social context could be classified as 
controlled." (Collins, 1996, p.58) 
By 'external' context, Figure :3.8, the author refers almost entirely to the situation in the 
area of origin and looks into these three variables: security at home, economic conditions 
at home, infrastructures at home. 
External Controlled Free External 
Context ......... ---------+---------I~~ Context 
FIGURE 3.8: Collins: External Context 
He considers that even in this case where "the extent to which the elements of the 
external context are controlled or free determines whether or not the repatriation is in 
fact voluntary" (Collins, 1996, p.58).When explaining the variables of the social context 
and those of the external context, Collins clearly draws his examples from the African 
scene. In fact, in his analysis of the social context he refers to African cultures in 
order to explain some of the complexities characterising the 'kinship ties' variable and 
he discusses the economic situations in both contexts by focusing on the importance of 
agriculture and the examples of refugee migrations to Kenya and Zaire. However, from 
a more abstract point of view his division of the spheres of influence into social and 
external context could be applied to any repatriation movement if the characteristics 
of the two contexts were consciously redefined according to the peculiarity of the cases 
under analysis. 
The typology of repatriation of Collins (1996), outlined in Figure 3.9, "uses the previ-
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FIGURE 3.9: Collins's typology of repatriation 
ously described social and external contexts as the primary test ofvoluntariness" (Collins, 
1996, p.65). The two contexts are graphically represented by two crossed axes whose 
intersection results into four areas representing distinct types of repatriation. Three of 
these types of refugee return migration are classified as involuntary repatriation (co-
erced return, imposed repatriation, expulsion), while only one is considered voluntary 
repatriation. 
According to Collins's typology, we deal with a completely free decision only in those 
cases where both, the social and external contexts are free. In his own words: 
"Refugees whose social contexts are free are able to make an informed deci-
sion to return home. The refugees are granted the opportunity to remain in 
exile; no pressure is brought to bear on their immediate economic or secu-
rity situations. Refugees who are members of vulnerable groups are provided 
with appropriate assistance to help them return home." (Collins, 1996, p.66). 
Moreover, he stresses how in cases of voluntary repatriation, security issues at home 
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should be resolved to the complete satisfaction of the refugees, how programs to iden-
tify and clear possible minefields should be undertaken and, if necessary, development 
projects should be targeted at providing repaired and upgraded infrastructures. 
The other three types of repatriation depend on Collins's assumption that all cases 
where either one of the two contexts or both are 'controlled' have to be considered as 
involuntary forms of repatriation leaving the refugees without a 'real' free choice. The 
definitions of 'coerced return', 'imposed repatriation' and 'expulsion' selected by Collins 
to distinguish these three types can give rise to confusion. Actually, the three terms 
can be considered as synonymous since they all refer to the act of 'compelling, forcing, 
obliging somebody to do something'. The way in which each term has been attached to 
a specific situation described in the typology is completely arbitrary. 
The main weaknesses of Collins's typology, though, are the limited range of variables 
considered when describing the factors influencing the refugees' decisions and the sim-
plistic character of the definition of 'free' or 'controlled' contexts in both country of exile 
and of origin with its consequent distinctions between voluntary or involuntary repatri-
ation. A free environment cannot simply correspond to a situation "where refugees 
control their economy, security and family life and when external agencies or forces have 
no influence in their lives" (Collins, 1996, p.58). This kind of situation is difficult to 
distinguish in real life. The definition of 'control' is very controversial when trying, for 
example, to understand when we can claim to have control over our economic situation: 
Is it when we have permission to work, though we cannot easily find a job? Or when 
we have a job providing us with a salary but unrelated to our qualifications? Or when 
the job corresponds to our level of qualifications and somebody employs us? Or when 
we have an autonomous job? 
The same sort of doubts and questions could derive even from each of the other variables. 
For instance, it is similarly complicated to understand what is meant by not being 
influenced by external agencies or forces and how can we ever be sure not to be influenced 
by other people's opinion, by the mass media, by national or international policies. The 
personal relationship with these 'external' inputs is one of the most difficult to analyse 
and study. 
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The strongest point in the development of his typology of repatriation is the fact that 
Collins points indirectly at the need for researching repatriation by considering the in-
terplay of structural factors with people's agency. I develop my research within this 
frame leaving aside the problem of confronting the 'voluntary versus involuntary' repa-
triation debate. Obviously, this issue is part of a much larger sociological debate about 
'freedom and constraint' and in the specific case of repatriation the line between the two 
will always be difficult to draw and it is likely to move according to one's perspective. 
Therefore the aim of the thesis is rather that of investigating the dynamics that lay at 
the basis of refugees' decision to either settle in the country of exile or return to the 
country of origin. The goal is that of acknowledging and understanding the factors that 
influence the decision-making process and the way in which refugees relate to them. I 
leave the codification of standards, definition and rules about voluntary and involuntary 
repatriation to practitioners. 
In order to do this, in the following section I argue for the advantage of using Archer's 
approach to the theoretical structure and agency debate, which more than the classic 
collectivist or individualist approach, or contemporary structuration theory, enables me 
to investigate the interaction between conditions in the host country and refugees in 
relation to their choice vis-a.-vis return. 
3.6 Repatriation, structure and agency 
Obviously, investigating refugees' choice to repatriate means dealing with the dual, con-
tradictory nature of the human condition torn between autonomy and constraint, free-
dom and dependence, individuality and participation, therefore, it is useful to refer to 
the general sociological debate on structure and agency in order to understand how to 
explore the subject within this frame. 
Richmond states: 
"An adequate sociological theory of migration must incorporate an under-
standing of social action and human agency, the question of conflict, con-
Chapter 3 Theoretical Background 
tradiction and opposition in social systems, the meaning of structure and 
change, and the importance of power." (Richmond, 1989, p.17) 
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In the following sections I examine the major issues related to refugee repatriation from 
these perspectives. It is not in the scope of the thesis to elaborate on this core issue 
of sociological theorizing; I do not propose a revisited account of the development of 
this debate or an abstract critique of the different approaches. However, I present the 
main academic standpoints (collectivism, individualism, structuralism, realism) through 
a brief overview of the positions of some of the major exponents (Durkheim, Weber, 
Giddens, Archer). This review is necessary in order to explain the reasons why I con-
sider sociological realism (especially Archer's exploration of analytical dualism and her 
methodological 'morphogenetic approach') to be a suitable theory for application to the 
specific research issue of refugee repatriation. 
3.6.1 The structure and agency debate 
As Sztompka puts it: 
"All our life we feel the oppressive presence of what Ralf Dahrendorf calls 
the 'vexatious fact of society', we feel bound by norms, rules, traditions, ex-
pectations and requirements, and occasionally hit our heads against the hard 
wall of social sanctions. [ ... ] But at the same time we perceive ourselves as 
persons, unique individuals with identity, integrity, independence, freedom. 
We profess some level of control over our actions, feel responsible for our 
decisions, experience pride, guilt and shame." (Sztompka, 1991, p.16) 
Being a refugee is not an exception. All the main experiences related to the conditions 
during the pre-exile time, the life in exile and the possible repatriation phase, are em-
bedded in the everyday human struggle between freedom and constraint. This positions 
the research problem at the centre of the classic sociological dilemma of structure and 
agency. 
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"The relation of the social order and the individual being, the relation of the unit and the 
whole" (Nadel, 1957, p.401) or simply the 'Structure-Agency' question has concerned 
theoretically oriented sociology for decades and is considered one of the fundamental 
theoretical questions in the human sciences by several sociologists (Archer, 1995; Carl-
snaes, 1992; Giddens, Giddens; McAnulla, 1992). The classic academic debate has seen 
the opposition of two distinguished approaches: a collectivist standpoint, resting on the 
claim that social wholes are something more than the sum of the individuals involved 
and have their own specific mode of existence, and an individualist approach, believing 
that societal entities are ultimately reducible to the individual.1 The last two decades 
have been characterised by new theoretical efforts towards the development of synthetic 
approaches that recognise the valuable points of previous theories and avoid embarking 
on those paths that have already proved to be fruitless (Giddens, 1987). 
3.6.2 Collectivism and Individualism 
An answer to the structure-agency dilemma came from the collectivist approach, which 
is based on the holistic ontological claim that there is a "Social Whole whose sui generis 
properties constituted the object of study" (Archer, 1995, p.5). 
One of the earliest formulations of this standpoint is found in Comte and his positivist 
belief into the independent objective existence of social wholes, their irreducibility to 
individuals and the causal priority of the whole over its parts. These principles are 
constantly defended in the work of Durkheim whose faith in positivism influenced the 
belief that sociology should concern itself with the study of social facts. Looking at 
some of the main ideas in Durkheim's work we can highlight the tenets of the collectivist 
approach. According to him: 
"Whenever certain elements combine, and thereby produce, by the fact of 
their combination, new phenomena, it is plain that these new phenom-
ena reside not in the original elements but in the totality formed by their 
union." (Durkheim, 1962, p.xlvii) 
lTh dis ute has often been labelled with different names: holistic-compositive, holistic-atomistic, collecti~isti:elementaristic. I refer to them by using the term 'collectivism' and 'individualism'. 
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Consequently, man is seen as a product of society, shaped by social facts that "impose 
themselves upon him, independent of his individual will" (Durkheim, 1962, p.2). 
From a methodological point of view, considering 'Society' as a totality irreducible to 
individuals means that a 'social fact' can be explained only by referring to another 'social 
fact' and not referring to human individuals and their actions. Durkheim's methodology 
for studying social facts relies on the methods of the natural sciences and rests on the 
idea that external social forces coerce people; therefore, they can be studied as objects 
by gathering definitions, observations, classifications, and statistical descriptions. 
Within the collectivist frame, the researcher would attempt to define the subject of the 
study, for instance 'the success of repatriation policies', identify some possible factors 
responsible for it, as 'incentive grants' or 'achieved stability in the country of origin', and 
then identify indicators of success such as the number of immigrants that repatriated, 
their housing conditions, their access to employment, education, healthcare, etc. and 
then decide how to investigate empirically. 
According to the opposite individualistic standpoint social reality is ontologically posited 
as the result of individuals and their actions. Sztompka explains that: 
"The dominant themes of structural determinism and 'social mould theory' 
have been replaced by the themes of agential determinism and structural 
emergence" and "the lines of causation assumed to operate in the social realm 
have been reversed too: no longer from structures to action, but rather from 
action to structures." (Sztompka, 1991, p.4) 
This individualistic orientation can be clearly seen in Weber's anti-positivist position. 
He conceives collectivities as "solely the resultants and modes of organisation of the 
specific acts of individual men, since these alone are [ ... ] the agents who carry out 
subjectively understandable action" (Weber, 1968, vol I, p.13). 
He concentrates on social behaviours and actions and emphasises the importance of 
human will, and the ability of people to change their behaviour. This position differs 
sharply from Durkheim's focus on behaviour as being determined by social facts and, 
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of course, implies also a rejection of the collectivist methodological position on the 
grounds that people have a will which affects their behaviours and actions and therefore 
" , 
they cannot be treated as objects and studied through the methodology of the natural 
sciences. 
According to Weber the crucial components of 'action', i.e. the psychological context 
of action (intentions, motivations, reasons) and the normative (or cultural) context of 
action (rules, norms, values), cannot be researched through experiments, observation 
or other methods derived by natural sciences. It is necessary to apply new methods 
based on the interpretative understanding of human activities (Sztompka, 1979). For 
example, the researcher would seek for people's own perceptions and interpretation of 
their interaction with other actors in repatriation movements by interviewing returnees 
or observing the way they have organised their return or resettled in the host country. 
Both these approaches have been criticised because they "either deny people their free-
dom because of their involvement in society or leave their freedom completely untram-
melled by their social involvements" (Archer, 1995, p.4). If we bring these ideas closer 
to the subject of our study this criticism comes to life. Refugee movements are generally 
defined as 'forced migrations' and this immediately points to the structural determinis-
tic pressures exercised on the individuals who are compelled to flee from their country. 
The application of a holistic approach to the issue would lead us towards the tempting 
vision of refugees as 'puppets' moved by structural forces with no agential power. The 
opposite approach, however, would deny the structural constraints we all seem to recog-
nise as a limiting or enabling factor in our life and would postulate a situation where 
the structural elements leading to and connected to the experience of exile would be 
solely the result of individual activities. Neither a determinist nor a voluntaristic ap-
proach seems to help us in understanding the complex nature of the phenomenon under 
analysis. What does the contemporary debate offer us? In which other ways can we 
understand the relation between structure and agency? 
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3.6.3 Structuration Theory and Realist Social Theory 
Sztompka affirms that "the dispute of collectivism and individualism is by no means out-
dated. It is still a significant controversy, providing a touchstone for the classification of 
contemporary sociological theories" (Sztompka, 1979, p.294). There are some modern 
approaches that assume a collectivistic standpoint, such as structural functionalism (Ma-
linowski, Merton, Radcliffe-Brown), modern conflict theory (Dahl, Gluckman), modern 
systems theory (Buckley); others that depart from an individualistic approach, for in-
stance, the early exchange theory (Homans) or symbolic interactionism (Blumer, Becker, 
Goffman). However, the contemporary debate in sociological theorising is dominated by 
synthetic efforts. Once the pendulum has already swung between two opposite bias, the 
absolutism of structures and the absolutism of actions, "sooner or later the need for a 
'third sociology' was bound to be felt. Fusing the two instead of counterpoising them, 
combining the wisdom of both rather than ignoring half their message" (Sztompka, 
1991). 
The evolving theory of agency, in all its different formulations and developments, rep-
resents the main attempt to reconcile and link structures and actions and offers the 
possibility to investigate refugee issues by considering both the refugees' agential power 
and the structural constraining or enabling factors affecting them. 
Structuration theory and realist social theory are among the most well known examples 
of this kind of formulation. Although these theoretical developments stem from the 
same need of answering the 'Structure-Agency' question departing from the collectivist 
and individualist approaches, they offer two different solutions: the former proposes 
the concept of 'duality of structure' affirming the mutual constitution of structure and 
agency; the latter stresses the importance of emergent properties at the levels of both 
structure and agency and develops the concept of 'analytical dualism' according to which 
structure and agency are analytically distinct, irreducible to each other and temporally 
separable. 
In order to understand the major contributions of both these approaches and the reasons 
for using a realist approach in the study of refugee issues I refer briefly to the work of 
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Giddens, the formulator and major exponent of structuration theory, and then focus on 
Archer's development of the realist concept of analytical dualism in her morphogenetic 
approach. 
3.6.3.1 Giddens's Structuration Theory 
Giddens' structuration theory affirms that the structure-agency dualism has to be recon-
ceptualised as a duality: the duality of structure. This concept implies that structure 
and agency have to be seen as two sides of the same coin. On one side, structure "is 
something that is conceptualised as inhabiting people in the sense that it enters into the 
constitution of the reflexive and prereflexive motivations, knowledgeability and practices 
of people" (Stones, 2001, p.184). On the other side of the coin, "agency is the ability 
to act [ ... J in relation to the external and internal structure that provide the conditions 
of action" (Stones, 2001, p.184). Therefore, there are structural properties (defined as 
rules and resources) which lead a virtual existence until instantiated through agency 
structuration, in other words until activated by knowledgeable contemporary actors. 
The conception of agency linked to action leads to the relevant claim that 'agent' is one 
who does something but who could have done otherwise "either positively in terms of 
attempted intervention in the process of 'events in the world', or negatively in terms of 
forbearance" (Giddens, 1979, p.56). 
Going back to the pictorial description of the structure-agency debate as a pendulum 
swinging between the collectivists and the individualists' positions, structuration theory 
does not seem to have stabilised the pendulum as yet. In fact, the main critiques of 
structuration theory focus on the concept of 'duality of structure and agency' and its 
consequent rejection of the idea of independent structural forces exercising an external 
influence on human behaviour. Although Giddens recognises that society is not a cre-
ation of individuals, his conceptualisation of structure as 'rules and resources' existing 
only in memory traces and instantiated in action and his emphasis on the study of daily 
human activities seems to have led the pendulum towards the individualist side. 
His work presents different limitations when approaching the issue of migration and 
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refugee issues, because of two particular points: the idea of 'activity' as a condition sine 
qua non of the existence of agency and the inseparability of structure and agency. 
The question of the 'over-active view of the agent' that derives from Giddens' ontology of 
praxis creates several problems when researching refugee issues, since I believe refugees 
have agential power to influence structures for the simple reason of existing and being an 
issue with which society has to confront with. For example, in 1999, during the refugee 
crisis in Kosovo, although most of the EU states promoted the reception of refugees in 
the region of origin as the best solution, the increasing number of refugees arriving in 
neighbouring countries, overburdening the camps and threatening the political stability 
of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Yugoslavia (FYROM) 's ethnic balance, forced the 
governments of many EU member states to accept the evacuation of Kosovar Albanians 
to their countries and to adhere to the Humanitarian Evacuation Programme. 
The concept of 'duality of structure', with all its implications about both the nature 
of structure and agency creates some major analytical problems. As Archer (1995) 
and Layder (1987) explain, Giddens' theory undermines any sense of structures as pre-
constituted and relatively autonomous, or determinant of action. Healy argues that: 
"[ ... ]although we can readily concede the point that actors and structures are 
bound very closely together, when the time comes to do some research we 
will inevitably need to make the kind of distinctions that Giddens wants us 
not to make." (Healy, 1998, p.512) 
He also points to the fact that: 
"Giddens will not allow a fixed and discursively available body of rules, a 
properly external system or a genuinely independent individual. The result 
is analytic paralysis: he ends up being unable to separate out these elements 
at all. [ ... ] His theory allows little room for definite statements about cause 
and effect. Everything is left floating around in the vicinity of the actor, and 
the various elements are impossible to separate." (Healy, 1998, p.510) 
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When analysing Koser (1993), Collins (1996) or Cuny and Stein (1991)'s work on repa-
triation earlier, I have argued for the importance of looking at repatriation (or set-
tlement/resettlement) as the resulting outcome of a chain of events and I have also , , 
emphasised the notion that repatriation (or settlement) is the result of the interplay 
between structure and agency, making my task that of investigating this interplay over 
a period of time. This approach would enable me to investigate the complex relations 
between asylum policies, hosting society and refugees and analyse the ways in which 
they shape the context within which refugees have to decide about return. The funda-
mental principle of the duality posited by structuration theory prevents any attempt in 
this direction. The concept of structure and agency mutually constituting each other 
"precludes the examination of their interplay, of the effects of one upon the other and 
of any statement about their relative contribution to stability and change at any given 
time" (Archer, 1995, p.14) which is what I am interested in analysing. Archer's mor-
phogenetic approach, discussed below, seems to offer a solution to the methodological 
issues concerning my research of refugees' decisions to settle or repatriate. 
3.6.3.2 Archer's Morphogenesis 
Archer's theory is grounded on the main principles of social realism such as the idea 
that structure and agency are analytically distinct and irreducible to each other, the 
methodological commitment to analytical dualism, the idea of a stratified social reality 
and the belief that structure and agency not only have distinctive properties and tem-
poralities, but are also internally differentiated. In other words, her theory develops the 
idea that structure and agency are different levels of stratified social reality and have 
distinctive emergent properties which are real and causally efficacious but irreducible 
to one another (Archer, 1995). The consideration that structure and agency are not 
different aspects of the same thing but are completely different in kind is followed by the 
idea that "explanation of why things social are so and not otherwise depends upon an 
account of how the properties and powers of the 'people' causally intertwine with those 
of the 'parts'" (Archer, 1995, p.15). In short, structure and agency can be analytically 
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separated through temporality. Archer's morphogenetic/morphostatic approach2 sup-
plies a method for the analysis of their interplay over time and space and is based on 
two assumptions: structure necessarily pre-dates the action(s) and structural elabora-
tion necessarily post-dates it. She explains that: "because 'structure' and 'agency' are 
phased over different tracts of time, this enables us to formulate practical social theories 
in terms of the former being prior to the latter, having autonomy from it and exerting 
a causal influence upon it" (Archer, 1995, p.183). This allows Archer to develop the 
idea of morphogenetic/morphostatic cycles. Each cycle begins at stage one (T1) where 
we deal with structural conditioning which is antecedent to the social interaction which 
takes place at stage two (T2) and that might either generate structural elaboration or 
reproduction at stage three (T3). The same kind of cycle can be described for cul-
ture (cultural conditioning -+ cultural interaction -+ cultural elaboration) and agency 
(socio-cultural conditioning of groups -+ group interaction -+ group elaboration) and 
in society the three cycles operate continuously and are always interconnected through 
people. However, they are autonomous from one another and this means that we might 
encounter instances when the cycles are in synchrony in their promotion of either mor-
phogenesis or morphostasis and others when they are out of synchrony when one is 
fostering morphogenesis while another is fostering morphostasis. 
This approach supports the idea that we can analyse the interplay between 'structure' 
and 'agency' in refugee related issues and suggests a methodological path that would 
allow us to study analytically their histories of emergence. 
3.6.4 Repatriation: Structuration or Morphogenesis? 
Comparing Archer's theory with Giddens' structuration theory, it is clear that analyt-
ical dualism and the morphogenetic approach provide an interesting starting point for 
planning my work and approaching the research topic from a defined methodological 
2The terms 'morphogenesis/morphostasis' used by Archer to define the temporal cycle 'conditioning 
-----+ interaction -----+ elaboration" derives from 'morpho' indicating shape and referring to the concept of 
society as an open system with no pre-set form and 'genetic' signalling that. its shaping is the prod-
t f social relations. "Thus 'Morphogenesis' refers to those processes whIch tend to elaborate or uc 0 h d .. 
change a system's given form, state or structure while 'Morphostasis' to those whic ten to mamtam 
them." (Archer, 1995, p.166). 
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perspective able to guide the selection of my methods of data collection and my final 
analysis of the research findings. 
I am aware of certain issues raised by authors such as Stones (2001) who refuse the 
realism-structuration divide and try to dismiss the idea that duality in structuration 
theory means inseparability of structure and agency. He argues that structuration theory 
and realist social theory can actually be compatible at the ontological level and writes: 
"I believe that there is a good deal of confusion here, deriving from the 
failure to carefully distinguish the lone signifier - whether this be 'structure', 
'dualism' or 'duality' - from the conceptual network within which it derives 
its meaning." 
He explains that it is necessary: 
"[ ... ]to clarify the meaning of 'structure' in both Archer's and Giddens's work 
in order to show that both theorists' conception of structure incorporates a 
sense of 'dualism' in Archer's terms, which is based upon a temporal division 
between structural preconditions and the moment of agency. There is no 
necessary antagonism here." (Stones, 2001, p.178) 
However, my task is not that of engaging in such theoretical disputes and elaborating on 
these issues, but rather that of finding the best approach that can help me in studying 
my research topic, in simple words: the way refugees decide whether to settle in the 
host country or to repatriate.When it comes to doing research, Stones admits that "it is 
quite clear that Archer's work, precisely on account of its placing so much emphasis on 
dualism, has much more to say about it than does structuration theory." (Stones, 2001, 
p.184) 
Walsham also explains that: 
"There is not, and never will be, a best theory. Theory is our chronically, 
inadequate attempt to come to terms with the infinite complexity of the real 
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world. Our quest should be for improved theory, not best theory, and for 
theory that is relevant to the issues of our time." (Walsham, 1993, p.4 78) 
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Archer's development of the realist concept of analytical dualism through her mor-
phogenetic/morphostatic framework offers the most developed tool for analysing the 
interplay between structure and agency in the study of refugee repatriation as I explain 
in more detail in the next chapter. 
3. 7 Conclusions 
In this chapter I argued for the need of further research on issues related to refugee 
repatriation movements and reviewed some of the main theoretical approaches to the 
subject. Examining the developments in the field from the 1980s onwards, I emphasised 
the limitations of the predominantly empirical or descriptive existing material, under-
lining the lack of in-depth qualitative analysis and theoretical synthesis. In the attempt 
to develop a research approach that could enable me to avoid the pitfalls of merely 
descriptive empirical studies I examined the ways other authors have confronted this 
theme. I began by arguing that refugee repatriation should be considered as a particu-
lar case requiring a specific approach within the larger study of return migration. My 
argument was set in contrast with the ideas of Kunz Koser (1993) that refugees behave 
as any other kind of migrant when it comes to the decision to return. Given the general 
view that the set of experiences that cause a refugee to migrate and shape his/her life 
in the host country differ from those of other migrants, I argued that these differences 
also influence the way in which a refugee relates to repatriation. I then examined the 
work of Cuny and Stein (1991) that emphasises the advantage of studying repatriation 
as part of the whole experience of exile and connected these authors specific research 
on repatriation with other academic studies on refugee issues that developed along the 
same lines. Exploring the work of Kunz (1973) and Joly (2002), I established that there 
are major gains in contextualising refugees' attitudes towards return and connecting it 
to the experiences that have preceded it in order to have a deeper understanding of its 
dynamics and its underpinnings. Through a review of the information and decision-
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making models of Koser (1993) and Collins (1996), I exposed the shortcomings of a 
utilitarian approach to the study of refugees' decisions-making processes in relation to 
return. I examined the use of rational choice theory and highlighted the limitations of a 
gain/loss paradigm when studying a refugees' choice to settle or repatriate. Underlying 
the more complex set of factors influencing the decision to return I referred to beliefs, 
fears and emotional factors that go beyond a utility-maximizing behaviour. I concluded 
that these models propose a partial account of a complex phenomenon. Finally, Collins's 
study on voluntary/involuntary repatriation allowed me to highlight the theoretical lim-
itations of such distinctions and clarify that the main issue behind this kind of debate 
is, obviously, the larger sociological question about 'freedom and constraint'. Overall, 
the way in which the existing theories have dealt with the link between social action 
and social context in refugee return issues is rather limited. In certain instances, such 
as Cuny and Stein's four categories of repatriation or Collins's typology of voluntary /in-
voluntary repatriation, the authors have indirectly pointed towards the importance of 
analysing the issue while considering the structure-agency relation. However, they have 
not developed this obvious connection and their approaches keep repatriation far from 
the general debate between freedom and dependence, autonomy and constraint, struc-
ture and agency. I argued that in order to address these shortcomings we need to engage 
in a more sophisticated account of human beings relation to the world and develop a 
more adequate link between social action and social context when researching refugees 
and return. Among the main approaches to the theoretical debate on structure and 
agency, I propose Archer's morphogenetic approach as the most suitable for the study 
of refugees' interaction with repatriation policies. In the following chapter I explain 
her methodological approach in more detail outlining the main concepts and ideas that 
contributed to this study. 
Chapter 4 
Methodology and Research 
Process 
4.1 Introduction 
The literature review on return migration and refugee repatriation revealed the dearth 
of research in the field of refugee repatriation and highlighted a lack of appropriate theo-
retical foundations. Existing models are largely based on rational choice theory and are 
not sufficient to embrace the complexity of the phenomenon. In response, the previous 
chapter called for a different approach able to offer a more comprehensive examination 
of refugee repatriation and, especially, of refugees' decision-making processes in relation 
to return. Two main claims were made: 
• Firstly, refugee repatriation should be analysed within the general debate about 
freedom and constraint, autonomy and dependence to help overcome the sterile 
division between 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' repatriation and better reflect the 
range of factors that influence the refugees' choice . 
• Secondly, the topic should be placed within a more general theoretical framework 
that provides the opportunity to approach the issue from a well-defined ontological 
and epistemological position that can help the research planning while at the same 
time leaving space for further deductive theorising. 
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It was suggested that analytical dualism, as proposed in Archer's morphogenetic model, 
can provide an interesting approach to the issue and enable the analysis of the inter-
play between structure and agency. It was argued that collectivism, individualism and 
structuration theory do not allow for such a kind of analysis because they support views 
that position refugees as either passive objects of given situations or full bearers of 
responsibility for their conditions. 
This chapter analyses in more detail the ways in which these ideas relate to the study of 
exile and refugee repatriation and explains how they underpin the development of this 
research project. It is divided into two main parts, with the first exploring what Archer's 
morphogenetic approach has to offer to the study of refugees' decision to repatriate (or 
settle) and how it can help us to search for answers to the following questions: What do 
refugees think about the idea of repatriating? How do they choose whether to repatriate 
or settle? Which factors influence this choice? What are their current plans for the 
future? It does so by detailing the advantages of using the morphogenetic approach in 
this research and exploring three main ideas of Archer's work: the morphogenetic/mor-
phostatic cycle, the question of freedom and constraint, and the concept of agency. The 
second part discusses how this research process is informed by the theoretical underpin-
nings provided through Archer (1995) and deals with the more practical aspects of the 
research process providing more information about the selection of the case study, the 
research methods, ethical considerations, and the fieldwork experience. 
4.2 Archer's morphogenetic approach 
Archer's morphogenetic approach is an explanatory methodology developed on a realist 
social ontology and derives from a firm belief that social theory has to be useful and 
usable and should not be an end in itself. Through her methodology she aims to enable 
researchers to explore the interplay between structure and agency over a certain period of 
time, a feature which I believe is particularly helpful when exploring refugees' attitudes 
towards return and the dynamics of their decision-making processes. In this respect, it 
is useful to explore here three key ideas of Archer's work and relate them to the study 
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of refugee issues: the morphogenetic/morphostatic cycle coupled with the concept of 
double morphogenesis, the question of freedom and constraint and the stratified view of 
agency, with its particular distinction between primary and corporate agents. Each is 
viewed in turn below. 
4.2.1 The morphogenetic/static cycle and the concept of double mor-
phogenesis 
As was explained in the previous chapter, Archer's morphogenetic approach supplies a 
method for the analysis of the interplay of structure and agency over time and space 
and is based on two theorems: 
"(i) Structure necessarily pre-dates the action(s) which transform it and [ ... ] 
(ii) Structural elaboration necessarily post-dates those actions." (Archer, 1995, 
p.15) 
Analytical separation on a temporal basis is the foundation of the development of a three-
part cycle composed of: structural 'conditioning' at stage Tl, where a given structure 
conditions, but does not determine, the social interaction taking place at stage T2. 
This social interaction takes place because of actions oriented towards the realisation of 
the interests and needs of current agents and results in either structural elaboration or 
reproduction at stage T3. 
By means of an illustration of the morphogenetic/static cycle, I consider the case 
of refugees entering a country whose policies and/or public attitudes towards asylum 
and immigration are the emergent result of previous interactions between governments, 
refugees, NGOs and public opinion. The policies and public attitudes towards asylum, 
at stage TI, shape the situation new refugees find themselves into and the new socio-
cultural and group interaction at stage T2. These can lead to the maintenance of those 
policies and attitudes towards asylum or to their elaboration at stage T3 that will define 
the new context at stage TI of the following cycle. 
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Archer outlines four basic propositions which are necessary for the practical application 
of the morphogenetic/static analysis: 
1. "there are internal and necessary relations within and between social 
structures; 
2. causal influences are exerted by social structure(s) on social interaction; 
3. there are causal relationships between groups and individuals at the 
level of social interaction; 
4. social interaction elaborates upon the composition of social structure(s) 
by modifying current internal and necessary structural relationships and 
introducing new ones where morphogenesis is concerned. Alternatively, 
social interaction reproduces existing internal and necessary structural 
relations when morphostasis applies." 
(Archer, 1995, p.168-169) 
Structure, culture and agency each undergo the same cycle of conditioning, interaction 
and elaboration (or reproduction) and the above four propositions apply to each of them. 
The three cycles are respectively: 
(1) structural conditioning, (2) social interaction and (3) structural elaboration or 
reproduction. 
(1) cultural conditioning, (2) socio-cultural interaction and (3) cultural elaboration or 
reproduction. 
(1) socio-cultural conditioning of groups, (2) group interaction and (3) group elabora-
tion or reproduction. 
Although, structure, culture and agency are always involved where any form of Social 
Elaboration is concerned, Archer (1995) explains that the focus of an investigation can 
be even just on one element alone, provided that the others are still taken into account. 
In this thesis I focus on the dialectic relation between structure and agency and make 
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use of the concept of double-morphogenesis. This is the self-same process by which peo-
ple bring about social transformation and which is at the same time responsible for the 
systematic transformation of agency. In other words, people collectively generate elabo-
ration of structure and culture, while simultaneously undergoing elaboration as people. 
In the process of researching refugee repatriation it is essential to consider the double 
morphogenesis while taking into account the following issues. At the structural level 
the changes brought by the conflict to the country of origin and those undergone in the 
country of exile when managing, politically and socially, the experience of receiving and 
hosting refugees and at the level of agency the changes refugees go through during the 
whole experience as a group and as individuals. The concept of 'double-morphogenesis' 
enables us to connect those changes together by showing the way they are interrelated 
and causally influential to one another thus highlighting some of the indispensable dy-
namics that have to be considered when looking at the decision of whether to settle or 
repatriate. 
4.2.2 Freedom and constraint 
When examining the decision to repatriate (or to settle) I am especially interested in the 
way in which structural conditionings influence the decision-making process. Archer's 
theory suggests the following as a means to examine this aspect of the research problem: 
"Structural and cultural factors influence agents only through shaping the 
situations in which they find themselves and distributing vested interests in 
maintenance and transformation to different groups. These compel no one 
and are better construed in terms of structure and culture supplying good 
reasons for various courses of action to those in given positions, than as 
hydraulic pressures. However, a good reason requires a reflective agent to 
evaluate it as such, to adopt it, and to decide then what to do about it, all 
of which is beyond the wits of 'passive man'." (Archer, 1995, p.249) 
At this point it is necessary to clarify that some situations may be seen as unavoidably 
deterministic. For example, it is hard to see how the condition of exile does not exercise 
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a deterministic influence on refugees' lives. In fact, Archer herself uses the example 
of exile when accepting that constraining circumstances, like exile or famine, could be 
interpreted as hydraulic pressures since it is commonly assumed that no one would hold 
the project of starvation or exile. Naturally, she explains, this would be the case for the 
majority of us and simply indicates that human agents tend to have some basic common 
life projects. However, she goes on to claim that: 
"To omit reference to them and to the self-reflexivity which is nevertheless 
involved in living them out (frequently in only semi-awareness) is to render 
two forms of action incomprehensible. They are robbed of intelligibility which 
is rooted in the reflective mediation of circumstances. On the one hand, 
there are reasons which can move people to entertain and sustain a project 
of starvation (hunger strikers), and on the other, the effect of experiencing 
a stringent constraint entails a considered response and not an autonomic 
reaction (there are many different ways of projecting the exilic experience)." 
(Archer, 1995, p.199) 
Guided by these considerations we are led to examine the ways in which different groups 
and individuals respond to the experience of exile, acknowledge the differences and 
capture some of the reasons behind them. The characteristic power of the people is 
their 'intentionality', their ability to make plans and projects1 and think of ways to 
accomplish their goals in relation to whatever conditions they find themselves into. 
The approach can be summarised as one which attempts to determine how structural 
properties may hamper or aid projects. 
Archer explains that: 
"It is only their specific relationship to the particular projects of particu-
lar agents in particular positions which allows us to call their conditional 
influence a 'constraint' or an 'enablement'. It makes no sense to think of 
1 With the term 'project' Archer refers to "any goal countenanced by a social agent, from the 
satisfaction of biologically grounded needs to the utopian reconstruction of society" (Archer, 1995, 
p.198). 
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any emergent social property being constraining or enabling by nature or in 
abstraction. These themselves are also relational terms: they designate the 
congruence or incongruence between two sets of powers - those powers of the 
'parts' in relation to the 'projects' of the people. Only in this way, of course, 
can the same environmental property [ ... J give rise to situations which some 
agents find enabling and others constraining." (Archer, 1995, p.198) 
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The case of repatriation programmes for temporarily protected refugees from Kosovo in 
different EU member states offers a good example. When temporary protection status for 
Kosovar refugees ended many governments offered three options: claim asylum, adhere 
to repatriation programmes set up by government and/or international organisations or 
face deportation. In this case repatriation programmes were an enabling factor for those 
refugees who had already decided that they wanted to return. The same programmes 
represented a constraint for those who wanted to remain in the host country and whose 
only alternatives were claiming asylum (with no guarantee of obtaining refugee status) 
or risk to be deported. Moreover, I argue that structural properties can also condition 
the formulation of a project itself by restricting or widening the imaginative space and 
influencing the practical sense of feasibility and viability. For example, refugees with a 
temporary permission to stay, either asylum seekers waiting for a decision or temporarily 
protected people, are faced with the uncertainty about their future imposed by their 
status. This situation of limbo makes it impossible for them to conceive a possible 
project for their future life in the country of exile and, at the same time, also makes it 
hard to plan for an eventual return that they usually fear. 
So far I have stressed the importance of taking agency into account when analysing 
refugee issues, but I have used the term in a rather general sense. Archer has a particular 
view of agency that can contribute further to define the epistemological boundaries when 
researching refugees' agency in this context. The next section analyses her definitions 
of agency in relation to the specific case under analysis. 
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4.2.3 A stratified view of agency: Person, agents and actors 
Archer proposes a stratified view of agency where she distinguishes three different lev-
els: Human Persons (organisms with individual psychology and identity), Social Actors 
(persons occupying social positions and playing social roles); and Agents (members of 
collectivities sharing similar life chances). According to her this distinction is necessary 
since each of these levels entails different things in different settings and involves dif-
ferent powers, interests and reasons. Below is a brief summary of the main features of 
these three strata followed by a discussion of how this distinction can help in researching 
refugees' agency. 
Person 
Archer explains that the human person is the necessary central stratum to which Agents 
and Actors are anchored. The kinds of social beings that people become depend on the 
fact that human beings are the ones who do the becoming. This depends on people's 
specific properties which are indispensable for being able to recognise that a certain 
collective interest is one's own and that it influences one's present and future. The 
defining property of a human person is the continuity of consciousness, the ability to be 
aware of its own persistence and progress through time. This continuous 'sense of self' 
is the necessary contribution of our humanity to our social life and the indispensable 
conditions of social life itself. 
Social Actor 
Actors emerge from the 'triple morphogenesis' a process whereby specific social identities 
of individual social actors are created from agential collectivities in relation to the array 
of organisational roles available in a society at a specific moment in time (Archer, 1995). 
Archer explains that: 
"[ ... J Actors are not reducible to Persons but none the less have to be an-
chored in them in order to bring to any role they occupy the human qualities 
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of reflexivity and creativity. Without these qualities, the Actor is not a sub-
ject who can reflect upon the stringency of role-governed constraints and 
decide whether nothing else can be done other than routine acts of repro-
duction, nor one who can bring his or her personal ingenuity to bear in 
order to exploit the degrees of freedom and thus attempt role transforma-
tion." (Archer, 1995, p.280) 
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She defines Actors as role incumbents and points out that roles themselves have emergent 
properties which cannot be reduced to the characteristics of their occupants. Social roles 
imply necessary and internal relations each of which entails other necessary and internal 
relationships with resources and rules. For example, a pupil requires a teacher, and this 
relation requires resources, such as buildings, teaching materials, specialised knowledge, 
and rules, such as curricula and attendance. 
Agents 
Agents are agents of the socio-cultural system into which they are born (groups or 
collectivities in the same position or situations) and of the systemic features they trans-
form (since groups and collectivities are modified in the process). They are defined as 
collectivities sharing the same life chances and Archer explains that: 
"Internal and necessary relations maintain between these two elements, for 
this concept is irreducible to 'people plus some statistical probability about 
their future income, influence, etc.' On the contrary, the major distributions 
of resources upon which 'life chances' pivot are themselves dependent upon 
relations between the propertied and the propertyless, the powerful and the 
powerless, the discriminators and the subjects of discrimination: and these, 
of course, are relationship between collectivities." (Archer, 1995, p.257) 
The notion of Agency as an emergent stratum implies that agency has powers proper to 
itself and it cannot be explained by any formula of the sort 'individuals plus resources'. 
Agency is seen by Archer as the final product of the double morphogenesis in which 
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collectivities of human beings are grouped and re-grouped while they contribute to the 
process of changing or maintaining the structure or culture of society. At the same 
time, they retain or change their collective identities when maintaining or transforming 
the socio-cultural structures which they inherited at birth. She introduces also another 
important differentiation between corporate and primary agents. Corporate agents, such 
as self-conscious vested interest groups, promotive interest groups, social movements and 
defensive associations are characterised by their ability to articulate shared interests, 
organise collective action and have an active impact in structural and cultural modelling. 
They act together and interact with other Agents strategically, which means in a way 
that cannot be construed as the addition of individuals' self-interest. It follows that 
Corporate Agents are 'active' because they are social subjects with reasons for trying 
to bring about certain outcomes, rather than passive groups to whom things simply 
happen. Primary agents, instead, lack a say in systemic organisation and reorganisation, 
they do not express an interest or organise for their strategic pursuit. Their impact on 
the system comes only in the form of unintended aggregate effects of the reaction of 
collectivities similarly situated in the context they live in. However, despite the fact 
that they behave as people to whom things happen, who respond to happenings which 
are not of their making and whose agential effects can be analysed simply as aggregate 
responses, they cannot be considered as intrinsically 'passive'. Their passivity itself, 
according to Archer, represents a deliberate suspension of their agential powers on the 
part of those corporate agents whose interest it serves. Therefore, their passiveness can 
often be understood only in terms of the relations between Collectivities, a relation that 
takes the following form: 
"Corporate Agency [thus] shapes the context for all actors (usually not in the 
way any particular agent wants but as the emergent consequence of Corpo-
rate interaction). Primary Agency inhabits this context, but in responding 
to it also reconstitutes the environment which Corporate Agency seek to con-
trol. The former unleashes a stream of aggregate environmental pressures 
and problems which affect the attainment of the latter's promotive interests. 
Corporate Agency thus has two tasks, the pursuit of its self-declared goals, 
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as defined in a prior social context, and their continued pursuit in an envi-
ronment modified by the responses of Primary Agency to the context which 
they confront." (Archer, 1995, p.260) 
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The outcome of the interaction can either lead to morphogenesis or morphostasis both 
at the systemic level and at the level of Agency itself. This is the process of double mor-
phogenesis during which Agency, in its attempt to maintain or change the social system, 
cannot avoid maintaining or changing the categories of Corporate and Primary Agents 
themselves. In fact, it is necessary to stress that the distinction between Corporate and 
Primary agents is not a static one, since Primary agents can constitute themselves into 
new social movements and eventually become Corporate agents themselves. 
In a few words Archer's stratified view of agency presents the human Person as fathering 
the Agent who fathers the Actor and proposes a differentiation between Primary agents 
and Corporate agents as having different properties and powers. In the context of refugee 
studies these distinctions are useful because they enable researchers to acknowledge the 
individual character of refugees at their level of human Persons while focusing on their 
position within the social context both as Social Agents, that is as collectivities sharing 
the same life chances, and Social Actors2, as occupying certain roles shaped by Social 
Agency. This means that it is not for a study of this kind to analyse refugees' individual 
personal psychology and identity as this would require a different disciplinary approach, 
but what can be explored from a sociological perspective here are their social positions 
as well as their membership of collectivities sharing similar life chances. The most 
interesting concept in Archer's view of agency in this respect is the distinction between 
Corporate and Primary agents. Often, asylum seekers, and in some cases even refugees 
with convention status, behave as Primary agents, mostly reacting to what happens to 
them with a complete lack of collective organisation and without an articulated shared 
interest. Many obstacles lie on the path towards becoming corporate agents, for example 
there are obvious problems of communication given by the fact that they arrive at 
different stages, come from different cultural systems, speak different languages, are 
located in different areas in the country of exile, etc. 
2Social Agent and the Social Actor are not different people - the distinction is only temporal and 
analytical. 
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While such an observation has often led researchers to consider refugees as passive 
beings with no saying in the structural and cultural system surrounding them Archer, 
in contrast, outlines a more sophisticated understanding. Talking about primary agents 
as passive agents does not mean, in Archer's term, considering them as powerless, or 
unable to have any effect on society. The consideration of their agential power as the 
result of aggregate responses leaves more space for the study of their impact over society. 
4.3 From theory to practice: the morphogenetic approach 
and empirical research 
Archer's analytical dualism, the idea of morphogenetic/static cycles, the conceptuali-
sation of freedom and constraint and the stratified view of agency form the basis of 
my methodology and shape the selection of research methods I chose to apply to this 
research. Walsham states that "A good framework should not be regarded as a rigid 
structure, but as a valuable guide to empirical research" (Walsham, 1993, p.71). In fact, 
Archer conceived her morphogenetic approach as the practical complement of social real-
ism supplying "a genuine method of conceptualising how the interplay between structure 
and agency can actually be analysed over time and space" (Archer, 1995, p.15). How-
ever, her explanatory methodology does not indicate a preference for specific research 
methods, but rather guides the approach to the subject under investigation and their 
selection. The attempt to apply analytical dualism and the morphogenetic approach 
to this kind of empirical study does not have many precedents, making this task more 
difficult and more challenging at the same time. In response, the research design called 
for methods that could enable me to analytically separate the subject on a temporal 
basis following the three main steps indicated by Archer's morphogenetic/morphostatic 
model. 
In order to study the factors influencing refugees' attitudes towards return two key cycles 
needed to be considered. Firstly, it is necessary to analyse the refugees' interaction with 
the conflict in the country of origin in order to understand the reasons for their flight and 
the relationship they had with the conflict while in exile. Secondly, a study of the cycle 
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that begun with the arrival of the refugees in the country of exile in order to examine 
their interaction with its structures and how these affected the decision about return. 
This required a multidisciplinary approach able to combine a study of the political and 
legal aspects of the issue with the main sociological ones by using, mainly, a qualitative 
research method. The use of secondary analysis, documentary analysis and interviews 
with policy makers, representatives of international organisations, NGOs and commu-
nity leaders also helped in identifying and explaining a range of structural and cultural 
factors so as to enable me to subsequently explore the interplay between those and 
agency. On the other hand, interviews with refugees were indispensable for learning 
about their understanding of their relationship with the country of origin, the conflict, 
the host society and, especially, their projects for the future (to settle or to repatriate?). 
Each form of data collected represented a piece of the temporal jigsaw outlined by the 
morphogenetic model. Therefore, as a methodological framework, the model guided 
both the collection of empirical data and the focus of the analysis. 
Having explained the basis of my approach to the study of refugee repatriation and the 
methodological assumptions that underpin the development of my research strategy, in 
the next sections I explain the more practical aspects of this research project focusing 
on three stages: the selection of the case studies, the research methods and the actual 
experience in the field. 
4.3.1 Case study 
The choice of studying Kosovo-Albanian refugees in Italy and in the UK was dictated 
by the consideration that in the case of Kosovo several repatriation programs set up 
by European governments seem to have been 'successful' in reference to the number of 
people participating. This apparent success has supported the claims of many politicians 
that repatriation is what the refugees themselves wish for and has provided them with a 
good example against the idea of granting long-term status. However, despite the success 
of repatriation rates in the Kosovo case, the fact that not all Kosovars have repatriated 
and others are still coming to seek asylum offered an interesting chance to question the 
idea that all refugees want to repatriate. It was considered that the analysis of this case 
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could have better answered questions such as: Why some refugees decide to repatriate 
and others decide not to? How much control do the refugees have over their decision-
making process? And, especially, are the ones who are still in exile planning to settle or 
to return? Which are the factors that influence their decision? The choice of comparing 
Italy and the UK, two host countries within the European context, is an attempt to 
understand the impact of different asylum policies and socio-economic situations on the 
decision to repatriate. A comparative analysis offers the possibility to highlight the 
impact of different structural and cultural contexts on refugees who escaped from the 
same conflict and share a similar pre-exile experience. These two countries represent two 
different European realities due to their geopolitical position, their history of migration, 
their different relationships with the European Union, their legal developments on the 
issue of asylum and their approach to the conflict in Kosovo. 
The initial design of the research project also included fieldwork in Kosovo, so as to 
enable me to assess the situation on the ground after the end of the war and conduct 
some interviews with returnees. I had been offered an internship by the 10M within the 
Employment Assistance Services unit assisting former KLA combatants, war widows, 
and Kosovo Protection Corps Reservists to find employment. However, in consideration 
of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office's assessment of the situation in Kosovo 
as highly dangerous and the general recommendations to avoid travelling to Kosovo 
unless necessary, concerns about my safety were raised by the funding bodies and the 
university. As a matter of fact, both the job assigned to me by the 10M and the fieldwork 
for my research project would have required a lot of travelling around Kosovo which made 
my stay all the more dangerous. The 10M could only offer me protection for the tasks 
related to the work carried out for them, but not for the movements required for my own 
research. Consequently, given the level of risks involved funding was not secured and I 
had to devise a different way of gathering information. In order to examine Kosovo's 
post-war situation I have referred to documents and reports of the main organisations 
operating on the ground and secondary sources. The ability to interview returnees 
would have clearly added a further dimension to my research on refugees' decision-
making process vis-a.-vis return, since it would have provided me with the opportunity 
to ask the returnees about the reasons for their return and their experience with the 
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post-war conditions in Kosovo. Nevertheless, the focus on the refugees who were still in 
Italy and the UK has allowed me to satisfactorily investigate refugees' attitudes towards 
return and explore the decision-making process. 
4.3.2 Ethical questions 
The research presented a number of ethical considerations due to the very sensitive 
nature of the topic in general and to the prominent focus on the conflict in Kosovo and 
on the refugees' relation to it. This affected many of the phases of the research process 
from the collection and analysis of secondary data to the interviews with the refugees. 
The Balkans have witnessed centuries of wars, political, religious and ethnic tensions 
and consequently historical accounts are often criticised for not being objective and for 
proposing partial versions of facts and revisionist interpretations of events. It is even 
more so the case with recent publications that evaluate the conflict of the 1990s, whose 
wounds still run deep. Morozzo della Rocca (1999) explains that there is a vast literature 
on Kosovo that is influenced by the Serbian and the Albanian interpretative thesis. As 
he puts it, there are always two truths when it comes to Kosovo: "SuI Kosovo esistono 
sempre due verita" (Morozzo della Rocca, 1999, p.8). Therefore, choosing the right 
points of reference for analytical purposes was a difficult task. I followed Morozzo della 
Rocca's approach of referring mainly to those facts accepted by both groups and I limited 
my work to a collection of important basic facts avoiding judgements and evaluations 
of responsibilities and faults. When it was necessary to refer to partial accounts or 
interpretations in order to explain what a certain group believes or wants other people 
to believe and how this influenced other views or events I openly stated that this was 
the case. 
Another sensitive issue encountered from an early stage was that of language. For 
example, it was highly recommended to use a non-Serbian pronunciation of geographical 
names during the interviews. 
The nature of the topic discussed during the interviews required a clear explanation of 
the aim of the research and my position as a researcher. Of course, it was necessary 
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to guarantee anonymity and confidentiality to all the interviewees 3. The names of the 
refugees quoted in the thesis have been changed to protect their identity. Furthermore, 
two cases required even more attention. One case is that of some interviewees who 
admitted to have been part of the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army) or had relatives 
involved, or implied that this was the case; the other case regards the interviews con-
ducted in Comiso, the Italian municipality where a former NATO base was used to host 
around 5000 refugees coming through the evacuation programme in 1999. At the time 
of my fieldwork the magistrates were investigating the way government funds had been 
misspent and the way the camp had been run. People in the administration and those 
who had worked or volunteered during the crisis were very reluctant to talk to me and 
those who did agree to be interviewed needed to have their identity protected. 
Despite the fact that, generally, refugees showed enthusiasm for the fact that someone 
was interested in their stories and was writing about it, the interviews required special 
attention when discussing certain issues that caused tension and distress such as the 
time of repression and persecution. In order to reduce stress to the minimum, I devoted 
plenty of time for each interview giving people the possibility to take their time. I never 
insisted or pushed people to answer questions they were feeling uncomfortable with. 
Questions about the reasons for the flight or the situation during the conflict recalled, 
inevitably, the moments families and friends had been killed or tortured, the images of 
their village or their house burning, the times people were hiding in the mountains. It 
was often required to interrupt the interviews and change subject until necessary. This 
occasion tested also my emotional position as a researcher as I explain in a later session 
on my experience in the field. 
I asked for permission to record the interviews to my interviewees and, in most cases, 
I was asked not to use a tape recorder. I accepted this condition since I felt that it 
was ethically correct to respect the wishes of the interviewees and I also realised that 
by not insisting and showing respect and understanding for their reasons I put myself 
in a better position to be trusted. Nevertheless, this posed a technical problem and a 
further ethical concern. The interviews were long, in-depth discussions and I needed to 
3Copies of the letter of information and the informed consent letter are in Appendix C and D. 
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record the outcome as accurately as possible so as not to loose any important data and, 
also, make sure that the views of the interviewees were respected and reported correctly. 
As such, it was necessary for me to device a different technique that is described in the 
following section. 
4.3.3 Interviews 
An investigation of the methods used in previous research on topics related to refugees' 
experience reveals a preference for an open approach to the subjects using unstructured 
or semi-structured interviews. I identified the method of semi-structured interviews 
as the most appropriate tool to gain knowledge about the refugees' experience. This 
method leaves a certain freedom to the respondents while retaining a good capacity 
for later analysis and requires the use of questions in a flexible manner as a guide to 
conversation (Lofland and Lofland, 1995). Therefore, it does not exclude the possibility 
that interviewees may produce a wealth of non requested information leading the dis-
cussion to unexpected directions (Rubin and Rubin, 1995) and enabling the researcher 
to explore new areas of potential interest (Fielding, 1993). 
It was necessary to design interview guidelines that reflected the ideas developed in the 
theoretical work on repatriation and on the selected methodological approach to the 
issue. As a result, the questions were clustered under different sections concerned with 
life before the flight, arrival and settlement in the country of exile, and plans for the 
future after the end of the conflict. These reflect the three phases of Archer's morpho-
genetic/static cycle with structural conditioning at stage Tl, social interaction at stage 
T2 and structural elaboration or reproduction at stage T3. In practical terms this meant 
that after a few questions about their current status and some personal data, I asked 
them about life before and during the conflict, and the flight. Subsequently, I focused 
on the arrival in the host country and the impact with life in exile, asking questions 
about accommodation, legal advice, health, employment, language, education, social 
life, racism-discrimination, attitudes towards the conflict, information about Kosovo. 
Finally, I enquired about their plans for the future and attitudes towards repatriation. 
I had a list of questions for each session, but very often there was no need for me to ask 
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each of them, since the discussion on the general topic provided me with the answers 
already. The interview guidelines are enclosed as an appendix (Appendix 1). 
The structure of the interview, with questions chronologically clustered under different 
headings, guided my analysis of the findings and represented an initial distinction of 
various issues I wanted to compare and analyse. Firstly, the transcripts and notes of 
the interviews were manually analysed with the use of colours. Secondly, the data were 
related to the findings obtained through other primary sources and secondary data. For 
example, the answers to the questions on life before the conflict and the reasons for the 
flight were compared and analysed within the context of Chapter 5, which deals with 
the escalation of the conflict in Kosovo. 
As I have explained, during the early stage of the fieldwork it became apparent that 
people did not want me to tape the interviews and I needed to devise a system that 
would enable me to record the data effectively in order to retain all the information and 
remain as close as possible to the actual content of the conversations. Of course, I tried 
to take as many notes as possible during the interviews, but this was not enough and it 
was not always possible at all moments since it was important to maintain eye contact 
with the refugees especially when they were discussing very sensitive issues. Therefore, 
after the first two interviews I started using the following method: I took a tape recorder 
with me and during the interview I noted as much information as possible by using key 
words that could help me remember the conversation. As soon as the interview was over 
and I parted company with the interviewee I used the tape recorder and, with the help of 
my notes, I repeated the discussion and recorded it. In order to verify the usefulness and 
accuracy of this method I did this even in those cases were people had agreed on taping 
the interview and I compared the final transcripts. The accuracy was very satisfactory 
and, therefore, I kept using this technique every time it was necessary. 
4.3.4 "Acquiring a Sample" 
The individuals interviewed for this study are not a representative sample of the Kosovar 
Albanian population in the UK or Italy. An attempt to build a representative sample 
would have been, in any case, difficult since there are no official data accounting for 
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the total number of people coming from Kosovo in both countries. This is because 
throughout the 1990s they were registered as people coming from the Former Republic 
of Yugoslavia and no mention was made to the specific area they came from. The 
records available are incomplete since they regard mostly refugees who came as part 
of the evacuation programme set up by the international community during NATO's 
intervention in 1999 and often ignore the spontaneous arrivals. Therefore, given the 
indeterminate nature of the population, the notion of "sampling" in its exact statistical 
sense does not apply in this case. Overall, this research is a qualitative study involving 
small numbers. The interviewees were selected using a combination of snowballing and 
quota sampling techniques based on my contacts with associations and individuals in 
the field. However, I have included in the "sample" people belonging to different age 
groups, from both sexes and with different legal status in the host country. 
The age range was generally broad, although largely concentrated in the twenty to forty 
range. The interviewees extended from college students to individuals in their fifties and 
sixties, and in four cases over seventies. 
They came from various parts of Kosovo, and both from rural and urban areas. Overall, 
the majority of those who came in the UK and Italy during the first half of the 1990s 
came from urban areas, mainly Pristina/Prishtin, Pea/Pec and Mitrovica/Mitrovice. 
The majority of those who came in the late 1990s came from rural areas. I do not 
specify the exact locations as this might indirectly reveal the identity of the respondents. 
In Italy, around 25% of the respondents arrived between 1990 and 1993, another 25% 
between 1994 and 1995, 25% between 1996 and 1998, and the final 25% in 1999. In the 
UK 29% of the interviewees arrived between 1990 and 1993, 11% came between 1994 
and 1995, another 22% between 1996 and 1998 and the final 38% in 1999. 
Out of a total of fifty-five interviews with refugees, thirty were conducted in Italy and 
twenty-five in the UK. I conducted twenty-six interviews with men, twenty with women 
and nine with families. This means that nine were group interviews with the whole 
family present at the same time, varying from two to ten family members. As a result, a 
total of about ninety people were involved in these fifty-five semi-structured interviews. 
An overview of the figures is given in Table 4.1 
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REFUGEES ITALY UK Total 
Males 15 11 26 
Females 11 9 20 
Families 4 5 9 
TOTAL 30 I 25 I 55 
TABLE 4.1: Breakdown of interviewee numbers 
I tried to cover various geographical areas in Italy and in the UK in order to collect 
data from people who experienced life in different parts of the host countries, from the 
capital, to other big cities, to small towns and villages. For example, in the UK I talked 
to people in London, the Midlands, North and South of England and Wales, while in 
Italy I went to different regions: Veneto, Lombardia, Toscana, Lazio and Puglia. I do not 
specify the exact locations as this might indirectly reveal the identity of the respondents. 
4.3.5 Access 
In order to gain access I established contacts with key informants in both countries. 
These were representatives of Kosovar Albanian and Albanian organisations such as 
Kosova Phoenix and Albanesi in Toscana, NGOs working with immigrants and refugees 
such as Refugee Action and 10M, and local authorities. In order to widen the "sample", 
I also used personal networks in both countries talking to British or Italian citizens who 
introduced me to Kosovar Albanians who lived or worked in their areas. These key 
informants introduced me to a few refugees who, in turn, offered to put me in touch 
with other Kosovar Albanians. 
It was more difficult to gain access in the UK where four of the people contacted refused 
to talk to me because during the war in 1999 they had been contacted by various 
journalists and talking to them had been very traumatic. They also explained that the 
way their positions had been reported in the press had been very disappointing. In 
Italy, only two people refused to talk to me because they still felt unable to discuss the 
persecution and the horror of the war in Kosovo. 
Talking to women and families was a central part of my research plan. In order to 
understand how different personal conditions and situations affect the refugees' decision-
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making process it was necessary to talk to people from both sexes and also with different 
family situations. I did not encounter any problems with gaining access to women and 
families. Overall, once people agreed to talk to me they seemed to be open and during 
the conversation they showed an increasing level of trust in me. This is mostly due to 
the fact that at the beginning of each interview I let them ask questions about me and 
my work to make sure that they understood the nature and the aim of the research. 
Knowing something about me created an immediate connection as I explain later in the 
chapter. 
4.3.6 Language 
The majority of the interviews were carried out either in English or in Italian, while 
a few respondents required the help of an interpreter from Albanian into English or 
Italian. I asked about the language problem during my first contact in order to have 
the necessary time to organise for an interpreter to translate. Having one interpreter 
in each country was not an option for me, since as a student I did not have funding to 
pay an interpreter to come with me at each interview. It was also difficult to rely on a 
volunteer because I was travelling long distances within the UK and Italy. For practical 
reasons I had to look for somebody who could translate for me when this was necessary 
and in the area I was having the interview. 
Using an interpreter adds the presence of a third person to what should be typically a 
one-to-one interview relationship and creates some problems. Edwards (1998) discusses 
some of the issues involved in the use of interpreters in the field and explains two different 
approaches. One response is acting as "if this was not the case; to render the interpreter 
invisible" (Edwards, 1998). This position requires the use of methods (triangular seating 
arrangement, direct translation using the first person, etc.) able to push the interpreter 
in the background. In this case, interpreters are expected to match the interviewees' 
social characteristics and the researcher by understanding their role and responsibility 
within the research process. The other approach, supported by Edwards, is based on the 
idea of making the interpreters visible by acknowledging their presence and use this as a 
strength. This approach requires "an exploration of the social location of the interpreter 
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and, along with the researcher and interviewee, their impact upon the construction of 
the interview accounts" (Edwards, 1998). 
In my case, the interviewees who needed an interpreter had a certain knowledge of Italian 
or English language, but they did not feel confident and comfortable enough to use a 
foreign language to answer my questions. They were able though to understand if the 
translation was not correct and in those cases they either said it in English or Italian 
themselves, or stopped and asked to clarify. I left the interviewees choose a person 
they trusted to translate for me, usually a friend or a relative. Following Edwards' 
example, I considered the interpreters as a further source of information taking into 
account a reflexive evaluation of their social position, their beliefs and their relationship 
with the interviewee and the way they interacted with me and the respondent during 
the interview. Only in one case in Italy the interviewee did not speak Italian at all, this 
was the case of a ninety year old woman whose nephew translated for her. I considered 
the discussion with this woman as part of a group-interview with her family of four 
individuals. 
In Italy many of the people I interviewed speak Italian with the strong local accent of 
the area they live in. In some cases they actually use many words from the local dialects 
when talking Italian. A personal familiarity with many Italian dialects helped me in 
understanding them and interpreting some of the words they were using. For example, 
when conducting my interviews in Veneto many people referred to their employers as 
'padrone' (master), a direct translation of 'paron' used in the dialect of that region. 
In this case this was not indicative of the relationship of the interviewees with their 
employers, but rather reflected the way in which certain local strata of the population 
still refer to their employers as "master" when using the dialect. 
4.3.7 Direct and Participant Observation 
There are different forms of observation from participation requiring the researcher to get 
involved in the context he/she is researching to observation where the researcher remains 
an outsider while observing. Both methods of direct and participant observation were a 
useful tool to further my understanding of the refugees' social organisation and of their 
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dynamic interaction with the host society and its structure. 
Direct observation implies that the researcher remains external to the group and watches 
rather than take part. For example, in Italy, I attended three meetings of local Albanian 
associations and one national meeting of Albanians and Kosovar Albanians coming from 
different Italian regions. The latter was an important event were the main issues con-
cerning the Albanian community in Italy were discussed. In this occasion I was provided 
by the organisers with a professional interpreter who translated simultaneously for me. 
I was also invited to observe the latest stage of the organisation of the 'Settimana della 
Cultura Albanese', a conference on Albanian Culture whose main purpose was that of 
improving the image of Albanian and Albanians in Italy. 
Further occasions to gather data through observation where those interviews that took 
place in the refugees' accommodation. This was mostly the case in Italy. In fact, while 
most interviews in the UK were carried out in public places, in Italy the majority of 
them took place at the house of the respondents giving me the opportunity to observe 
more houses. When visiting people at home for the interview I observed the place and 
took several notes on what I saw. For example it was common to find the television on 
and in several cases the respondents turned the volume down and left it on during the 
interview. They were watching RTK (Radio Television Kosovo), the first independent 
public broadcaster in Kosovo set up and managed by the European Broadcasting Union 
(EBU). The channel started transmitting two hours per day in September 1999 and in 
January 2002 (the time when I started the fieldwork in Italy) it started transmitting 
fifteen hours per day. Other common features of the houses I visited were a display of 
different images such as pictures of Mother Theresa, whose family was Albanian, the 
Albanian flag and pictures of KLA soldiers who lost their life in combat. 
Participant observation requires the researcher to become a participant in the context 
that is being observed. There are different roles the researcher can adopt in participant 
observation that can be carried out covertly, by attempting to pass as a member of the 
group, or overtly, by explaining that the purpose of the observation is that of collecting 
data for the research. In my case my position as a researcher was always clear. I was 
invited, both in Italy and in the UK to cultural events, to dinners where traditional 
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food was served and to the celebration of the day of the Albanian National Flag and 
of Muslim festivities ('Id al-Adha, the Festival of Sacrifice and Mawlid al-Nabiy the 
birthday of the prophet Muhammad). 
A few times after having lunch or dinner at a particular family we would regroup around 
the television and watch RTK. Of course I could not understand what was said in Alba-
nian and they explained to me what was going on. These moments often started discus-
sions on Kosovo, its past and present situation and its future. During three instances 
when this happened the TV station broadcasted programmes that showed traditional 
folklore or the daily live coverage of The Hague trial. 
4.3.8 Other interviews 
During the fieldwork I also interviewed leaders of Kosovar Albanian associations, rep-
resentatives of international and national organisations and NGOs, and policy makers. 
In Italy I interviewed representatives of the UNHCR, 10M, CIR, PNA, Caritas, ANCI, 
Agesci, Caritas di Ragusa, three officials of Comiso City Council, two officials of the Min-
istry of Interior Affairs. I also interviewed representatives of Albanian associations in 
TUscany, Veneto, Lombardi and Lazio. In the UK, I talked to representatives of Refugee 
Action, Refugee Council, ECRE, 10M, UNHCR, ODA. At the time of the fieldwork in 
the UK, many of the Albanian associations that were active during the war had ceased 
to operate, as for example Kosova Phoenix. Nevertheless, I managed to talk to some of 
the people who had been involved. 
Before each meeting with representatives of NGOs and policy makers, I studied the 
specific context within which their organisations or institutions work and the role they 
play in the field. The Internet proved to be a very useful tool in this phase allowing me 
to access updated information about the organisations and enabling me to customize 
the questions of my interviews for the specific meeting with the representative of each 
agency. In Italy, most of this work was carried out in Rome and partly in Milan, in the 
UK mainly in London, the cities were most organisations at national and international 
level have their headquarters. 
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I visited some of the organisations several times, either to talk with people working in 
different offices or to consult the archives. Access was relatively easy, though it usually 
required protracted mail and phone negotiations before each first meeting. The most 
difficult task was that of obtaining an appointment with officials working for the Ministry 
of Interior in Italy, I had to use all my personal contacts and connections to be able to 
meet the high officials in charge. 
4.3.9 Documentary evidence 
Many documentary sources were examined as part of the research. Use was made of 
reports of the UNHCR, OSCE, UNMIK, ECRE, 10M, CIR, Refugee Action, Refugee 
Council, MORI, Oxfam, Caritas, ICG, IS TAT , SISTAN, ICS, etc. Some reports were 
written but not published and were obtained directly from the organisations. For ex-
ample, in the UK I was given copies of correspondence between the Home Office and 
Refugee Action concerning various issues related to the end of temporary protection. 
Information on the history of Kosovo and the causes of the war that took place in 1999 
was obtained from published books and articles by academics and other experts. The 
main documents and reports consulted on the war and its aftermath were those produced 
by the UN, UNMIK, OSCE, the UNHCR, ICG, EU. Important sources of reference were 
the 'Kosovo Report', produced by the Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 
and 'Strategy for Sustainable Returns' and 'The Right to Sustainable Return', produced 
by UNMIK. 
Newspapers and web-based news were consulted in both countries in order to find infor-
mation about the wider debate on asylum in the UK and Italy, and the Kosovar refugee 
crisis. In the thesis I refer specifically to articles published on The Guardian, BBC News, 
La Repubblica, II Giornale di Sicilia, La Sicilia. 
I also used other internet resources to obtain information concerning the peace agree-
ment, the situation in the country after the war and consult reports monitoring the 
social, political and economic developments in Kosovo. Particularly useful was infor-
mation published by UNMIK and OSCE on the election results and 10M statistics on 
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return of refugees and internally displaced persons. 
Statistics on the number of persons that arrived in Britain as part of the programme 
were obtained from the Home Office statistical bulletins and in Italy from the Ministry 
of Interior Affairs. 
4.3.10 My position in the field 
The people I interviewed showed great respect for the fact that I was a student. Edu-
cation is very important to Kosovar Albanians because access to education has been an 
integral part of the ethnic conflict in Kosovo and many of them had this right denied. 
Once the interviewees heard that I was from Italy and that I was living in England a 
form of direct connection to me was immediately established. In the UK I was perceived 
as another person who came from the south of Europe into a country that was very 
different from 'home'. They often referred to the local population as 'they', a third 
group different from them and from me. Moreover, it was given for granted that I could 
be able to share the same feeling of nostalgia for friends and family back home. Although 
my experience in Italy was obviously different from theirs in Kosovo and despite the fact 
that the two places are culturally quite different, it was assumed that 'they and l' came 
from the 'same culture' and therefore went through the same 'cultural shocks' in the 
UK. Comments like "I guess you can understand what I mean!" were often made. 
Paradoxically, in Italy I went through a similar situation. For the interviewees the fact 
that I am Italian but I am living abroad put me in a better position to understand their 
problems since 'I must know' what it means to live abroad, to cope with a different 
system and culture and 'I must miss' my country, my family and friends, the food, the 
weather, etc. Sentences such as: "You know what it feels like", "You must have a hard 
time away from your family too", "You feel neither here nor there, don't you feel the 
same way?" were recurrent. 
In most cases, they wanted to know from where I was exactly in Italy and, once again, 
saying that I was from Sicily created an even closer connection. ~lany of them had an 
image of Sicily as a 'poor corrupt' region of southern Italy and they started to mention 
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certain problems in Kosovo referring to Sicily. Some of them had heard from relatives 
and friends who had migrated to Germany or Switzerland in the 1960s and 1970s about 
Sicilian immigrants. 'Their people and my people' had been through similar problems. 
When discussing with people in the North of Italy about the relationship with the local 
population and when asking questions about discrimination and racism, they immedi-
ately referred to the racism against southern Italians as a parallel to their condition. 
The underlying assumption was again that through these examples I should have un-
derstood even better. On the one hand, this situation created more trust and people 
felt they could talk openly about certain issues. They felt that those elements of my 
personal life were a sort of guarantee of my understanding, sympathy and reliability. 
On the other hand, certain questions I was asked made me fear that my answers could 
influence theirs, especially when getting to the final discussion about their future and 
their plans. In most cases, especially when interviewing women, I was asked to answer 
the same questions I was asking them, they wanted to know where do I feel more at 
home? What am I planning to do? Will I stay in the UK or return to Italy? 
I feared that my answers to these questions might influence theirs and at the same time 
I did not want to disappoint them by showing to be very reserved and not to trust them. 
My solution was that of leading the conversation back to their opinions and ideas and 
talk a little about myself once I had obtained their answers. I tried to focus more on 
aspects of my life that were unrelated to the main subjects of the interviews. This was 
not easy, since I was personally asking those exact questions about the future to myself 
at that time. 
The fieldwork was emotionally rewarding and demanding at the same time. I felt that 
those who accepted to talk to me considered my research to be important since it was a 
way to have their voice heard. I am still in contact with many of the people I interviewed. 
This has been useful for my research and my data, since during the analysis of the 
interviews I have been able to go back to them asking for some clarifications. Moreover, 
they have given me the necessary encouragement to work on the project during different 
stages of the research process. Listening to the refugees' accounts of life in a conflict zone, 
of massacres, of torture, hearing about their problems in the host countries and their 
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fears about the future required me to be understanding while refraining from showing 
the deep disturbing effect those accounts were having on me. If they had found the 
strength to go through those times and tell me the story, I had to at least find the 
strength to listen. 
4.4 Conclusions 
Having established the need for solid theoretical and methodological foundations that 
could guide the development of a research design able to capture the various relations 
between the different actors involved in refugee repatriation, I argued in this chapter for 
the advantage of using Archer's methodological approach. 
The first part of the chapter explored some specific ideas of her work and explained their 
relevance when analysing refugee-related issues, especially with regard to return. Firstly, 
it was argued that analytical dualism, through its formulation in the morphogenetic ap-
proach, provides a useful tool for the analysis of the complex relations between refugees, 
the conflict in the country of origin and the situation in the country of exile. Moreover, 
the concept of double morphogenesis emphasises the importance of paying attention to 
the way in which refugees undergo changes themselves while interacting with the country 
of exile and altering or reproducing some of its structures. Secondly, Archer's theory 
supports the consideration of asylum policies and, specifically, repatriation policies, ei-
ther as forms of enablement or as constraints to refugees' projects depending on different 
perspectives. This facilitates their placement within a theoretical framework that also 
views refugees as social actors able to react and adapt their projects to different con-
ditions and recognise their agency. In fact, Archer's stratified view of agency with its 
three levels of Human Person, Agent and Actor, enables researchers to acknowledge the 
individual character of refugees at their level of Human Persons while focusing on their 
position within a given social context both as Social Agents and Social Actors. Further-
more, the distinction between Primary agents and Corporate agents with their different 
properties and powers suggests the need to consider the impact of refugees' agency both 
in those cases when they form proactive organised groups or in those situations when 
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they react as an unorganised group to a given situation. 
The second part of the chapter explained the ways in which these methodological un-
derpinnings have guided the more practical development of this research and provides 
an account of the research methods adopted and the experience in the field. The study 
used a multidisciplinary approach in the attempt to explore the political and legal as-
pects of refugee repatriation as well as the main sociological ones. The use of secondary 
analysis, documentary analysis and interviews with policy makers, representatives of 
international organisations, NGOs and community leaders provided the necessary data 
to understand many structural and cultural factors and explore the interplay between 
these and refugees. At the same time, interviews with refugees provided a better under-
standing of their relationship with the country of origin, the conflict, the host society 
and, especially, their future plans. 
In the terms set out by the morphogenetic models these data were essential for analysing 
two main cycles involved in refugee repatriation issues. Firstly, the cycle that began with 
the flight of the refugees examining their interaction with the country of origin during 
exile; secondly, a study of the cycle that began with the arrival of the refugees in the 
country of exile examining their interaction with its structures. The study of these two 
parallel cycles allows me to analyse the ways in which the interplay between refugees 
and the country of origin and that of exile influence their choice on return. 
PAGE NUMBERING AS IN THE 
ORIGINAL THESIS 
Chapter 5 
The Conflict and the Reasons for 
the Flight 
5 .1 Introduction 
This chapter attempts to explore Kosovar Albanians' relationship with the conflict and 
their reasons for the flight. As I have argued in Chapter 3, this is an important step 
towards understanding their position in relation to the conflict, the impact this had on 
their lives, the reasons for leaving the country of origin, and the time and modality 
of the flight. These factors do not only affect their mode of settlement, as argued by 
scholars such as Kunz (1973) and Joly (2002), but also have a significant impact on 
their decision about return as suggested by Cuny and Stein (1991). 
Firstly, this chapter provides the necessary background to analyse the impact the rela-
tionship between the refugees and their country of origin has had on their settlement and 
their views about return. It begins with a brief account of the historical background of 
the conflict and then focuses on the situation of the 1990s, specifically, the 1999 NATO 
intervention. Secondly, it discusses the refugees' positions vis-a.-vis the conflict during 
the 1990s referring to data collected in the field during the interviews with a sample 
of Kosovar Albanian refugees. In order to analyse these data, I refer to existing ty-
pologies of refugees as described in Chapter 3, because they guide my understanding of 
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the findings and allow me to better structure the information collected. In particular I 
use typology of refugees of Zolberg et al. (1989), which is developed in relation to the 
refugees' position within a conflict and distinguishes three categories of refugees: ac-
tivists, targets and victims. This enables me to explore Kosovo Albanians' relationship 
with the conflict and their reasons for the flight. I also use Kunz's analysis of refugees in 
flight and its kinetic model which allow me to explain how the refugees' position within a 
conflict can influence the modality of the flight and explain the different types of Kosovar 
Albanian emigration out of Kosovo during the 1990s. The findings are presented through 
a division which follows the structure of the interviews along the following points: the 
beginning of the conflict, life and plan for the future before the conflict, the reasons for 
the flight, the time and modalities of departure, and the final destination. 
5.2 History, myths and legends 
The literature on the ethnic tensions and conflict between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo 
is considerable and reflects a wide spectrum of positions and interpretations characterised 
by two extremes: the pro-Serbian and the pro-Albanian ones. These extremes have 
led Morozzo della Rocca (1999) to assert that there are always two truths about Kosovo. 
Therefore, when approaching the subject it is necessary to distinguish facts and scientific 
data accepted by both sides from partial accounts and interpretations of events, and 
understand the impact of some biased theses on the development of the relationship 
between the two communities and on the conflict. 
During the twentieth century both Albanians and Serbs have gone through bloody times 
in Kosovo and have been, in turns, responsible for and victims of atrocities. The origins 
of the crisis of the late 1990s, according to the Independent International Commission on 
Kosovo (2000) have to be understood through a consideration of the wave of nationalism 
that developed in the 1970s and 1980s, which was based on the rediscovery of myths 
and legends, and the reinterpretation of history. 
In general, the origins of ethnic conflicts are thought to have roots going back hundreds 
of years and this is a common perception with respect to Kosovo as well. However, 
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it is not until the late nineteenth century that we can start talking about tensions 
between Albanians and Serbs in term of ethnic conflict (Malcolm, 1998; Independent 
International Commission on Kosovo, 2000). This was the time when myths and stories, 
which had been kept alive in ballads and legends for centuries, acquired a different 
role and importance in the narratives of Serbian and Albanian national movements. 
They provided the basis for claiming the right to the territory and its governance, 
justified certain policies and contributed to the development of opposite nationalist 
historiographies. 
We can distinguish three main historical elements that have been incorporated in the 
development of nationalist discourses and have played a role in the ethnic contraposition 
of Albanians and Serbs: the myth of the origin, the Kosovo Polje battle and 'the great 
migration'. We briefly discuss these below. 
The historical debate about the origin of the Albanian or Serbian presence in Kosovo 
has played a central role in the nationalist interpretation of modern and contemporary 
political situations. The Albanian population in Kosovo claims to be the descendant of 
the earliest known inhabitants of that area of the Balkans, the Illyrians. On the other 
side, Serbian nationalists refer to the presence of many medieval monuments, churches 
and monasteries as evidence of the Slavic roots of Kosovo. The Albanian answer to the 
last claim is that the foundations of these monuments are often built on top of Illyrian 
archeological remains. Other arguments and counterarguments follow on the same line 
in order for each group to claim the most ancient roots in the area and, therefore, 
according to a certain nationalist logic, the right to live and govern in Kosovo. 
The Kosovo Polje battle was fought and lost by the Serbs against the Ottoman Turks in 
1389. In fact, the fourteenth century was characterised by the resistance to the Ottoman 
expansion. Between 1370 and 1380, the territory governed by Serbs was divided into dif-
ferent princedoms that faced the advance of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans which 
eventually led to the fall of the Serbian empire. The princes' response to the Ottoman 
expansion led either to the establishment of a pact of vassalage or to military resistance. 
Many battles were fought, but the battle of Kosovo Polje of 1389 in particular is still 
remembered and plays a central role in the contemporary Serb nationalist revival. Nev-
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ertheless, little historical data about it is actually available. Malcolm (1998), Morozzo 
della Rocca (1999) and other authors agree that it is possible that several Albanians , 
who were still Christians, fought with the Serbs against the Muslim Turks, while at the 
same time, other Albanians from central and northern Albania, two areas which were 
already under Ottoman influence, fought with them. 
The area corresponding approximately to the current Serbia and Kosovo was finally 
conquered by the Ottoman Turks in 1459. Under the Islamic Ottoman rule Serbs and 
Christian Albanians, were considered 'hahl al kitab', people of the book, and were 
allowed to keep their faith and their traditions. They were subjected to the dhimma, or 
protection of life and property by the Muslim state, in return for paying of the jizya, a 
tax paid exclusively by non-Muslims living in a Muslim State 1. Consequently, a number 
of people converted to Islam in order to avoid the payment of this tax and a treatment 
as second class subjects of the Empire. However, some Serbs began to leave Kosovo and 
move towards the centre of Serbia, this migration, remembered as 'the great migration', 
reshaped the demographic composition of Kosovo and is interpreted in different ways by 
Serbs and Albanians 2. Together with the dispute about the origin of Kosovo and the 
battle of Kosovo Polje, it is part of both nationalist discourses. 
Tensions about the demographic composition of the population of Kosovo and about 
emigration from Kosovo continued to be the centre of controversies even through the 
nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, until the mass expulsions of Albanians that 
characterised the final phase of the 1999 conflict. Below is a general overview of the 
main phases of the Serbian-Albanian relations between the collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire and NATO's military campaign of 1999. The main aim of the following sections 
is that of highlighting the political, economic and social background to the conflict and 
understand the characteristics of the migration waves caused by it. 
IThey remained with this status until the emancipation ordered by the Ottoman Sultan in the middle 
of the 19th century under pressure from the European powers. 
2 According to Serbian views, as a consequence of the void left by the emigration of the Serbs, 
Albanians from the mountains moved eastward into Kosovo. There are two Albanian interpretations of 
these events: initially, it was accepted that Albanians moved into Kosovo after the exodus of many Serbs 
in the late seventeenth century. However, this was seen and interpreted as a return to the homeland that 
they had left when driven out by the Serbs. Since the 1970s, the theory of the 'ethnic void' has been 
rejected. The new position claims that the Serbs appeared in Kosovo after the eleventh century and 
that even during their rule in Kosovo the majority of the population remained Albanian, even though 
some of them were assimilated by the Serbs. 
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5.3 World War I and World War II: demographic wars 
The retreat of the Ottoman Empire from the Balkans was followed by waves of ethnic 
cleansing whose main drive was the interest to avenge and possess the land that had been 
previously expropriated (Morozzo della Rocca, 1999). However, many of the Muslims 
that were expelled had been the owners of the land for centuries and many of them were 
Serbs, Greeks and Bulgarians that had converted to Islam in order to keep the land that 
had belonged to their family and avoid paying the jizya. 
In Kosovo, the 1878 Peace Accord that followed the defeat of the Ottoman Turks in the 
Russo-Ottoman War gave the Serbs control of Mitrovica/Mitrovice and Pristina/Prishtina. 
This peace settlement alerted the Albanian population and Albanian nationalists organ-
ised a meeting in Prizren, where delegates from Kosovo and Macedonia founded "The 
Prizren League". The League also involved Albanian intellectuals who were inspired by 
ideas of the European Renaissance and were interested in the creation of an independent 
political entity that could unite all Albanian people under the umbrella of Ottoman rule. 
In 1912, as a result of the Balkan war, Serbs, Bulgarians and Greeks reduced the do-
main of the Ottoman Empire to Thrace. Serbia achieved independence and Kosovo 
came under Serbian authority 3. During the First World War, Kosovo was occupied 
by Austria-Hungarian and Bulgarian forces. The Austria-Hungarian declaration of war 
against Serbia was welcomed in Albania and, therefore, Serbia saw Albania and Albani-
ans as its enemy. This led to guerrilla fighting between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo 
with atrocious acts committed on both sides and Albanian refugees fleeing into Albania. 
The new 'Kingdom of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs' was proclaimed in December 1918 
and was dominated by Serbia; it included also Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Montenegro and Macedonia. Kosovo, once more, became an integral part of Serbia. 
However, while the new Yugoslavia was predominantly a Slavic state, in Kosovo 64% of 
the population was Albanian (Vickers, 1998). In response, Albanians organised an armed 
resistance, known as the Kachak movement, against the Serbian power with the support 
of Northern Albania. The events unfolded following a typical chain of reactions in the 
3In 1912, during the Conference of Ambassadors in London presided over by the British Foreign 
Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, Serbia was given sovereignty over Kosovo. 
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Serbian-Albanian relations which usually lead to the reinforcement of mutual mistrust. 
As a consequence of the development of the Kachak movement, Albanians in Kosovo 
were increasingly seen by Serbs as part of an outlaw national liberation movement , 
against the Yugoslav constitution. The government of Belgrade decided to suppress the 
movement and use the situation to resolve the ethnic question in Kosovo. Several changes 
took place in order to reach the goal of either assimilating the Albanian population 
or 'encouraging' them to leave. For example, under the Yugoslav government their 
involvement in local government, the right to use Albanian language in their work and 
the opportunity to set up Albanian-language schools, which had been obtained when 
Austria-Hungarian and Bulgarian troops had moved into Kosovo, were lost (Malcolm, 
1998). The Serb government did not consider the Albanian-speakers in Kosovo as an 
ethnic or national group, but as Serbs who spoke Albanian. By the 1930s there were 
no Albanian schools left, Albanians were denied the status of national minority and 
a programme of colonisation sending Slav-speaking settlers in the area had been set 
up (Malcolm, 1998). Some tens of thousands of Serb and Montenegrin settlers moved 
into Kosovo and at the end of the 1930s a plan for the mass deportation of Albanians to 
AnatoIia had been outlined. As an example of the tactics used to 'encourage' Albanians 
to leave we can refer to a 1937 document of the government in Belgrade stating that 
the maximum size of the land-holding permitted, which was 0.4 hectares, was: "below 
the minimum for subsistence. But that is and has been our aim: to make their life 
impossible, and in that way to force them to emigrate" (Gilbert, 1998). Nevertheless, 
despite several attempts, between 1912 and 1941, the demographic balance of Kosovo 
changed very Ii ttle. 
During the Second World War, the roles switched and Albanians gained a position of 
strength that allowed them to start reverting the situation. During the war Albania 
was occupied by Italian forces in 1939. Just a year later Italy attacked Greece, the 
outcome of this was a situation of impasse that required the intervention of German 
troops. In 1941, Germany put the Yugoslav government under strong pressure to join 
the Tripartite Pact (Germany, Italy and Japan) in order to gain the right for their troops 
to pass through Yugoslavia to reach Greece from the North. Two days later an anti-axis 
coup took place, but as a result a few weeks later, Germany invaded Yugoslavia (Gilbert, 
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1998). Most of Kosovo was occupied by Albania with the exception of the important 
mining area surrounding Mitrovica/Mitrovice which remained under German control. 
When Italy dropped out of the war in 1943, the Germans entered Kosovo and promised 
the province independence. According to Malcolm: "The German policy towards the 
newly acquired territory of Kosovo and Albania was to court the sympathy of the 
population by using the rhetoric of Albanian nationalism and Albanian independence 
[ ... J." (Malcolm, 1998).They raised an SS Division from among the Albanian population 
called the Skanderberg Division, whose role is still fuelling harsh historical controversies 
4 
What appears to be generally accepted is that during this time, the scenario was dras-
tically reverted with Albanians trying to push out of Kosovo as many Serbs as possible. 
Having experienced the dream of unification with Albania, Kosovo Albanians defended 
the idea of Great Albania and very few of them joined the partisan resistance against 
the occupation led by Josip Broz, known as Marshall Tito in Yugoslavia. However, in 
the south of Albania, a group of communist Albanian partisans led by Enver Hoxha col-
lab orated with Marshall Tito, in the resistance. When German troops finally left, the 
Balli Kombeter, the Albanian nationalists, had taken over the region until the partisans 
of Hoxha defeated them in Northern Albania first, and then, with the help of Tito's 
partisans, in Kosovo as well. When the war was over Hoxa accepted the border that 
existed before the war and Kosovo came back under Yugoslav power. In the aftermath of 
the war roles were switched once again and two interpretations of the events developed. 
The local historiography of Kosovo at the communist time exaggerated the contribution 
of Kosovar Albanians to the liberation movement in Yugoslavia, while on the Serbian 
side emphasis was given to the collaboration of Albanians with the fascist regime. A 
new period of persecution and forced migration of Albanians from Kosovo had started. 
4According to lVlalcolm (1998) the recruitment, which was carried out in early 1944 was a disap-
pointment because of an invisible resistance of the beys and agas who discouraged the enrolment; he 
concludes that the Skanderbeg division had never played a significant role as a combat force. 
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The aftermath of the II World War: Albanian migra-
tion and forced migration 
From 1946 until 1967, severe repressive actions were taken against Albanians in Kosovo 
as they were perceived to be politically unreliable because of their wartime cooperation 
with the Axis powers. The 1946 Yugoslav constitution did not grant territorial autonomy 
to Kosovo, but rather defined it as an autonomous region under federal jurisdiction. The 
Yugoslav Federation recognised five nationalities (Serb, Croat, Slovene, Montenegrin and 
Macedonian), but Albanian was not one of them. 
When Tito broke the relationship with Stalin in 1948, Yugoslavia and Albania ended 
diplomatic relations. The Albanian president Hoxha remained loyal to Moscow and 
became a severe critic of Tito's policies, especially with relation to Yugoslav rule in 
Kosovo. Consequently, the Yugoslav secret police began to regard all Albanians in 
Kosovo as potential traitors and spies. The Yugoslav government took action to disarm 
them, house to house, and thousands of them were arrested. Malcolm (1998) explains 
that the repression got to such a point that many Albanian families bought a weapon in 
order to have something to give to the Yugoslav police and avoid the harsh punishments. 
The atmosphere of suspicion, mistrust and hostility led many Albanians to consider em-
igration. Emigration was also induced by the fact that the Communist regime imposed 
restrictions on religious practice, therefore abolishing the §eriat courts, the Koranic 
schools and the dervish orders (Malcolm, 1998). Moreover, during the late 1940s and 
early 1950s, the Yugoslav authorities encouraged people in Kosovo and Macedonia to 
identify as ''lUrks' by nationality by declaring the 'lUrks as a national minority and 
setting up new 'lUrkish schools 5. In 1953, this policy began to be regarded as a plot to 
remove large numbers of Albanians when Yugoslavia signed a treaty with Turkey and 
Greece which provided for cooperation in security and defence measures and permitted 
a large-scale emigration of ''lUrks' from Yugoslavia to 'lUrkey. 
The economic situation of the region was another incentive to migrate since, immediately 
5The 1953 Census showed that the number of people registered as Turks in Kosovo had gone from 
1,315 in the last Census of 1948 to 34,583. 
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after the war, Yugoslavia was one of the poorest countries in Europe and Kosovo was 
the poorest part of the country. In 1946, the average income in Slovenia, the richest of 
the republics, was three times greater that in Kosovo and in 1964 it was five times more. 
Tracing in detail the emigration of Albanians from Kosovo between the 1950s and 1970s 
is not an easy task because little statistical evidence of their migration is available since 
they were often registered in the country of migration as Yugoslavs or as TUrks. Blumi 
explains that: 
"[ ... ] contrary to common views held about European migration, large num-
bers of immigrants from the 1950s onwards were not 'Thrkish' or 'Yugoslav' 
men seeking jobs. Rather, many of these men (and their families) were com-
ing from a variety of ethno-linguistic backgrounds and personally did not 
associate themselves with these two 'identities'. [ ... ] Not only were many 
of these 'Yugoslavs' and 'Thrks' actually Kurdish or Albanian speakers, but 
in large part they were persecuted 'minorities' in their countries of origin 
as well. This meant the overwhelming majority of Albanians came to West 
Europe on entirely different pretexts than those with whom they were ulti-
mately associated in the 1950-1980 period. Being a TUrkish or Yugoslav guest 
worker and being a victim of political violence were two entirely different ex-
periences, experiences which were all but erased by the very associations 
attached to being 'ethnically' linked to the immediate countries from which 
they came." (Blumi, 2003, p.952) 
Blumi (2003) also explains that in certain instances many of the expellees who passed 
through Thrkey identified themselves as Yugoslavs themselves, because at that time 
when one was asked from where he/she was originally from, it was more likely that the 
answer would not be Kosovo, or a specific town, but Yugoslavia. He claims that his 
empirical research shows that even those who had been uprooted from their homes in 
Yugoslavia and forced to migrate to TUrkey actively stated to be Yugoslav in Western 
Europe. 
For most Kosovar Albanian migrants the main destinations were Germany and Switzer-
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land. They grouped themselves around village or regional loyalties rather than a national 
group, since there was no sense of a larger community to set up organisational goals. The 
reason for this was also that the people who migrated before the 1980s had never had 
the chance to live in a political or cultural environment which promoted their Albanian 
identity. None of the people from the first generation of expellees interviewed by Blumi 
for his study, had studied Albanian at school and the majority of them grew up reading 
about Kosovo, Montenegro and Macedonia in Serbian texts (Blumi, 2003). 
Eventually, new Yugoslav policies in Kosovo during the 1970s introduced some degree of 
autonomy in the region and opened the possibility to be educated in Albanian language 
and celebrate Albanian identity. This created a new social environment which had an 
impact on the political scene of Kosovo after Marshall Tito's death and on the new 
waves of Albanian emigration of the 1980s which joined the others. 
5.5 The 1970s - 1980s: the changing face of Kosovar Al-
banian migration 
The life of Albanians in Kosovo changed in the late 1960s when Tito decided to abandon 
the idea of creating a homogeneous 'Yugoslavism' and encouraged more elements of 
national self-direction (Ma.lcolm, 1998). A series of cultural reforms followed and the 
use of the Albanian language and the study of Albanian history and culture were officially 
permitted. The reforms included the establishment of a university in Pristina/Prishtina, 
the employment of Albanian professors, the Albanisation of administration, security and 
public investment (Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000). 
These developments continued and intensified until Kosovo became an autonomous 
province with the 1974 constitution and, more importantly, an equal constitutional 
element of the Federation as one of eight federal units. The new constitution gave au-
tonomous provinces the right to issue their own constitution. Kosovo also had its own 
assembly and judiciary; however, it did not have the right to secede from the federation 
as Yugoslav republics did 6. These reforms opened new possibilities for Albanian politi-
6This was possible because only nations had the right to their own republic, while nationalities did 
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cal aspirations and, more importantly, generated the cultural/pedagogical environment 
conducive to the formation of a generation of politically-sophisticated activists (Blumi, 
2003). 
Nevertheless, from an economic point of view Kosovo was still the poorest area of Yu-
goslavia. This situation was made worse since between 1961 and 1981 the proportion of 
Albanians in the population of Kosovo rose from 67% to 78%. This was due both to the 
high birth rate of Albanians and to outmigration of Serbs and Montenegrins. Actual 
emigration by Serbs and Montenegrins during this period was probably around 100,000, 
although much higher figures were claimed in Belgrade. In fact, emigration was high 
among all communities, mainly because of the stagnating economic situation of Kosovo 
in comparison with other parts of Yugoslavia (Independent International Commission 
on Kosovo, 2000). 
In 1980 Marshal Tito died and his death marked the beginning of the end of a unified Yu-
goslavia whose unity was closely associated with him. Nationalist demands for a higher 
degree of autonomy started to grow among the various ethnic groups of Yugoslavia. The 
state-run socialist economy continued to stagnate and there was increasing resentment 
of centralised government control. Nationalist politicians looked for scapegoats to blame 
for the difficult economic times and their political rethoric fomented ethnic tensions. 
In the spring of 1981 clashes occurred in Kosovo between the Serbian administration and 
numerous Kosovar Albanians calling for status as the seventh republic. The first demon-
strators in the streets of Pristina/Prishtina were students and they were followed by other 
parts of the population protesting about the conditions of Albanians in Kosovo who con-
sidered themselves as victims of an unfair federal system. By then, the unemployment 
level in Kosovo was the highest in Yugoslavia and Serbs and Montenegrins who were 
15% of the total population held 30% of the jobs available in state-run enterprises (Mal-
coIrn, 1998). The police brutally crushed the protest killing some demonstrators and 
arresting thousands of others who were then sentenced from one month to fifteen years 
of imprisonment. A state of emergency was declared and police and military units from 
all over Yugoslavia were sent into Kosovo. 
not. In fact, Albanians in Kosovo, like Hungarians in Vojvodina, were considered as a nationality rather 
than as a nation like Croats, Slovenians and Serbs, because their nations had a homeland elsewhere. 
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More than 200,000 Albanians emigrated from Kosovo as a consequence of the suppression 
of the demonstrations. Some of them were highly engaged in politics and regrouped 
into political organisations registered legally in the countries of migration. Over 20 
organisations existed, among which were the Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo , 
the World Union of Kosovo, the New Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo or the 
Federation of Trade Unions of Kosovo (Blumi, 2003). 
Blumi highlights the new aspect of this second wave of Albanian emigration from Kosovo 
asserting that: 
"The massacre of Albanian students in 1981, which marked the apex of 
collective Albanian consciousness in an organised form, finally transformed 
Kosova into an international issue with corresponding political consequences 
for those who were targeted by the Yugoslav state (Mertus, 1999, p.11-29). 
Aside from the several thousand Kosovars imprisoned for long terms, thou-
sands more fled to Europe to settle in what little there was of an organised 
Albanian diaspora. What is important to note is the dramatic difference 
between this new, now politically educated generation of expellees and their 
largely rural and uneducated predecessors. This post-Rankovic generation 
constituted a dramatic change in Kosovar (and Albanian) intra-communal 
relations for they had been politicized in an environment that at once enabled 
them to organise as Albanians (the Albanian language was now permitted 
in schools and Prishtina University) and persecuted them for such mobiliza-
tion." (Blumi, 2003, p.960) 
During the 1980s, Albanian emigration from Kosovo brought a new sense of identity to 
the community abroad and a new political awareness. The main European destinations 
were still Germany and Switzerland and it was not until the early 1990s that other 
European countries, including Italy and the UK, started to be considered as possible 
destinations. During the 1990s, the escalation of events in Kosovo led to further diverse 
waves of migration/forced migration. 
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5.6 Kosovo: 1980s and 1990s 
The 1980s were a period of austerity for the whole country. Despite several investments 
in the area, Kosovo remained the poorest region of Yugoslavia and tensions about the 
ways in which resources were distributed were incorporated in the nationalist debate 
(Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000). While on the one hand, 
Serbia was considering the withdrawal of the autonomy of Kosovo as the solution to its 
economic situation, on the other hand, Albanian activists believed that the general state 
of poverty of Kosovo was precisely due to the fact that they did not have total control 
over their economic life and demanded republic status. 
The 1981 events gave rise to a series of reciprocal accusations used by both Albanian and 
Serb nationalists. In Serbia, intellectuals, the press and the general public were caught 
up in a spiral of growing hatred and mistrust fuelled by speculations about alleged violent 
attacks on the Serbian community in Kosovo, the rediscovery of myths and legends from 
the past and reciprocal scapegoating. 
After Tito's death, many Serbs began to rediscover their old national myths and Kosovo 
regained a special historical significance. The Serbs of Kosovo complained about being 
a disadvantaged minority under the political and economic domination of the Kosovo 
Albanian community and talked about discrimination and unpunished violent attacks 
against them (OSCE, 1999). Moreover, rumours about Albanians raping or murdering 
Serbs in Kosovo spread in Belgrade and, despite the fact that these claims were never 
confirmed by official figures, they had a great impact on the rising ethnic tensions and 
level of intolerance. In 1986, a part of the intelligentsia at the Serbian Academy of 
Sciences published a Memorandum were it was claimed that since 1981 Albanians in 
Kosovo had carried out genocide against the Serbs. 
A year later, in 1987, Slobodan Milosevic, then deputy-president of the Serbian Party, 
visited Kosovo for the first time. While he was meeting the representatives of the Serb 
local community in Kosovo Polje/Fushe Kosove, many people demonstrated outside the 
building in their support. The police drove back the demonstrators using batons and 
they fought back. Milosevic decided to address the crowd and in front of television 
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cameras he stated firmly that no one should dare to beat them (OSCE, 1999). Although 
his political career had not developed within a nationalist political culture, during this 
visit, he seized the moment embracing the nationalist cause and his speech about the 
rights of Serbs in Kosovo turned him instantly into a national hero. In 1988, during 
a rally in Belgrade, he declared: "Every nation has a love, which eternally warms its 
heart. For Serbia, it is Kosovo" (Mertus, 1999). Milosevic's 'reconquest' of Kosovo had 
started and the main steps can be summarised as follows: 
• the promotion of Serb colonisation of Kosovo, family planning for Albanians and 
restrictions on the sale of properties to them; 
• the public gathering in June 1989 to commemorate the 600th anniversary of the 
Kosovo Polje battle of 1389; 
• the submission of a proposal to change the constitution in order to revoke the state 
of autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina; 
• the harsh repression of strikes and demonstration of 1989; 
• the proclamation of the state of emergency in Kosovo and the consequent heavy 
presence of Serbian military and police forces on the territory and, finally, the final 
revocation of Kosovo autonomy in 1990 (Independent International Commission 
on Kosovo, 2000). 
Therefore, during the 1990s, under Slobodan Milosevic's government, Kosovars expe-
rienced once more exclusion from government, repression of their political opposition 
and the de-Albanianisation of cultural and educational institutions followed by re- Ser-
bianisation. Street names were changed from Albanian to Serbian; Albanian language 
newspapers, radios and television channels were closed, as well as the Albanian Insti-
tute. Moreover, a new Serbian curriculum was imposed for universities and schools. 
The 1990 Milosevic's government removed Kosovo's autonomy through a change in the 
Serbian constitution that redefined Kosovo as a region in Serbia, with administrative 
and executive control in the hands of the Serbian National Assembly. 
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5.6.1 A de facto apartheid regime 
On the 2nd of July 1990, 114 out of 123 Albanian members of the Kosovo Assembly 
rejected the new constitutional proposals of Serbia; they declared Kosovo independent of 
Serbia and a full constituent republic within the federation of Yugoslavia. In retaliation, 
the government dissolved Kosovo's provincial assembly, taking over its responsibilities. 
In September, the same year, at a secret meeting, Albanian representatives of the dis-
solved Assembly of Kosovo passed the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo. The 
government's response was the dismissal of Albanian employees from government and 
state positions and the censorship of the independent Albanian media, in addition to 
the restriction of political and cultural expression by the Albanian population (Malcolm, 
1998). 
From 1992 to 1998 life in Kosovo was governed by a de facto apartheid regime, with 
Albanians and Serbs living parallel existences. The Serbs occupied institutional and 
public positions and controlled the economy while Albanians run a 'parallel state' led 
by Ibrahim Rugova, who had been elected president of the self-proclaimed republic after 
an election held in defiance of Serbian authorities in 1992. 
While other Albanian political leaders, such as Adem Demaqi e Rexhep Qosia, pro-
moted a strong resistance against the Serbian power, Rugova opted for a non-violent 
strategy whose main goals were: to stop the regime, maintain the Albanian community 
and its way of life, prevent war by avoiding being provoked to violence and win inter-
national support against the regime (Clark, 2002). In order to achieve these goals, he 
established a 'shadow' government whose members were abroad and his party the Demo-
cratic League of Kosova (LDK) organised the community in Kosovo. They established 
parallel structures of state including political, cultural, educational, and media systems. 
The main focus of this parallel apparatus was on the health-care, education and a so-
cial security network that provided basic necessities for families in need. The system 
was financed by a voluntary taxation system, which Albanians living both in Kosovo 
and in exile paid to the 'shadow' government 7. The organisation was quite successful 
7The suggested guidelines indicated around 5% of the income for employed individuals, between 8% 
and 10% for businesses and 3% for workers in the Diaspora. 
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in Kosovo and its strategy of non-violent resistance also promoted the view that the 
source of violence in Kosovo was primarily the regime (Clark, 2002). Throughout most 
of the 1990s, the LDK had managed to obtain several high-level diplomatic meetings 
with foreign governments, however, until 1997 Kosovo received sporadic attention from 
the international community with the only exception of some NGOs. 
In fact, from the mid-1990s people's confidence in Rugova' s leadership and his strategy 
began to be questioned. While during an initial phase this strategy had brought a sense 
of empowerment, its inability to raise active support from the international community 
spread a general sense of hopeless frustration (Clark, 2002). 
In 1996 an agreement on education between the LDK and the Belgrade Ministry of 
Education was reached with the mediation of an Italian catholic organisation Comunita 
di Sant Egidio. This agreement was never implemented, but it opened the possibility 
to negotiate for a peaceful solution of the situation. A few proposals were discussed 
by intellectuals in both Belgrade and Pristina/Prishtina. For example, the President 
of the Academy of Sciences, Aleksandr Despic, proposed a plan for a peaceful secession 
of Kosovo while others proposed a 'three republics' solution according to which Kosovo 
should be given equal status to Montenegro (Independent International Commission on 
Kosovo, 2000). Overall, none of the diplomatic efforts translated into concrete plans of 
action, bringing new doubts about the efficacy of the non-violent struggle. In addition 
to this, in the desperation to stop the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo was not 
included in the Dayton negotiations. The strategy of the LDK was held responsible for 
the stagnant political situation and several Kosovar intellectuals criticised Rugova for 
excessive passivity and discussed alternative strategies; for example Professor Rexhap 
Qosja argued for a more active non-violent resistance and Adem Demaqi talked about 
civil disobedience. People started to believe that violent resistance could be the only 
realistic solution. 
It was at this time, that the Ushtria Clirimtare Kosovs (UCK), the Kosovo Libration 
Army (KLA), an organisation based in Switzerland, emerged as an opposition force 
claiming responsibility for the killing of a Serb policeman that had happened in 1995. At 
that time most Albanians had not heard of the existence of the KLA and many thought 
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that the attacks were masterminded by the Yugoslav authorities in order to provoke 
their reaction (Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000). Between 1996 
and 1998 they eliminated around thirty people, suspected Albanian 'collaborators' and 
Serb policemen, using terrorist hit-and-run tactics. 
The Serbian government considered the KLA a terrorist organisation and as a response 
to their increasing activities, police in Kosovo intensified the repression. Several human 
rights organisations, such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Humani-
tarian Law Centre, and others documented illegal searches, arbitrary arrests, torture, 
restrictions on the media and many other abuses. The police targeted members of the 
KLA and the LDK, activists and also civilians. 
5.6.2 The escalation of violence 
In late February 1998, Yugoslav forces attacked several villages in the Drenica area, 
a known base of KLA activities. The fighting continued for several days. A particular 
target was Adem Jashari, a KLA leader, and on the 5th of March an attack was launched 
on the houses of his clan killing 58 people, including women and children (Independent 
International Commission on Kosovo, 2000). 
The massacre of Drenica represents a turning point in the escalation of the conflict. The 
general doubts about the non-violent tactics of the LDK increased and people started 
to place their hopes on the KLA. After Drenica, every Serbian military action had the 
effect of attracting more young Albanians to the KLA and further internationalising the 
conflict. 
The escalation of violence called for immediate intervention from the international com-
munity. In March 1998, some international sanctions against Serbia were discussed in 
order to back up the Contact Group 's 8 call for negotiations on Kosovo's autonomy 
in the hope to avoid the use of force. The sanctions were eventually introduced in late 
April and, in addition to that, the UN Security Council imposed an arms embargo under 
Resolution 1160 of 30 March (OSCE, 1999). 
8The Contact Group formed in 1994 in response to the conflict in Bosnia and included US, Russia, 
GB, France, Germany and Italy 
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In Serbia, in April 1998, Milosevic gained overwhelming support in a referendum and 
in June, ignoring the warning of European governments, Serb forces started to force 
villagers out of their homes and then burned them (OSCE, 1999). As the situation 
worsened on the ground, negotiations became more difficult and were finally interrupted 
by the start of the war. The KLA had gained strength and, initially, they had managed 
to extend their control in the area, but when new Yugoslav forces arrived in Kosovo, 
they suffered a strong counter attack. Many fighters were helped by Albanian families 
and found refuge in their houses. As a consequence, Serb forces attacked and destroyed 
villages and farm houses. Soon, the KLA realised that they could not make it on 
their own and that international support was indispensable. New efforts were put into 
spreading news about the suffering of the Albanian population in Kosovo in the attempt 
to involve the international community and the Diaspora had a great role in this. 
During summer, the destruction and the violence increased, around 500 Albanians were 
killed, about 300 villages were destroyed and aid agencies estimated that some 200,000-
300,000 Albanians were driven from their homes between April and September 1998 
(Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000). Many of them fled: approxi-
mately 60,000 crossed to neighboring Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro, others were 
hosted in other villages in Kosovo, but many (about 50,000) were still wandering around 
without a shelter (Morozzo della Rocca, 1999). 
The military defeat of the KLA, the level of destruction and the fact that the interna-
tional community had not intervened had a demoralising effect on the Albanian pop-
ulation, the number of fighters in the KLA ranks decreased and many went back to 
their jobs abroad. With winter approaching, the humanitarian crisis worsened and the 
images of homeless people wandering in the woods shown by the media touched public 
opinion in many countries and put pressure on foreign governments to reopen diplomatic 
negotiations. 
On the 23th of September 1998, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1199, which 
called for: a cease-fire in Kosovo, international observers to monitor the situation on the 
ground, the withdrawal of forces, and negotiations on the future of Kosovo (OSCE, 1999). 
The US Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke, representing the Contact Group, managed 
Chapter 5 The Conflict and the Reasons for the Flight 113 
to negotiate with Milosevic who accepted to allow refugees to return to their homes, 
withdraw some forces and allow 2000 unarmed OSCE observer in Kosovo. The OSCE 
Kosovo Verification Mission (OSCE-KVM) began to be operative from November. 
The Milosevic-Holbrooke agreement seemed to be making progress for two months, de-
spite a number of violations of the cease-fire. In the meantime, US and European 
diplomats continued to promote a Kosovo settlement, excluding the KLA in the pro-
cess (OSCE, 1999). However, with the majority of the Serbian forces out of Kosovo, the 
KLA managed to reorganise, retrain and take advantage of the situation. The peace ac-
cord was internationally understood as an agreement between Serbs and Albanians, but 
no Albanian representatives were asked to sign, therefore the KLA did not feel bound 
by it (Morozzo della Rocca, 1999). The KLA could launch offensive attacks, but if the 
Serbian forces reacted they were officially breaching the terms of the agreement. The 
situation quickly became very tense and violence escalated again on both sides producing 
both Serb and Albanian victims. In January 1999 the Serb army moved a large number 
of troops in Kosovo, on the 15th of January they assaulted the Racak village where they 
executed 45 Albanians. 
5.6.3 The Rambouillet peace talks 
The international community condemned the massacre and NATO threatened military 
action against the FRY if the cease-fire was not restored. In a further attempt to avoid 
the use of force, the Contact Group called for new peace talks about the future of Kosovo 
to be held in February in Rambouillet, France. Leaders from both sides were invited. 
This time Albanians were represented by both LDK and KLA leaders and Hashim Thaqi, 
leader of the KLA supported by the US, acted as the main representative of the Albanian 
community. 
The key points proposed in the plan stipulated that: 
"The UCK must be disarmed within three months (the provision they most 
strongly opposed) and all Yugoslav jSerbian troops withdrawn from Kosovo 
apart from 1,400 border guards and 2,500 security forces. A 30,000-member 
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NATO 'enabling force' would be deployed in Kosovo (the provision most 
strongly opposed by the Serbian leadership) to ensure implementation of the 
agreement. For a three-year interim period, Kosovo would have autonomous 
institutions once again, as before 1989, including its own elected assembly, 
president and constitutional court. There would be greater devolution of 
power, however, to the province's municipalities, in areas such as policing. 
More contentiously, the different 'national communities' of Kosovo would 
have powers to block legislation if it threatened their national interest, and 
official posts would be divided up among them on a quota basis. At the 
end of the three years, there would be a further international meeting "to 
determine a mechanism for a final settlement" - a formula which did not 
exclude independence, although the Contact Group was known to be against 
it." (OSCE, 1999, p.23) 
Initially, Thaqi, refused to sign, but in March, when a second attempt to reach an 
agreement was made in Paris, he signed. The Serbian leaders refused to do so and, on 
the 20th of March, when news of 30,000 Serbian troops and irregular militia units being 
deployed spread, OSCE-KVM was pulled out. Four days later the aerial attacks on the 
FRY began with NATO attacking without an explicit authorisation of the UN Security 
Council. 
NATO air strikes continued until June and the action was formally suspended on the 
10th of June when it was confirmed that Serbian forces had started to withdraw under 
a peace plan contained in the UN Security Council Resolution 1244. 
Between March and June 1999 forces of the FRY and Serbia launched a vicious campaign 
against the Kosovo Albanian population and expelled some 863,000 from Kosovo. The 
large majority of expellees stayed in the region in Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia, Montenegro (FRY) or Bosnia-Herzegovina. An estimated 590,000 were 
internally displaced within Kosovo and remained in the province throughout the conflict 
(Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000). 
The UNHCR had to set up a complicated operation in order to assist the refugees. The 
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organisation faced both practical and diplomatic problems because of the scale of the 
crisis and the tense political environment. 
According to Morris: 
"UNHCR found itself engaged in an operation as difficult and complex as 
any we have faced. Great practical problems of assistance were compounded 
by major protection problems. Macedonia was reluctant to give asylum. 
In Montenegro the Kosovan Albanians found a government ready to protect 
them if it could but were threatened by the presence of Federal security forces. 
KLA recruitment gathered pace. Many families were separated and the 
number of missing family members grew. A multitude of practical, protection 
and political problems had to be addressed in a highly charged political 
environment in which the stakes for the governments concerned were very 
high indeed." (Morris, 1999, p.15) 
The EU states solution to the refugee crisis was reception in the neighbouring countries 
of Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro. However, the high number of refugees crossing 
the borders every day and the level of emergency in the refugee camps put a strain 
on neighbouring country. As a response, in April 1999, the UNHCR organised the 
Humanitarian Evacuation Programme (HEP) that evacuated refugees to 40 different 
countries. 
A peace plan was finally accepted by FRY President Milosevic and approved by the 
Serbian National Assembly on the 3rd of June. The main terms of the agreement 
included that: 
"[ ... ] all Serbian forces should be withdrawn, and all refugees allowed to 
return. The UCK and any other armed Kosovo Albanian groups were to 
"end immediately all offensive actions" and comply with requirements for 
demilitarization. Implementation would be overseen by KFOR, an "effective 
international security presence with substantial NATO participation", mean-
ing in practice a 50,OOO-strong joint NATO-Russian peacekeeping force, and 
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by a 3,000-member UN civilian security force. Kosovo would have a civil-
ian administrator, appointed by the UN Secretary-General, overseeing the 
establishment of "substantial autonomy" for Kosovo within the FRY and 
"provisional and democratic institutions" under an interim administration 
"pending a final settlement". No time limit was set on the life of the in-
terim administration, nor was any specific mention made of a referendum on 
Kosovo's future status." (OSCE, 1999, p.24) 
Overall, the 1990s were a decade of emigration from Kosovo. At different stages, Albani-
ans fled from discrimination and persecution and the outflow reflected some of the main 
events in the area. We can generally talk about two main groups, people arriving in 
countries of destination spontaneously, throughout the decade and during the weeks of 
NATO's bombing campaign, and refugees arriving as part of the evacuation programme 
set up by the UNHCR and 10M during the refugee crisis of April-May 1999. 
As we have seen, the emigrant community abroad played a central role in the political 
and social development of Kosovo during the 1990s, starting with their support to the 
parallel state structures set up by the LDK, their help to new waves of emigrants in 
the reception countries, their later involvement with the KLA and their active political 
role in the attempt to bring the situation of Kosovo at the attention of the international 
community. Below is a more detailed examination of the position of Kosovar Albanian 
refugees within the 1990s conflict and an analysis of their flight. In the following sections, 
I distinguish various types of emigrants by connecting the events described above to the 
results of the fieldwork and explaining how the Albanians I interviewed in the UK and 
Italy are represented in these categories. 
5.7 Refugees, conflict and flight 
In order to examine the ways in which the conflict affected people's lives and their plans 
about the future, it was necessary to understand when they considered the conflict to 
have started and find out about their ways of living and expectations about their future 
before the conflict began. 
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5.7.1 Beginning of the conflict 
There are different events that can be considered as the beginning of the conflict: Tito's 
death in 1981, Milosevic first visit to Kosovo in 1987, the revocation of Kosovo's auton-
omy of 1990, the intensification of KLA's activities 1996-1997, the beginning of NATO 
air bombing campaign of 1999. 
Several respondents referred to the death of Marshal Tito as the beginning of the prob-
lems for Kosovo and Yugoslavia in general, and described the years of Tito's regime 
with affection remembering the times of Kosovo's autonomy with nostalgia. One of the 
respondents said that after Tito's death everything started to go wrong: 
"D all , 1981, guarda, quando Tito e morto tutto e andato storto." Behar (M, 
30+, m, arr:1991, construction site manager9 ) 
None of them mentioned the hard times Kosovo Albanians went through in the early 
decades of Tito's regime; this is mostly due to the fact that the vast majority was too 
young to be able to remember the repression of 1950s and 1960s. Some respondents 
talked about the poor economic conditions of Kosovo during the 1970s and the 1980s 
and about widespread discrimination against Albanians. As a matter of fact, as ex-
plained earlier, the 1980s were especially troubled times. The political tensions started 
to rise after Marshall Tito's death when ethnic Albanians began to demonstrate against 
discrimination and asked for republic status for Kosovo. The protests were repressed 
by the police and the government tried to reassert control over the province through 
constitutional changes which limited its autonomy. Further demonstrations took place 
against these changes and, as a response the government imposed a state of emergency 
in 1989 and, in July of the following year, suspended the local parliament and govern-
ment of Kosovo. Despite these events, until the end of the decade, people did enjoy the 
benefits of Kosovo's autonomy and this aspect dominated their accounts. 
DIll the quotations from the interviews with refugees: capital 'M' stands for Male and capital 'F' for 
Female; '20+, 30+, 40+', etc. indicate if, at the time of the interviews, a respondent was in his/her 
twenties, thirties, forties and so on. The small 'm' and the small's' indicate whether the interviewee 
was married or single, 'arr:' followed by a year, refers to the refugee's time of arrival in the country of 
exile; finally, there is a reference to the employment condition of the respondent 
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"Before the war, we (Albanians) had a normal life in Kosova. We had the 
poorest jobs and our employers were mainly Serbs, especially in the factories. 
But in the villages people had more chances to work on their own land with 
animals and, in any case you see, many men were abroad to work and sent 
money to the families, so it was not too bad. At least we could speak our 
language and send our children to study." Ardian (M, 30+, m, arr:1999, 
unemployed) 
The date they all identified as the beginning of the conflict in Kosovo is 1990, the year of 
the revocation of Kosovo's autonomy. These is mostly because, as I explained earlier in 
the chapter, the new constitution revoking Kosovo's autonomy was followed by radical 
changes that affected all aspects of the life of ethnic Albanians in the province. Firstly, 
the judiciary system came under Serbian control and its independence and the guarantee 
of fair trials became questionable, and increasingly hasher restrictions were imposed on 
the media, Albanian schools were shut down, people were dismissed from their jobs in the 
public sector and general police harassment of ethnic Albanians increased. In Febru-
ary 1993, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the FRY, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, 
expressed his worries in a report to the General Assembly at its forty-seventh session 
(A/47/666), denouncing the human rights situation in Kosovo, the mass dismissal of 
Albanians from the public sector, police brutality, the lack of freedom of the media and 
problems concerning education. The report stated that: 
"The situation of human rights has been constantly worsening since Kosovo 
lost its status as an autonomous province in July 1990. The Albanian pop-
ulation has been enduring various forms of discrimination as a result of new 
laws adopted by the Republic of Serbia and the economic situation has de-
teriorated to the extent that even the subsistence of many Albanian families 
is threatened." (J\;lazowiecki, 1993, p.35) 
The refugees I interviewed suffered the direct consequences of the changes brought by 
the new constitution, whether they were actively involved in the political life of Kosovo 
or not, therefore they considered this event as the start of the conflict in the province. 
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Denis affirmed: 
"For me the problems started in 1989-1990 when Milosevic took away our 
autonomy and started to ask people to support his regime if they wanted to 
keep their jobs" Denis (M, 20+, s, arr:1995, factory worker) 
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Jetmir also said that after the changes brought by Milosevic's government in 1990 many 
people had to leave: 
"Dopo quello che ha fatto Milosevic nel '90 molti sono dovuti partire." Jetmir 
( M, 40+, m, arr:1995, unemployed) 
Saimir explained that he left in 1991 because problems in Kosovo had already started, 
factories were shut and young men risked persecution: 
"10 sono scappato nel '91, I problemi erano gia cominciati, hanno chiuso 
molte fabbriche e noi giovani maschi rischiavano di essere arrestati e tortu-
rati." Saimir (M, 30+, m, arr:1991, shepherd) 
In conclusion, the respondents felt that problems for Kosovo started with the death 
of Marshal Tito in 1980, but they recognised 1990, the year when Kosovo's autonomy 
was removed, as the beginning of the conflict. Having established this, it was necessary 
now to learn more about life before and after 1990 and ask about the ways in which 
the conflict affected not only their everyday life, but also their ideas and plans for the 
future. 
5.7.2 Life before the conflict: hopes and expectations for the future 
Many respondents described life before 1990 as relatively peaceful. Those who were over 
35 years of age at the time of the interview (2001-03) remembered the seventies and the 
eighties, the times when the autonomy of Kosovo had allowed Albanians to be involved 
in the administration, to study in Albanian schools and to live 'a normal life'. 
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Before the conflict started to escalate, the worries and hopes for the future were those 
common to lots of people and families in many other parts of the world. People hoped 
to grow and develop as individuals in their private and professional life, some hoped 
to start a family, others wished for a good education for their children and for good 
job prospects for them. Pal said that before the problems started, he had a good life 
in Kosovo, he was teaching chemistry in high school and hoped that his children could 
have the same chance to study and build a good career, then the schools were closed 
and he lost his job, his family, he lost everything, even hope: 
"A vevo una buona vita in Kosova prima di tutti problemi. Ero professore, 
insegnavo chimica a ragazzi da 14 a 18 anni. Speravo di continuare con il 
lavoro e speravo di potere fare studiare anche i miei figli, rna poi hanno chiuso 
Ie scuole e ho perso il lavoro, abbiamo perso tutto, anche la speranza" Pal 
(M, 50+, m, arr:1994, factory worker) 
Stela talked about the changes her family had to go through: 
"The conflict started in the early '90s and before we had a normal life, 
happy life. My husband is a sport doctor and he had nice job, I worked 
for the government. We have four children, two sons and two daughters. 
My children had two holidays each year, one on the sea and one skiing. At 
weekend we go around visit other places and countries. In the early 1990s the 
problems started and my three oldest children came to the UK and stayed 
here. The situation for young people was very bad. You know, the university 
was closed, schools were stopped and we lost our jobs. At that time we hoped 
that the situation could become better soon, to go back to our usual life, but 
it didn't." Stela (F, 50+, m, arr:1999, unemployed) 
As for the future of Kosovo, some respondents said that at that time they hoped that 
Kosovo could one day become independent. 
"We wanted a better future for Kosova, we wanted to have more control about 
the life of our country. The autonomy of '74 was good, but not enough. If 
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Croatia, Slovenia and t he others were republics why not Kosova? We were 
discriminated in our own house, after years of autonomy we were still POOl' , 
we needed more power to bring more changes." Ardian (M, 30+, m, arr:1999, 
unemployed) 
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The younger generations have no memory of peaceful tiDIes in Kosovo. For them, peace 
in Kosovo represents either an early childhood memory or their hope for the future . 
Most of t hem grew up attending the classes set up in private homes and garages by the 
Albanian parallel government of Kosovo, many of them saw their parents losing their 
jobs and some had been arrested or beaten up. Those who remained in Kosovo until the 
late 1990s saw their villages destroyed, their families and neighbours beaten or killed 
and the women raped. 
"My childhood was generally nice, but my adolescence was undermined by 
so many problems! You cannot imagine how it was! People were jailed for 
no reasons or murdered and many just disappeared. All this was going on 
while me and my friends were already faci ng the problems that we all have 
at that age, you know, just growing up, I guess! My cousin was put in jail 
for 7 years and she did not even know why. Her sister was put in jail as well 
for 2 days because she was part of a student group. They let her go so soon 
because her father managed to put a lot of pressure on them." Albana (F, 
30+, s, arr:1990, employee) 
Tonin said that all he could remember about his family is troubles, in the community, 
in school, at work, only problems. He is too young to remember anything different. His 
brothers left in 1992 to avoid joining the army and to look for a job abroad. They were 
sending money back and the family were just getting by, until one day a large number 
of people of his village were massacred under his own eyes and more than 147 people 
were killed. 
"Mi ricordo solo problemi, sempre problemi, a scuola, al lavoro, solo case 
terribili e problemi. Sono troppo giovane per ricordare tempi pili tranquilli , 
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non ho conosciuto niente di diverso io. I miei fratelli sono partiti nel '92 per 
evitare il servizio militare obbligatorio sotto i Serbi e per trovare un lavoro in 
Svizzera. Ci mandavano dei soldi e andavamo avanti. Poi tutto e scoppiato. 
Un giorno sono arrivati al villaggio ed hanno massacrato tutti sotto i miei 
occm. Harulo fatto un massacre, prima hanno arumazzato 147 persone, poi 
altre 5 e poi altre 28." Tonin (M, 20+, s, arr:1999, builder) 
Generally, the expectations about the futme of young generations (under 35 between 
2001-2003) were heavily conditioned by these kind of experiences. Those who were 
children during the 1990s grew up attending the schools set up by the parallel Albanian 
government in which the conditions for learning were not ideal and their final certificates 
were recognised only by the Albanian parallel structures. 
ErmaJ explained that ms grand father was the first Kosovar Albanian who took a de-
gree in a certain subject and he received his certificate during an official ceremony from 
Marshal Tito in person. In the family, they consider education as a really important 
achievement for their future and they were generally very good at school. All the grand-
children wanted to study medicine and become doctors, but when the conflict started 
and the schools were closed they were forced to continue studying in the self-organised 
schools in private houses. As a result , the standard of teaching dropped significantly 
and they begun to realise that their plans to study medicine and become doctors became 
less and less feasible and more of a dream. Moreover, the documents and certificates 
from their schools were not recognised by other authorities in and outside of Kosovo. 
"Mia nonno e stato il primo Kossoval'o Albanese a prendere la laurea in .. ; 
il Maresciallo Tito in persona gli ha consegnato il diploma in una cerimonia 
ufficiale importante. Tutti nella mia famiglia pensiamo che studiare e impor-
tantissimo per avere un buon futuro ed eravamo tutti bravi a scuola. Tutti 
noi nipoti volevamo studiare medicina e diventare dottori, rna quando tutto 
e iniziato ed hanno chiuso Ie scuole abbiamo dovuto continuare a studiare 
negli scantinati e nelle case private. Illivello si e abbassato tanto e abbiamo 
capito che diventare dot tori sarebbe stato impossibile se si continuava COSI, 
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medicina era un sogno e basta. E poi ness uno accetta 0 riconosce i documenti 
delle nostre scuole." Ermal (M, 19, s, arr:1999, student) 
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The childhood and teenage years of the young interviewees were dominated by the con-
flict and they did not know what living in peace meant until they arrived to the country 
of exile. When leaving Kosovo they either followed their parents or families or, if they 
had left on their own they were most likely to be away from their country, friends and 
families for the first time. In certain cases they had faced direct persecution or violence 
and at that time the main worry was about survival. Their hopes and expectations 
about their future were heavily influenced by the conflict and the simple plan to study 
for a certain degree to acquire a certain profession became simply untenable. 
"My generation, we had dreams, yes we did dream, but we learnt soon that 
reality was a different story, it was all about surviving." Albana (F, 30+, s, 
arr:1990, employee) 
The conflict had a strong impact on people's lives since both their daily existence and 
their future projects were disrupted by the events. While the older respondents were 
able to describe the changes in detail and remembered the years before the conflict 
with nostalgia, the youngsters, could not remember much about life before the conflict. 
Nevertheless, they also had a clear understanding of the impact it had had on their past, 
present and future. 
5.7.3 The reasons for the flight 
The growing ethnic tensions between Serbs and Albanians after the loss of Kosovo's 
autonomy, the persecution of political opponents, the violation of human rights and the 
poor economic conditions of the region were the main reasons behind the emigration 
of many Kosovo Albanians during the 1990s. Although the majority of the people I 
interviewed left Kosovo for fear of persecution, it is also clear that economic factors 
were often strictly intertwined with the political scenario and that some people might 
have appeared to be economic migrants. However, even when this seemed to be the case, 
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persecution was the main reason for their flight as people had lost their jobs because of 
their ethnicity, their political engagement or the destruction brought by the war between 
1998 and 1999. 
In order to better understand the reasons for the flight in relation to the position of 
the refugees within the conflict, it is helpful to use Zolberg et al. (1989)'s typology of 
refugees, which distinguishes between 'activists', 'targets' and 'victims'. In the case 
of the Kosovar Albanian refugee population two of the three types proposed by their 
typology are especially relevant as I explain below: activists and targets. 
Given the characteristics of the ethnic conflict in Kosovo, with two main ethnic groups 
confronting each other from different positions of power, Zolberg et all's definition of 
'target' as "a social or cultural group that has been singled out for the abuse of state 
power" (Zolberg et al., 1989, p.30) can describe the situation of Kosovo Albanians. 
In many phases of the conflict during the 1990s all Albanians in Kosovo had become 
potential targets simply because of their ethnicity. Those of them who can be considered 
as political activists, because they engaged "in some politically significant activity that 
the state seeks to extinguish" (Zolberg et al., 1989, p.30) were at the same time target 
and political activists, if we consider both their ethnicity and political engagement. 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, Kosovar Albanian 'political activists' were people 
involved in various political activities within political parties, factories, student groups, 
the press, etc. 
Zolberg et all's definition of 'victim' as the "persons displaced by societal or international 
violence that is not necessarily directed to them as individuals but makes life in their 
own country impossible" (Zolberg et al., 1989, p.30)is relevant in the case of Romas,the 
third ethnic group living in Kosovo, who were caught between Serbian and Albanian 
fires. During the Kosovo crisis, the only case when violence was not specifically directed 
at Kosovar Albanians is the case of NATO's bombing campaign addressed to specific 
Serbian targets. During the campaign, Kosovar Albanians feared violence from two 
different fronts: the Serbs pushing them out of their houses and from NATO's mistakes. 
As such it is difficult to place them within Zolberg et all's precise definition of victims, 
therefore, I focus only on the cases of Targets and Political Activists below. 
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Target 
In Kosovo, stereotypes and racism emerging from nationalist discourses and fomented 
by various events throughout the 1990s exacerbated the polarisation of the two main 
ethnic groups, Serbs and Albanians. The net division allowed the identification of each 
other's enemy on an ethnic basis making Serb and Albanians the respective target of 
each other's attacks. Given the power differential between the two groups, during many 
phases of the conflict Albanians in Kosovo were targets of state abuse. 
"They hate us, they think we are less than human being. If you were Al-
banian it was already a good reason for them to kill you. They had no 
respect for women, children, old people, we were all targets" Petrit (M, 18, 
s, arr:1999, student) 
Various human rights organisations recorded human rights violations against Kosovar 
Albanians throughout the 1990s. I discuss this in more details later in the chapter. 
Political activists 
The group of political activists includes people of different educational and family back-
grounds, age and social class who were actively opposing Belgrade's government and 
its policies in Kosovo and who asked for Kosovo's autonomy to be restored and/or for 
the recognition of its republic status. This group includes members of political parties, 
members of the parallel Kosovo Albanian government, students, journalists, factory 
workers, KLA members and supporters, and constituted, therefore, the prime target of 
persecution. 
For example, the category also includes young people who adhered to the non-violent 
protest organised by the Students Union of the Prishtina University (UPS) on the 1st 
of October 1997, in which they were asking for the use of the university premises and 
for education in Albanian language. The students faced the violent repression of their 
demonstration by the police who arrested and injured many of them. 
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This was also the case of the miners of the Thepca mines who went on strike in 1989 
to protest against the revocation of Kosovo's autonomous status and as a consequence 
lost their jobs because they were dismissed, arrested or decided to leave their jobs out 
of solidarity. 10 
In a few words, all Kosovo Albanians were potential targets of state persecution in 
Kosovo during the 1990s. Therefore, some people left Kosovo because their ethnicity 
alone made them fear violence and persecution, while others left because their political 
activities put their life particularly in danger. It is important to understand how these 
differences influenced both the time and the modality of their flight as this determined 
the time of arrival in exile and the kind of experience refugees had been through before 
their departure. 
5.7.4 The time of departure 
All the respondents I interviewed had left the region during the 1990s. Some of them had 
escaped independently to Western Europe, while others left during NATO's bombing 
campaign and had escaped first to neighbouring countries before reaching, independently 
or through the evacuation programme, other countries of exile. 
The Kinetic Model of Kunz (1973) is helpful in explaining different movements out of 
Kosovo and his distinction between 'anticipatory refugee movement' and 'acute refugee 
movement' is useful in understanding the different ways in which people fled out of 
Kosovo in relation to their situation and their position within the conflict. 
According to Kunz's typology, anticipatory refugee movements involve refugees who 
leave their home country before the deterioration of the military or political situation. 
The perceived approaching danger determines the choice to leave and the time available 
to plan the flight. In this case, K unz explains, it is not unusual that the personal fear of 
danger is preceded by gradual economical restrictions thus causing anticipatory flights 
which are simultaneously dictated by the wish to seek better economic opportunities 
and escape personal danger. 
lOBy 1995, there were only 1,200 Albanian workers in the mines, down from 5,100 in 1989. 
Chapter 5 The Conflict and the Reasons for the Flight 127 
In the case of acute refugee movements, people flee in mass or in groups, in order to 
escape the immediate danger brought by a great political change or war and run to 
safety in a neighbouring country or nearby country willing to grant them asylum. If 
the situation deteriorates in the first country of exile, further migration to a different 
country might follow. 
In the case of Kosovar refugees, we can distinguish both types: anticipatory refugee 
movements in Kosovo include a variety of people who left the region at different stages 
in the 1990s in order to escape for fear of personal danger such as political activists, 
young people, people who lost their jobs because of the political situation and suspected 
collaborators of the regime; acute refugee movements include the people who left in the 
late 1990s exodus of people from Kosovo as a consequence of the escalation of violence, 
mass expulsions and NATO's bombing campaign. The two cases are explained in more 
detail next. 
5.7.5 Anticipatory refugees 
Youth 
This group includes young people who left Kosovo when the University of Pristina was 
closed, to escape persecution and study abroad or look for a job. Behar was studying 
law in the late 1980s and got involved with the student movement. He managed not 
to get caught when the police raided the demonstrations, but he was always in great 
danger. When they closed the university he left immediately since the situation was 
getting worse and there was nothing he could do if he stayed but endanger his life. 
"Alla fine degli anni '80 ero iscritto all'Universita di Pristina e studiavo 
legge. Facevo parte del movimento studentesco ed ho partecipato alle man-
ifestazioni. Quando la polizia e intervenuta ed ha arrestato alcuni di noi 
so no riuscito a scappare. Sono rimasto, anche se ero sempre in pericolo, fino 
a quando hanno chiuso l'universita. A que I punto ho deciso di andar via, 
perche la situazione stava precipitando e per me non c'era altro che pericolo 
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per la mia vita se restavo."Behar (M, 30+, m, arr:1991, construction site 
manager) 
Another group of young people, coming mainly from middle class families from Pristina, 
were already abroad in the early 1990s. They were mainly in the UK, to learn or improve 
their English language skills or to travel during their gap year. Many of them decided 
that it was not safe to return to Kosovo considering the news they received from home 
and became refugees. 
"Many of my generation came to London after high school. Almost all my 
school came here. We wanted to see London and learn English. [ ... ] Then the 
problem started in Croatia and even in Kosova the situation became worse 
and worse. I talked to my parents on the phone and they told me that it was 
better if I did not go back. I did not want to be part of the conflict, neither 
as a victim nor as an offender. My friend decided to do the same and many 
others of us remained here." Ada (F, 30+, s, arr:1991, shop manager) 
A further example is that of young males who were conscripted into the Yugoslav army, 
which after the war in Bosnia and Croatia was de facto a Serbian army. Many of them 
left Kosovo to avoid the military service. 
"I escaped to avoid the army. The ones who went, did not come back. The 
war in other parts of Yugoslavia had started and I did not want to fight in 
the Serbian army. They arrested people if they didn't want to go, so I knew 
that my life was in danger and I had to leave." Ardian (M, 30+, m, arr: 1999, 
unemployed) 
People who had lost their jobs 
Civil servants, doctors, teachers, professors, journalists, miners and many others lost 
their jobs because of their ethnicity. Some of them lost their positions for having 
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protested against the revocation of Kosovo's autonomy status or/and certain policies 
imposed on them from Belgrade. 
Behar explained that the regime closed the schools, fired many workers and stopped 
paying teachers and other professionals. He said that people were desperate and that if 
you were Albanian you could not find work any longer. 
"Anni '90, chiuse scuole e hanno mandato via tutti quanti gli operai, il regime 
non pagava pili insegnanti 0 altri professionisti. La gente era disperata. Se 
eri Albanese, non lavoravi pili."Behar (M, 30+, m, arr:1991, construction 
si te manager) 
This reinforces the view that even though some refugees could appear to be economic 
migrants, they were in fact refugees escaping persecution and discrimination. 
Collaborators of the regime 
Some people, including civil servants who kept their jobs, interpreters and whoever was 
suspected of entertaining good relationship with the Serbian community, were considered 
as collaborators of the Serbian regime. The majority of these people left Kosovo after the 
KLA started to be operative in Kosovo targeting them. Others remained in Kosovo and 
left only during the mass expulsion that happened during NATO air bombing campaign. 
"I worked for the government as an interpreter for 20 years and I was also 
employed in the office that worked with political prisoners. I have so many 
enemies, all the families of political prisoners. I managed to escape danger 
until 1999 when my family was pushed out of Kosova by Serbian paramilitary 
soldiers." Stela(F, 50+, m, arr:1999, unemployed) 
5.7.6 Acute refugees 
Between 1998 and 1999, the conflict reached the highest level of violence causing the 
flight of thousands of Kosovar Albanians. The clashes in 1998 (between April and 
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September) caused the displacement of between 200,000 and 300,000 people of which 
about 60,000 fled out of Kosovo (Independent International Commission on Kosovo , 
2000). The refugee crisis worsened during NATO's intervention, from March to June 
1999, with many people driven out of their homes to escape violence or being directly 
expelled (Morozzo della Rocca, 1999). 
Human rights violations had been recorded by several human rights organisations in 
Kosovo throughout the 1990s. A report of the OSCE-KVM mission describes the situ-
ation between October 1998 to 9 June 1999 recording various human rights violations. 
According to the report: 
"The range of themes covered is indicative of how extensive was Kosovo's 
human rights crisis within the time period of October 1998 to the 9th June 
1999, albeit many of the issues covered had been of growing concern for 
years." (OSCE, 1999, p.30) 
The list of violations includes: violation of the right to life, torture and ill-treatment, 
rape and other forms of sexual violence, missing persons, arbitrary arrest and detention, 
violation of the right to a fair trial, other forms of persecution such as intimidation 
and harassment and denial of access to health care. Moreover, OSCE (1999) recorded 
deliberate destruction of civilian property, looting and pillage. During NATO's bombing 
campaign other human rights abuses were recorded such as the use of human shields and 
other endangering of non-combatants during military operations and forced expulsion. 
Some of the people I interviewed had been victims of violence and human rights abuses 
or had escaped after witnessing violence on families, neighbours and friends; many had 
seen the destruction of their houses and/or their entire villages. 
"In March 1999, the Serbians attacked my village with heavy artillery. They 
came with their tanks and kept shooting for 3 hours. They started burn-
ing houses. We all tried to leave immediately our homes and run to the 
mountains to escape. The day after we went back to check, the village was 
destroyed, my house was completely destroyed by the fire, there was nothing 
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no food, no fire, nothing. Only bodies of dead people, especially women 
and children, they had cut their heads off. It was terrible, horrifying, I can-
not think about it. (The interview was stopped for a moment, to give the 
respondent time to calm down, after a while he agreed to continue.) We 
couldn't stay there, we had to go, it was terrible and they could come back 
at anytime." Alban (M, 20+, m, arr:1999, student) 
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Other people had been expelled; they were thrown out of their houses and ordered to 
leave the country immediately. This was the case for Stela' s family: 
"One day, in 1999, the Serbian soldiers came to our area in Prishtina and 
gave us 5 minutes to leave the country. I had just time to get a warm jacket 
for my son and hide my gold in my socks. I left with nothing, wearing my 
slippers because I did not even had time to put my shoes on. We started 
going towards the border with Macedonia with our neighbours and many 
other people." Stela (F, 50+, m, arr:1999, unemployed) 
People generally fled en masse or in groups, in the attempt to escape the immediate 
danger brought by the war or were forced out of their houses and expelled by military or 
paramilitary forces. They ran to safety mainly in Albania and in the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Some of them proceeded to migrate to a further 
country of exile. 
5.7.7 Modalities of the flight and final destination 
The way in which refugees left Kosovo, the issue of whether they chose their destinations 
and, if they did, why they chose particular countries can offer new elements to the study 
of their initial encounter with the country of exile and their modes of settlement and, 
therefore, their attitudes towards return. 
Robinson and Segrott (2002) studied the way in which asylum seekers choose their 
country of destination. Their report highlights three main factors: the prior decision-
making of the possible agent, their access to resources and the urgency of their departure 
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from their country of origin. They explain that acute asylum seekers may have to take the 
first opportunity offered to them while anticipatory asylum seekers may be able to wait 
for what they perceive as a better offer. Therefore, the distinction between anticipatory 
and acute refugee movements is also useful to examine how the respondents took the 
decision to leave, the way they left, whether they planned the flight and how and why 
they decided to come to Italy or the UK. According to Robinson and Segrott (2002), 
another four variables are important in the selection of a destination for an asylum 
seekers: 
1. the most important factor is whether an asylum seeker has family or friends who 
already live in one of the countries considered; If the asylum seeker does not know 
anybody abroad or has relatives in more than one possible countries; 
2. then, language becomes the next most important factor; 
3. in cases where asylum seekers have the choice of several countries where they have 
relatives and where their chosen language is also spoken, they will choose on the 
basis of cultural affinity; 
4. finally, when all the above factors are taken into account and the choice is still 
quite wide, decisions are taken on the basis of images and perceptions already 
held, and usually casually acquired (through film, music, sport and novels). 
In the case of Kosovar Albanian refugees these variables were especially important in 
the case of anticipatory refugees and acute refugees who left Kosovo independently and 
less relevant in the case of acute refugees who were moved out of their area through the 
evacuation programme. 
5.8 Anticipatory refugee movements 
Kunz (1973) observes that anticipatory refugees might have preferences on where to flee, 
but often other factors, rather than their personal wish, will determine the destination. 
Generally, Kosovar Albanians belonging to this category had some time to think about 
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their departure. The general favourite destinations in Europe were Switzerland and 
Germany, because many of them had families or friends who had migrated earlier to 
those countries. The respondents I interviewed in Italy and in the UK had very different 
reasons for having reached the two countries. 
5.B.1 Arrivals in Italy 
Italy was not the immediate choice for many people at the beginning of the 1990s. Ini-
tially, many saw Italy as a country of transition to other destinations, mainly Switzerland 
and Germany. Some people tried repeatedly to go and settle there, but did not manage 
and remained in Italy. As a result, a significant number of Kosovar Albanians are settled 
in certain northern areas of Italy, for example in the region of Lombardia at the border 
with Switzerland. I conducted some of my interviews in that area and the respondents 
told me that, initially, they had gone there to try to cross the border. Then they realised 
that it was not easy and remained there. There was an advantage on being close to the 
border anyway, a relative proximity to their relatives and friends on the other side of 
the border. Other people went to Italy to join other friends or families who had already 
settled there for some time and did not know what to expect. Engjll left Kosovo to 
go to Switzerland in 1992. He stayed there until 1994, but since he had not managed 
to regularise his position, he decided to try in Italy and joined some friends of his who 
could help him. 
"Ho lasciato il Kosovo per and are in Svizzera nel 1992, sono stato per un 
po' di tempo la fino al 1994, rna non sono riuscito ad avere documenti a 
posto. Allora sono venuto qua in Italia dove avevo alcuni amici che mi 
hanno aiutato." Engjll (M, 50+, m, arr:1994, carpenter) 
Saimir, instead, came to Italy directly from Kosovo to join a friend. The only information 
about Italy he had was about the Mafia, moreover, other friends who had migrated to 
Switzerland or Germany had told him that many Italians were migrants there as well. 
"Un mio amico lavorava qui, allora l'ho raggiunto. Avevo sentito dell'Italia 
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solo per la Mafia e avevo sentito da parenti e amici che erano andati in 
Svizzera e Germania che molti Italiani erano anche loro la." Saimir (M, 
30+, m, arr:1991, shepherd) 
5.8.2 Arrivals in the UK 
According to Robinson and Segrott's specific study on the UK situation, many of the 
people that they interviewed came to the UK: 
"[ ... J because they spoke English, because they had some familiarity with 
English or because they regarded English as a world language, the acquisition 
of which would increase access to opportunities" (Robinson and Segrott, 
2002, p.62) 
The case of Kosovar Albanians in the UK seems to confirm these findings. Initially, 
people came to the UK mainly because of the language. Some people had studied 
English at school and felt more comfortable about communicating with the locals and, 
therefore, better equipped to seize more opportunities; others were attracted by the 
chance to improve their language skills or learn English, which they considered to be 
a useful language for its international relevance. Joining families and friends was the 
other main reason for choosing the UK as a destination. 
"We wanted to see London and learn English. That is why we came here. 
Where else could I have gone? Germany? Too racist! Italy or France, I 
did not know the language at all and I am not interested in learning them 
either. These are fine to visit, not to live in! Scandinavian countries it is 
too cold! England is logical, for the language!" Denisa (F, 30+, s, arr:1990, 
beautician) 
5.9 Acute refugee movements 
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Kunz (1973) highlights that the first need for refugees in acute refugee movements is that 
of reaching safety. In this case, the aim of most refugees is that of crossing the border 
to escape the immediate danger and the choice of the destination is dictated by this 
need. He adds that, in some cases further migration to a third country will be necessary 
at a later stage, but when passing through the borders few of the refugees are actually 
aware that this might take place. In Kosovo, those who belong to this category did not 
have much time to prepare their departure. Many had never considered this possibility 
before, as they were especially old people, women and children, but were forced to leave 
as a response to the direct violence that pushed them out of their homes and villages 
and reached neighbouring countries. 
Ermal told the story of his family's escape from their village. On the 25th of March 1999 
he had to flee with his grandmother, his mother and two brothers. His father had left 
earlier to escape persecution. They used to live together and since 1998 they had been 
worried about Serbian attacks to their village which was inhabited only by Albanians. 
That day, when his mother woke up to check out the window if the situation was safe, 
she saw Serbian soldiers on the hill opposite their house. Then she woke them up and 
while they were looking out of the window they saw one of their neighbours who was 
going to the centre of the village to warn other people. The man was shot under their 
eyes and they understood they had to leave. Only three families of the village managed 
to escape. The Serbians killed 22 family members and 56 other people. His grandfather 
decided to stay behind to bury the corpses of the first people who had died which were 
in their garden, but they shot him too. In the turmoil of the attack, they could do 
nothing but keep fleeing for their lives with nothing, not even shoes on their feet. They 
followed other people who were going to Albania. 
"II 25 Marzo 1999, io, mia nonna, mia mamma e due fratelli siamo dovuti 
scappare da casa nostra. Abitavamo tutti insieme. Mio papa era andato via 
qualche anno prima perche 10 cercavano per ammazzarlo. Dal 1998 eravamo 
sempre preoccupati di un attacco, il nostro villaggio era abitato solo da 
Albanesi ed eravamo un target dell'esercito Serbo. II 25 i\larzo, mia madre 
si era alzata presto. Si alzava presto ogni mattina, per controllare dalla 
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finestra la situazione. Quel giorno si e accorta che la collina davanti a casa 
nostra era piena di soldati Serbi. Ci ha svegliati, e siamo andati a controllare 
alIa finestra anche noi, Abbiamo visto un nostro vicino che correva verso il 
centro del villaggio per avvisare tutti. Lo abbiamo visto cadere a terra , 
gli hanno sparato dalla collina. Solo tre famiglie siamo riuscite a scappare. 
Hanno sparato a 22 persone della mia famiglia e 56 altre persone sono morte. 
Quando siamo scappati, mio non no e rimasto indietro perche voleva seppellire 
i primi tredici che hanno ucciso i cui corpi erano nel nostro giardino, rna non 
e riuscito perche hanno sparato anche a lui. Noi non siamo riusciti a fare 
niente, dovevamo andare. Siamo scappati senza niente, neanche Ie scarpe e 
abbiamo seguito gli altri verso l'Albania". Ermal (M, 19, s, arr:1999, student) 
People escaped to neighbouring countries, and at a later stage, some of them were 
either taken to other countries through the evacuation programme or left independently 
to reach other destinations. The main reasons for this further migration were that of 
avoiding the harsh conditions of the refugee camps and the growing tension in the first 
country of exile or reach families and friends abroad. 
Everyone I interviewed, who belongs to this group, arrived in Italy or the UK after 
having reached one of the possible neighbouring countries; some of them managed to 
leave independently, often with the aim of reaching relatives who already lived there, 
while others came through the evacuation programme. 
"Serbian soldiers came to the village in March 1999. They wanted to know 
where the UCK people lived, they threatened that if we did not tell them 
they would rape the women and kill the children. Then, they set fire to the 
house. They separated the men from the women and children. The young 
women were raped and the children were terrified. We were separated for 3 
days before we saw our husbands again. All the men had been beaten and 
the village had been completely destroyed. We had to leave, women and 
children in a trailer and the men on foot, we started going. We went to 
Albania and stayed in a camp in a tent. There we found an agent who sold 
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us a trip to safety and after about a month of traveling by bus and plane and 
train we arrived to England." Mimoza (F, 40+, m, arr:1999, unemployed) 
"We reached the border with Macedonia. There we found several Albanian 
families from Macedonia waiting to help those who were running away from 
Kosovo like us. We were really lucky because a family decided to help us 
and they had us in their house for two months. They were too good to us! I 
will never forget what they did for us! While we were there, we heard about 
the possibility to apply in Scopje for the evacuation offered by the English 
government and we applied in the hope to see our children again. (They 
were in London since the early 1990s). We were accepted and we went to 
Manchester." Stela (F, 50+, m, arr:1999, unemployed) 
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In conclusion, anticipatory refugees had generally more time to plan their escape from 
Kosovo. Although, the majority would have preferred to go to Switzerland or Germany, 
other factors influenced their flight to other countries. Initially, those who went to Italy 
had the intention to reach other destinations, but since they did not manage to cross 
the borders, they stayed; others, chose Italy because they already had some families or 
friends there who could help them. The UK was mostly chosen for the language oppor-
tunities and to join families and friends as well. Overall, acute refugees escaped because 
of sudden events such as the direct attack to their neighbourhoods, families and houses 
or because they were expelled. Their flight was not planned, but came as a reaction to 
events that were out of their control. They run towards neighbouring countries. Some 
of them remained there, while others migrated further to other countries. The acute 
refugees, who reached Italy or the UK, did so independently or through the evacuation 
programme and the main aim was that of reaching friends or relatives. 
5.10 Conclusions 
This chapter presented an overview of the main historical phases of the Serbian-Albanian 
relations in Kosovo and the ways in which different crisis produced new migration waves. 
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It focused on the 1990s events and the escalation of the conflict and examined their im-
pact on the life of the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo. Furthermore, it explored 
the refugees' position within the conflict and the ways in which this affected the time and 
the way they left the country. An understanding of this phase of the refugee experience 
was necessary as it plays a central role in the analysis of the following phases, of settle-
ment and return, that I present in the following chapters. According to the findings of 
the fieldwork, most refugees believed that the revocation of Kosovo's autonomy, in 1990, 
marked the beginning of the conflict. Although problems of discrimination and racism 
had been part of life in Kosovo during the 1970s and 1980s as well, the respondents who 
could remember those years described them with nostalgia. At that time they enjoyed 
the benefits afforded by Kosovo's status of autonomous province which allowed them 
to live a peaceful existence, participate in the administration, send their children to 
Albanian schools and celebrate their cultural heritage. The main differences in people's 
accounts of life before 1990 were mostly determined by their social class, education, age, 
place of residence, etc. Undoubtedly, the conflict brought major changes that influenced 
both their daily life and their plans for the future. In fact, after the removal of Kosovo's 
autonomy, human rights were restricted and the economic situation of ethnic Albanians 
started to worsen as a result of laws adopted by the Republic of Serbia. The judiciary 
system came under Serbian control and the concept of fair trials was largely abandoned, 
harsh restrictions were imposed on the media, Albanian schools were closed down and 
general police harassment of ethnic Albanians increased. As a result, career prospects, 
students' academic opportunities and other personal plans for the future were disrupted 
by these events. Moreover, all Kosovar Albanians became potential targets of state per-
secution. Obviously, the life of those who were politically engaged was particularly in 
danger, however, the simple fact of being ethnic Albanian made people the target of 
human rights abuses. I analysed this in more detail referring to Zolberg et al. (1989) 's 
typology which explains refugees' position in relation to the conflict and distinguished 
two types of Kosovar Albanian refugees, Targets and Political Activists. This allowed 
me to explain different patterns of flight with the additional help of Kunz (1973) 's ki-
netic model. I showed that Political Activists and specific kind of Targets (the youth, 
journalists, teachers and people dismissed from their jobs because of their ethnicity) 
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were anticipatory refugees who left Kosovo before the conflict precipitated in 1998-1999. 
These people, I explained, had specific reasons for leaving the country and had, gen-
erally, more time to plan their flight and attempt to reach their favorite destination. 
Acute refugee movements included Targets, people who were direct subject of violence 
because of their ethnicity as a result of the increasing level of violence that was brought 
by the events of the late 1990s. In this case, people left suddenly, with no time to 
plan their flight and reached neighbouring countries in desperate conditions. Some of 
them proceeded to re-emigrate to other countries independently or via the evacuation 
programme. 
These differences, I have argued in previous chapters, are most likely to influence the 
refugees' mode of settlement in the country of exile and, consequently, have also an 
impact on the decision about return. In the following two chapters on Kosovar Albanians 
who arrived in the UK or Italy independently (Chapter 6) or through the Humanitarian 
Evacuation Programme (Chapter7) I deal with the refugees experience in exile and 
examine the different contexts anticipatory and acute refugees had to confront and the 
way in which they related to them. 
PAGE NUMBERING AS IN THE 
ORIGINAL THESIS 
Chapter 6 
Reception and settlement of 
Kosovar Albanian refugees in the 
UK: the case of spontaneous 
arrivals 
6 .1 Introduction 
In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 I argued that four key factors need to be considered when 
studying refugees' decision-making processes in relation to return: their relationship with 
the country of origin and the conflict, the experience during the flight, their encounter 
and interaction with the receiving society and its policies, the conditions in the country 
of origin after the end of the conflict. 
In this chapter and in Chapter 7 I focus on the refugees' experiences in the country of 
exile, the UK and Italy respectively, beginning with an analysis of the immigration and 
asylum policies that set up the context within which refugees found themselves at the 
time of their arrival. As explained in Chapter 4, I distinguish between different groups 
of Kosovar Albanian refugees in the UK (more specifically England) and Italy in order 
to better understand the influence exercised by the conditions in the country of exile on 
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the decision to return. 
This chapter focuses on the case of Kosovar Albanians in the UK. It provides a brief 
overview of the previous interaction between politics, media, public opinion, NGOs and 
refugees vis-a.-vis immigration and asylum in order to understand the conditions Kosovar 
Albanian refugees found when they arrived in the UK. This overview is followed by an 
analysis of the refugees' interaction with these conditions and a study of their collective 
and individual responses to them. Attention is given to the differences in social class, 
education, age and gender of the refugees and their different positions within the conflict 
in the country of origin. While in the previous chapter I distinguished between different 
types of refugees according to their position in relation to the conflict, the time and 
the modes of their departure, here I explore the ways in which these differences affected 
the relationship with the policies and society of the receiving country, and the modes of 
settlement of anticipatory and acute refugees who arrived spontaneously in the UK. 
In the following chapter, I focus on the reception and settlement of Kosovar Albanians 
who arrived spontaneously in Italy and I compare the experiences of the refugees in the 
two countries highlighting some of the differences and similarities. 
6.1.1 Preliminary 
In both Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, I discuss refugees' settlement and integration policies 
and considering that there are no clear single definitions of these concepts, it is necessary 
to explain how I use these terms before delving into the analysis. 
With respect to "integration", Castles et al. (2003) emphasise that: "There is no single, 
generally accepted definition, theory or model of immigrant and refugee integration. 
The concept continues to be controversial and hotly debated" (Castles et al., 2003). 
There are two main usages of the term which have different meanings. Integration, they 
explain, is either used in a normative way, indicating a one-way process of adaptation 
by newcomers to fit in with a dominant culture and way of life or is conceived as a 
two-way process of adaptation, which implies changing values, norms and behaviour for 
both newcomers and members of the existing society (Castles et al., 2003, p.114). 
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Similarly, there is no single definition of settlement. It is one of the many alternative 
concepts to integration and it is a relatively general and neutral term indicating once 
again the process whereby immigrants and refugees become part of society (Castles et al., 
2003). Castles et al. (2003) notice that despite the fact that much sociological research 
on settlement stresses the active role of the immigrants and the ethnic community, in 
the context of policy models the term is mainly used to define the process in top-down 
or social engineering terms. 
In general, I use the term 'integration' or 'settlement' in Chapter ?? and Chapter ?? 
to describe the process by which refugees and the structure and culture of the receiving 
society interact with each other in the country of exile. I follow the definition of the 
European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) that considers integration to be a 
process of change that is: 
"a) dynamic and two-way: it places demands on both receiving societies and the indi-
viduals and/or the communities concerned. From a refugee perspective, integration 
requires a preparedness to adapt to the lifestyle of the host society without having 
to lose one's own cultural identity. From the point of view of the host society, it 
requires a willingness to adapt public institutions to changes in the population pro-
file, accept refugees as part of the national community, and take action to facilitate 
access to resources and decision-making processes. 
b) long term: from a psychological perspective, it often starts at the time of arrival in 
the country of final destination and is concluded when a refugee becomes an active 
member of that society from a legal, social, economic, educational and cultural 
perspective. 
c) multi-dimensional: it relates both to the conditions for and actual participation in 
all aspects of the economic, social, cultural, civil and political life of the country 
of durable asylum as well as to refugees' own perception of acceptance by and 
membership in the host society." (ECRE, 1999, p.6-7) 
Although, ECRE places emphasis on the fact that integration often starts at the time 
of arrival, in the policy context, both integration and settlement are often referred to 
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people who already have a status in the country of exile. Smart (2001) recognises that 
excluding people with no status, such as asylum seekers or illegal migrants, means ne-
glecting their needs and universal human desire to put down roots wherever they are 
and independently of how short the stay. In this chapter, and in the following one, I use 
the terms settlement/integration interchangeably and analyse refugees' settlement/inte-
gration process independently of their legal position in the country of exile. 
6.2 Migration and Asylum Policies in the UK 
This chapter deals with migration and asylum policies in the UK beginning with a brief 
general historical overview before placing emphasis on the 1990s which directly affected 
Kosovar Albanian refugees. 
Migration has been part of British history for a long time, with Britain being both a 
country of emigration and immigration (Morgado, 1989; Miles and Cleary, 1993; Cohen, 
1994; Bade, 2003). Since the beginning of the nineteenth century emigration from Britain 
has been larger than immigration (Wahlbeck, 1999; Foot, 1999), however, it is the latter 
that has increasingly come to dominate public discourse since the end of the nineteenth 
century, especially after the Second World War (Morgado, 1989; Foot, 1999). 
The debate on immigration of the 1950s is particularly relevant to the study of current 
immigration and asylum policies in Britain because it defines the general British ap-
proach to immigration issues. At that time, immigration was a response to the labour 
shortages following the war and Britain received new waves of immigrants from the New 
Commonwealth (the Caribbean and the Indian subcontinent) while continuing to at-
tract others from the Old Commonwealth, the Irish Republic and Europe (Zetter et al., 
2002). The debate focused mainly on the issues related to Black immigration to Britain 
and led to the adoption of specific measures that discouraged and restricted admission 
(Carter et al., 1987). On the one hand, it was believed that new 'coloured' entrants 
could be assimilated into British society considering that according to the 1948 British 
Nationality Act all New Commonwealth immigrants were indistinctly given British citi-
zenship. On the other hand, in practice, their presence was regarded with apprehension 
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and their 'colour' was held to signify 'racial' features that made it impossible for them 
to be assimilated in British society (Carter, 2000). Increasing social tensions demanded 
political action and the interpretation of immigration as a problem of numbers in re-
lation to potential cultural and racial dilution (Zetter et al., 2002). This led to the 
development of a racist and restrictive tradition in immigration control (Platt, 1991) 
based on two contrasting ideas: on the one hand, the growing numbers of Black citizens 
represented a threat for society as a source of social problems on the ground of racial 
differences and their access to the country needed to be controlled and restricted; on the 
other hand, it was necessary to promote the 'integration' in the wider society of those 
who were already in the country under the umbrella of multiculturalism which promotes 
diversity and tolerance within an equal opportunity framework (Solomos, 1989). Ac-
cording to the multicultural discourse in Britain, different cultures can coexist within 
the same society. People belong to distinct communities which are culturally defined 
and have clear boundaries (Anthias and Yuval-Davies, 1992)) but at the same time they 
are equal to each others in the public domain. Zetter at al. emphasise the relevance of 
these issues in the study of refugees in Britain remarking that: 
"[ ... ] public discourse on immigration in the UK continues to focus on the 
question of race and race relations. Immigration has become synonymous 
with race relations, a factor which helps explain the generally restrictive 
government response to increasing numbers of asylum seekers entering the 
UK from the middle of the 1980s onwards, many of whom were from non-
white 'third world' countries (Miles and Cleary, 1993; Cohen, 1994; Schuster 
and Solomos, 1999; Griffith and Chan-Kam, 2002)." (Zetter et al., 2002, p.42) 
The following section explores in more detail the development of asylum policies in the 
UK, the reaction of the media and public opinion to asylum seekers and refugees and 
the response of refugees and refugee organisations. 
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6.2.1 Asylum policies in the UK: 1990s 
Britain has a long-standing tradition of hosting refugees that goes back to the seven-
teenth century, with the case of the French Huguenots and for centuries the country of-
fered a right to asylum to refugees without actually having an explicit asylum law (Foot, 
1999). According to Bade (2003), because of this lack of policy, Britain was actually the 
most consistent and important asylum-granting country in the nineteenth century. The 
first attempts to control refugee influx coincided with the arrival of Jews from Eastern 
Europe at the end of the nineteenth century (Foot, 1999; Wahlbeck, 1999). However, 
until the 1980s, Britain was still one of the most open countries within Europe in respect 
to the right of asylum. In fact, it was among the initial signatory countries to the UN 
Refugee Convention in 1951 and ratified the 1967 Protocol in 1968 (United Nations, 
1995). 
It was only in the 1990s, the timeframe that concerns specifically the case of Kosovar 
Albanian refugees, that the government started adopting restrictive measures in order 
to control the number of refugees as a response to the general increase in the number 
of asylum claimants. In fact, throughout the 1980s, the UK had received a low number 
of refugees compared to the majority of other Western European countries (Cohen and 
J oly, 1989). However, at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s the numbers had increased 
notably. This was mostly a reflection of the general worldwide increase in the number 
of refugees due to the raising instability in many regions of the world and to the specific 
large-scale movement of refugees caused by the break-up of Yugoslavia within Europe. 
As a matter of fact, until the 1990s, asylum seekers and refugees were considered as 
a particular group of immigrants which was kept outside of the general immigration 
debate. Ironically, at a time when general immigration issues were loosing a central role 
in the political and public debate, mostly because the doors to immigration had been 
closed since the mid-seventies (Joly, 1996), issues related to the right to asylum moved 
high up in the political agenda. Consequently, the public and media hostility that usu-
ally, in the past, had characterised responses to newly-arrived immigrant communities 
started to be directed towards asylum seekers and refugees (Zetter and Pearl, 2000). 
Moreover, the increase in numbers put a strain on the traditional individual determi-
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nation procedures presenting a challenge to the domestic legal systems designed for the 
protection of refugees which were neither prepared nor equipped to deal with it (Billings, 
2001). The government response was to explain the increase of applications by asserting 
that this was due to economic migrants abusing the system; it was generally concluded 
that tighter immigration control was needed in relation to asylum. Consequently, the 
historical proud heritage of Britain as a home for those fleeing persecution and torture 
emphasising an inclusive and open vision of modern Britain (Wills, 2002) now needed 
to be reconciled with these new perceptions of asylum seekers/refugees as a threat to 
community stability and good race relations. Therefore, mirroring the post-war debate 
on immigration of the 1950s, over the past fifteen years the debate on asylum has devel-
oped around two different arguments: on the one hand, deterring people from coming 
and claiming asylum is considered a necessity while, on the other hand, refugees who 
are already in Britain are expected to adapt and fit in the larger society (Griffith and 
Chan-Kam, 2002). This kind of political approach to asylum, the negative media rep-
resentation of asylum seekers/refugees and people's perception of them as a threat to 
national identity and stability have contributed to turning asylum seekers/refugees into 
one of the least popular groups in British society (Griffith and Chan-Kam, 2002). 
At the political level, over the past decade, the difference between the approach of the 
Labour and Conservative parties to the issue has shrank and this is evident in the use of 
a common political language which talks about 'swamping', 'floods', 'torrents' of asylum 
seekers coming into Britain and describes the need to be tough on 'bogus' refugees and 
fair with 'genuine' refugees. Overall, the strategy of the Labour government is based on 
the idea that it is necessary to be tough on immigration and asylum in order to deny 
the British National Party and other extreme right movements the possibility to step 
into the breach with more extreme rhetoric (D'Ancona, 2002). According to the Home 
Secretary Blunkett (2002): 
"Unless properly managed, (however), migration can be perceived as a threat 
to community stability and good race relations. Where asylum is used as a 
route to economic migration, it can cause deep resentment in the host com-
munity. Democratic governments need to ensure that their electorates have 
Chapter 6 Reception and settlement of Kosovar Albanian refugees in the UK: the case 
148 ft' al o spon aneous arTlV: s 
confidence and trust in the nationality, immigration and asylum systems they 
are operating, or else people will turn to extremists for answers." (Blunkett, 
2002, p.65) 
Throughout the 1990s, the government adopted different strategies in order to keep the 
figures in relation to asylum as low as possible; Billings (2001) distinguishes between 
two different kinds of strategies: external and internal ones. 
He lists various measures: 
"The external strategies employed are: the imposition of visa requirements 
from people from countries likely to produce refugees; the burden of finan-
cial penalties for carriers who accept passengers without the correct travel 
documentation; the concept of 'safe third country'; the use of international 
zones at ports of entry; and interdiction of asylum seekers at sea. Internal 
strategies are: the use of expedited asylum status determination procedures 
and truncated means of appeal; restrictions on, or denial of, basic means of 
subsistence, health care and education; and the use of detention." (Billings, 
2001, p.5) 
In the media, despite the fact that general reporting of race-related issues has shown 
signs of improvement over the last decade, the negative reporting has shifted from mi-
norities to asylum seekers (Mollard, 2001). A study by Oxfam indicates that, through 
unbalanced reporting, the British press continues to spread a whole series of myths, 
including perceptions of Britain as being a 'soft touch' and of 'refugees swamping' the 
country. For example, in a recent poll conducted by MORl, when asked what percentage 
of the world's refugees are in the UK, respondents estimated an average of 23% while 
the real figure is actually 1.9% (MORI, 2002). 
Similarly, since the early 1990s, the public debate on asylum has increasingly focused on 
the widespread opinion that refugees and asylum seekers represent a threat to society. 
Griffith and Chall-Kam (2002) emphasise the fact that public negative perceptions of 
refugees have never been worse and Britain has become one of the most refugee-phobic 
Chapter 6 Reception and settlement of Kosovar Albanian refugees in the UK: the case 
of spontaneous arrivals 149 
countries in the EU. The public rhetoric behind people's protests against the opening 
of new centres to host asylum seekers shows the use of stereotypes and a 'new' racism 
that justify widespread general fear. For example, in 2003, the Home Office's plan 
to use the former military airbase Daedalus in Lee-on-the-Solent, Hampshire, to host 
between 400 and 500 asylum seekers met the fierce opposition of the local community 
that created the Daedalus Action Group which used the slogan 'Realist not Racist'. 
Gosport Borough Council voted unanimously to contribute £5,000 towards the action 
group campaigning against the proposed centre and councillors in Fareham agreed to 
contribute another £5,000. The group organised public gatherings, demonstrations, and 
presented a petition to the Home Office against the plan which was dropped. 
The Daedalus Action Group's website explains what the community fears listing: 
"Increased crime, personal safety issues, terrorism links, proximity to naval 
bases and other high risk installations, overtaxing health and other resources, 
reduction in property prices, increased insurance costs." (Daedalus Action 
Group, 2004) 
Resistance to this kind of criminalisation of asylum seekers and refugees has mostly come 
from the NGO sector and from Refugee Community Organisations (RCOs). For asylum 
seekers it is difficult to mobilise as a group since they do not have a common language 
or country of origin, they lack resources and their status impedes organisation (Webber, 
1995). Some of them, especially those kept in detention centres or fearing deportation, 
have tried to protest using hunger strikes and other peaceful form of protest such as the 
case of an Iranian refugee who stitched up his eyelids, lips and ears in protest at the 
threat of deportation. In a few extreme cases small groups have reacted with rooftop 
protests (like in Campsfield detention centre in 1994). 
Overall, organisations such as the Refugee Council, Refugee Action, Amnesty Interna-
tional Oxfam and RCOs have been the main promoters of different views on asylum , 
and the 1990s have seen the creation of new organisations which aim to combat the 
widespread racism and intolerance. To name a few: the National Coalition of Anti-
Deportation Campaigns formed in 1995 to campaign against deportation of asylum 
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seekers, the Refugees, Asylum-seekers and the Mass Media Project created in 1999 with 
the aim of improving the quality and accuracy of media coverage, Barbed Wire Britain 
campaigning to end migrant and refugee detention, and many others. 
In conclusion, since the early 1990s the issue of asylum has become increasingly prob-
lematised in the UK. At the political level, this has implied a series of political reforms 
of the asylum system with the aim of reducing access to asylum procedures and di-
minish support for asylum seekers and refugees. In the public debate negative media 
reporting and people fears and intolerance have made asylum seekers and refugees the 
new recipients of racism and discrimination. Considering that the refugee influx from 
Kosovo started in the early 1990s, reached is peak in 1999 and continued even in the 
early 2000s, it is not surprising that different waves of Kosovars coming to Britain faced 
progressively tougher conditions as the public debate and political response developed, 
which consequently means that they were faced with different problems depending on 
their time of arrival. 
Having discussed the general developments of asylum policies and the public discourse 
on asylum in the UK during the 1990s, in the next section the attention is turned to the 
specific conditions encountered by Kosovar refugees, beginning with a general overview 
of the main changes in the asylum systems that affected their settlement. 
6.3 The case of spontaneous arrivals in the UK 
Kosovar Albanians started arriving spontaneously in the UK in the early 1990s; after the 
abolition of Kosovo's autonomy by the Serbian regime in 1989/90 gave start to a decade 
of conflict. The inflow from Kosovo continued throughout the decade with numbers 
increasing from 1997 until 1999 reflecting the intensification of the crisis. 
The first ones to arrive were mostly young people coming mainly from urban areas while 
the majority of those who came at a later stage and during NATO's bombing campaign 
were from rural areas. People from Kosovo kept coming even after the 1999 war and 
between January 2001 and December 2002 over 5,000 applications from the FRY were 
largely from Kosovars (Smart, 2004). 
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It is difficult to estimate the size of the Kosovar Albanian population in the UK, since any 
relevant statistics relate to the entire Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, with no separate 
subcategories for Serbia, Kosovo and Montenegro (Guild, 2000; Smart, 2001). Smart 
(2004) claims that at the height of the crisis in Kosovo there could have been up to 
20,000 Kosovars in the UK and assesses that currently (2004) there are between 8,000 
and 10,000 people; it is also estimated that 80% of them are based in the Greater London 
area (Smart, 2001) and that 65% of the population are men. 
The spontaneous arrivals from Kosovo included both anticipatory refugees that had left 
Kosovo to escape the persecution of the Serbian authorities (this includs those who were 
politically engaged or wanted to avoid being conscripted into the Serbian army to fight 
in Bosnia or had been sacked from public jobs for their ethnicity) and acute refugee 
movements of people who escaped the direct danger brought to their doorsteps by the 
conflict. 
Their life in the UK was influenced by two main pieces of legislation: the 1996 Asylum 
and Immigration Act and the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act. These acts set up 
different conditions for asylum seekers in the UK and, therefore, in the account of 
Kosovar Albanians' experiences, I often distinguish between the people who arrived 
before 1996, from those who came between 1996 and 1999, and those who arrived after 
the system introduced by the 1999 Act began to operate. 
Those who came in the early 1990s were among the first Albanians to arrive in the 
United Kingdom and settled mainly in the Greater London area gradually forming the 
Kosovar Albanian community in the country (Kostovicova and Prestreshi, 2003). They 
were young when they arrived and are currently in their late 20s and 30s. They came 
in small numbers mostly by their own means. Among the very first Kosovo Albanians 
in the UK is a group of young people who had just finished school or university before 
leaving Kosovo and arrived on student visas to study English in London between 1990 
and 1991. This is the only group of people who became refugees while already in the 
UK. The other people arrived from Kosovo to escape persecution and the numbers of 
arrivals increased especially after 1996-1997 and reached the maximum height in 1999. 
Until 1992, Kosovars could arrive on student or tourist visas; however, after the war broke 
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out in Bosnia in 1992, the UK introduced mandatory visa requirements on nationals of 
the FRY which included Kosovars. This meant that anyone in Kosovo had to travel to 
Belgrade to apply for a visa at the British consulate if they wanted to come to the UK. 
This, obviously, presented people with several problems and as a result Guild (2000) 
explains that few Bosnian or Kosovar refugees arrived after that date with a visa issued 
in Belgrade, but found different ways to reach the UK, some irregularly and on false 
documents. 
This indicates that the new wave of restrictive measures vis-a.-vis asylum seekers had 
already started and was aimed especially at deterring people from reaching the UK. In 
fact, in 1993, the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act introduced further measures to 
deter people from coming to claim asylum in the UK such as: increased penalties for 
carriers, fingerprinting for the registration of claims, the right to return asylum seekers 
to a safe third country and the possibility to hold asylum seekers in detention. The 
act also introduced 'fast-track' procedures for assessing applications, restricted housing 
rights and while ensuring that asylum seekers had the right to appeal negative decisions 
on their applications, it imposed strict time limits (Smart, 2001; Zetter et al., 2002; 
Refugee Council, 2004). 
Guild (2000) explains that detention in prisons or special closed camps, in particular, 
was used by the administration as a means of deterring people from coming to the 
UK and the government had defended its use in respect of the Bosnian crisis saying 
that it was a necessary measure to keep numbers down. In the case of refugees from 
Kosovo detention as purely a means to deter was not used. However, in several cases 
asylum seekers where detained on the grounds that they travelled to the country on 
false documents, since mandatory visa requirements to enter the UK were in place. 
Despite the fact that the authorities knew that ethnic Albanians from Kosovo could not 
easily obtain documents before coming or that they had them confiscated by the Serbian 
forces before being expelled, asylum seekers were detained in the UK because they had 
insufficient documents to prove they originated from Kosovo and were suspected to be 
Albanians immigrants who wanted instead to abuse the system (Guild, 2000). 
OIl average, people who claimed asylum before 1996 had to wait between four and six 
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years before getting a verdict on their applications. However, because of the system in 
place at the time, they had access to social benefits and support while waiting. As a 
matter of fact, in the early 1990s, asylum claimants waiting for a decision on their appli-
cations were entitled to a certain range of support which included 90% income support 
payments, child benefit, disability benefit, council tax benefit and housing benefit. They 
also received assistance with housing, legal aid in relation to their asylum claim, free 
healthcare, school placement for their children and higher education, and six months 
after submitting their claim they could apply for the right to work (Smart, 2001). Once 
granted refugee status or ELR, they were entitled to the normal benefit rate. 
The situation was different for those who arrived after 1996, because the 1996 Asylum 
and Immigration Act introduced stronger deterrence measures such as the removal of 
all rights to social benefits for people claiming asylum in-country or for those on appeal. 
Moreover, following changes in the 1996 Housing Act, access to public social housing 
was reduced and resulted in more destitution for asylum seekers and more pressures for 
social services departments because under the 1948 National Assistance Act they were 
legally responsible to house them (Zetter et al., 2002). However, following legal action 
from refugee organisations, assistance had to be reintroduced and the result was that 
local governments were then made responsible for supporting asylum seekers (Smart, 
2001). 
Consequently, those Kosovar Albanians who arrived after 1996 faced harsher conditions 
which depended mostly on the standard of support offered by each single local authority 
with serious consequences for their well being and their integration process. The waiting 
time for an asylum decision had been shortened, but on average they still waited between 
one and four years while living on minimum support. 
However, the situation became even worse for those who started arriving in 1999 as a 
consequence of new stricter legislation. In 1998, the new Labour government, which had 
been elected in May 1997, issued a White Paper entitled Fairer, Faster and Firmer with 
which it presented the new proposals to change the legislation on asylum. With the 1999 
Immigration and Asylum Act, financial responsibility to support asylum seekers went 
back to central government that set up a national system of vouchers. The support for 
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each asylum seeker was reduced to 70% of the general income support benefits, mean-
ing that each eligible asylum seeker would receive £36.54 per week, of which only £10 
would be in cash. Moreover, with this Act, the government created the National Asylum 
Support Service (NASS) which had the goal of assessing asylum seekers eligibility for 
support, arranging for their accommodation and providing grants to voluntary organi-
sations or reception assistants, which are organisations that help people to complete the 
application forms to request support and provide initial emergency accommodation for 
seven days, while NASS examines the claims. In addition to this, the Act established 
that asylum seekers with no accommodation were to be dispersed around the country 
and away from London and the seaports. After a positive decision on their claims, 
refugees would have 14 days to be moved to mainstream services, but in practice this 
took much longer. 
Needless to say the people arriving from Kosovo in 1999, were mostly part of acute 
refugee movements escaping from the direct consequences of the war or expelled by 
Serbian forces out of their country. They were a particularly vulnerable group as many 
had been victims of violence or had been suddenly expelled from their homes, but they 
also arrived at a moment when they had to face tougher conditions in the UK. 
In the following section I analyse the experience of Kosovar Albanian refugees in relation 
to: legal status, support received upon arrival, housing conditions, English language 
fluency, legal advice, health, education, employment, gender relations, social life and 
community organisations. Where relevant I distinguish between three groups: those 
who arrived before 1996; those who arrived between 1996 and 1999; and those who 
arrived during and after 1999. 
6.3.1 Status 
During the late 1980s the number of people who were granted full refugee status accord-
ing to the Geneva Convention of 1951 had already began to decrease, while the number 
of people who received Exceptional Leave to Remain (ELR) increased. 
There are significant differences between the entitlements granted by these two cat-
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egories. Refugees with convention status are entitled to the same social benefits as 
British citizens, to grants and home fees for their studies, and have the right to family 
reunion as well as economic activities rights and travel documents. Moreover, after five 
years they can apply for British citizenship. 
ELR is granted in those cases in which the authorities are not satisfied that the asylum 
claimants are in genuine fear of persecution on the grounds of race, religion, nation-
ality, membership of a social group or political opinion under the terms of the 1951 
Geneva Convention but recognise that claimants could not be sent back on humanitar-
ian grounds. It is granted for a specific period of time, after which the refugee can apply 
for an extension or for Indefinite Leave to Remain (ILR). People with ELR are entitled 
to social assistance benefits, but are not entitled to family reunion, they have to pay 
home student fees for further and higher education but have to have been living in the 
UK for three years before they qualify for student support (loans and grants). 
During the 1990s, as a result of new restrictive policies, even the number of persons 
receiving ELR began to decrease and more negative decisions were taken about asylum 
claims in general (Wahlbeck, 1999). Those Kosovar Albanians who were able to prove 
a personal well founded fear of persecution in Kosovo were likely to be granted refugee 
status or ELR for one year that could be extended upon request. However, a decision 
of the immigration appeal tribunal in 1996 on the case of Mr. Gashi and Mr. Nikshiqi, 
Kosovar Albanians who had been refused asylum, established that Mr. Gashi and his co-
appellant were refugees on the sole ground of their race and the history of persecution of 
their race in Kosovo. With this decision, the UK courts imposed on the administration 
to recognise all Kosovar Albanians claiming asylum as refugees (Guild, 2000). 
Guild (2000) explains that it is not clear from the statistics to what extent the admin-
istration actually followed the court's judgement on Kosovars. Nevertheless, she notices 
that "until about mid-May 1999 it seemed that applicants were being recognised as 
refugees on a rather random but individual basis". Many cases remained undecided for 
years becoming part of the backlog of cases to be decided by the Home Office (Smart, 
2004). During the war in 1999, there was a rush of recognitions of Kosovars as refugees 
which was followed by a complete stop in July 1999, after which some Kosovars were 
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granted one year ELR. On the 13 of September 1999, the Home Secretary Jack Straw 
announced that no ELR would be granted 'automatically' to Kosovars any longer (Guild, 
2000). Of those who did not return at the end of the war and had applied for an exten-
sion of their ELR, some had it granted while others had it refused. Asylum seekers who 
arrived thereafter were more likely to receive a negative decision on their claim, unless 
there were specific individual circumstances. 
At the time of the interviews, the refugees who had arrived from Kosovo before 1996 had 
received refugee status, ELR or ILR and some of them had been granted citizenship; 
some of the respondents who had arrived between 1996 and 2000 were still waiting for 
their asylum decision; some were waiting to hear from their appeal and others were 
fighting against deportation orders. 
6.3.2 Support upon arrival and Benefits 
As already mentioned, a group of young people were already in London when the tensions 
began in Kosovo and understood that going back was not safe. Initially, they started 
supporting themselves doing small jobs in London. In some cases they hat to wait over 
a year before hearing that they could claim asylum and seek help. 
"A friend of mine found a job as a waitress and supported both of us with 
her money, in the meantime I was looking for a job and after two months I 
found a job in a restaurant as a waitress as well. I was very shy and also 
ashamed of this job. A few months earlier I wanted to study to become a 
lawyer and I was even fighting with my father who preferred that I studied 
architecture because he said that there was no place for lawyers in Kosovo 
under the regime. Now, here I was a waitress with no future. Then another 
friend mentioned to us that we could apply for asylum and explained what 
to do." Besa (F,30+, m, arr:1991, lawyer) 
Deciding to claim asylum was not easy as this involved a clear realisation that it was 
not possible to go home anytime soon and that they would not see their families for a 
long time. 
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"It took me months to decide to apply for asylum, you know. I knew that 
if I did, I was not going to see my parents for a long time. Then, following 
what was going on in Kosovo and talking to my parents over the phone, I 
realised that it was the only option. I also understood that I would have 
had more rights here and more prospects". Ada (F, 30+, s, arr:1991, shop 
manager) 
These doubts about filing a claim were also coupled with the fact that many of them 
were experiencing life abroad and away from their families for the first time and that 
talking to immigration officers reminded them of the regime back home, therefore, the 
procedure was not an easy emotional experience. As one of them explained: 
"The immigration officer terrified me, I grew up with the feeling that au-
thority is evil." Denisa (F, 30+, s, arr:1990, beautician) 
Some of them were friends before coming to the UK and tried to give each other moral 
and practical support. In general, people who arrived before 1996 waited up to six years 
to hear about the decision on their asylum claims, however, those who needed help had 
the full support of the pre-1996 asylum system. Obviously, as Smart (2001) remarks, 
living on benefits was not easy and meant hardship, but it helped people with their 
basic needs while trying to establish a new life in the UK. This support meant that 
they had time to improve their language skills, build some networks with other Kosovar 
Albanians or British people and look for employment. None of the people I interviewed 
who arrived in this time frame were claiming benefit at the time of the interviews. 
The people who arrived between 1996 and 1999, faced the consequences of the new 1996 
Immigration Act and were supported by local authorities which had a responsibility to 
make sure that they were not destitute. This implied the adoption of different support 
systems that led to a variety of conditions. In some cities the situation was better 
than others, but overall the approach was that of guaranteeing the minimum possible 
standards. In some cases local authorities had contracted hotels and B&Bs to provide 
asylum seekers with accommodation and meals, and did not provide any other form of 
support. 
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In other instances a voucher system was introduced and asylum seekers were allowed to 
use the vouchers only in specific shops, which often were not the cheapest or the most 
convenient ones. In certain cases, some items were excluded from the range of products 
they could purchase. In this confusing environment, it was extremely hard even for 
NGOs and RCOs to provide advice to people and it was difficult for them to understand 
what they were and were not entitled to. 
"When I arrived a friend of mine who was already here helped me and sup-
ported me. He talked to the Refugee Legal Centre and they decided to help 
me with the application. I stayed with my friend for two months, until the 
Refugee Council found me a place where I had a small room and I shared 
kitchen, bathroom and a toilet. The common spaces were really dirty and 
disgusting, but nobody seemed to care. I wanted to look for a job imme-
diately, but they explained that I could not work for the first six months, 
the council paid for the accommodation and arranged for my meals, but I 
had no money at all. I couldn't even pay for the bus or make a phone call." 
Rezar (M, 40+, s, arr:1997, mechanic) 
Many of them were still living on benefits at the time of the interviews as the uncertainty 
of their status together with other factors that I analyse in the section about employment, 
had made it difficult for them to find a job and become self sufficient. 
The new 1999 Act, was introduced gradually and this meant that for a certain time the 
old and new systems overlapped, with some asylum seekers still under the responsibility 
of local authorities and others already handled by NASS. The main changes introduced 
by the Act were dispersal and the voucher scheme. Dispersal in the territory implied 
that people in need of assistance were spread away from London and the South-East, 
which were the areas of the country with the largest refugee population, to destinations 
decided by NASS. This often cut people out from the rest of the community and created 
a sense of isolation. 
"When they told me that they were sending me outside of London I felt lost, 
I had some friends here and they were the only link I had with Kosovo here. 
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I wanted to refuse to go, but then I understood that if I did, they would cut 
my benefits and I could not accept to stay with my friends and be maintained 
by them." Zenel (M, 40+, m, arr:1999, unemployed) 
Generally, the voucher system has been severely criticised because of the difficulties 
and the different problems asylum seekers faced as a consequence of this scheme. A 
report of the Development and Statistics Directorate of the Home Office, surveyed over 
200 asylum seekers using vouchers to understand the main problems they faced (Eagle 
et al., 2002). Some of the problems they found are reflected in the experiences of the 
interviewees I talked to: 
1. Often very long distances had to be traveled to collect the vouchers or to come 
and go from shops which were part of the scheme; 
"I am alone here with my four children and the shops are really far, 
it is hard for me to take my children with me to the shops or to leave 
them with someone, but I cannot pay for the bus, I do not have enough 
money to pay for all of us on the bus." Juliana (F, 30+, m, arr:1999, 
unemployed) 
2. Some shops refused vouchers for various reasons and often shop staff did not know 
what could be purchased with vouchers and restricted choices about what to buy; 
"They told me that yogurt is a luxury and I cannot buy it. For us yogurt 
is normal, is no luxury. Fruit also no, cigarettes no, a telephone card 
also." Jetmir (M, 40+, m, arr:1995, unemployed) 
3. Overall, shops that accept vouchers were more expensive than other shops not 
participating in the scheme; 
"I have seen shops around here much cheaper. But they say I need money 
no vouchers to buy there." Juliana (F, 30+, m, arr:1999, unemployed) 
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4. Finally, many asylum seekers felt embarrassed when collecting their vouchers or 
if they had difficulties adding up the costs of their shopping and understanding 
which vouchers to use. 
"You go to buy bread and eggs and you need a calculator with you, 
it is so embarrassing! People look, why he does not pay with money? 
What are these tickets and I feel bad. They think you are a bad person 
because you are an asylum seeker and you cannot have money. I was 
a teacher in Kosovo, people respected me, now I have to be considered 
like a homeless person." Jetmir (M, 40+, m, arr:1995, unemployed) 
In few words, the different support systems had a major impact on the refugees' inte-
gration process defining their spheres of action. The progressively tougher and stricter 
provisions made it increasingly harder for Kosovar Albanians to improve their conditions 
and affected all aspects of their life in the UK. 
6.3.3 Housing 
Having or not having a 'proper house' was indicated by the respondents as an element 
of stability or instability for their life in the UK. 
"N ow I feel settled here. I have a proper house that belongs to me, I have a 
place I can really call home." Besa (F, 30+, m, arr:1991, lawyer) 
The first group of people who arrived in the UK in the early 1990s had initially stayed 
with British families as au pair or in shared accommodation with other youngsters. 
After claiming asylum, those who were on benefits where allocated accommodation while 
others who had found a job kept sharing with other people. This group received and 
helped newcomers throughout the decade, often providing people with an initial place to 
stay. In general, those who arrived before 1996, had often stayed in B&Bs provided by 
social services departments and moved into independent accommodation after getting 
refugee status or ELR. At the time of the interviews the majority of them had a stable 
status and a good job that allowed them to rent or buy their own property. 
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"I have moved so many times in the past 10 years. I am so glad to have 
a house now. No one can tell me to get out or what to do. I am finally 
settled." Vitore (M, 30+, s, arr:1991, IT consultant) 
After 1996, most asylum seekers had been given temporary accommodation by social 
services which were often overcrowded and in bad conditions. The interviewees explained 
that it was even hard to get some help to repair the place or try to improve it. 
"No one cared about the conditions we lived in, the bathroom was disgusting, 
you know all these people sharing! The house was falling apart. I had lots 
of free time and I wanted to do some work on the fiat, but I could not afford 
the material to do it. I asked them if they (social services) could help, but 
they said no." Mitat (M, 40+, s, arr:1998, unemployed) 
After 1999, dispersal policies spread people around the country, the problems with the 
standard of the accommodations remained high and the situation worsened with the 
distance from key refugee service providers and other members of the community. The 
main areas that received Kosovar Albanians under NASS were the Midlands, the North 
of England and the Greater Manchester area. Smart (2004) notes that NASS had started 
to list people from Kosovo as a distinct group and was able to provide data for 2003 
when they provided accommodation for a total of 764 Kosovars of which 155 in Greater 
London, 82 in the East Midlands, 90 in the North East, 113 in the North West, 194 in 
Yorkshire and Humberside and 130 in Scotland. 
Moreover, the lack of cash imposed by the new voucher system made it more difficult to 
keep in touch with various services and with other Kosovar Albanians in the UK because 
of the high cost of travelling and phone calls. 
6.3.4 English language 
Language skills have proved to be a great concern for all the interviewees because at 
some point they have all experienced the frustration of not being able to understand 
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and communicate and have experienced the consequences of this. Many of those who 
came before 1996 spoke some English before arriving; this helped them immediately 
with finding the necessary support, getting a job or study. Those who spoke no English 
when they arrived felt powerless and confused, speaking the language made people feel 
more in control and independent. 
"Before the war I was very active and independent. I was the point of 
reference for all my extended family in Pristina. Talking the language gives 
me back a bit of independence, so I do not have to stress my children too 
much with my problems." Stela (F, 50+, m, arr:1999, unemployed) 
The inability to speak created communication problems with lawyers, some service 
providers, doctors, attempts to find a job and restricted socialisation to just other 
Albanian-speaking people. 
The ability to learn English was influenced by the personal predisposition to learn foreign 
languages, by the level of education, age, personal motivation and the level of support 
and socialisation with English speakers. In general, those refugees who already spoke 
other languages or had a higher level of education found it easier to learn English, so 
did young people, while the older generation struggled. Pupils in school did extremely 
well and they often interpreted for their parents in everyday life situations. 
Obviously, the length of stay in the UK also had an impact on people's fluency, the 
longer they had been here, the better their English. Moreover, the time of arrival also 
determined the level of external support people received. In general, few of those who 
arrived spontaneously had the chance to attend English classes for adults. The ones 
who lived in London had more opportunities to attend these courses. For example the 
College of North East London, which is the London area with the highest presence of 
refugees and asylum seekers, has organised special classes to teach English to speakers 
of other languages which are mostly attended by refugees 1 , of which in the late 1990s 
many from Kosovo. 
1 Asylum seekers with ELR who have been in the UK for more the three years and refugees with full 
convention status do not have to pay for tuition, registration or exam fees. 
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However, those who did not attend classes used different systems to learn, from 'teach 
yourself' text books, following the homework of their children and watching television 
with the support of teletext's subtitles. 
"I cannot go to school at my age! I have to take care of my son. He comes 
first. I am happy, he is good with the language. I am studying at home, 
I have those books and I use the subtitles on the TV. This helps a lot, to 
understand, because for me they talk so fast! In Kosovo I was an interpreter, 
I speak other languages and I am used to studying alone." Flora (F, 40+, 
m, arr:1998, unemployed) 
6.3.5 Legal Advice 
Receiving good legal advice was always important for the success of an asylum claim 
or an appeal. However, over the decade, it became progressively more vital as the 
assessment of each case became stricter on the part of the authority. Moreover, most 
lawyers where in London and the 1999 dispersal policies complicated the situation even 
further. Asylum seekers placed away from the London area, had difficulties accessing 
good expert lawyers in other areas of the country. 
The consequences of bad legal advice were enormous and caused many Kosovar Albani-
ans to have their claims refused and risk deportation. 
"The solicitor told us to give only the simple facts to the court at the be-
ginning, when they asked me questions I answered and I said more things. 
Because I said more when they asked, they said that at the beginning I 
was not saying the truth and they refused the appeal." Azim (M, 30+, m, 
arr: 1999, unemployed) 
6.3.6 Health 
People were happy with the healthcare they received in the UK. Some people received 
proper care for the first time in this country, because in Kosovo they did not trust the 
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Serb-dominated health facilities. They explained that it was not safe and said that 
children had been poisoned by Serbian doctors or Albanian babies killed during the 
delivery. Although these assertions cannot be proved, it has been documented that 
during NATO's air campaign there was widespread violation of medical neutrality by 
Serbian forces against Kosovar Albanians (Independent International Commission on 
Kosovo, 2000). 
According to the time of their flight and the situation they had escaped from in Kosovo, 
some of them had injuries as a result of conflict while others were mostly psychologi-
cally traumatised. According to the Independent International Commission on Kosovo 
(2000), it was common practice for Serbian forces to beat up ethnic Albanians during 
interrogations or before expelling them. Administering electric shocks and other forms 
of painful and humiliating torture was a matter of routine. The commission also found 
that rape and sexual assaults that took place during the air war in 1999 were merely a 
continuation of a trend begun by Serb forces a decade earlier. 
However, by the time of the interviews Kosovar Albanians who had arrived before 
1996/1997 had resolved their physical problems. Those who were still with an uncertain 
status at the time of the interviews were anxious about being able to complete their 
treatment before having to return. Getting access to GPs was relatively easy; however, 
for those who could not speak English the difficulties to explain their problems caused 
distress, frustration and delays. 
Psychological support was more difficult to obtain, many interviewees were or had been 
suffering with anxiety, depression and post-traumatic disorders. Some people did not 
know they could get help for psychological distress and in some cases it was their GP 
who pointed out that they might be depressed and explained that they could get help. 
"My GP told me that I had depression. I was really low and unable to cope. 
Now I am going to counselling and it is helping a lot to understand what to 
do with my life, how to open a new chapter and leave all my problems in the 
past." Denisa (F, 30+, s, arr:1990, beautician) 
There were different reasons that caused anxiety or depression. Those who arrived 
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before NATO's air campaign were worried about the situation in Kosovo. The difficulty 
of getting news from their relatives and friends, and the news about the abuses and the 
killings made them constantly anxious and stressed. 
"The first month of the war I managed to get news from my parents, for the 
following two months it was impossible to get in touch. I could not sleep at 
night, I was always following the news to understand which areas had been 
affected. I was devastated when I heard news of massacres and rapes. I 
calmed down only when I finally managed to talk to them again." Denisa 
(F, 30+, s, arr:1990, beautician) 
Those who had been victims of violence or had witnessed human rights abuses suffered 
post-traumatic disorders. For example, one of the interviewees had been detained and 
raped by Serbian forces in 1995, had seen his sister raped and killed and his parents mur-
dered. He suffered from depression, anxiety and panic attacks and had been diagnosed 
with post-traumatic stress and psychotic depression. 
A further cause of anxiety was the wait for the asylum decision, the uncertainty about 
their future and the fear of deportation which added further stress. 
6.3.7 Education 
Under the Milosevic's regime Albanians were expelled from the official university and 
school system and were denied education for a decade. As we have already mentioned 
many of the refugees who arrived in the UK before the escalation of the conflict in 
1998-1999 were either students or people who had recently terminated their studies and 
who regarded education as an essential part of their life. For many of them the reason 
for leaving Kosovo was directly linked to their involvement in student movements and 
protest, therefore, the opportunity to study while in exile was highly valued. However, 
for many years this opportunity was denied to them even in the UK. As a matter of 
fact, asylum seekers can access university and further educational colleges, but they are 
not eligible for student loans and have to pay prohibitive overseas fees. Needless to say 
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that until they received refugee status, ILR, or after three years passed from the time 
they were granted ELR, which finally entitled them to pay home fees and gave them 
access to student loans, studying in the UK was not an option for the vast majority of 
Kosovar Albanian refugees. 
Therefore,many of them had to abandon their studies or stop them for a few years until 
they were granted a status that allowed them to go back to education. Considering that 
the asylum determination procedure of the early 1990s took up to six/seven years for a 
decision, it is not until 1996-97 that we can see the return of Kosovar Albanian refugees 
to higher education or vocational courses. Another impediment on the road to higher 
education was the need to earn enough money to support their life in the UK and their 
families back in Kosovo, that put a strain on many refugees who could not afford to 
study. 
"It was impossible to pay for the fees, we did not have good jobs then and we 
needed to maintain ourselves and sent money back home. It was impossible, 
only for rich people! Then, after 5 years when I got ILR, I applied and I got 
a place to study computer science. First of all now I paid for home fees plus 
I could get help from the bank." Florin (M, 30+, s, arr:1990, IT consultant) 
"With my friend we decided that we had to get out of the waitress job circle 
and do something, study or whatever! I could not afford university, so I 
studied to become a beautician, and this is what I have done for the past 
seven years now." Denisa (F, 30+, s, arr:1990, beautician) 
Kostovicova and Prestreshi (2003) claim that it is currently estimated that between 10% 
and 15% of the Albanians in the UK are involved in postsecondary education. They 
also explain that some refugees developed coping strategies to overcome the obstacles 
presented by the lack of a legal status by arranging special deals with their university 
for the payment of the fees or, in extreme cases, by faking their IDs and claiming to be 
from a European Union member state. 
After the end of the war in 1999, people began to have less responsibilities and worries 
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about Kosovo and, therefore, they began to have more money and were in a better 
frame of mind for returning to study. Those who had studied, or had started to study in 
Kosovo before fleeing, had mostly studied for science degrees, because social sciences and 
humanities departments were the first targets of the regime and, consequently, the first to 
be shut. In the UK only exams undertaken for engineering course were recognised, while 
people with degrees in other areas had to requalify (Kostovicova and Prestreshi, 2003). 
In exile the choice of the courses refugees decided to study for were either determined by 
what they had studied before exile or by the interest in getting a degree that could help 
them to better their situation in the UK as well as their wish to be able to contribute 
to the reconstruction and development of Kosovo (Kostovicova and Prestreshi, 2003). 
As for children, status made no difference to educational entitlement up to the age 
of 16. All refugee and asylum-seeking children can use pre-school facilities (such as 
local authority nurseries) and children aged 5 to 15 are required go to school. Kosovar 
Albanian children have, generally, done very well at school and enjoy the British system 
and approach to teaching. Some of them had attended the schools set up by the parallel 
Albanian government in Kosovo, often in private houses, and appreciated particularly 
the facilities they found here in school and the more informal way of teaching. 
6.3.8 Employment 
For most of the period during which refugees arrived spontaneously from Kosovo, asylum 
seekers were allowed to apply for a work permit after six months from submitting an 
asylum claim (Smart, 2004). 
Having a job allowed people to be self sufficient and independent,to maintain themselves 
and help their families back in Kosovo. 
"When I got a job, it was really good because I could help my family in 
Kosovo. My father was a professor in the university and the first thing the 
Serbs did was close the university. My father could not find another job 
there and the money I managed to send home allowed all of them to go on." 
Besa (F, 30+, m, arr:1991, lawyer) 
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Those who arrived before 1996, had their first work experience here at the beginning. 
Many have managed to go up the ladder over the years and currently have 'good' jobs 
in London. They worked their way up from small jobs and have tried to get more 
qualifications or training to go further with their careers. There have been times when 
they were unemployed, but they considered this to be normal for anybody in life. 
Good skills, education and the ability to speak English increased the chances of employ-
ment and allowed people to get better jobs. However, the most important factor to get a 
job was their legal status. In fact, in many cases, an uncertain status stopped employers 
from offering a position because it was not clear whether it was legal for them to employ 
people with a temporary form of status or because they worried that the refugees could 
be sent back soon. 
"I did well at the interview. They sent me all the papers and everything, 
but when they checked and saw that I was an asylum seeker, they said they 
were sorry, but they worried that I could be sent back soon." Zani (M, 40+, 
s, arr:1997, unemployed) 
It was not surprising that, Kosovar Albanians who arrived after 1996 and were still 
asylum seekers or with ELR at the time of the interview struggled more to find a 
job. Commonly, people have done some interpreting work for NGOs or for community 
associations, or have found jobs in factories, or in building sites. Some people were 
employed by the Kosovo Programme that was set up to receive the refugees who came 
through the Humanitarian Evacuation Programme. 
All of them agreed that working was important in order to feel active, independent and 
stop thinking too much about the problems back in Kosovo. As a matter of fact, some 
respondents had experience of volunteering and said that even if they did not earn any 
money, it helped them to get busy, learn new skills and know more people. 
Those who came after 1999 were particularly misinformed about their right to work, and 
given the restricted support they received and the limitations of the voucher system, 
some of them worked in the black market and risked compromising their stay in the UK. 
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6.3.9 Gender relations 
Life in exile has brought both changes and continuity in the gender relations within the 
Kosovar Albanian community in the UK. Gender relations in exile are influenced by the 
political, social, economic and cultural context of the host country and by the legacy 
of the culture and the society of the country of origin. On the one hand, the experi-
ence of exile can bring changes to the relationship between men and women redefining 
their identity and their roles, on the other hand it can also lead to the maintenance or 
reinforcement of previously established roles and relations. 
Life in exile has brought both change and continuity to gender relations within the 
Kosovar Albanian community in the UK. For Kosovar Albanian women exile has been 
a difficult but empowering experience. However, this empowerment has had limited 
boundaries imposed by the Albanian ethnic community itself. Kostovicova and Pre-
streshi (2003) describe this paradox as limited liberation and explain that, for example, 
one of the limitations imposed on them is the fact that intermarriage with members of 
any other ethnic/national groups in the UK is frowned upon, an issue also raised during 
my interviews as I discuss below. 
In the UK, women from Kosovo who arrived before 1996 gained a sense of independence 
and liberation by working and supporting themselves, living on their own and providing 
for their families back in Kosovo. Their empowerment has mainly happened through 
work or education and their experience in the work place or in universities and colleges 
has allowed them to meet people and form friendships outside the community. 
"I am very independent here, I have spent my youth here on my own, it has 
been hard but now I am happy with who I am and what I have managed 
to achieve. Initially it was a very solitary life. I was worried about home 
and I had to support myself here and my family in Kosovo when they fired 
my father from his job. In those years I functioned like a robot blocking all 
my emotions out. But now things are getting better, I have lots of friends, 
from all sorts of background, people I met in college, at work or just hanging 
around." Albana (F, 30+, s, arr: 1990, employee) 
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However, Kostovicova and Prestreshi (2003) explain that this new found independence 
was not pushed as far as to marry a non-Albanian partner. The main reason for intra-
national dating is said to be patriotism, making women responsible for the preservation 
of the community ethnic boundaries. However, some women point the finger at the 
conservative views of the Albanian community and stress the inequality that makes it 
more acceptable for men to marry outside of the community. I interviewed two women 
who were friends separately, but they knew I was talking to both of them. One of them, 
Alina, was married with a conational, while the other was single. Ada told me that she 
was dating a non-Albanian person and she asked me not to tell Alina about it. She 
explained that: 
"You see, she (Alina) has done better than me, but she had her boyfriend 
here with her from the beginning and they have had each other during these 
terrible years, they had a family. I was here alone, and it was not easy for 
me. Now I have found the right person, but he is not Albanian and I don't 
care. But they would not understand me, they would think I am an easy girl 
and I do not think about my people. If I was the man it would be different. 
You know, old mentality! Men can do what they want, we can't. People 
have been here for so long, but certain ideas don't leave their heads." Ada 
(F, 30+, s, arr:1991, shop manager) 
Kostovicova and Prestreshi (2003) also note that, ironically, young Albanian women 
regardless of their commitment to the Albanian community through the preservation 
of the 'Albanian family', have found that their emancipation has actually become an 
obstacle to finding an Albanian partner. 
"Albanian men are too scared of me. I am too independent; they know I 
could not stand certain things and they know that I do not need to accept 
things because I can support myself. That is why they rather go for someone 
sent to them from Kosovo, so that they can feel in control." Denisa (F, 30+, 
s, arr:1990, beautician) 
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As a matter of fact, the number of arranged marriages in the Albanian community in 
the UK seems to have been on the increase over the recent years, because, as Kostovica 
and Prestreshi state: 
"Women in the UK are perceived as having ceased to be authentic bear-
ers of Albanian identity just by their mere pursuit of opportunities, mainly 
educational and economic, offered by the diasporic milieu. In it, they are 
expected to re-traditionalise their mores and expectations in order to become 
accepted and acceptable guardians of the ethnic community." (Kostovicova 
and Prestreshi, 2003) 
The women who came after the outbreak of the war had different problems, some of 
them had been raped during the war, but felt they could not tell their family and tried 
to cope with no help and support. Others, who came with their husbands and children, 
remained alone to handle their situation in the UK when their husbands were detained 
after the family had been refused asylum. This is the story of Juliana who came with 
her family and claimed asylum in April 1999. They were refused in 2000 and launched 
an appeal. 
"They called my husband for an interview with immigration officers. He 
went and they said that our appeal had been refused and they took him and 
sent him to a detention centre near the airport. Then they sent me a letter 
saying that me and my son had to join him to be deported. I was desperate, 
I could only speak to my husband on the phone, but I could not go to see 
him. I asked for help to all the people I knew, my English teacher helped 
me to get a better solicitor, she talked to MPs and many other people and 
in the end we managed, we got the deportation order suspended. But many 
others were not so lucky and were sent back." Juliana (F, 30+, m, arr:1999, 
unemployed) 
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6.3.10 Socialising 
The majority of the interviewees were in touch with other Kosovar Albanians in the UK 
and some of them also had British friends. Initially the community in London was small 
and very informal, they formed close relationship with each other and tried to help and 
support newcomers. Language problems made it difficult for them to talk to British 
people at the beginning and the improvements with the language was reflected on the 
ability to communicate with more people outside the Kosovar Albanian community. 
It was emphasised by various interviewees that other people did not know about Kosovo 
and it was not easy to explain to them what was happening and what they were going 
through. 
"In the beauty salon (where she worked), it was hard to hear people worried 
about their skin or their nails while my people in Kosovo were dying! I could 
not chat about these things and they could not listen to my problems." 
Denisa (F, 30+, s, arr:1990, beautician) 
For those who went to university making friends outside the Kosovar Albanian commu-
nity was easier, because they found that young people were more open, the university 
was a very international environment and, especially, because they were seen as students, 
like anyone else, rather than as refugees. 
In general, the refugees who arrived in the first half of the 1990s now have a permanent 
status or have acquired British citizenship, are fluent in English and many of them have 
good jobs and own a house. They are still concerned about the situation in Kosovo and 
its future and they are still helping their families there, however, they feel less worried 
about it and this has allowed them the serenity and the time to cultivate social relations 
here. None of them complained about discrimination and harassment and many saw 
themselves as Londoners besides being Kosovar Albanians. 
As I explained, people who arrived after 1996 and during and after 1999, have faced dif-
ferent problems in the UK and found building social relations particularly difficult. The 
uncertainty of their status, the daily worries about basic needs, the language barriers, 
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the isolated existence in some towns where they were often the only Albanians for a long 
period of time, had an impact on their ability to make friends. The dispersal system 
forced them out of London where the majority of other Kosovar Albanians were living 
and the impossibility to get enough cash made travelling by train or calling over the 
phone very difficult. It was common to save as much money as possible towards buying 
a mobile phone, the only way to remain in touch with people when being moved around 
the country. Unfortunately, for many local people and service providers, the fact that 
they had a mobile phone proved that they were 'bogus' refugees, as a mobile phone was 
only seen as a superfluous luxury item. 
"I get the vouchers and £10 in cash. I want to collect the money to buy 
a mobile phone, so my friends from London and my solicitor can find me." 
Ardian (M, 30+, m, arr:1999, unemployed) 
They, often, experienced hostility from local authority officials and service providers and 
their feeling of exclusion was emphasised by the use of vouchers. Moreover, the negative 
press and the awareness of incidents of attacks against asylum seekers scared them and 
stopped them from going out at certain times of the day. None of the respondents had 
been personally attacked, but some of them knew other asylum seekers who had been 
harassed, including the case of a Kosovar Albanian who had been attacked and received 
serious head injury. 
In 1999, NATO's bombing campaign dominated the news and Kosovar refugees were 
positively represented in the media making British people particularly sympathetic to-
wards Kosovar Albanians in the UK and for a certain time they seemed more aware of 
the reasons why they had come to the UK. 
"Finally, I thought, the world heard what happened to us. I felt they were 
finally understanding us, but when the newspaper stopped and the govern-
ment started saying that now we should go home, everything returned as it 
always used to be, we became invisible again." Mitat (M, 40+, s, arr:1998, 
unemployed) 
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As a matter of fact, the solidarity and the sympathy were easily forgotten once Kosovo 
stopped making the first page headlines and the fear and the worry about racist attacks 
and about their future here became even stronger now that many of them risked depor-
tation. Moreover, many had felt misrepresented and used by journalists who had gone 
to interview them during the war. 
Smart explains that: 
"Once the spotlight of public concern shifts, it is the community organisa-
tions that are left to provide support, and in the case of the Kosovars, lack 
of resources is making this difficult. The impact of media reporting is now 
seen as overwhelmingly negative. Stories that criticise the numbers of asy-
lum seekers, the cost of asylum support, or report increasing public hostility 
to asylum seekers, sometimes mentioning Kosovars as an example, add to 
feelings of isolation among Kosovars." (Smart, 2004, p.30) 
Local churches and mosques around the country have provided Kosovar Albanians with 
support and created a platform for them to meet other people and establish new re-
lationships. English classes, when available, offered the same opportunity and allowed 
them to establish friendships with teachers and other class mates. 
In some cases, psychological conditions prevented the refugees from cultivating any re-
lationships with fellow Kosovar Albanians or with other people. 
"Here I have no social life. I have no energy. Only the responsibility of my 
youngest son keeps me going. Sometimes I wish a strong illness could get 
me and make me die. You see, because of my depression I cannot be in very 
crowded places, I get sick. Other Kosovars? What do we meet for? We 
all have problems and I cannot listen to other problems, it becomes like a 
competition of problems! Just to get out of this house, sometimes I go for a 
coffee around the corner. This area is quiet, where I was before it was too 
busy and I could not go with all the people in the street. I like visits of other 
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people at home, like you, so I can talk and take it all out." Stela (F, 50+, 
m, arr:1999, unemployed) 
6.3.11 Community Organisations 
The Kosovar Albanian community in the UK is relatively young and there are few 
organised activities taking place mostly in London. Kosovar Albanians were among 
the very first Albanians to arrive in the UK (Kostovicova and Prestreshi, 2003). The 
first attempts to set up some community organisations took place in the mid-1990s. 
In those years, many efforts to organise an Albanian cultural centre failed, however, 
other activities were set up such as a Student Association and an Islamic centre. Other 
organisations were set up during the 1999 war to help the new refugees coming to the 
UK and make the voice of the community heard. These activities were suspended after 
the war ended and new organisations were created instead to support, more generally, 
Albanian-speaking people in the UK. 
During the 1990s, there were different obstacles for the creation of community associa-
tions and the organisation of activities; the main problems were a lack of funding and 
a lack of time and resources. Refugees in London met often informally at a coffee place 
in North-West London on Sunday nights, but they were too busy trying to support 
themselves in the UK, study and send some money back home, to dedicate time and 
efforts to organise the community in a more formal way. Furthermore, as we have seen 
already in the previous sections, as time went by the Kosovar Albanian population be-
came more and more heterogeneous, people had escaped from Kosovo at different times, 
had various statuses and faced the consequences of different support systems in the UK. 
Moreover, personal differences in terms of age, education, social background and political 
ideas made it even more difficult for them to come together as an organised community. 
Overall, the different associations that were set up during the years were more oriented 
towards helping refugees to settle and support newcomers, especially those who came 
in 1999 through the evacuation programme set up by 10M and the UNHCR, very lit-
tle official activities were oriented to the cause of the Kosovar Albanian population in 
Kosovo. I list some of the community organisations below and provide a brief summary 
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of their activities in the UK, before analysing the refugees support to the cause of their 
co-nationals in Kosovo. 
In the mid-1990s some of the Kosovar Albanians who managed to go back to university 
set up the Society of Albanian Students centred at University College London, which had 
a relatively short life (Kostovicova and Prestreshi, 2003). In 1994, a group of Kosovars 
set up the Kosova Islamic Centre UK in London in order to overcome the problem 
of having to relate to other Muslim communities in the UK, which had very different 
religious views and ways of practicing Islam. Kostovicova and Prest res hi explain that: 
"At the very beginning, devout Kosovo Albanians went to the Central Mosque 
in Baker Street or to their local mosques and Islamic centres. However, they 
found their Asian co-religionists were patronising, authoritative and strict. 
At the same time, they felt estranged by the cultural customs that they felt 
were imposed as Islamic without tolerance for their cultural input in the 
practise of religion." (Kostovicova and Prestreshi, 2003, p.1091) 
The centre is still operating and is used as a mosque to pray and for social gatherings. It 
also offers services like a Madrasa for the Education of Children and Adults, an Islamic 
library and is used by about 600 believers. 
In 1997, another community organisation, Albanian Youth Action, was set up by a group 
of volunteers in London in order to meet the needs of a growing numbers of unaccompa-
nied teenage Albanian refugees coming from Kosovo as well as from Macedonia, Albania 
and Montenegro escaping from conflicts in the Balkans. The organisation is still fully 
operating in London and provides young Albanian speaking refugees with support to 
adapt to life in the UK and achieve their potential, while maintaining their own cul-
ture. The organisation runs several activities from providing general advice on benefits, 
accessing legal and immigration advice, housing, doctors appointments, etc. to offer-
ing assistance to find a job, registering with schools and colleges, contacting families 
at home, running group activities involving art, drama, and sport, organising weekend 
activities and holidays. 
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Other organisations were set up in 1999 during the war to represent the views of the 
refugee community on the situation in Kosovo and help the new arrivals; most of these 
were closed a few months after the war finished like Hope for Kosova and Kosova Phoenix. 
The former was coordinated by a Kosovar Albanian journalist who was a refugee in the 
UK, Hamide Latifi; the association had the aim of serving as a bridge between Kosovar 
refugees in Britain, local communities and institutions as well as organisations in Kosovo, 
Albania and Macedonia and worked a lot to help women. The organisation does not 
exist any longer, Hamide Latifi went back to Kosovo after the war and since 2000 she has 
been Country Director of the Kosovo Office of Women for Women International helping 
women to rebuild their life in Kosovo. 
Kosova Phoenix was another women's organisation set up during the war, which was a 
small community organisation set up by some of the refugees who had arrived in London 
in the early 1990s with the aim of assisting and supporting especially women refugees. 
Months after the war the organisation ceased to exist. 
Following the end of the war, between 2000-2001, while some of the organisations that 
were active during the war were closing down, new organisations were set up. In January 
2001, a group of volunteers formed a refugee support programme for all Albanian refugees 
and immigrants in the UK called Shpresa, which means Hope. Like Albanian Youth 
Action, the organisation is not exclusively focused on Kosovar Albanians in the UK, 
but provides support to all Albanian-speaking asylum seekers, refugees and migrants. 
The aim of the organisation is to help them to settle and fully participate in society, 
gain confidence and make progress in their lives. By the end of 2002, more than 160 
Albanian families were using Shpresa's services which include women's support groups, 
a men's drop-in centre, a young people programme, English language classes and help 
with translation. The organisation has also supported a group of young people who 
wanted to create a music group performing music from their own culture that could 
act as a means of communication with other non-Albanian young people and perform 
during the UK's annual Refugee Week and on Albanian Flag Day. 
Outside of London, there are not many Kosovar Albanian led activities. However, in the 
year 2000 in Leeds, which was one of the main destinations for evacuated refugees within 
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the Kosovo Programme, a group of people created the Kosova Club or 'Klubi Kosova' 
in order to support those refugees who did not return to Kosovo. This was replaced 
by Albanian Unity or 'Bashkesia Shqiptare' which was created as a fully constituted 
community organisation in 2001 and represents all ethnic Albanians (from Kosova, Al-
bania, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia) living in Leeds and close by, with the aim 
to provide support for Albanians and help them in their integration in the UK. 
The vast majority of the interviewees who had been in the UK since the early 1990s said 
to be disappointed that the general public in the UK ignored the conflict in Kosovo and 
the problems they faced. However, they did not organise significant formal activities to 
raise awareness about the Kosovo crisis and to put pressure on the UK government to 
intervene. 
While it has been established, during the fieldwork and through secondary sources, 
that all the refugees contributed to support their families back in Kosovo, it was not 
clear whether a more organised system of collection of a self-taxation to support the 
Albanian parallel government's structures in Kosovo existed. None of the interviewees, 
neither refugees nor coordinators of community organisations could answer my question. 
Similarly, their political views and alignment with political parties in Kosovo was not 
an easy subject to discuss and people were vague in their answers. This was because 
either they feared that this could play against their asylum or appeal decision or, as a 
couple of them explained, because they were not used to discuss political matters about 
Kosovo with people outside the community. 
"Here they are not used to discuss political things about Kosovo with other 
people. Others don't know Kosovo politics and they are not interested either, 
to be honest. With other Kosovars you can often end up fighting if you have 
different ideas, so you just learn not to talk about it. You only talk about the 
large picture and leave the details to yourself." Orner (M, 30+, m, arr:1990, 
engineer) 
When NATO launched the bombing campaign the refugees in the UK were taken by 
a storm of mixed emotions, on the one hand, they were happy that the international 
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community was finally intervening, on the other hand, they were extremely worried 
about the consequences for their people in Kosovo. Some of the men had probably 
gone back to join the KLA and fight, but this was not a subject that could be touched 
in depth during the interviews. Some of the women talked more openly about it, for 
example Denisa said that: 
"When NATO started bombing, my first thought was to go back, enrol and 
fight. I was watching the news all the time and I felt I had to fight. Some 
of the men I knew went, but in the end I did not go because I heard they 
were raping women, you know I could stand a bullet, but not rape and 
humiliation."Denisa (F, 30+, s, arr:1990, beautician) 
In the UK, most of the advocacy activities in support of Kosovar Albanians in Kosovo 
took place in 1999, with some refugees and organisations being more active than others 
in this respect; for example, in March 1999, at the height of NATO's bombing campaign, 
Hamide Latifi of Hope for Kosova addressed a Ministry of Defence briefing defending 
the UK's leading role in the destruction of the Serb military machine (Hanna, 1999) and 
in April 1999 Kosova Phoenix expressed their worries about the refugee crisis in Kosovo 
and neighbouring countries to the International Development Select Committee of the 
House of Commons. 
6.3.12 Summary 
Before looking at the Italian context and analyse the experience of Kosovar Albanian 
refugees in Italy, Table 6.1 offers a summary of the key points that have characterised 
their experience in the UK. 
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Spontaneous Ar- Refugees' life in the UK was influenced by the 1996 and 1999 
rivals Asylum and Immigration Acts. It is useful to distinguish three 
different groups in relation to the time of arrival: before 1996, 
between 1996 and 1999, 1999. 
Legal Status We can distinguish between different types of legal status: asylum 
seekers and refugees, people with ELR or ILR, temporarily pro-
tected refugees, family reunion cases. Status affected most aspects 
of their life in the UK (housing, jobs, education, etc.). 
Support and Ben- Refugees offered each other help and support. The kind of institu-
efits tional support available depended on the asylum system in place 
at the time of arrival. The new legislations introduced stricter 
provisions and the dispersal and voucher systems. 
Housing Housing conditions were generally poor, in some cases hotels 
and B&Bs were assigned as accommodation by social services. 
Refugees with a stable status and better level of integration had 
managed to rent or buy better properties. 
English Language Few adult refugees managed to access language courses. The ma-
jority had to learn on their own. 
Legal Advice Mostly available in London. Difficult to obtain after dispersal. 
Health Physical and psychological healthcare was available to asylum 
seekers and refugees. 
Education A stable status was indispensable to be able to afford higher edu-
cation. Many people waited up to 6-7 years before being able to 
go back to study. Schooling was available to all children. 
Employment A stable status and good language skills were indispensable to get 
a decent job. Asylum seekers were not allowed to work for the first 
six months in the UK. Some of the young refugees who arrived in 
the early 1990s have managed to further their career. 
Gender Relations The experience of exile empowered many women. This had an im-
pact on their relationship with other members of the community. 
Social Life Socialising required time and effort. In any case, it was easier to 
socialise with other Albanians because of language and cultural 
factors. Relations with British people depended especially on the 
ability to speak English. 
Community The community in the UK is relatively young and the few existing 
Organisations organised activities take place mostly in London. The first at-
tempts to set up some community organisations took place in the 
mid-1990s, many of them are now shut and new ones have replaced 
them. Their main aim has been, and still is, that of improving the 
conditions of Kosovar Albanians in the UK. 
TABLE 6.1: Summary of the refugees' experience in the UK 
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6.4 Conclusions 
This chapter dealt with the settlement of Kosovar Albanians in the UK. It provided a 
short overview of the country's general approach to asylum referring to policies, media 
representation and public discourse, as well as the role of the voluntary sector and refugee 
organisations. 
Having set the background, it analysed various situations that different waves of Koso-
var Albanians found when they arrived in the UK during the 1990s and analysed the 
way in which the environment in the country of exile shaped their settlement. Then it 
considered the impact of different legal statuses and asylum support systems on their 
experience in exile and focused on specific aspects of their lives such as: health, edu-
cation, employment, housing, legal advice, language skills, gender relations, socialising 
and community organisations. 
The next chapter focuses on the case of Kosovar Albanian refugees in Italy following a 
similar structure. Moreover, it analyses the differences and similarities between the UK 
and the Italian contexts in order to explain the kind of impact these differences had on 
refugee integration and on their decision in relation to return. 
PAGE NUMBERING AS IN THE 
ORIGINAL THESIS 
Chapter 7 
Reception and settlement of 
Kosovar Albanian refugees in 
Italy: the case of spontaneous 
arrivals 
7 .1 Introduction 
Having analysed the reception and settlement experience of Kosovar Albanian refugees 
in the UK, this chapter deals with the case of Kosovar Albanians in Italy. It focuses 
on the refugees' experiences in Italy and analyses their interactions with the context 
they found upon arrival. An analysis of their settlement experiences is relevant when 
attempting to understand the impact of the relationship with the receiving society and 
its policies on the refugees' decision-making process in relation to return. 
Following the structure of Chapter 6, this chapter begins with a brief overview of the 
previous interaction between politics, media, public opinion, NGOs and refugees in Italy 
in relation to immigration and asylum. This is necessary in order to understand the 
situation Kosovar Albanian refugees found when they arrived in Italy. Having set the 
background, it provides an analysis of their collective and individual interaction with 
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conditions in exile. 
As in Chapter 6, this chapter considers the cases of both anticipatory and acute refugees 
who arrived spontaneously in Italy during the 1990s. It gives particular attention to the 
differences in social class, education, age and gender of the refugees and their different 
relationship with the conflict in the country of origin. The aim is that of exploring the 
ways in which these differences impacted on the refugees' interplay with the policies 
and society of the receiving country, and affected their modes of settlement. Moreover, 
the final section entitled 'Comparing settlement experiences', analyses differences and 
similarities between the reception and settlement of Kosovar Albanians who arrived 
spontaneously in the UK or in Italy in order to highlight the impact of the exile context 
on refugee integration and on their decision in relation to return. 
7.2 Migration and Asylum Policies in Italy 
The following sections present a brief account of migration and asylum policies in Italy 
providing the necessary background to better understand the conditions and the general 
environment that Kosovar Albanian refugees had to interact with when arriving in Italy 
during the 1990s. 
For more than a century, since its unification in 1861 and until the economic boom of 
the 1960s, Italy was a country of emigration rather than one of immigration (Macioti 
and Pugliese, 1993). In fact, between 1860 and 1920, it was the second most important 
country of emigration in Europe, after the British Isles (Bade 2003) and it is estimated 
that between 1876, which was the year when official records begun to be collected, and 
the 1970s about 26 million emigrants left Italy to go abroad (Favero and Tassello, 1978) 
mostly to the US, South America, other European countries and Italy's colony in North 
Africa. 
Therefore, when the migration flow started to change direction, Italy was unprepared and 
the country took a while before realising its new condition as a country of immigration. 
Although the influx of immigrants to Italy started to increase at the beginning of the 
1970s, it is only in the 1981 census that the country discovered to have switched from 
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being a country of emigration to one of immigration (Zincone, 1993). This change was 
mainly due to the decline of the emigration flow, the return migration of many Italians 
from abroad and the consequences of the 'closed door policy' of Northern European 
countries, which caused the increase in the migration influx to Mediterranean European 
countries during the 1980s. Within this context, several factors contributed in bringing 
about a significant increase in the migratory influx in Italy: the geographical proximity 
to the countries of origin of many migrants, the lack of specific policies on migration that 
allowed an easy entry into Europe and offered good possibilities of transit to Northern 
States, and the improved economy of the country. 
Bade explains that: 
"In Italy, where intercontinental south-north migration to the Euro-Mediterranean 
region emerged earliest and strongest, immigration controls were deliberately 
treated liberally, unbureaucratically and for a long time generally with-
out a visa stamp, because the overwhelming majority of foreigners were 
tourists." (Bade, 2003, p.235) 
Undoubtedly, at the early stages of this new phenomenon Italy was not prepared to 
face the consequences of a growing migratory inflow and the initial political answers 
were given in the form of emergency measures. However, as discussed later on, 'impro-
visation' and 'emergency' seem to have turned into permanent features of the Italian 
political response to immigration and show the difficulty of both politicians of all politi-
cal orientations and public opinion to accept the new reality of migration. For example, 
Italy is the EU member state which has had the highest number of amnesties (sanatorie) 
to tackle the problem of illegal migration. Since the mid-eighties there have been a total 
of five amnesties in 1986, 1990, 1995, 1998 and 2002. Moreover, throughout most of the 
1990s, the approach to immigration focused mostly on new arrivals, rather than on those 
migrants who were already settled (Zetter et al., 2002), with a consequent general lack 
of an integration strategy at the national level. The task of taking care of the needs of 
migrants was left in the hands of voluntary organisations, especially within the catholic 
voluntary sector, which handled most of the emergencies and dealt with many aspects 
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of the immigrants' life in Italy. Their work earned them a central role within the debate 
on immigration in the country and turned them into key providers of social assistance. 
Zetter at al. note that "the dominant role played principally by Caritas in organising 
and responding to the needs generated by this new social context, permitted the Ital-
ian political system to abdicate responsibility for the phenomenon" (Zetter et al., 2002, 
p.71). Policy makers' reluctance to deal with the immigrant population is also empha-
sised by their general efforts to stress and revive the links with Italian emigrants abroad 
rather than improving the conditions for immigrants in Italy. For example, in 1992, the 
country passed a law on citizenship (law 91) that confirmed ius sanguinis to be the main 
criterion to become an Italian citizen and established that foreign citizens need to have 
had permanent residence in the country for ten years before being able to apply for cit-
izenship (Zincone, 2000). Almost ten years later, in 2001, Italy passed another law (law 
n. 459) to ensure the right to vote of Italian citizens resident abroad, many of which are 
descendents of Italian emigrants who have never been to Italy and are also citizens of 
the state they were born in, while the political participation of immigrants still remains 
the subject of controversial debates and is mostly discussed only in relation to local 
elections. In a study on second-generation migrants, Andall (2002) confirms the view 
that despite the presence of migrant communities already into the second generation, 
public and political attention in Italy has continued to focus on new waves of migration 
and undocumented migration. Therefore, "the conditions of settled communities have 
tended to be of peripheral concern to immigration social policy makers" (Andall, 2002, 
p.389). 
Currently, despite some improvements, the issue of immigration in Italy is still pre-
dominantly dealt with in relation to border controls and national security issues, with 
emergency responses and amnesties still playing an important part in the political ap-
proach to the issue, while the voluntary sector is still the main provider of assistance 
for immigrants in the country. This is even more so in the case of asylum and refugee 
issues. The following section explores in more detail the issue of asylum in Italy, the 
reaction of the media and public opinion to asylum seekers and refugees and the role of 
the voluntary sector and refugee organisations. 
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7.2.1 Asylum policies in Italy: 1990s 
The question of political asylum has been even more neglected than general immigration 
issues by Italian policy makers over the years and, in general, the topic is not strongly 
debated as a distinct issue in the media and in public debate as it is the case in many 
Northern European countries. Blade explains that while during the 1980s in central, 
western and northern Europe, the concerns in public and political discussions about the 
immigrant population that emerged from labour migration receded behind the issue of 
'asylum', in the Euro-Mediterranean zone, it is the subject of 'illegality' that moved to 
the fore. In fact, in southern Europe, asylum played only a minor role up to the late 
1980s, whereas illegal immigration did not become the focus of discussion in central, 
western and northern Europe until the 1990s (Bade, 2003). 
In Italy this is still the case, asylum is not at the top of the political agenda and public 
debate, and it is mostly the concern of voluntary associations and NGOs. As a matter 
of fact, Italy as of 2004 remained the only EU country! with no specific legislation 
on asylum and, over the past fifteen years, has dealt with various refugee crises on 
an emergency basis. The country ratified the 1951 Geneva Convention on the status 
of refugees in 1954 but did not sign the 1967 Protocol which lifted the 'geographical 
limitation' to refugees coming from European countries until 1990. Consequently, for 
almost forty years, refugees coming from areas outside of Europe did not have any right 
to apply for political asylum and Italy was the only European country with refugees 
recognised under the UNHCR mandate (Joly, 1992). Finally, in 1990, Italy passed Law n. 
39, known as the Martelli Law, which represented a first level of harmonisation with other 
European countries' legislation on the entry and permanence of non-European foreigners. 
The most relevant changes brought by this law in matters of asylum were the withdrawal 
of the geographic restriction to the 1951 Geneva Convention and the introduction, for 
the first time, of specific provisions on asylum (CIR, 1990). However, the law established 
only a few minimum standards in relation to the asylum procedure in article 1. According 
to this article: asylum applications are examined by the Central Commission for Refugee 
Status Determination2 and asylum seekers are entitled to minimum assistance while 
IHere we refer to the EU member states before the enlargement of 2004. 
2The Central Commission for Refugee Status Determination which is the competent administrative 
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waiting for an answer; they can only receive 25.000 liras per person per day (about 12 
euros) for the first 45 days (CIR, 1996a) and have no right to work. 
It is not surprising that the number of asylum claims under the 1951 Geneva Convention 
has been very low in Italy over the years. Under these conditions, considering the average 
waiting time for a decision from the central commission (typically at least a year), asylum 
seekers risk to remain without support, work permits and rights to family reunification 
for a long time. The table below shows the number of applications submitted from 1990 
until 2001 and the number of applications actually examined by the commission every 
year, illustrating also the generally low acceptance rate 3. 
I Year I Submitted Applications I Applications Examined I Accepted Claims I 
1990 4830 1466 824 
1991 26470 20076 944 
1992 6040 6960 336 
1993 1650 1955 165 
1994 1790 1699 298 
1995 1730 1741 282 
1996 680 791 175 
1997 1860 1854 348 
1998 11120 5005 1108 
1999 33360 8311 809 
2000 15560 24438 1642 
2001 9620 13344 2098 
TABLE 7.1: Asylum Applications and final decision (1990-2001) Source: Caritas, 2002 
This explains why, even during the 1990s, many refugees preferred to enter the country 
illegally and live clandestinely until yet another amnesty for illegal labour migrants gave 
them the chance to regularise their position, while others received a residence permit 
through family reunification or simply transited through Italy in order to reach other 
destinations in Western Europe. 
Given the shortcomings of the law it was necessary to develop emergency plans to be 
able to cope with the acute refugee crisis throughout the 1990s. From 1991 to 1996, 
the Italian government faced many emergencies due to new influxes of immigrants and 
asylum seekers (Albanians, Somalis, former Yugoslavs, etc.), and was forced to look for 
body deciding about asylum claims. 
3Statistical data about asylum in Italy show small variations in different sources. 
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some possible solutions outside the Martelli Law. For example, the first refugee influx 
from the Former Republic of Yugoslavia had to be dealt with within this context and 
required ad hoc legislation when the number of people seeking asylum began to increase; 
this was provided through decree-law 27 (May 1992), granting humanitarian entry visas 
at the border, which was then converted into Law 390 (September 1992). As Rein (2000) 
notes, although the law does not use the specific term, it was clearly meant as measure 
of temporary protection and it preceded even the DNRCR recommendation of July 1992 
on temporary protection. In the mid-nineties the problems related to immigrants and 
asylum seekers were at the top of the national political agenda. Proposals to amend 
Law n.39 came from both centre-right parties and centre-left ones. The former aimed at 
a severe enforcement of expulsions and promoted a harsh condemnation of illegal entries 
and permanence. The latter, were proposing a new 'amnesty' to regularise the people 
who were staying in Italy illegally, but could prove they had a job (CIR, 1995). 
In 1996, the newly elected centre-left government, decided that 'it was no longer ac-
ceptable to carryon with a policy based on 'decrees' issued to face emergencies or local 
problems and it was time to tackle the inadequacy of the existing structures, the lack 
of reception and settlement policies (CIR, 1996b). Therefore, the government decided 
to promote a new comprehensive framework, in an attempt to provide a more coherent 
and broader political response. In 1998, the Parliament passed Law n. 40 'Disciplina 
dell'immigrazione e dello straniero' which introduced important innovations such as: a 
residence card (obtainable after having spent five years in Italy with a regular renew-
able residence permit) which allows an active participation in public life, including the 
right to vote in local elections (art.7); specific anti-discrimination and anti-racist mea-
sures (art. 41-42); measures on intercultural education (art.36) and integration policies 
(art.44). In relation to asylum issues, the new bill included only an expulsion ban ap-
plying to those foreigners who might risk being persecuted because of their race, gender, 
language, nationality, religion, political opinion, personal or social condition (art.17) and 
measures for humanitarian emergencies in case of conflict, natural disasters and other 
severe events taking place in non ED states (art. 18). This was mainly due to the fact 
that the government had decided to exclude from Law n.40 the subject of asylum in 
order to prepare a specific bill on the subject that would have represented Italy's first 
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legislation on asylum. In 1997, Prodi's government presented a bill on asylum (draft 
n. 5381) which was given the green light by the Chamber of Deputies just the day 
before the President of the Italian Republic dissolved parliament to pave the way for 
national elections in May. This left no time for the Senate to re-discuss it and give it 
final approval and since then, no further attempts have been made4 . 
This implied that until 1999, the year of NATO's bombing campaign in Kosovo, asylum 
issues were still mostly dealt with on an ad hoc emergency basis in Italy, conditions for 
asylum seekers had not yet improved and NGOs were still the main providers of services 
and support for both economic migrants and refugees. 
For the Italian media and public opinion the distinction between labour migrants and 
refugees in public discourse is often blurred. This is not surprising in a country that 
does not have specific asylum policies where most refugees follow other routes to legalise 
their position rather than claiming asylum. 
In media reporting the words 'immigrato' or 'extracomunitario' (person coming from out-
side the European Union) are often used for any person coming from countries troubled 
by poverty or by war with no distinction between refugees, asylum seekers and economic 
migrants. Following the waves of emergency situations, the media refer to 'rifugiati' 
(refugees), 'profughi' (refugees), 'sfollati' (evacuees) mostly in relation to mass refugee 
influx coming from conflicts which dominate the news at a specific moment. This was 
the case for the early arrivals of Albanians, Bosnians and Kosovars. 
In general, the international relevance of a crisis coupled with welcoming government 
policies seem to have led to positive press reports and positive attitudes towards refugees 
from the public. However, the situation has often changed as soon as the refugee pro-
ducing conflict stopped being under the spotlight and the government toughened their 
policies. An emblematic example of this is the case of Albanian refugees in the early 
1990s. 
The first influx of Albanians arrived in Italy in July 1990 (after the Embassies crises 
in Tirana) and in a few years they have gone through different migratory situations. 
4The following government modified the asylum procedure with a new immigration Law n. 189/2002 
adopting a more restrictive approach, but did not attempt to draft a specific legislation on asylum. 
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Initially, those who entered the Italian embassy in Tirana, around 800 individuals, were 
granted refugee status. The newspapers were talking about them as 'sons of the same 
sea' (Balbo and Manconi, 1992) and the population was welcoming them with sympa-
thy. In this general positive atmosphere, a joint protest by the trade unions and the 
general public stopped the government from taking any restrictive measures against the 
first mass arrivals in the summer of 1990. However, in 1991 the reaction to the increas-
ing arrivals of ships to the Italian coasts vis-a.-vis the European pressures towards the 
adoption of restrictive policies in the light of the Schengen Agreement, prevented the 
government from prolonging the state of emergency. Consequently, Albanians were dis-
missed as prima facie economic migrants and deported without being allowed to apply 
for refugee status (CIR, 1991). In August 1991, the episode of the overcrowded tow-
boat of Albanians, waiting in the Adriatic Sea to dock in the port of Brindisi, covered 
the pages of many European newspapers. The Italian government, again unprepared to 
face the situation, left the ship in the offing for several days. Then, people were put in 
a football stadium with no assistance, while the government decided to send them back 
to Albania (Delle Donne, 1995). The expulsion was followed by the militarisation of the 
Adriatic sea in order to stop the influx and by the Italian Pellicano Operation offering 
aid and co-operation in Albania as an alternative to migration (Campani, 1995). Con-
sidering the sympathetic reaction of the Italian population towards the earliest arrivals 
of Albanians, we would expect protests and demonstrations against these last decisions 
of the government and a general opposition to the expulsion orders but this did not 
happen, as Italy was caught by what Delle Donne defines as the 'invasion syndrome' 
when she explains that: 
"[ ... J the reaction of panic, fed by the media and by the inaction of the 
government and public institutions, in the face of the ship swarming with 
Albanians, set in motion a psychological mechanism of non-acceptance and 
opposition." (Delle Donne, 1995, p.115) 
Consequently, the positive image of the Albanian turned into a very negative one. More-
over the official block of Albanian immigration did not stop the influx that turned its , 
way towards illegality. Smuggling immigrants became a profitable business in the hands 
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of the Pugliese Mafia 'Sacra Corona Unita' (Perlmutter, 1998) and Albanian smugglers, 
a phenomenon that contributed as well to the construction of the negative stereotype of 
the Albanian immigrant. 
As already mentioned, in Italy the voluntary sector plays a central role even in the 
reception and integration process of asylum seekers and refugees and many organisations 
deal both with economic migrants and refugees. The Consiglio Italiano per i Rifugiati 
(the Italian Refugee Council) is the national agency which coordinates and develops 
activities carried out by various organisations and associations in defence of refugees 
and asylum seekers rights. NGOs are also the main advocacy groups and playa key role 
in the public debate on immigration and asylum. They were the leading force behind 
the creation of the PNA (Programma Nazionale Asilo), a project which involves national 
NGOs, institutional and international actors and represents a first effort to establish a 
nationally coordinated reception and support services for asylum seekers and refugees. 
Currently, they are the main group lobbying for Italy to adopt a specific bill on asylum 
and monitoring the consequences of the latest immigration law for refugees. 
In Italy, the better established networks of refugees are in the larger cities, especially 
in Rome and Milan. Some of them are formally constituted and can, therefore, apply 
for funding from local authorities while others are more informal organisations. In 
both cases, given the limited national support, these organisations have a crucial role, 
especially in the reception phase when they can provide assistance to new comers helping 
with the language, finding a job and accommodation. Zetter at al. point out that, 
generally, refugee organisations do not playa significant role in the political arena. 
They explain that: 
"Lacking a national presence, in notable contrast to Germany and to a lesser 
extent the UK, with very few exceptions they do not participate in national-
level decision-making processes. Participation in public life at the local level 
is more significant given the immediate needs of their communities for basic 
needs as much as broader political rights and recognition." (Zettcr et al., 
2002, p.88) 
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In conclusion, Italy does not have yet a specific comprehensive legislation on asylum 
and, therefore, the refugee reception and integration systems are still dominated by the 
adoption of emergency measures and by the work of NGOs and RCOs. This was the 
context Kosovar Albanians had to relate to when settling in the country. The following 
section focuses on the specific conditions encountered by Kosovar Albanian refugees 
during the 1990s and their integration strategies. 
7.3 The case of spontaneous arrivals in Italy 
This chapter deals with Kosovar Albanian refugees' spontaneous arrivals in Italy. The 
following section provides a short overview of the main developments that have defined 
the conditions faced by the refugees in Italy, which was not the immediate choice for 
many refugees coming from Kosovo at the beginning of the 1990s. As explained in 
Chapter 5, initially, many Kosovar Albanians considered it as a country of transition to 
other destinations and once they were in the national territory they attempted repeatedly 
to cross the borders. However, some of them did not manage to settle in other countries 
or cross the border and settled in Italy instead, attracting other refugees who left Kosovo 
at a later stage. The vast majority of these Kosovar Albanians did not apply for refugee 
status. Initially, a small number of them submitted a claim under the 1951 Geneva 
Convention; others received temporary protection or a residence permit through family 
reunification; many entered the country illegally and lived clandestinely until a new 
amnesty for illegal labour migrants gave them a chance to regularise their position. 
During the late 1990s, the arrivals of refugees from Kosovo increased sharply and by 
1998 it is estimated that they were also the largest national group of asylum seekers in 
the country. Nevertheless, it is very difficult to give an estimate of how many Kosovar 
Albanians are currently in Italy, official data of 2001 from the Ministry of Interior claimed 
that there were 3,493 Kosovars on the national territory, with no specific subsection 
for ethnic groups. In contrast with this data, the estimate of the Kosovar Albanian 
community leaders is that there are currently around 46.000 Kosovar Albanians in Italy. 
The reasons for the lack of precise statistical information is given by the fact that 
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Kosovar Albanians have settled with different statuses and appear in different statistics, 
they were often listed as citizens of the FRY and some of them are illegally in Italy. For 
example, the number of Kosovars who applied for convention status is not clear because 
they do not appear as a separate group in the statistics, but are, instead, included in 
the general group of applicants from the FRY. In 1999, the general number of asylum 
applications in Italy was about 8,356 and the number of application from the FRY was 
4,456 (SISTAN, 2000). 
In general, the first refugees to arrive were mostly men, while families and women came 
at a later stage. They reached Italy through smugglers via the Adriatic Sea or after a long 
trip through the Balkans, while others came officially through family reunification. They 
settled mainly in the north and central part of Italy, where they found better developed 
support networks for migrants and job opportunities. Spontaneous arrivals from Kosovo 
included both anticipatory refugees leaving Kosovo to escape the persecution of the 
Serbian authorities (this included those who were politically engaged or wanted to avoid 
to be conscripted in the Serbian army or had been dismissed from public jobs because 
of their ethnicity) and acute refugee movements of people who escaped direct danger. 
Their life in Italy was mostly influenced by the lack of specific provisions for refugees and 
by general immigration policies as well as by the widespread prejudices versus Albanian 
immigrants. Two specific ad hoc decrees, one issued during the first refugee crisis from 
former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s and one passed in response to the specific Kosovo 
refugee crisis in 1999, provided many Kosovar Albanians with temporary protection. 
During the 1999 NATO's bombing campaign, Italy adopted a temporary protection mea-
sure for Kosovar refugees, both evacuated refugees and spontaneous arrivals. The next 
chapter on the refugees who arrived through the evacuation programme deals specifically 
with involvement of the Italian government in the Humanitarian Evacuation Programme 
and the temporary protection measures adopted for the refugees in 1999. However, in 
order to provide a comprehensive account of the different conditions the refugees who 
arrived spontaneously found in Italy, in this chapter I also consider the case of those who 
arrived in 1999 by their own means and received temporary protection status. Many of 
them reached families and friends who were already settled in Italy while others received 
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the support of NGOs and voluntary organisations. Their arrivals within the context of 
a lack an adequate reception system provided the voluntary sector with a strong incen-
tive to create a joint project of reception called Azione Comune 1999. The project was 
funded by the EU and the Italian Ministry of Interior Affairs, while the UNHCR acted as 
an advisor and monitored the activities and CIR led and coordinated the project which 
involved a total of twelve national and international organisations. The programme 
began operating on the 12th of July 1999, almost a month after the end of the war, 
and finished on the 31st of December 1999, but was then renewed for 2000 with an 
extension to all asylum seekers and refugees irrespective of their nationality. Azione Co-
mune 1999 coordinated 34 reception centres spread throughout ten different regions and 
provided accommodation to about 1,000 refugees coming from Kosovo (21.77% of them 
were asylum seekers, 2.21% had refugee status and 52.41% were temporarily protected 
people); 58.66% of those assisted by the project were Kosovar Albanians and 32.05% 
were Kosovar Romas (Lo Prato, 2000). The programme also offered services to people 
who did not reside in the centres such as legal advice, health care, assistance to return 
and a financial contribution to rent payments if refugees had found their own accommo-
dation. In total, the programme was used by around 12,000 people (Lo Prato, 2000). 
This project was relatively successful and formed the foundation of the PNA, which 
has established the first national system of reception and support for the integration of 
asylum seekers, refugees, temporarily protected people and people with permit to stay 
on humanitarian grounds currently involving several NGOs, the National Association of 
Italian Municipalities and the UNHCR. 
In conclusion, Kosovar Albanian refugees in Italy had to cope with the lack of provisions 
for asylum seekers, many settled as labour migrants, some obtained temporary protec-
tion status and few of them, arriving in 1999, had the support of the newly formed 
Azione Comune. In the following sections, I analyse the experience of Kosovar Albanian 
refugees in Italy in relation to the following issues: legal status, support received upon 
arrival, housing conditions, Italian language fluency, legal advice, health, education, 
employment, gender relations, social life and community organisations. 
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7.3.1 Status 
As already explained, Kosovar Albanians have used various ways to obtain a permit to 
stay in Italy. Until the 1999 crisis, they settled either as labour migrants or through 
humanitarian entry visas which were adopted with ad hoc decree-laws in 1992 in order 
to cope with the refugee influx from the Former Republic of Yugoslavia and in 1999 to 
face the Kosovo refugee crisis. 
In general, throughout the decade, many people remained illegally in the country for 
some time and then applied for one of the amnesties (in 1995 and 1998) while others came 
through family reunification. The leaders of the community explained that claiming 
asylum was not an option for many Kosovar Albanians in Italy, since many of them had 
left their family behind and wanted to feel free to go back to rescue their relatives if 
necessary. Submitting an asylum claim would have stopped them from being able to 
do so. Moreover, they explained, Italians are not aware of asylum issues and political 
reasons for migration, so even those who were asylum seekers always claimed to be there 
to work, because Italians do not like people who are assisted by the state. 
"Avevano paura di chiedere asilo, perche questo toglieva la possibilita di 
tornare ad aiutare Ie famiglie se era necessario. E poi, agli It ali ani , si dice 
sempre per lavoro, gli It ali ani non sanno di motivi politici e sono contro 
chi e assistito dallo stato." Behar (M, 30+, m, arr:1991, construction site 
manager) 
Some of the respondents who had arrived in 1998 submitted a claim upon arrival but 
received a negative answer in late 1999 or early 2000 saying that Kosovo was now safe 
and, therefore, there was no ground for their claim anymore. They received instead 
a humanitarian permit for a year and at the time of the interview (2002) they had 
converted it into a work permit. Others were still waiting for an answer and were 
sure that it would have come with a negative decision, therefore, they were planning 
alternative ways to stay, including the possibility to remain illegally. Feti said that if 
the decision was negative he would continue to work illegally until finding a way to get 
1:1, work permit: 
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"Se la risposta che arriva e negativa, continuero a lavorare in nero fino a 
quando non trovo il sistema per un permesso di lavoro." Feti (M, 20+, s, 
arr:2001, builder) 
For those who obtained humanitarian protection in 1992, the law granted a three months 
only residence permit with no right to work or to family reunion. Then, between 1993 
and 1994, following the pressure exercised by NGOs and refugee advocates, the permit 
was extended to one year. It was renewable 'automatically' and included the right to 
work, the right to higher education and to family reunification (Hein, 2000). Despite the 
fact that refugees were given the chance of working and studying, for almost six years 
the future continued to look uncertain. It was only in August 1998 that an ordinance 
proclaimed the cessation of humanitarian protection status and people were given three 
options: an asylum claim under the terms of the 1951 Geneva Convention; the conversion 
of their humanitarian residence permit into an immigration permit for two years on 
condition of showing evidence of a job offer; a permit on humanitarian grounds based on 
aliens Law n. 40 for persons unable to work for personal, health or age reasons (Hein, 
2000). It is not clear how many Kosovar Albanians obtained each of these kinds of 
permit, since their ethnicity was not specified on the records. 
Similarly, those who arrived in May 1999, during the acute refugee crisis in Kosovo, 
obtained a temporary form of protection. This was approved through a ministerial 
decree (Ministerial decree: DPC11 12 May, 1999) and both refugees who arrived spon-
taneously and evacuees were given the choice between submitting an asylum claim or 
accepting temporary protection. The decree included from the start a humanitarian 
residence permit, a work permit and the right to be assisted in collective centres until 
31 December 1999 (Ministerial decree: DPCM 12 May, 1999) and was later extended 
until the 30th of June 2000. The final ministerial decree on the issue (Ministirial Decree: 
DPCM 1 September, 2000) detailed the terms for the cessation of temporary protection. 
Refugees could take part in assisted repatriation programmes or risked 'removal' from 
the national territory as the law in force prescribed. However, similarly to the case 
of the humanitarian protection adopted in 1992 and ended in 1998, there were other 
options for those refugees who wanted to stay (Commissione Permanente Affari Costi-
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tuzionali 2000) through a different form of residence permit: they could claim refugee 
status under the terms of the 1951 Geneva Convention; they could ask for a humani-
tarian residence permit in accordance with decree-law n. 286 (25 July 1998); or they 
could stay also as labour migrants if they provided all the necessary documentation by 
the 30th September 2000 to a police headquarters (questura) in order to prove that they 
had a job and accommodation (Amore, 2002b). I refer to this in the following chapter 
on the specific case of refugees evacuated in Italy and I examine the implications of each 
of these post-temporary protection options in the last chapter on return. 
7.3.2 Support upon arrival and Benefits 
Regardless of their status and official or unofficial presence in Italy, Kosovar Albanians 
have not received support from the state, with the only exception of asylum seekers 
who received financial support for the first 45 days after the submission of their claim. 
The respondents often explained that only families and friends have helped them and in 
some cases the local church or local support groups. 
Their informal network provided support for newcomers throughout the 1990s and even 
during the height of the crisis. Drita, who had arrived in 1994 to reach her husband 
who was already in Italy, explained that in 1999 those who were already settled in Italy 
provided accommodation and helped those who escaped during the war. Many had 
shared their homes with relatives and friends who had arrived during 1998-1999 and 
some of them were still hosting them at the time of the interviews. She said that many 
were calling them once they reached Italy to ask for help and accommodation until they 
could manage to reach their relatives in Germany and Switzerland. 
Community leaders complained about the lack of support upon arrival explaining that 
they tried to help as much as they could; Behar said that arriving from the shock of a 
war zone in a foreign country like Italy you are left totally on your own and you have 
no idea were to turn for help: 
"Quando vieni da una guerra sei gia sotto shock e qui non sai dove sbattere 
la testa, proprio! Non sai chi ti puo aiutare."Behar (M, 30+, m, arr:1991, 
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construction site manager) 
The only support for refugees was the network of relatives, friends and voluntary asso-
ciations offering help, but overall they had to find the way to support themselves. 
7.3.3 Housing 
Finding a house is a problem for the vast majority of immigrants in Italy. Throughout 
the 1990s, Kosovar Albanians did not receive any help from the government and had to 
find solutions on their own. Few of those who arrived in 1999 received help from the 
project Azione Comune. 
Typically, at the beginning the first arrivals were mostly men who shared a rented house 
with other migrants or compatriots. These were often very crowded fiats or old houses in 
extremely bad conditions which were located in neglected areas of historical city centres, 
suburbs or the countryside and offered just a 'roof over your head'! Through hard work 
and contacts, they often managed to rent 'better' places or larger houses where they 
could even house their families if necessary. Discrimination and racism were an obstacle 
to finding a decent place to rent as many landlords did not want to let to immigrants in 
general and to Albanians in particular. 
In many cases although the house they found was in poor condition they managed to 
improve it up to a good standard through their own means. In some cases this was 
very clear when I visited them as the exterior of the house was still unfinished or in a 
bad state, while the fiat or the house inside had been perfectly finished and arranged 
by the refugees. Moreover, in certain cases the landlords were clearly taking advantage 
of the situation. For example Saimir and his family had rented an unfinished fiat in a 
building that was just a shell in the middle of the countryside. When I arrived to meet 
them, the house looked like a picture from a war zone, even the main staircase was just 
bare cement, broken bricks and rotten iron, but when I entered the fiat, it was a very 
different picture. They had managed to finish it off nicely through their own efforts and 
resources. However, once finished, the landlord wanted it back to sell it and threatened 
to throw them out any day. 
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Another common problem was that the rent was generally very high but the landlords 
refused to sign an official contract or simply declared a much lower rent than what was 
actually paid in order to pay fewer taxes. This is common practice in Italy even with 
other social groups, including students, but for immigrants it has serious consequences. 
If they were suddenly asked to leave the accommodation, it was not easy for them 
to find an alternative given the general difficulties for migrants in finding appropriate 
housing; moreover, proof of a rental contract for the house was often required for many 
bureaucratic procedures. 
In some cases people joined forces, managing to buy a property and fix it. For example, 
this was the case of four different families who bought a derelict building with their 
savings and managed to create four fiats. In general such actions were taken by people 
who had arrived in the early 1990s and had managed to save enough money and build 
enough networks to be able to buy a property. In other cases NGOs helped the refugees 
to find accommodation. One of the leaders of the community, who had arrived in Italy 
in the late 1980s, explained that CARITAS generally helped them but also stressed 
that they, mostly, helped themselves. He affirmed that in the late 1990s he personally 
guaranteed over thirty-five fiats for compatriots. 
"La Caritas ha aiutato molto, rna noi Kossovari ci siamo principalmente 
aiutati ed organizzati da soli. Per oltre 35 appartamenti ho garantito io 
personalmente." Hekuran (M, 50+, m, arr:1989, teacher) 
The refugees helped by Azione Comune were assigned a place in a reception centre, 
wherever there was availability. In parallel to this, CIR had organised another scheme 
which offered a lump sum to pay for a few months' rent for private accommodation that 
the refugees had found on their own. 
7.3.4 Italian language 
Language was a big barrier for all the refugees in Italy. They did not find any official 
support system for learning and, in any case, they were too busy trying to survive to 
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have the time to attend possible classes for immigrants organised by NGOs and volun-
teers. In general, they learnt Italian 'from the street' and, therefore, they often speak 
a mixture of Italian and the local dialect. Not being able to speak Italian in a country 
with no structured reception and integration system can create all sorts of problems. 
Understanding what their duties and rights are, where they can find information and 
how the bureaucratic system works is essential for survival and being able to communi-
cate is essential. For example, the inability to speak Italian meant that many children 
entered school at a lower level than their age would justify. 
"Quando sono arrivato qua avevo quattordici anni e mi hanno messo in 
seconda media con i ragazzini pili piccoli perche non parlavo Italiano. Quindi 
ho perso pili di due anni." Ermal (M, 19, s, arr:1999, student) 
Moreover, not speaking Italian could also create problems at work. For example, Besnik 
was not able to explain in Italian that he was a wall painter and managed to find a job in 
a furniture factory instead, where he was still working at the time of the interview. He 
said that only two years later, when his boss told him that he was looking for someone 
to repaint his house, he finally told him what his main job before coming to Italy was. 
"Non parlavo una parola d'italiano quando sono arrivato, non potevo neanche 
spiegare cosa sapevo fare ed ho accettato il primo lavoro che ho trovato, qui 
in una fabbrica di mobili. Poi un giorno il padrone, mi ha detto che cercava 
un imbianchino, e gli ho detto: 'rna sono io'! Ho fatto l'imbianchino per 
tanti anni prima di venir qua."Besnik (M,50+, m, arr:1994, factory worker) 
Once more the newcomers were helped to also overcome problems related to language 
and communication by those who were already in Italy, who tried to interpret for them 
when it was necessary. 
7.3.5 Legal advice 
Generally, no particular relevance was given to legal advice by most Kosovar Albanian 
refugees ill Italy, because few of them applied for asylum that required special legal 
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assistance. This was indispensable though for those who did submit a claim, especially 
given the low acceptance rate. In theory, destitute asylum seekers were entitled to legal 
assistance, but in practice, this was only provided by some NGOs. The main organisation 
providing legal support was CIR and in 1999 Azione Comune provided assistance on 
legal matters as well. Moreover, a few private lawyers working on a pro-bono basis 
were available and some offices for aliens in certain municipalities provided free legal 
assistance to asylum seekers during the first stage of the asylum procedure (ECRE, 
2001). 
7.3.6 Health 
As explained in the previous part of this chapter on the UK, refugees explained that 
in Kosovo they felt it was not safe to use the Serb-dominated health facilities and, in 
fact, it has been documented that before and during NATO air campaign there was 
widespread violation of medical neutrality by Serbs against Kosovar Albanians (Inde-
pendent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000). 
People were generally satisfied with the healthcare they received in Italy as many of them 
received proper care for the first time in years. Those who were still with an uncertain 
status at the time of the interviews were worried about not being able to complete 
their treatment before return. Not being able to speak Italian made it more difficult to 
explain the problems and caused frustration and delays, but overall the experience was 
a positive one. 
Psychological support was much more difficult to obtain, many interviewees had been 
suffering of anxiety, depression and post-traumatic disorders. These were caused either 
by the worries about the situation in Kosovo, especially during the height of the crisis 
when it was difficult to contact relatives and friends while the general news reported 
abuses, killings and destruction, or by the violence they had faced before escaping. 
None of the people I interviewed had received any help for psychological distress at the 
time of the interview. 
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7.3.7 Education 
The vast majority of the refugees who were studying in Kosovo before leaving, inter-
rupted their studies in Italy, with the exception of children and teenagers that continued 
their compulsory education in Italian schools. Higher education was not considered a 
possibility because of its costs, the lack of support and funding, and other priorities 
dictated by everyday problems. 
Ermal finished junior high school (scuola media) in Italy and he wanted to continue 
studying to become a nurse. Originally, he would have liked to go to university and 
study medicine, but training to become a nurse was a good compromise. However, given 
the costs involved his family could not afford it. 
Those who had finished their study in Kosovo faced several problems in having their 
diplomas recognised. Arjan was a nurse but he was working in a factory in Italy be-
cause the documents certifying that he was qualified to be a nurse were not recognised 
since they had been issued by the 'Republic of Kosova' which no one recognised as an 
independent state. Similarly, Drita, who was a student at the University of Pristina, 
missed the three last exams for her degree, when the university was shut. She continued 
studying attending the courses set up by the community in private houses and passed 
her last exams in secret obtaining a degree in Physics and Chemistry. Unfortunately, the 
documents certifying that she has a degree are stamped in the name of the 'Republic of 
Kosova' and were not considered valid in Italy. She explained that she was disappointed 
and disillusioned, since after so many years of study her degree was not recognised, her 
knowledge was of no use and she had to start from scratch. 
"Sono cosl delusa! Ma ho capito che non posso aspettarmi niente. Pern che 
peccato! Thtti 'sti anni a studiare per una laurea che non vale niente e tutto 
quello che ho imparato non serve a niente. Ho dovuto cominciare da zero." 
Drita (F, 30+, m, arr:1994, factory worker) 
She went back to school in Italy attending evening classes for secondary school while 
working in a factory and, at the time of the interview, she was attending a computer 
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course. 
7.3.8 Employment 
Finding a job in Italy was a matter of absolute necessity for all the refugees regardless 
of their status or time of arrival. This was important even for those who obtained 
refugee status because despite the fact that they are entitled to the same level of social 
assistance available to Italian citizens, this is quite low. Working 'in nero', in the black 
economy is common practice for both Italians and immigrants. The vast majority of the 
respondents had at some point in their life in Italy worked 'in nero' or were still fully or 
partially doing so. 
The Kosovar Albanian networks were the main way of finding jobs for new arrivals 
and while people took a wide variety of jobs, they mainly worked in factories or in the 
construction sector. Women also worked for hotels or restaurants. In the construction 
sector, some of those who had arrived in the early 1990s were now employing their com-
patriots or Italians in small businesses of their own, while some of those who worked in 
factories explained how fast they had managed to achieve higher positions and how they 
were respected by their bosses because of their hard work. More than one interviewee 
showed me some keys saying that they were so trusted at work that their boss had given 
them the keys to the factory. This made them feel proud and respected. They also 
explained, though, that they were among the few who accepted to work longer hours 
and at weekends 'fuori busta' (outside the envelope, not included in the official pay slip), 
meaning that these extra work was done 'in nero', illegally and, therefore, the money 
for these hours could not go on their official pay slip. They all said that they worked 
really hard and that their pay and the work conditions were not good, especially in the 
early days. But they all had the need to work in order to survive in Italy and send 
money back home to their families and to the community at large. Some of them had 
been in Italy long enough to master the system and knew who to talk to in order to im-
prove their conditions at work. Many had been in touch with the trade unions that are 
generally interested and involved in the issues of migrant workers' rights. For example, 
Floresha, was working for a factory when she got pregnant with her second child and 
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their employers tried to fire her, so she went to the trade union and managed to stop 
them. 
"Quando sono rimasta incinta lavoravo gia per questa fabbrica. Hanno fatto 
di tutto per mandarmi via, cercavano tutte Ie scuse. Ma io ho capito, allora 
sono andata dai sindacati e li ho fermati." Floresha (F, 40+, m, arr:1998, 
factory worker) 
7.3.9 Gender 
In Italy gender relations within the Kosovar Albanian community mirrored the structure 
of society in the country of origin. Kosovar Albanian men were the first to arrive 
spontaneously and settle in Italy, while women arrived spontaneously as part of a family 
or to join other relatives who were already there. None of my respondents knew women 
who had come to Italy independently, without following their father, husband, brother 
or fiance. In many instances the father had left the rest of the family behind with the 
mother in charge of taking care of the children and the respective sets of parents. The 
family often came to Italy at a later stage during the 1999 war. This situation was 
conducive to the maintenance of previously established roles and relations. 
Some of the women I interviewed were working in factories or hotels, many others, espe-
cially those who arrived in 1999 and had children, did not work and spent most of their 
day at home to take care of them. These women, lived an isolated life in Italy. By the 
time of the interviews the Kosovar Albanian television channel RTK began transmis-
sion and they spent most of their time at home watching Albanian programmes. With 
no significant institutional support and spending most of their time in the house, they 
found learning Italian and establishing a certain degree of independence very difficult. 
Being unable to speak the language and relying on their husband for everyday tasks, 
such as going to the supermarket or to the doctor, deprived them of their basic level of 
independence. They explained this situation saying that there was no need for them to 
try to learn the language or make contacts outside the family because they felt in a tran-
sitory situation waiting to return to Kosovo, however, for some of them this transitory 
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moment had already lasted two or three years. The possibility of dating or marrying 
non-Albanians was not even considered by the women I talked to. This can partly be 
explained by the fact that the vast majority was already in a relationship when they 
arrived in Italy and the second generation was still too young. However, a small number 
of single men did admit to having dated Italian girls and a few mixed marriages had 
already taken place although the majority prefers to marry other Kosovar Albanians. 
The new generations might bring considerable changes in the future. 
7.3.10 Socialising 
The majority of the respondents were in touch with other Kosovar Albanians in Italy, 
some of them had Italian friends and few were also in contact with Albanians from 
Albania. 
The vast majority had different members of their extended family living in Italy in vari-
ous locations; therefore, visiting each other's houses, meeting at weekends or celebrating 
together personal, national or religious occasions was common practice. The strong and 
tight network of people helping the newly arrived ones made it possible for the latter to 
feel immediately part of a wider community and establish some basic links. Only in a 
single case the respondent had not met other Kosovar Albanians in Italy and was not 
in touch with any of them, but this was the case of a refugee who had come here alone 
and found a job as a shepherd spending three years in total isolation in the country side. 
During those three years spent alone with the cattle, he explained, he had not had a 
chance to learn Italian and he joked about the risk of forgetting Albanian as well, so 
when he finally changed his job he had to start from scratch to build a social network 
in Italy. 
Speaking the language was necessary for establishing relations with Italians and more 
often than not understanding the local dialect was also required for a good level of 
communication. Overall, they felt Italians were ignorant about the situation in Kosovo, 
and despite their efforts to attract public attention to the dramatic situation, Kosovars 
were largely ignored by the Italian government, the media and the public opinion until 
the escalation of the conflict in 1998-1999. The widespread racism against Albanians 
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was initially an obstacle when looking for a job or trying to establish relationships with 
Italians and they felt they had to work harder to gain trust. Drita said that when she 
introduced herself as Albanian, people looked scared and had a clearly negative reaction. 
However, when she started introducing herself as Kosovar it was better, especially after 
NATO's campaign in Kosovo started. 
"Quando mi presentavo e dicevo che ero Albanese mi guardavano male, ave-
vano paura. Una reazione cosl negativa! Quando poi ho cominciato a dire 
che sono Kossovara era motlo meglio, specialmente dopo che la NATO ha 
cominciato i bombardamenti." Drita (F, 30+, m, arr:1994, factory worker) 
When the conflict in Kosovo entered the public domain in 1999, the combination of a 
welcoming government policy and positive press reports influenced people's attitudes in 
favour of the refugees and the widespread prejudices against Albanians were put aside 
when dealing with Kosovar Albanians. In order to reconcile the racist stereotype of the 
Albanian migrant a new stereotype was created: 'Kosovar Albanians are different from 
Albanians from Albania'. This stereotype has been confirmed in my interviews with 
government officials, representatives of international organisations and local NGOs in 
Italy. The general opinion was that Kosovars are an easy group of people to work with 
because they are hard-working, able to keep away from illegal trafficking, law-abiding and 
generally well organised. A widespread complaint regarded Albanians instead, accused 
by many of taking advantage of the situation by pretending to be Kosovars in order to 
get a permit to stay in Italy, a fact that cannot be proved in any convincing manner. 
Many of the Kosovars I interviewed said that while they had problems to find a job if 
they said they were Albanians throughout the 1990s, after 1999, the situation changed 
because if they specified that they were from Kosovo people reacted with sympathy; 
being from Kosovo had become a kind of 'guarantee of reliability and trustworthiness'. 
Another group of people they interacted with were other Albanians from Albania resid-
ing in Italy. This was not an easy relationship as there is a certain distance between 
the two groups which hold a series of prejudices about each other. Kosovars often joke 
about the differences that distinguish them from Albanians from Albania. Morozzo della 
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Rocca (1999) writes that they consider themselves to be like 'Germans' compared to their 
cousins. This opinion is based on a certain stereotype that wants Kosovars to have a 
better sense of social organisation, to be law-abiding and disciplined workers 'unlike 
Albanians'. On the other hand, the journalist (Raxhimi, 1999) claims that "mainland 
Albanians have the stereotype of Albanians from here (Kosovo) as lousy and cheating, 
but rich, Kosovars". A border has separated Albanians and Kosovar Albanians since 
1913, with an interruption during the Second World War under the Italian and German 
occupation (De Rapper, 1998). For more then 80 years, Albanians and Kosovar Albani-
ans have been living in two different states, going through different political, economic 
and social developments that made them grow apart rather then strengthen some of the 
points in common such as the language and a common heritage. These differences have 
influenced their mode of settlement in Italy and, consequently, their interaction. On the 
one hand, the experience of being part of an ethnic minority during times of repression 
enabled Albanians in Kosovo to develop strong nationalist feelings and consolidate their 
struggle to protect and maintain their Albanian cultural identity; on the other hand, 
being part of Yugoslavia, especially, after the constitution of 1974, gave people in Kosovo 
the chance to live in a modern society, to be educated in their own language and to get 
involved in public life activities. Both situations provided them with the experience of 
self-organisation within Kosovo, whether in order to resist oppression or to govern their 
autonomy. At the same time these efforts involved the coordination of their transna-
tional network constituted by those who had emigrated throughout the years. These 
points are the basis of Kosovars' pride of being Albanians and to their self-definition 
as educated, organised and disciplined people caring for their culture. Their conditions 
were generally better off then those of people in Albania, thanks to the better over-
all economic development in Yugoslavia and to the contributions from the emigrants. 
These elements contributed to the stereotype that developed in Albania describing them 
as 'rich moaners', as one Albanian I interviewed said: 
"I crossed the border once and visited Kosovo with some friends, we saw 
what they had. They had some land, a house, a tractor. We could not 
believe they could be so unhappy and complain about not being allowed to 
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show the Albanian flag on the roof. We had the flag, but it did not give us 
food to eat." Dora (F, 30+, s, arr:1991, professional) 
The situation of Albanians in Albania was different because they lived in their indepen-
dent country, however, between 1946 and 1999, the fact that they were an independent 
country did not save them from facing harsh political and economic problems. Alba-
nians experienced repression from other Albanians, during the communist regime and 
even in democracy. Internal political, social, economic and regional distinctions (North, 
Gegs and South, Tosks) were the sources of several problems that pushed many of them 
outside of their country during the late 1990s. 
These two different contexts experienced by Albanians in Albania and in Kosovo, and 
the different reasons for their flight, influenced their mode of settlement in Italy and their 
interaction. The way Kosovar Albanians settled in Italy was influenced by the situation 
they escaped from in Kosovo. Their life in Italy was mainly oriented to raising awareness 
of the conflict back home and towards contributing to the cause of their people. They 
often worked long hours in order to be able to support themselves and their family in 
Kosovo and had no much time for socialising. For Albanians, the situations they fled 
from and the negative stereotype they faced in Italy shaped their interest in integrating 
into Italian society, letting their Albanian identity fade in the background. One of 
the representatives of the Albanian community in Italy explained that, in the early 
times, Albanians focused on improving their own personal lives in Italy and avoided 
contact with other Albanians, unless they knew them directly. They mistrusted other 
compatriots because they feared they might have been spies working for the regime they 
had escaped from. Other interviewees confirmed this, one of them said: 
"Years ago, we used to say that for every three Albanians in Italy one was 
a spy. We did not trust each other easily. Today it is different". Agon (M, 
40+, s, arr: 1987, employee) 
This phase seems to be over now and Albanians have began to feel the need to fight 
together against the negative stereotypes they face in their everyday life in Italy and in 
defence of the image of Albania. 
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In the late 1990s, the two communities began to interact more; however, this was mostly 
at a community level rather than on a personal level. 
7.3.11 Community Organisations 
As I have already mentioned, the life of Kosovar Albanians in Italy was mainly oriented 
to raising awareness of the problems back home and to contributing to the cause of their 
people. Their main interaction with Italian society revolved around their efforts to help 
Albanians in Kosovo and they organised their community in line with this goal. They 
organised demonstrations asking for Italy's attention to the sufferance of their people 
and since 1997 several of them were held outside the Italian Foreign Ministry in Rome. 
They also participated in a general demonstration of Kosovar Albanians in Geneva on 
the 29th of April 1998 where their representative presented three main requests: 
"[ ... J to operate urgently in order to stop the massacre, murders, ethnic 
cleansing and military genocide carried out against unarmed civilians; dis-
tinguish between the regime supported by the army and the police acting 
against civilians and those who are defending their families and homes; to 
sanction the Serbian regime which is composed and led by war criminals and 
compensate the Albanians of Kosova and their pacific movement recognising 
the undeniable right of self-determination." Mr. Berisha 
They also adhered to the general initiative of the Kosovar emigrant community to collect 
donations of 3% of the salary of each Kosovar working abroad to contribute to the cause. 
The collection of this fund was ignored by the Italian authorities for a long time, however, 
after the constitution of the KLA and the suspicions that this money might have gone 
towards buying weapons, some of the houses of the leaders of the community who were 
in charge of the fund where raided by the police and they were often accused in political 
public debates of financing terrorism. Nothing was ever proven. They emphasised during 
the interviews, that they accepted that a group of conationals wanted to use the money 
for this purpose rather than keep following Rugova and putting the funding towards 
the parallel structures of the Albanian community in Kosovo. Even after the war, this 
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activity has continued and, at the time of the interviews, the Kosovar Albanian diaspora 
in the world had created UFORK, that had already contributed to the reconstruction 
of 169 houses in a city near MitrovicajMitrovice and of three entire villages. 
Their efforts to raise the level of attention towards the conflict in Kosovo in the late 1990s , 
were also supported by some Albanians in Italy who helped them with the organisation of 
demonstrations and the care of refugees in 1999. As we already discussed, the Albanian 
community in Italy is made of both Kosovars and Albanians and, lately, the two groups 
have overcome some of the initial divisions and interact more frequently at local and 
national levels. However, some of the differences, which were highlighted earlier, are still 
creating internal fragmentation and represent an obstacle. The distinction between Gegs 
from Southern Albania and Tosks from the North of Albania and Kosovo, which mirrored 
socio-political divisions within Albania, is a reason for internal segmentation within the 
Albanian community in Italy. According to De Rapper (1998), in the South, people 
equate Kosovo with the North and the stereotype of the Kosovars is that of violent 
and intransigent mountain people, in contrast to the civilised southerners; Northern 
Albanians instead are closer to Kosovar Albanians because of the language and, in some 
cases, because of family links across the borders. These distinctions pervade the life 
of the community in Italy. During a national meeting, organised by the association 
'Albanesi in Toscana' 5 (Albanians in Tuscany) in February 2002, around 20 leaders 
(Kosovars and Albanians) of local Albanian associations, coming from different parts of 
Italy, met to discuss about the need of a coordinated effort to improve the life and image 
of the Albanian community in Italy. 
It is interesting to refer to the debate that took place during the meeting, since it sum-
marises the current situation of the community in Italy showing the internal tensions as 
well as the current efforts towards a common strategy against a widespread Albanopho-
bia. The main objective of the meeting was to set up a structure able to coordinate all 
the national activities. However, a discussion about the war in Kosovo started abruptly 
in the very early stage of the meeting. The subject was still very topical and started an 
animated confrontation between different political positions. The most sensitive point of 
5The association exists since 1996 and has worked on different issues concerning the integration of 
Albanians (housing, work, education, health, legal matters) in the Tuscany region. 
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discussion was the role of the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army) in the war that raised the 
tension between Rugova's supporters and Thaqi's supporters and also between Albanian 
Gegs and Tosks. Time was needed to calm the tone of the debate, to put aside these 
political differences and to bring the debate back to the main topic of the future of the 
community in Italy. 
The most interesting discussion regarded the tasks of the eventual national organisa-
tion. Albanians and Kosovars shared the same concerns but they had different priorities 
which reflected the differences we have discussed so far in their approach to life in Italy. 
Albanians were more concerned about improving the image of Albania and Albanian mi-
grants in Italy. At the top of their agenda was: co-ordinated assistance to the Albanian 
migrants in Italy on housing, work, education, health, legal matters; clear collabora-
tion with the Italian authority in the fight against the prostitution of Albanian women 
and other illegal activities carried out by some of their compatriots; the promotion of 
Albanian culture and of Albania as a new tourist location. 
Kosovars agreed on the importance of offering assistance to the migrants and refugees in 
Italy, but prioritised other needs over the fight against the Albanian negative stereotype 
in Italy such as: helping the reconstruction in Kosovo; organising courses of Albanian 
language for their children; preserving the national culture through the organisation of 
cultural activities; organising the celebration of national festivities. 
At the end of the meeting it looked as no agreement had been reached on any of the issues 
listed on the agenda. However, in his conclusion, the chairman stressed that this was a 
first meeting and that the lively confrontations and discussions were needed before being 
able to start working effectively together. He declared himself to be optimistic that in 
the future things would get better. I had the chance to interview some of them after the 
meeting and they seemed to have learnt a lot from an apparent fruitless meeting from 
listening to each other's concerns. They confirmed what other interviews had already 
revealed: by living in Italy the two groups have slowly learned a lot about each other 
and from each other. On one hand, Albanians understood the tragic persecution and 
repression their 'cousins' in Kosovo went through and their attachment to their culture 
and their flag. They also learned from them to be proud of their culture and their 
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country and this has undoubtedly given them more strength in the fight against racism 
in Italy. On the other hand, Kosovar Albanians understood that their stereotypes of 
the Albanians are unfounded and that those very same stereotypes are the ones that 
create the difficulties and the racism they all face in Italy. They also learned from them 
to accept their long term permanence in Italy and the importance of integrating within 
the majority society rather than concentrating most efforts on the situation in Kosovo. 
Few initiatives related to some of the issues discussed in the general meeting have taken 
place. They were organised by local associations, which are often constituted by both 
Albanians and Kosovar Albanians, since a national concerted effort was still difficult 
to achieve, and reflected the different interests and priorities of the local associations 
according to the prevalence of Kosovar Albanians or Albanians within the organisations. 
For example, in the area around the cities of Treviso and Bassano del Grappa (in the 
region of Veneto) some Kosovar Albanians set up Albanian language classes for their 
children and organised, in collaboration with local authorities, the celebration of some 
of their festivities. In Thscany, instead, the association' Albanesi in Toscana' organised 
a conference on Albania and Albanian culture, an Albanian music concert and an ex-
hibition of historical pictures of Albania to promote the image of their country among 
Italians. 
Nevertheless, divisions and different interests are still prevailing within the community 
and they are still far from managing a nationally coordinated strategy to improve the 
life of all Albanians (from Albania and from Kosovo), that will meet all internal needs 
and expectations and fight racism and prejudices in Italy. Kosovar Albanians, are still 
more oriented towards working for Kosovo, its reconstruction and the political post-war 
situation, however, they have recently joined forces with other Albanians working at a 
common interest of improving the life of the community in Italy. I further examine this 
change ill the last chapter on return. 
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7.3.12 Summary 
Spontaneous Ar- Refugees' life in Italy was mainly influenced by the lack of an 
rivals asylum support system and by the adoption of ad hoc legislation 
adopted in response to refugee crisis in the Balkans. 
Legal Status We can distinguish between different legal status: asylum seekers 
and refugees, temporarily protected refugees, family reunion cases 
and people settling as labour migrants. The kind of legal position 
people had influenced the specific conditions they faced. 
Support and Ben- Other refugees and NGOs were the main source of help in a coun-
efits try with no support system for refugees. In 1999 Azione Comune 
became the first attempt to set up a national refugee reception 
system. 
Housing Housing conditions were generally poor, some refugees had man-
aged to improve them. In some cases landlords were taking ad-
vantage of refugees asking for expensive rent. Some of those with 
a more stable legal and financial situation had managed to rent or 
buy properties in better conditions. 
Italian Language No support was available for improving Italian language skills. 
People learned on their own and, often learned to speak the local 
dialect as well. 
Legal Advice Legal Advice was provided only by NGOs and some municipalities. 
Azione Comune offered assistance. 
Health Refugees were satisfied with the healthcare received in Italy. No 
special psychological support was available. 
Education Higher education was not an easy possibility given the costs, the 
lack of support and funding, and the need to take care of basic 
everyday needs. Schooling was available to all children. 
Employment Having a job in Italy was indispensable given the lack of support 
from the state and considering that most refugees settled as labour 
migrants. Asylum seekers are not allowed to work. Some of the 
early arrivals have managed to improve their career over the years. 
Gender Relations Men were the first to arrive in Italy, women usually followed their 
spouse, father or brother at a later stage. Some women worked 
and experienced some level of independence; many others stayed 
at home and took care of the family. 
Social Life Refugees were in touch with other Kosovar Albanians, some of 
them were also in touch with other Albanians. In general, the 
widespread Italian prejudices against Albanian immigrants were 
an initial obstacle to socialisation with Italians. 
Community The activities of the community was oriented towards raising 
Organisations awareness of the problems back home and contribute to the cause. 
Lately more efforts have been made to improve life standards for 
Kosovar Albanians in Italy. 
TABLE 7.2: Summary of the refugees' experience in Italy 
Before passing to the direct comparison of the two settlement contexts in the next 
section, tht' Table 7.2 provides a summary of the main features of the experience of 
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Kosovar Albanian refugees in Italy. 
7.4 Comparing settlement experiences 
Throughout the 1990s Kosovar Albanians fieeing persecution reached spontaneously var-
ious EU member states, including the UK and Italy. There they encountered very dif-
ferent asylum/immigration systems and environments which set the context for their 
settlement. As we have considered in Chapter 6, in the UK the asylum system was more 
developed than in Italy, but since the early 1990s asylum policies had become increas-
ingly stricter. Two main bills defined three distinct phases which were characterised by 
different support systems, these where the 1996 and 1999 Asylum and Immigration Acts. 
Therefore, the time of arrival of Kosovar Albanians determined the kind of support they 
received as asylum seekers, which was clearly harsher for those who arrived after 1996 
and 1999. Overall, having a stable status was crucial to reach a satisfactory level of inte-
gration in the UK. The condition of asylum seekers was not only difficult because of the 
low standard of support received, especially in the late 1990s, but also because it made 
it extremely hard for the refugees to be able to establish an independent existence and 
fend for themselves. Being an asylum seeker made finding a stable job (when they were 
allowed to work), continuing education, getting decent accommodation, improving their 
skills and extending their social network particularly difficult. Only the refugees who 
had arrived in the early 1990s had received a stable status (refugee convention status 
or ILR) by the time of the interview but they had waited on average six to seven years 
for it. This combined with their personal background and the length of their stay in 
the UK made them the most integrated group. The others were still waiting for a final 
decision on their claim when I interviewed them and this added the worry about their 
future to the general difficulties they faced. 
On the contrary, this chapter indicated that in Italy refugees found no institutional 
support since the country had neither a specific legislation on asylum nor a developed 
reception and support system for asylum seekers and refugees. Asylum seekers received 
minimum assistance for the first 45 days and were then left with no support while 
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having no permission to work. It is not surprising to find that, with the exception 
of some refugees who received temporary forms of protections with ad hoc legislation, 
most Kosovar Albanians settled in Italy as labour migrants. Therefore, two main factors 
contributed to a satisfactory level of integration in Italy: having a job and getting 
support from NGOs and other Kosovar Albanians. 
The analysis of both countries in this chapter indicates that the personal background 
of each refugee and the time of their departure from the country of origin have a great 
influence in their ability to relate to the environment they find in the country of exile. 
These two elements are often connected, given that the ability to flee in a given moment 
is influenced by the socio-economic resources available to the refugee. Van Hear argues 
that: 
"As the international migration regime has become more stringent, the main 
factors which determine the ability to reach these destinations have increas-
ingly become cost, connections (or 'social capital'), and chance. At least the 
first two of these are shaped by socio-economic standing. (Arguably chance 
is too, since the better endowed might be said to 'make their own luck': 
i.e. their greater wealth and social capital makes more likely the working of 
chance to their advantage). It follows that access to more prosperous and de-
sirable destinations will be limited to better resourced migrants." (Van Hear, 
2004) 
In his study on conflict, forced migration and class, he refers to Bourdieu's definition 
of classes as distinguished by the possession of different forms of capital (economic 
capital; cultural capital or better, informational capital; social capital, connections and 
group membership; symbolic capital, the form with which different types of capital are 
perceived and recognized as legitimate) in different volumes and compositions. He claims 
that: 
"These notions of classes and of different endowments of capital than can be 
transmitted or converted can be usefully applied to the migration arena. For 
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in the migration arena, possession of wealth is much of the story, but not the 
whole story. International migration requires the accumulation or possession 
of amounts of capital in various combinations: economic/financial capital, 
cultural/informational capital, and social and human capital." (Van Hear, 
2004) 
I argue that even the time of the departure is largely influenced by the kinds of capital 
available to the refugee. Early anticipatory refugees from Kosovo came mostly from 
urban areas, had a higher educational and socio-economic background, in contrast acute 
refugees from Kosovo came mostly from rural areas, were less educated and had a lower 
socio-economic background. In the UK this distinction was more evident since, given its 
geographical location, reaching the country independently required more resources; Italy 
was easier to reach given its geographical position in relation to Kosovo and required 
less resources making it easier for people from a wider socio-economic spectrum to reach 
it. 
In general, this implied that, despite the fact that all refugees were escaping persecu-
tion, it was 'easier' to leave Kosovo before events precipitated for those who had better 
personal and socio-economic conditions (age, health, social class, financial resource). 
Their personal background also helped them in settling in the country of exile where 
they could count especially on their cultural and social capitals to make the most out 
of the system they were confronted with. This does not mean in any way that their 
experience was not hard and traumatic, their position brought anxiety and stress for 
the situation in Kosovo and the conditions of those who were left behind and the re-
sponsibility to support them. Undoubtedly, these elements exercised a heavy weight on 
their settlement in Italy or the UK. On the other hand, it was more common that those 
with lower personal and socio-economic resources left when events precipitated under 
generally more vulnerable conditions. This included women, children, the elderly, people 
from rural areas and with low financial possibilities. These often arrived traumatised 
by the violence and the destruction they witnessed or received before fleeing. Of this 
group, the elderly and the unskilled, uneducated refugees and those deeply traumatised 
by the violence in Kosovo had the hardest time in the country of exile. 
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This group faced better conditions in the UK, where they had some degree of institutional 
support that provided them with basic care and assistance. In Italy, where working was 
crucial for survival, this vulnerable groups had a harder time when unable to find enough 
support through the circle of families, friends and NGOs. 
Life in the UK has brought both continuity and change to gender relations. For some 
women, especially those who arrived alone at a young age, exile in the UK has been an 
empowering experience thus threatening the traditional equilibrium of gender relations 
within the community. On the other hand, they were confronted with the limitations and 
boundaries to their empowerment imposed by the community itself. On the contrary, in 
Italy, the gender relations that characterised Kosovar Albanian society in Kosovo was 
mostly reproduced, since women generally followed the rest of the family and recreated 
the pre-exile set of relations. 
Finally, referring to the analysis of refugees' modes of settlement in relation to their 
attitudes towards the conflict by Joly (2002) and to her typologies distinguishing be-
tween Odyssean and Rubicon refugees, I note that both types can be distinguished 
when analysing Kosovar Albanian refugees as social actors in the UK and Italy. In both 
countries of exile, those refugees, who were involved in the political struggle in Kosovo 
shaped their settlement around the cause of Kosovar Albanians in Kosovo while others, 
who were not politically engaged with the conflict, focused more on improving the con-
ditions of settlement in exile and caring for their relatives at home. However, Kosovar 
Albanians as a group seem to have had different modes of settlement in the UK and in 
Italy. In the UK the various community organisations focused their activities towards 
improving the conditions of Kosovar Albanians in the UK, while much less has been 
done to raise the profile of the crisis in Kosovo. Despite the fact that individually much 
effort was made to support the families in Kosovo, the kind of relations the community 
as whole entertained with the rest of the Kosovar Albanian Diaspora and with the con-
fiict in Kosovo is not clear. Therefore, in the UK they developed a mode of settlement 
which is closer to Joly's definition of Rubicon refugees. In Italy, instead, most efforts 
have been focused on bringing the case of the Kosovar Albanians' oppression in Kosovo 
at the attention of the Italian government and public opinion and contributing to the 
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running of the Albanian parallel structures in Kosovo before the war and to the recon-
struction afterwards. Only recently the community has begun to organise collectively 
to improve the conditions for Kosovar Albanians in Italy. Therefore,the characteristics 
of their mode of settlement is closer to Joly's Odyssean type. 
Several factors have had an impact on these differences, with the level of political activ-
ities and the involvement with the conflict before the flight being one of them. The first 
refugees to settle and lay the foundation of the community in the UK were very young, 
with many of them becoming refugees while already being abroad. In contrast, the first 
arrivals of Kosovar Albanians in Italy were constituted mostly of young men involved in 
politics, journalists and trade unionists who were persecuted because of their political 
activities. Another reason is that, in the UK, Kosovar Albanians followed the asylum 
route which meant that for several years they were asylum seekers and, therefore, un-
able to visit6 Kosovo and maintain direct connection with the place. The geographical 
distance of the UK from Kosovo plaid its part as well. On the contrary, in Italy, having 
settled mostly as labour migrants Kosovar Albanians were able to return to Kosovo for 
quick visits and maintain their relationships with activities on the ground at their own 
risk. The vicinity of Italy to Kosovo, made these contacts even easier. Moreover, the 
ability to travel and the geographical position of Italy was congenial to develop the re-
lationship with the largest Kosovar Albanian Diasporas in Europe, in Switzerland and 
Germany. This was not the case in the UK. 
This chapter has highlighted that the personal situation of each refugee, their experience 
in the country of origin and the time of their flight had an impact on the way they related 
to the conditions they found in the country of exile. Good material and social resources 
enabled them to develop more successful survival strategies in order to adjust to the 
new environment and re-establish their lives. 
In the UK, Kosovar Albanians found a structured asylum reception system which pro-
vided them with some support but at the same time restricted their actions. The 
assistance received by asylum seekers offered them immediate minimum support but in 
the long term, it clearly did not facilitate integration prolonging a state of uncertainty 
6If asylum seekers return to the country of origin for a visit they loose the right to their claim. 
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and promoting dependence. On the contrary, in Italy, they were faced with a general 
lack of structures supporting asylum seekers and immigrants. This made life tougher, 
especially at the beginning, but at the same time left them more space for action. In 
both cases the most resourceful refugees had better chances to integrate, either because 
it was easier for them to understand the system in the UK and they managed to get the 
best out of it, or because they were more able to cope with the total lack of support in 
Italy and find alternative ways to support themselves. 
In conclusion, the comparative analysis between Kosovar Albanian refugees in the UK 
and Italy provides good examples in support of Archer's morphogenetic approach which 
constitutes the methodological foundation of this research. The study of Kosovar refugees' 
settlement highlight the fact that they are neither passive objects of immigration and 
asylum policies, nor are they the sole bearer of responsibilities for their conditions in 
exile. This research has shown that refugees from Kosovo have entered the country of 
exile and confronted a system developed by previous interactions between refugees/im-
migrants, governments, the media, public opinion and the voluntary sector. The way in 
which they have interacted with the situation they found was influenced by various fac-
tors: their personal resources (material and social); their relationship with the conflict; 
and their experience in the country of origin before the flight. The situation they found 
in exile had an impact on their life, often redefining what was possible or impossible for 
them to do. In some cases this had a negative impact on people's lives (i.e. people being 
unable to continue education or find a job), in other cases it opened new possibilities 
that they had not even thought about before. One example is that of some Kosovar 
Albanian women in London who lived through a range of experiences in the UK and 
acquired a level of independence in exile that was unthinkable in the country of origin. 
At the same time Kosovar Albanians had an impact on the country of exile just by virtue 
of being there and representing an issue that needed to be dealt with. For example, the 
arrival of Kosovar Albanian refugees in Italy pushed the government to adopt specific 
measures to deal with them and the voluntary sector to create the first pilot project, 
Azione Comune, for a coordinated reception for refugees which has now developed into 
the first national reception system for refugees in Italy, the PN A. 
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7.5 Conclusions 
This chapter dealt with the settlement of Kosovar Albanians in Italy. It provided a 
short overview of the general approach towards asylum in both countries, referring to 
asylum policies, media representation and public discourse, voluntary sector and refugee 
organisations. 
Having set the background, it focused on the situation that different waves of Kosovar 
Albanians found when they arrived and analysed the way in which the environment in 
the country of exile shaped their settlement. Then it considered the impact of different 
legal status and asylum support systems on their experience and focused on specific 
aspects of their lives, health, education, employment, housing, legal advice, language 
skills, gender relations, socialising and community organisations. 
The final section brought the comparison between the reception and settlement of Koso-
var Albanian refugees in the UK and Italy to life by highlighting some of the differences 
between the two exile contexts and explaining the kind of impact they had on refugee 
integration. Throughout Chapter () and Chapter 7, and in the final comparison it is 
emphasised that personal material, and social resources, the time of the flight, the rela-
tionship with the conflict, and the experience before leaving Kosovo had an impact on 
the way in which refugees interacted with the new environment in the country of exile. 
The next chapter deals with the specific case of refugees evacuated to the UK or Italy dur-
ing the 1999 refugee crisis in Kosovo. The chapter explores the same kind of interaction 
between refugees and country of exiles within the context of the Humanitarian Evacua-
tion Programme and the special reception schemes set up for the evacuees. The study 
of the complex relationship between refugees and these two countries of exile within the 
settlement context provides essential information and analytical tools in order to better 
understand the issue of return examined in the final chapter. 
PAGE NUMBERING AS IN THE 
ORIGINAL THESIS 
Chapter 8 
Reception of Kosovar Albanian 
refugees in the UK and in Italy: 
the case of evacuated refugees 
8.1 Introduction 
Having examined the interaction of Kosovar Albanian refugees who arrived sponta-
neously in the UK and Italy throughout the 1990s, both through anticipatory and acute 
movements out of Kosovo, this chapter focuses on those refugees who were brought in 
through the evacuation programme set up by the UNHCR and 10M during the refugee 
crisis of 1999. The analysis of the issues related to the evacuation programme, in con-
junction with the earlier study of the different reasons, timing and modalities of the 
flight and in comparison with the different context spontaneous refugees faced in Italy 
and the UK, provides some indispensable keys for understanding the return movements 
back to Kosovo. 
Following the escalation of the conflict between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo in 1998 
and NATO's military intervention in 1999, mass refugee movements left the region. Peo-
ple fled in order to escape the immediate violence brought to their doorsteps by t he war 
or because of the direct expulsion at the hand of the Serbian police. They run to safety in 
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neighbouring countries and, eventually, some of them re-emigrated to a different country 
either independently or through the Humanitarian Evacuation Programme (HEP) set 
up by the UNHCR and the International Organisation for Migration (10M) during the 
refugee crisis of April-May 1999 in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FY-
ROM). The severity of the refugee flow required the full attention of the international 
community and of European states in particular. Initially, the UNHCR proposed a 
strategy of protection in the region and European Union (EU) member states supported 
this approach. However, as the refugee humanitarian crisis in the FYROM worsened, it 
became apparent that evacuation to other countries outside the region was indispens-
able. Consequently, the UNHCR launched repeated appeals, asking other countries to 
accept some of the refugees in their territory. Some governments responded by agreeing 
to offer temporary protection to specific numbers of refugees with the general under-
standing that they would stay for as long as protection was needed and that return was 
auspicable once the conflict was finally over (EU Special Council Meeting, 1999). Based 
on these agreements, 10M organised the humanitarian evacuation of Kosovo Albanian 
refugees!, which airlifted people to twenty different countries in Europe and elsewhere 
including the UK and Italy. 
Firstly, this chapter provides a brief overview of the general international response to the 
refugee crisis and the political discourse about protection in the region and evacuation 
to third countries in relation to return. Secondly, it analyses the specific response of the 
UK and Italian governments to the crisis. It focuses on the kind of protection offered 
to the evacuees and, then, presents an account of the kind of reception set up in both 
countries for them. The chapter is based on the analysis of primary and secondary 
i::iuurces as well as data collected through interviews with volunteers, service providers 
and policy makers. It was not possible to verify directly conditions in the reception 
centres for evacuees from Kosovo because when fieldwork started they had already been 
closed. In the UK, I interviewed some refugees who had been hosted in the reception 
centres when they arrived. In Italy it was not possible to get in touch with any of the 
evacuees who had been hosted in Comiso as the vast majority had already returned to 
IThrough the Humanitarian Evacuation programme rOM evacuated around 60,549 Kosovar refugees 
to 20 different countries in Europe. 
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Kosovo or moved to other countries when I started the fieldwork. No one, neither the 
authorities nor other informants, was able to put me in touch with the very few who 
had remained in Italy. 
8.2 The Kosovo refugee crisis in 1999 
As explained in Chapter 5, following the failure of the Rambouillet peace talks (January-
March 1999), NATO launched air strikes against Yugoslavia with the aim of ending 
violence in Kosovo (March-June 1999). The strikes began on the 24th of March and 
continued until June, with action formally suspended on the 10th of June when it was 
confirmed that Serbian forces had started to withdraw under a peace plan contained 
in the UN Security Council Resolution 1244. During the bombing, Serbian forces on 
the ground responded with a vicious campaign against the ethnic Albanian population, 
expelling some 863,000 from Kosovo, with the large majority of those expelled staying 
in the region in Albania, the FYROM or Montenegro (FRY). An estimated, additional 
590,000 were internally displaced within Kosovo and remained in the province through-
out the conflict (OSCE, 1999). 
The UNHCR had to set up a complicated operation in order to assist the refugees, facing 
both practical and diplomatic problems because of the scale of the crisis and the tense 
political environment. 
According to Morris: 
"UNHCR found itself engaged in an operation as difficult and complex as 
any we have faced. Great practical problems of assistance were compounded 
by major protection problems. Macedonia was reluctant to give asylum. 
In Montenegro the Kosovan Albanians found a government ready to protect 
them if it could but were threatened by the presence of Federal security forces. 
KLA recruitment gathered pace. Many families were separated and the 
number of missing family members grew. A multitude of practical, protection 
and political problems had to be addressed in a highly charged political 
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environment in which the stakes for the governments concerned were very 
high indeed." (Morris, 1999, p.15) 
The EU states' preferred solution to the refugee crisis was reception in neighbouring 
countries, Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro (Van Selm, 2000). Different reasons 
were provided to support such a decision: firstly, relocation of refugees would have 
meant indirect support for ethnic cleansing; secondly, the NATO military intervention 
was meant to have an immediate effect on the government of FRY and, therefore, a quick 
and easy return of refugees would have been appropriate and feasible; thirdly, it would 
have been cheaper to provide help and support to the refugees if they remained closer 
to their homes. The presidency conclusions of the Justice and Home Affaires special 
council meeting that was held on the 7th of April in Luxembourg includes these points: 
"The Council agrees that people displaced from Kosovo are in need of ef-
fective protection. It is unanimous that such protection should be provided 
as extensively as possible within the region. Temporary accommodation of 
displaced persons within the region makes life easier for people in unfamil-
iar surroundings as a result of cultural and linguistic affinities, while also 
facilitating their subsequent return home. Long-term admission of Kosovars 
to countries outside the region, on the other hand, would consolidate their 
displacement from their homes. That would send the wrong signal to the 
Serbian regime, on which all forms of pressure must be stepped up to put a 
stop to displacement of people from Kosovo and make it possible for them 
to return in safety." (ED Special Council Meeting, 1999) 
However, the high number of refugees crossing the borders every day and the level of 
emergency in the refugee camps put a strain on neighbouring countries. The ever-rising 
increase in the refugee population worried especially the government of the FYROM, 
which feared that the situation could destroy the economy and disrupt the country's 
own ethnic balance. In early April, when trains carrying thousands of people begun to 
arrive in Blace, at the border between Kosovo and Macedonia, the FYROM government 
panicked and allowed the refugees to cross the borders only on a transit basis, asking for 
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both the status and the final destination to be clarified before entrance. The government 
wanted international support and the assurance that some refugees would be relocated 
abroad (Barutciski and Suhrke, 2002). 
In order to deal with this 'crisis within a crisis', in April 1999, the DNHCR launched an 
appeal calling for the evacuation of refugees from the FYROM and ED states accepted 
to host quotas of refugees in their territory. These were possibilities that had already 
been considered in the same presidency conclusions of the Justice and Home Affaires 
special council meeting which acknowledges that: 
"The Council recognises that, with numbers of displaced persons swelling 
daily, it might, for humanitarian reasons and to avoid destabilising individual 
host countries in the region of origin, prove necessary in the future to afford 
displaced persons protection and assistance outside their region of origin on 
a temporary basis. 
Any such humanitarian evacuations out of neighbouring area must be based 
on the voluntary choice of the refugees to be temporarily relocated. In this 
context, the principle of family unity should also be applied." (ED Special 
Council Meeting, 1999) 
As a result, by the 9th of June, 80,000 refugees were evacuated to different countries 
supporting the HEP, organised by the DNHCR and the 10M (OSCE, 1999). 
Although politicians agreed with the DNHCR and NGOs that Kosovars undoubtedly 
qualified for refugee status under the Geneva Convention's definition, all ED states 
granted people who arrived through the HEP a version of temporary protection (Van Selm, 
2000). As indicated earlier, the post-temporary protection phase was mainly expected 
to lead to voluntary repatriation. As Koser explained: 
"An orientation towards repatriation was stated as one of the guiding prin-
ciples for the overall ED approach to the Kosovo crisis, which explains why 
the emphasis was on trying to protect Kosovar Albanian 'refugees' locally 
rather than outside the Balkans area." (Koser, 2000, p.39) 
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Moreover, the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons was 
included among NATO's main demands to President Milosevic in order to stop the 
strikes. With the bombing campaign over on the 10th of June, return was more or less 
expected as of July 1999 in many countries. Raving eliminated the cause of the conflict 
that generated refugees, states seemed to gain the 'right to repatriate people' on the 
basis of humanitarian discourses and on the assumption that all refugees want to go 
back to their country of origin (Amore, 2002a). Given the characteristics of the ethnic 
conflict in Kosovo, it was assumed outright that return was the wish of all Kosovar 
Albanian refugees. 
Having provided a brief overview of the general approach of the EU member states 
to the Kosovo refugee crisis of 1999, I now focus on the specific examples of the UK 
and Italy. Both countries supported the European strategy of 'protection in the region' 
and, eventually, accepted to take part in the REP. They emphasised return after the 
war as the ideal solution for the refugees and supported programmes for voluntary 
assisted repatriation to Kosovo. Before focusing on return we need to take a broader 
look at the UK and Italy's general response to the refugee crisis in Kosovo and to the 
adoption of temporary protection measures for the refugees so as to provide the necessary 
background for the specific analysis of return programmes in the next chapter. 
Here, the following sections, focus on the participation of the two countries in the REP, 
the types of temporary protection they adopted for the evacuees and the kind of reception 
they set up for them starting with the UK first and looking at the Italian case afterwards, 
before drawing out the most salient points of comparison in the conclusions. 
8.3 The UK and the Humanitarian Evacuation Programme 
The following section deals with the UK involvement in the refugee crisis in Kosovo in 
1999 and analyses the kind of protection the government gave to the refugees who arrived 
in the national territory in that period; moreover, it describes the Kosovo programme set 
up to receive the evacuees and explains the possibilities they had when their protection 
expired. 
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8.3.1 The UK and the Kosovo refugee crisis of 1999 
The British government actively supported NATO's intervention in Kosovo despite the 
fact that for many years the problems of that area of the Balkans were largely ignored. 
Chandlers claims that: "Kosovo, which initially was of little vital interest to Britain, 
became so once it was a focus for ethical policy-making" (Chandler, 2002, p.77). He 
affirms that the government's decision that Kosovo 'mattered' to Britain was not due to 
the importance of the situation on the ground or public support for refugees who actually 
received little sympathy when they tried to claim asylum in Britain, but to the aura 
of moral authority that intervention could bring to the government (Chandler, 2002). 
However, the decision of NATO to intervene without a United Nations Security Council 
mandate, which opened various controversies on the legitimacy of the intervention and 
divided politicians and the public, required a strong argument in support of military 
action. Few weeks into the war Prime Minister Blair found an effective justification for it: 
punishing crimes against humanity (Robertson, 2002). This implied that human rights 
abuses and crimes against civilians became the main focus of the campaign and Kosovar 
Albanian expellees/refugees clearly gained a more central political role within this frame. 
Nevertheless, Guild remarks that despite their new diplomatic role, "the question of 
the refugees did not figure as an important topic during the parliamentary debate on 
Kosovo. In the third debate, on 20 May, in the context of Foreign Office questions, little 
reference was made to the humanitarian dimension by reference to the refugees" (Guild, 
2000, p.83). In fact, the UK approach to the refugee crisis prioritised reception in the 
region as a favourite solution to the refugee crisis in Kosovo; the government responded 
reluctantly to both the UNHCR appeals to evacuate refugees from Macedonia and to 
the request of the German Presidency of the EU asking member states to offer shelter to 
evacuees in early April 1999. The Home Secretary Jack Straw stated that the UK had 
already taken around 10,000 refugees from Kosovo and that they would have accepted 
some more, but he did not specify a number. He declared: "The Government's aim, in 
common with that of our European Union partners, has been to ensure that the great 
majority of refugees are looked after in the region so that they are able to return to their 
homes when it is safe to do so." (Straw, 1999). 
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Moreover, he added in an interview: "We have said that we will take some thousands 
of refugees from the area. We have already taken 10,000 before the war started. [ ... ] 
We have laid in extensive contingency plans, we have said we will respond to UNHCR 
requests whenever they were made." (BBC NEWS, 1999). 
However, the number of Kosovar refugees included in this 10,000 was calculated with 
a 'quick and rough' count of the asylum applications from the Former Republic of Yu-
goslavia which were part of the Home Office backlog. Guild (2000) points out that this 
generated much confusion about the actual number of refugees from Kosovo admitted 
in the country because of the bombing campaign and those who had come earlier in-
dependently. She explains that the Home Secretary made the distinction between 'our' 
Kosovars, those who had arrived in the UK before NATO's campaign started and were 
dealt with more quickly and generously as a result of it, and 'other' Kosovars, those 
who were in Macedonia, Albania or elsewhere waiting to be resettled outside the region. 
She concludes that like in the Bosnia refugee crisis, the UK administration's approach 
to Kosovo determined that: 
"On the one hand those brave souls who had managed, notwithstanding 
the administrative efforts to place obstacles in their way, to get to the UK 
were then permitted to stay and presented publicly as evidence of the UK's 
commitment to the international humanitarian effort. On the other hand, 
those persons outside the UK seeking to go there were subject to very slow 
procedures, political commitments which were vague and subject to reinter-
pretation, coupled with a burst of activity towards the end of the crisis period 
to permit a number of persons in need of protection into the country." (Guild, 
2000, p.76) 
The repeated appeals from the UNHCR to evacuate refugees out of the region were 
met with silence by the UK administration until the 20th of April 1999 when the Home 
Secretary announced that the first refugees could be admitted through the Humanitarian 
Evacuation Programme and the UK promised to take a significant number of people. The 
first group of 161 evacuees arrived on the 26th of April and, as a consequence of further 
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pressures from the international community, on the 8th of May the UK were forced to 
be more specific and promised to take up to 1,000 refugees per week for a total of 5,000 
people. The last flight took place in June 1999, the total number of evacuees admitted to 
the programme was 4,346 and more than half of them arrived during the last ten days ~f 
the bombing campaign. Following the line of distinction between 'our refugees' and 'the 
others', the government sent officials in Macedonia in order to decide which refugees were 
going to be evacuated to the UK giving priority to those who already had relatives here. 
This group constituted 60% of the evacuee population, the rest were people with specific 
needs like special medical conditions, large families with several children, the elderly and 
other special cases. Evacuees were flown to the North of England and Scotland to the 
airports in Leeds, Manchester and Glasgow and were dispersed to various reception 
centres that had been set up in old structures not in use that were quickly reconverted 
for the occasion. The general idea was that of placing the evacuees in areas which had an 
ethnically diverse population but away from London and the South-East. The Refugee 
Council had recommended that the locations should be selected considering the presence 
of other refugee and ethnic minority communities, good race relations and the existence 
of basic services such as language classes and training opportunities for refugees. In 
practice, the choice of the destinations was determined mostly by the availability of 
housing facilities (Bloch, 1999). Of the 4,346 refugees evacuated to the UK 42% were 
between 5 and 18 years of age and 6% were over 60, therefore 48% of the population 
was constituted by vulnerable categories of people (Refugee Council, 1999a). In the 
following section, I describe the kind of protection they received in the UK and analyse 
the consequences of their status. 
8.3.2 Temporary protection status for Kosovar Albanian refugees In 
the UK 
As explained earlier in this chapter, despite the fact that the international community 
had recognised that all Kosovar Albanians expelled from Kosovo qualified individually 
as refugees under the terms of the Geneva Convention, all European ~1ember States 
decided to grant them temporary forms of protection. 
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In the UK, some evacuees were actually family reunification cases and were given per-
mission to enter in relation to the status that their relatives had been previously granted. 
The rest were granted Exceptional Leave to Remain (ELR) for twelve months with the 
understanding that refugees would have returned to Kosovo as soon as conditions al-
lowed them to go back. Jack Straw assured that: "those refugees arriving under the 
programme who have been granted 12 months leave to enter will not have their stay 
curtailed. We will, however, actively be establishing arrangements to facilitate the re-
turn of those who want to go back to Kosovo before then" (Straw, 1999). Therefore, the 
general emphasis was on return to Kosovo as soon as possible. 
Evacuees received a special form of ELR directly upon arrival which included access to 
social security benefits in line with UK nationals, the right to work and to temporary 
accommodation, family reunion, other services, and support to return. This appeared 
as a preferential treatment compared to the normal procedure other asylum seekers, 
including the spontaneous arrivals from the FRY, had to go through, which implied 
long waits and minimum levels of support. Bloch (1999) gives a short account of the 
parliamentary debate on this point and refers to the analogy used by a politician who 
described this disparity as the 'Rolls-Royce' welcome given to the evacuees from Kosovo 
in contrast to the 'rickshaw' welcome for other asylum seekers. Jack Straw defended 
this choice saying that the evacuees were undoubtedly escaping from well founded fear 
of persecution because the HEP was managed by the UNHCR that vetted them, while 
the ones arriving spontaneously could have made their stories up. However, on the 15th 
of June he stated that all asylum seekers from the FRY were going to be given ELR 
regardless of whether they came independently or through the evacuation programme. 
~evertheless, the difference between the treatment of refugees from Kosovo and other 
asylum seekers remained. As a matter of fact, the differences were obvious even at a 
surface level examination. Smart (2001) summarises the various support systems offered 
to asylum seekers, including those on the Kosovo programme, during the 1990s in the 
UK in table 8.1, which is self-explanatory. 
The disparity between the different support systems adopted by the British government 
for asylum seekers and temporarily protected people over the years and the Kosovo 
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SUPPORT ACCOMMODATION 
Before 1996 £46.98 cash plus housing benefit Private rented accommodation. 
and other benefits depending on 
circumstances. 
1996 - Nov. Assistance in kind from local au- Temporary accommodation pro-
1999 thorities (for in country appli- vided by local authorities. 
cants). 
Dec. 1999 - £36.54 mostly in vouchers. Dispersed to temporary accommo-
2000 dation anywhere in the country. 
Kosovo £52.20 cash plus assistance in Reception centres assistance to 
Programme kind (meals, donations, etc.), move to rented accommodation 
housing benefit and other bene-
fits depending on circumstances. 
TABLE 8.1: Summary of entitlements for a single adult at equivalent of 2000 rates 
Programme, in particular, is evident in this table; however, overall the situation of the 
refugees from Kosovo with ELR was not that favourable when analysing the implication 
of their status in the long term. As a matter of fact, while on the one hand, this treatment 
gave them an advantage as they did not need to present their case or go through the 
uncertainties other asylum seekers normally faced upon arrival, on the other hand, their 
ERL was limited to one year and it was made clear to them that there was no guarantee 
that temporary protection would be extended. This led to a constant level of anxiety 
about the future as temporary protection created a situation of limbo where people did 
not feel they could try to rebuild a new life in the UK and worried about having to 
return to Kosovo under unsafe conditions. Smart notes that the evacuees "complained 
of the stress of a date hanging over them when the year's temporary protection would 
be up" (Smart, 2001, p.75). 
Undoubtedly, return was the expected outcome at the end of the ELR period; the gov-
ernment gave the chance to people with ELR to apply for an extension of temporary 
protection or for refugee status under the general asylum determination procedure. How-
ever, as I explain in the following chapter, the fact that as soon as the war ended, the 
government stated that Kosovo was now a safe place to return to, limited the chances to 
be granted asylum and people needed to have very strong and detailed cases to stand a 
chance to obtain refugee status after NATO's campaign ended. The Refugee Council's 
Bulletin reported that: 
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"The Home Office has made it clear that it is taking a hard line on Kosovars, 
and that there will be no blanket extension of ELR. As such, everyone will 
be dealt with on a case by case basis - and good cases will certainly need to 
be made" (Refugee Council, 2000c). 
Considering that from the beginning of the refugee crisis the UNHCR and the inter-
national community had recognised that Kosovar Albanians qualified as refugees under 
the definition of the Geneva Convention, with a different political will and under a more 
efficient asylum system, evacuees from Kosovo could have been granted refugee status; 
they could have been handled in a very different way avoiding the uncertainty, anxiety 
and problems linked to a temporary form of protection. 
The issues related to the post-temporary protection phase and the assisted return pro-
gramme are discussed in more depth in the next chapter; here, the following section 
provides an overview of the organisation of the reception centres and the conditions 
refugees faced during their stay in the UK, which provide key background information 
for understanding their approach towards return analysed in the last chapter. 
8.3.3 Refugee reception centres in the UK 
Learning from the experience of the Bosnia programme in the early 1990s, the Refugee 
Council had set up an inter-agency group involving other NGOs (the British Red Cross, 
the Scottish Refugee Council, Refugee Action and the Refugee Housing Association) 
with the aim of organising a contingency plan for future emergency refugee crises (Bloch, 
1999). This plan, Bloch (1999) explains, provided the framework for the reception of 
Kosovar Albanian evacuees from Macedonia in the UK in 1999. Initially, the Refugee 
Council was meant to lead the whole Kosovo programme, however, when the number 
of refugees begun to rise the Home Office decided to take responsibility for the general 
coordination. The Local Government Agency (LGA) coordinated the local authorities 
involved in the programme; these were in charge of managing the arrival and reception 
of the evacuees and offer support under the guidance of other agencies. The Refugee 
Council coordinated the action of the inter-agency group and provided expertise. 
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Various initial problems of coordination and communication risked to slowdown the 
organisation of the programme and in order to avoid the dissemination of wrong infor-
mation the LGA decided to put together a weekly bulletin with the aim of providing 
clearer news and information to service providers in local authorities, particularly for 
the benefit of leading members, management teams and staff in Emergency Planning, 
Social Services, Housing and Education. Moreover, Refugee Action (1999) produced a 
document entitled 'Kosovan Refugee Reception Centres: A Practical Guide' which was 
a manual with detailed information to help organisations and local authorities to set up 
reception centres for newly arrived Kosovar refugees. The Refugee Council put together 
a periodic Bulletin 'For Kosovan Programme Support' (the first issue was distributed 
in February 2000) with the aim of informing both service providers and refugees of the 
developments of the situation in Kosovo and the legal developments for the stay of the 
evacuees in the UK. 
The reception of the evacuees was organised as follows. Upon arrival, the refugees were 
met at the airport by a team composed of immigration and local authority officers, 
health workers, interpreters and Refugee Council representatives. They were dispersed 
to various reception centres (there were a total of 49) which were set up in old structures 
not currently in use that were quickly reconverted to function as temporary accommoda-
tion. At a later stage, some refugees were moved to smaller accommodations in council 
fiats while others remained in the centres until the end of the Kosovan Programme. 
The centres provided various services including medical care, family tracing, language 
courses, social events, advice on finding employment or continuing education, and assis-
tance to return. All children were going to school and youngsters were placed at local 
colleges to take English language courses. The experience in the centres was generally 
positive, despite a few problems. For example, many members of staff had been involved 
in the Bosnia programme and thought that the needs of Kosovar Albanians were going 
to be the same as those of the Bosnian refugees. In many cases this proved wrong and 
they needed to learn and readjust as they went along with the programme. A particular 
problem in the centres for the refugees was access to telephones. Given the criterion used 
by the government to select people to be evacuated to Britain from Macedonia that gave 
priority to those who already had relatives in the UK, the majority of the refugees had 
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the need to contact their families. The need to make phone calls was met in different 
ways according to the solution provided by the management of the reception centres. In 
some cases they were given telephones to use whenever they wanted, in other cases they 
were provided with phone cards and in other centres, which wanted to make sure that 
people became self-sufficient as soon as possible, they were given a choice between phone 
cards or food items (Bloch, 1999). In fact, in some of the centres there was a conscious 
effort to involve the refugees as much as possible in running some of the activities in 
order to avoid the creation of a sense of passivity and purposelessness among the refugee 
population. For example in a reception centre in Cumbria, Ulverston, it was agreed be-
fore the evacuees even arrived that if there were cooks, teachers and other appropriate 
professions amongst them self-sufficiency was something that would be encouraged and 
when the first refugees arrived they got involved with cooking, cleaning, laundry and the 
planning of the welcome for the following flight. This was welcomed by the evacuees, 
however, after interviewing refugees in various centres, Smart concludes that: 
"There was a general feeling among programme interviewees that reception 
centres are an ideal way of providing for new arrivals but that it is not good 
to stay in them for so long. It was acknowledged by the evacuees that a 
long period in a reception centre created dependency - individuals became 
used to decisions being made for them and those who moved out into a flat 
after a long stay in a reception centre found it harder to adjust to fending 
for themselves than those who had moved out after a short stay." (Smart, 
2001, p.83-84) 
The reaction of the locals to the arrival of refugees from Kosovo was exceptionally pos-
itive compared to the general hostility against asylum seekers and refugees. The media 
coverage of the war in Kosovo and the repeated appeals of politicians to be supportive 
of the Kosovar Albanian population persecuted by Milosevic's regime triggered a more 
tolerant reaction to the announcement that refugees were going to be dispersed in some 
specific areas. Generally, people responded to the appeals for donations and, especially, 
clothing and toys had been collected before the evacuees even arrived. Thompson, in the 
book describing his experience with Kosovar Albanian refugees in a reception centre in 
Chapter 8 Reception of Kosovar Albanian refugees in the UK and in Italy: the case of 
evacuated refugees 237 
Manchester, describes also the phenomenon of curious locals passing outside the centre 
with their camera wanting a glimpse of the refugees. He comments: 
"The road outside suddenly became a thoroughfare. Cars full of people, 
especially families, would drive slowly by with all occupants staring at the 
centre and anyone who happened to be there. One afternoon, I even saw 
someone drive up to take photographs. It was sickening voyeurism, but only 
to be expected in a society dominated by media coverage. Here, in the 
middle of our community, were representatives of the refugees featured day 
and night on our TV screens" (Thompson, 2003, p.36) 
However, the evacuees had little contact with local people outside the circle of volunteers 
that helped in the reception centres and the feeling of warm welcome often changed as 
soon as they moved to independent accommodation where in some cases they even 
received threats and were harassed by neighbours (Smart, 2001). Moreover, this kind 
of problems followed the general worry that accompanied refugees when they moved to 
independent accommodation where they needed to fend for themselves in the absence of 
the net of continuous support and assistance that was available in the reception centres. 
Overall, the refugees were extremely grateful for the welcoming support they found in 
the centres, but many of them wanted to move out to reach other members of their 
families who were already living in other parts of the country, mainly in London. The 
general feeling of gratitude and wish to move on is summarised in the words of Stela 
who explained that: 
"The British people were fantastic, they welcomed us warmly and gave us 
more than we needed. There was a TV with programmes and news about 
Kosova. Children were given bicycles and we had cloths and food. Every-
thing we needed. But my children were all in London and they had to travel 
more than five hours to come to see us. So we decided to move to Lon-
don after five weeks in ... ; People did not want us to go there, they were so 
nice! They said London is too big and too expensive and not so friendly. 
Chapter 8 Reception of Kosovar Albanian refugees in tbe UK and in Italy: tbe case of 
238 evacuated refugees 
They were right, but going to London for us meant being a family again, all 
together after nine years!" Stela (F, 50+, m, arr:1999, unemployed) 
The Kosovo Programme finished operations in July 2000 and this meant that many 
services specific to evacuees from Kosovo were no longer available and in most cases 
refugees had to refer to the generic support arrangements that catered for all refugees 
regardless of their origin. This moment coincided with the end of ELR, the decrease of 
media attention and popularity of their case, and the insistence from the government that 
it was time to return. Suddenly, Kosovar refugees got off the 'Rolls-Royce' and found 
themselves on the 'rickshaw'. This is a relevant point in the analysis of repatriation 
movements of Kosovar refugees from the UK, as we can see in the next chapter where 
their options at the end of the one year protection are analysed together with the Explore 
and Prepare scheme and the Voluntary Assisted Return Programme (VARP) funded by 
the government to promote return. Before focusing on return though, it is indispensable 
for the sake of our comparison between the situations of Kosovar Albanian refugees in 
two different countries of exile, to explain Italy's response to the 1999 Kosovo refugee 
crisis in the following section. 
8.4 Italy and the Humanitarian Evacuation Programme 
This section deals with Italy's involvement in the refugee crisis in Kosovo in 1999 and 
the kind of protection the government offered to the refugees who arrived during the 
crisis, then it focuses on the reception organised in the former NATO military base in 
Comiso to accommodate over 5,000 evacuees. 
8.4.1 Italy and the Kosovo refugee crisis of 1999 
During the late 1990s, the arrivals of refugees from Kosovo in Italy increased sharply 
and by 1998 they were the largest national group of asylum seekers in the country. In 
March 1999, following the start of NATO's bombing campaign and the beginning of the 
acute refugee crisis in the region, the number of Kosovars arriving from Albania to the 
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southern coast of Italy increased dramatically with hundreds of people smuggled across 
the Adriatic Sea every night and many losing their lives in the journey. These incidents 
were reported daily by the media, which brought the gravity of the refugee crisis to 
everyone's attention. The situation required an immediate response and, initially, the 
government proposed the evacuation of refugees from Albania and advocated for the need 
of burden-sharing agreements within the EU framework. The plans for reception were 
made operational immediately and a centre was set up in the Puglia region. However, 
this plan was stopped abruptly as the government changed its position in order to 
support the idea of 'reception in the region' proposed by other EU states. This change 
in approach was quite sudden and is clearly apparent when looking at the media coverage 
of that time. While on the 27th of March 1999, newspapers headlines wrote about the 
intention of the government to send boats to rescue the refugees and evacuate them to 
safety in Italy2, two days later they reported that the new position of the government 
was promoting assistance in the region 3. According to Hein (2000), this change of 
direction came with the considerations that relocation would have indirectly supported 
ethnic cleansing and delayed repatriation and that it would have been more cost effective 
to send help to the region. Moreover, the Albanian government had expressed the wish 
to keep hosting the refugees in order to prove its solidarity with the Albanians from 
Kosovo. 
On the 30th of March Prime Minister Massimo D' Alema addressed the nation on televi-
sion. He expressed his worries about the war and talked about Italy's involvement both 
at a diplomatic and military level. He also launched the Missione Arcobaleno (Rainbow 
Mission), Italy's humanitarian intervention in the region to help the refugees. In his 
speech, he asked for the support of the Italian population and, proudly, emphasised that 
Italy had been the first country to answer to the call for help of the United Nations. 
The first aim of the humanitarian mission was that of setting up reception centres 
2n Corriere della Sera, 27th of March 1999: "E' emergenza per i profughi. Si pensa di inviare traghetti 
per portarli in salvo in Italia" (It is an emergency for the refugees. They are thinking to send ferries 
to take them to safety in Italy). La Stampa, 27th of March 1999: "Traghetti italiani trasporteranno i 
profughi dall'Albania in Puglia" (Italian ferries will take the refugees from Albania to Pulgia). 
3n Corriere della Sera, 29th of March 1999: Jervolino: assistiamoli Ii' . Pronte 5 navi per l' emergenza 
(Jervolino: we will assist them there. Five ships ready for the emergency). La Stampa, 29th of i\larch 
1999: Palazzo Chigi: li assisteremo suI territorio albanese (Palazzo Chigi: we will assist them in the 
Albanian Territory). 
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in Albania able to host up to 25,000 people. The mission was funded directly from 
central government, regional governments and private donations. The press strongly 
supported it and three of the most authoritative Italian journalists, Norberto Bobbio, 
Indro Montanelli and Eugenio Scalfari launched an official appeal asking for people's 
contribution to the mission: 
"Per aiutare i profughi del Kosovo il governo italiano ha organizzato 'Mis-
sione Arcobaleno', un intervento umanitario che ha l'obiettivo di alleviare 
concretamente Ie sofferenze di un intero popolo. E' un'azione di pace, un 
segnale di speranza da sostenere attivamente.4 " (Bobbio et al., 1999) 
Although Italians were divided on the issue of military intervention in Kosovo, they 
shared the same concern about the situation of its Albanian population and contributed 
'generously' to the humanitarian mission, which collected around 129 billion liras (about 
64.5 million euros) (Centorrino and Centorrino, 2001). However, in spite of these efforts, 
the Italian government did not manage to stop the inflow of refugees that kept arriving 
at the Italian coast daily. Moreover, the crisis in the FYROM opened another front 
on the refugee crisis. As we have already mentioned, in order to ease the pressure on 
the FYROM and ensure that refugees had continued access to safety, a Humanitarian 
Evacuation Programme (HEP) to host them in other countries in Western Europe and 
overseas was set up by the 10M and the UNHCR. 
Italy adhered to the UNHCR's call and to the HEP in early May and offered relocation 
for an initial quota of 10,000 refugees. According to Hein (2000) this delay in adhering 
to the programme can be explained by the fact that by participating in the programme 
Italy had to recognise that 'reception in the region' was not working and that some of 
the arguments against evacuation could not be maintained. In order to reconcile the 
initial position of the government with the evacuation of the refugees it was emphasised 
that their stay in Italy would have been temporary and that the ideal outcome would 
have been return. It is at this point that the government decided to prepare the former 
4Translation: In order to help the refugees from Kosovo the Italian government has organised the 
Rainbow Mission a humanitarian intervention with the aim of relieve the entire population from their , 
sufferance. It is an action of peace and a sign of hope that needs to be supported actively. 
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NATO cruise missile base at Comiso, in Sicily, as a temporary shelter for 5,000 people 
while other refugees would be hosted in other reception centres. 
The next section presents an analysis of the reasons for which the vast majority of 
refugees escaping from Kosovo in 1999 received temporary protection status rather than 
convention refugee status and the options they had after temporary protection ended. 
This will enable us to better understand the way in which evacuees in Comiso were dealt 
with providing relevant information for the analysis of the return schemes set up in Italy 
and, in general, Kosovar Albanians' approach to return which are dealt with in the next 
chapter. 
8.4.2 Temporary protection status for Kosovar Albanian refugees in 
Italy 
As explained in the previous chapter, Italy did not have an adequate legislation on 
political asylum in order to deal with the Kosovo's refugee crisis of 1998-1999. The 
legislative instruments available in 1999 were still law n. 39 (1990) and the new law n. 
40 (1998). As we have already considered, law n. 39 established only a few minimum 
standards in relation to the asylum procedure which entitled asylum seekers to minimum 
assistance while waiting for an answer on their case from the Central Commission. The 
new law n. 40, had introduced extraordinary measures for humanitarian emergencies in 
case of conflict, natural disasters and other severe events taking place in non ED states 
and Art. 18 included a specific provision on temporary protection. In this context, 
considering that the administrative set-up of the regular determination procedure had 
neither changed nor improved by the time of the refugee crisis in Kosovo, both the 
government and NGOs were worried that the system could not be adapted quickly 
enough to face the challenge of the mass influx of refugees and temporary protection 
seemed to be an immediate solution to the problem (Hein, 2000). Therefore, in May 1999, 
in response to the refugee crisis in Kosovo, the government approved a first ministerial 
decree (Ministerial decree: DPC1;1 12 May, 1999) introducing temporary protection for 
people coming from the Balkan areas affected by the war. The decree included from the 
start a humanitarian residence permit, a work permit and the right to be assisted in 
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collective centres until 31 December 1999 (Ministerial decree: DPCM 12 May, 1999). 
The refugees were offered a choice upon arrival: they could get temporary protection 
status or submit an individual refugee claim. Obviously, opting for an individual claim 
was not an appealing option in the short term, as this would have meant going through 
the problems that came with the normal recognition procedure. In the context of a 
general emergency situation where decisions need to be taken as fast as possible, refugees 
faced a serious dilemma. In practical terms, they were asked to choose between a 
guaranteed level of assistance and rights today and the chance of a full set of civil, 
social, economic rights in an uncertain possible date in the future. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that the vast majority of the refugees actually chose temporary protection 
considering that people in need of immediate refuge are more likely to opt for the faster 
immediate solution. According to official statistics of the Ministry of Interior, about 
18,400 refugees, including the 5,800 hosted in Comiso, had temporary protection status. 
The number of Kosovars who applied for convention status is not clear because they do 
not appear as a separate group in the statistics, but are, instead, included in the general 
group of applicants from the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. In 1999, the general number 
of asylum applications in Italy was 8,356 and the number of application from the FRY 
was 4,456 (SISTAN, 2000). 
Initially, temporary protection had been granted until the end of December, but con-
sidering the poor conditions of the infrastructure and housing in Kosovo, its unstable 
security situation and its harsh weather conditions during the winter season, the govern-
ment extended the protection. A second ministerial decree (Ministerial decree: DPCM 
30 December 1999) extended temporary protection until the 30th of June 2000. The 
decree stated that the Ministry of Interior, in agreement with the administrations in-
volved and the UNHCR, and in collaboration with the 10M and other humanitarian 
associations would promote a campaign to inform the refugees about the possibility to 
return starting on the 1st of April 2000. It also affirmed that a repatriation programme 
for the refugees would start on the 1st of July 2000 and end on the 31st of August 2000. 
The programme would respect the dignity and safety of the refugees and guarantee, 
whenever possible, support during the reintegration phase (Ministerial decree: DPC11, 
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1999). The final ministerial decree (Ministirial Decree: DPC11 1 September, 2000) de-
tailed the terms for the cessation of temporary protection. Refugees were offered the 
opportunity of taking part in assisted repatriation programmes for which they had to 
register by the 30 September 2000. Those who did not subscribe to the programme 
would have been 'removed' from the national territory as the law in force prescribed. 
However, under the pressure of advocacy groups and MPs, the government also included 
in the decree other options for those refugees who wanted to stay (Commissione Per-
manente Affari Costituzionali, 2000). It was established that they could apply for a 
different form of residence permit: they could claim refugee status under the terms of 
the 1951 Geneva Convention; they could ask for a humanitarian residence permit in 
accordance with decree-law n. 286 (25 July 1998); or they could stay also as labour 
migrants if they provided all the necessary documentation by the 30 September 2000 to 
a police headquarters (questura) in order to prove that they had a job and accommoda-
tion (Amore, 2002b). Despite the government's general emphasis on return and assisted 
return programmes, a low number of refugees actually went back. The largest number 
of returns came from the refugee camp in Comiso, were about 3,000 people left as soon 
as it was possible. This case was used to prove the success of the political strategy to the 
refugee crisis and to demonstrate that the promise that refugees would stay only until 
the conflict was over had been maintained. However, it only represented around 16% of 
the total number of Kosovar refugees with temporary protection in Italy. Moreover, as 
we explain in more detail in the next chapter, the refugees of Comiso did not have the 
chance to take advantage of the assisted repatriation programme set up by the 10M, 
which only started to operate few months after they had already left. Of the remaining 
temporary protected Kosovar refugees in Italy, only 444 people returned via the 10M 
programme, while the rest have either returned independently or have stayed in Italy. 
In order to be able to analyse and understand the different approach to return of the 
evacuees accommodated in the base in Comiso and other temporarily protected Kosovar 
Albanian refugees in Italy in the next chapter, it is necessary to look first at the issues 
involved in the decision to host the refugees in Comiso, the organisation of the camp 
and the problems refugees faced while staying there. 
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8.4.3 The refugee camp in Comiso 
The first 5,800 refugees from the REP were taken to the former NATO missiles bases 
in Comiso, a town of 30,000 inhabitants in the province of Ragusa in the south-east 
of Sicily. This was one of the most strategic NATO bases in Europe during the 1980s 
and attracted numerous protests from non-violent pacifist movements, making Comiso 
a major point of reference for international peace. The base was eventually dismantled 
in the early 1990s and since then the problem of reconverting the infrastructures into 
something useful for the area had been at the top of the local political agenda. Several 
proposals for the conversion had been discussed throughout the 1990s, but in 1999 no 
plans had become operational yet. 
On the 3rd of April 1999, in response to the refugee crisis in Kosovo, the bishop of 
the dioceses of Ragusa sent a letter to the Prime Minister and the Minister of Interior, 
suggesting that the former NATO base could be an adequate short term reception centre 
for a certain number of refugees from the Balkans. In this letter the bishop underlined 
the fact that the base that had originally hosted the families of military personnel was 
'crying for revenge' for the ordeals of hundreds of thousands of refugees (Caritas, 2000). 
It was suggested that hosting the victims of violence and war in the former military base, 
was the best way to 'redeem' this structure converting it into a symbol of compassion 
and solidarity. 
The government accepted the suggestion of the bishop and, on the 2nd of May, the 
Minister of Interior Jervolino visited the place and decided that it was an appropri-
ate structure to host the first 5,000 refugees. The reactions of locals to the arrival of 
thousands of refugees from Kosovo were varied. On the one hand, some people were 
sympathetic towards the refugees and volunteered to help out; on the other hand, peo-
ple worried about the impact of the arrival of 5,000 refugees in the area and considered 
them as a threat to the economy. The main fear was that the refugees would decide to 
stay and compete for jobs. Although, in 1999, the unemployment rate of the province 
SOn August 7, 1981 it was officially selected as the second European main operating base for Ground 
Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM), deployed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in response to 
the development and deployment of new intercontinental and intermediate range missiles by the Soviet 
Union. 
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of Ragusa was 14.5%, the lowest in Sicily with an average of 24.5% and just 3 points 
above the national rate of 11.4%, there was a general perception that jobs might be at 
risk (IS TAT , 1999). An indication of the general sentiments was provided by a twelve 
year old girl interviewed by the local press who said that she was happy that her town 
was going to offer refuge to so many children in need, but she added that the problem 
was that there were even adults with them and they would take the jobs of the local 
adults (Schembri, 1999a). 
The mayor of Comiso, tried to reassure the population and declared that it would have 
been a moral crime not to open the former base to the refugees from Kosovo and that 
it was their moral duty to welcome and support them (Lauretta, 1999). Two main ar-
guments were put forward by the local politicians to reassure the population: the short 
duration of the presence of the refugees in Comiso and the plan for reconverting the 
base. Everyone seemed to agree that the refugees should be in Comiso only temporar-
ily, ranging from the government, the opposition, local authorities to the many NGOs 
and voluntary associations involved (Schembri, 1999a; Lauretta, 1999). The regional 
newspaper La Sicilia published an article entitled "Che siano i benvenuti, rna non per 
sempre" (They are welcome, but not forever), which summarises the general approach to 
the arrival of the refugees as torn between a moral duty to offer solidarity and the fear of 
having to integrate 5,000 'strangers' in the province (Schembri, 1999a). As for the new 
conversion of the base, the issue was clearly part of the negotiation between the local 
authorities and the government. Since 1990, people were waiting for the transformation 
of the base into something that could benefit the area. The main proposals for the 
base were the creation of the University of Euro-Mediterranean studies and an airport. 
In early May, the mayor claimed that the Prime Minister and the Minister of Interior 
had reassured him about the fact that hosting the refugees would not interfere with or 
delay any such plans and that repair on the runway had already begun. Moreover, the 
Prime Minister had sent him a letter saying that the project for the airport and the 
university were compatible with each other and that the government was supporting 
them both (Liuzzo, 1999). Finally, it was agreed that the base would host the first 5,000 
refugees evacuated from the FYROM and that the regional government of Sicily with 
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the Dipartimento della Protezione Civile6 (Department for Civil Protection) would run 
the camp in collaboration with Comiso city council and various voluntary associations. 
On the 5th of May, the first 500 refugees arrived in Comiso and every day about 200/400 
people were flown in reaching a total number of about 5,800. As we explained earlier, 
they were given the option of either submitting an individual asylum claim or getting 
temporary protection and they opted for the latter. Although, in theory, the ministerial 
decree established that temporary protection would apply until the 31st of December 
1999, it was implicit that protection would be extended until necessary, at least until 
the end of the war. Therefore, the duration of their stay in the camp was not clearly 
established. The representatives of local authorities and voluntary associations that I 
interviewed expected that the refugees would have remained for at least a year and 
planned their activities accordingly. The Protezione Civile directing the camp had di-
vided their management in two phases: an initial phase to address the basic needs of 
the refugees and a second phase to organise more recreational activities and develop 
small projects oriented towards return. Even voluntary associations had planned vari-
ous projects that were oriented towards return and better reintegration in Kosovo after 
the war, such as training to learn new skills (for example a job placement for carpenters 
to learn new techniques and be able to set up a new business after return, computer 
training for young people, etc), collection of funding to buy tools to take to Kosovo, 
etc. However, they never managed to implement any of the projects they had planned 
because the refugees left the camp very early, and after four months from their arrival 
the camp was completely empty. 
Life in the camp in Comiso was not easy and people faced different problems as we can 
see in some of the examples below. First of all, the infrastructure had not been used for 
almost ten years and the updating was far from being completed when they begun to 
arrive: 
• The base is divided in two areas, the Italian part and the American part and the 
distance between the two areas is two kilometers. About 2,000 refugees were hosted 
6n Dipartimento della Protezione Civile is coordinated by the Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri 
and deals with problems related to the protection of people and the national environment during natural 
catastrophes (earthquakes, vulcano's eruptions, floods, etc.) and other emergency situations. 
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in the Italian area and the others in the American area. Initially, most services 
were in the Italian part of the base: public phones, a room with a television with 
parabolic antenna to follow the news in Albanian, a medical centre 7 , and the office 
where new documents for the refugees were prepared and issued. This meant that 
the majority of the refugees had to walk for two kilometers to use these services. 
Only at a later stage was an internal transport system arranged and some services 
set up in the other part of the base. 
• Two to three families shared the same fiat leading to overcrowding. In many cases 
they lacked basic furniture such as tables or chairs and some accommodations 
received water for just few hours every day while others had no direct water at 
all. The organisers seemed to address most of these issues, but the bureaucratic 
mechanism took a long time before being able to provide a solution. For instance, 
when the refugees arrived there were no fridges or cookers in the fiats, which arrived 
too late, when the camp was virtually empty at the end of August (Cabibbo, 
1999d). 
A second source of problems was the organisation and management of the camp which 
presented difficulties with the issuing of documents, the quality and distribution of food, 
the distribution of basic supplies, etc., which led to formal protests and complaints from 
both refugees and volunteers: 
• For the first month the refugees could not leave the base because they did not have 
documents and had to wait for the police to issue some new IDs and their visa. 
This led to protests from some of the refugees who wanted to leave the camp as 
soon as possible to reach their families in the North . 
• At the beginning the canteen of the camp seemed to work, although there were 
some problems. The catering service had the capability of preparing up to 3000 
meals per day, but the canteen could only seat 300 people at the time. They 
tried to distribute the meals door to door, but even this did not work very well as 
7There was a small medical centre in the camp which assured the daily visit of paediatricians and 
gynaecologists, considering the high number of children (50% of the population) and of pregnant women 
(around 400). Other doctors with different specialisation came in once a week. 
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many people did not have tables, chairs or cutlery in their flats. Later it became 
apparent that the food started to become too scarce and its quality dropped. This 
was partly due to the increasing number of people in the camp and partly due to 
the dubious management of supplies. Indeed, following several complaints from 
refugees and voluntary associations, the cooperative responsible for the catering 
was later placed under investigation for fraud . 
• The chain of communication was not very efficient. Many volunteers lamented that 
people remained for days with no basic supplies, no clean clothing and underwear, 
no soap, no shoes, etc. Many people suffered of hypotension, but also scabies and 
pediculosis because of a combination of low hygienic conditions and the heat, given 
that the temperature reached 40°c in certain days. Supplies were not missing, but 
they needed to be selected and catalogued and this process took time. In late 
June early July, some of the refugees broke into the supply containers over night 
and began to take the material out by themselves. Newspaper headlines talked 
about theft and showed pictures of destruction with clothes and boxes all over 
the floor; the authorities said that there was a general misunderstanding and a 
lack of communication and some volunteers justified the refugees saying that the 
waiting time for basic necessary items was far too long and the chain of distribution 
was disorganised. The looting of the containers continued for a few days reaching 
disastrous proportions, with about a thousand people grabbing what they could 
and, unavoidably, causing chaos and destruction. As a consequence, the authorities 
eventually decided to leave the storage space open and allow everyone to take 
whatever they wanted. 
Most of the activities in the camp were focused on solving these problems and taking 
care of the basic needs of the refugees. Voluntary associations complained about the fact 
that all efforts seemed to address only the material needs of the refugees. One of the 
interviewees said that all the authorities cared about was to provide them with a roof 
over their head and a meal. In contrast, voluntary associations were more concerned 
with keeping the refugees busy and starting their training projects. As a matter of fact, 
the authorities seemed to be of the same opinion, but they wanted to complete the first 
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part of their plan first. This is supported by the fact that they had commissioned IO~1 
to make a census of the population of the camp to be able to address, in a second phase, 
their specific needs and their preparation for return. In the refugee camps in Albania, 
the UNHCR in collaboration with 10M and other international organisations had set 
up a project to register the refugees and create a database of their data 8. In Italy, 
10M set up a similar pilot project in collaboration with the national association of the 
Italian city councils, Associazione Nazionale Comuni Italian (ANCI ), to undertake a 
census of the 5,800 refugees in the camp in Comiso. The aim of the project was that of 
facilitating the organisation of the refugees in the camp, simplifying family reunification 
procedures, aiding in the planning of an effective return to Kosovo, and preparing the 
refugees for the reconstruction of their country and its civil society (10M, 1999). 
Several organisations were involved: the 10M office in Italy, ANCI, the Italian refugee 
Council (Consiglio Italiano per i Rifugiati) and the Ministry of Interior. The project 
developed through different stages, the main steps of which were: the design of a ques-
tionnaire in Italian and Albanian; the design of software to record the data that was 
compatible with the one used for the larger project in Albania; the circulation of infor-
mation about the project in the camp; the conduct of the interviews and the analysis of 
the data. The interviews started on the 22nd of June 1999 and were completed on the 
21st of July 1999. The research team interviewed 2,049 people which allowed them to 
collect data for about 4,300 refugees. According to the 10M (10M, 1999), the data were 
representative of the entire population in the camp in Comiso and offered an accurate 
profile of the Kosovar population in general. The data were then analysed by a research 
team of the University of Wuppertal (Germany). 56.5% of the population in the camp 
was female and 43.5% male, and each family included an average of 5/6 members, 13% 
of them were illiterate and the level of education was generally low. 58.2% of the men 
had a job before the war while 70% of the women were housewives. The survey also 
found out that 65.1% had friends or families abroad, of which 30% in Germany and 
19.8% in Switzerland (10M, 1999). 
8The vast majority of the refugees expelled from Kosovo had no documents, either because they had 
no time to get them before escaping or because the Serbian authorities destroyed them before expelling 
them. 
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Although one of the main aims of the project was that of planning a better return and 
reintegration phase, in the end, it did not serve this purpose because, as explained in 
the next chapter, the refugees left the camp before the programme of assisted return 
started to operate. 
8.5 Conclusions 
According to the international community, the optimal solution to the Kosovo refugee 
crisis of 1999 was reception in the region, which meant reception close to home in Mon-
tenegro, Albania and the FYROM. It was argued that relocation would have indirectly 
supported ethnic cleansing and delayed repatriation and that assisting the refugees in 
the region would have been more cost effective. In early April 1999, when the situa-
tion deteriorated in the FYROM and it was necessary to evacuate some of the refugees 
to other countries outside the region, the UNHCR and 10M organised a Humanitar-
ian Evacuation Programme and EU states accepted to host quotas of refugees in their 
territory. However, despite the fact that Kosovar Albanians undoubtedly qualified for 
refugee status under the Geneva Convention's definition, all EU states granted them 
temporary protection (Van Selm, 2000) and maintained the initial orientation towards 
repatriation by emphasising return as the preferred solution after the end of temporary 
protection (Koser, 2000). 
Within this context, both the UK and Italy had already received and continued to 
receive spontaneous arrivals of refugees from Kosovo and responded quite late to the 
appeal of the UNHCR, accepting to host quotas of evacuees only in May 1999. Both 
countries adopted temporary forms of protections for all the evacuees and some of the 
spontaneous arrivals. Given the situation of the general national asylum systems, these 
forms of ad hoc protection provided an immediate better kind of support compared to the 
minimum level of assistance available to other asylum seekers. However, this status was 
temporary and the phase following the end of protection was intended by government to 
lead to return. In fact, caught between the public concerns for the desperate situation 
of Kosovar refugees reported by the media and the national and regional concerns for 
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the impact of thousand of refugees in the national territory, both governments in the 
UK and Italy emphasised the fact that refugees would be given shelter for as long as it 
was needed and that return would have been the ideal final solution for them at the end 
of temporary protection. Therefore, their reception was based on the assumption that 
they would return to Kosovo as soon as possible. 
The UK set up the Kosovo Programme, a reception system organised for Kosovar evac-
uees, and the long experience with refugees of the various actors involved proved to be 
crucial for the success of the programme. Evacuees were spread throughout the country, 
so that the size of each group was more manageable, the Refugee Council and other spe-
cialised agencies, which had long standing experience with refugees, were fully involved 
in the operations and local authorities were given the necessary support to set up the 
centres. When problems arose, solutions were relatively fast to arrive and the different 
bulletin services effectively provided information both to refugees and to the direction 
of the centres. The main problems begun when refugees moved out of the centres into 
independent accommodations or when the Kosovo Programme ended and they had to 
turn to the general national asylum system. People felt disoriented and faced at a later 
stage some of the main problems many asylum seekers are confronted with immediately 
upon arrival in the UK. 
In Italy, many of the good intentions to help the refugees and prepare them for their 
eventual return were lost due to the lack of experience with an established asylum system 
which had an impact on some of the decisions about the reception of evacuees and the 
organisation of the centre in Comiso. The decision to concentrate more than 5,000 
refugees in the same centre alone put the structure and the organisation of the centre 
under major strain. The situation was made worse by a lack of coordination between the 
actors involved and a lack or misuse of resources. There were many problems regarding 
refugees' basic needs and most solutions came when refugees had already started to leave 
the camp. 
This contrast between the two reception systems is evident when analysing the reaction 
of the refugees to life in the centres in both countries. While in the UK, people were 
happy with the services provided and were worried about leaving the centre, in Italy 
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refugees were grateful but generally unhappy about the situation and in some occasions 
they protested against certain problems they faced. Moreover, in the UK evacuees 
generally found a better structured support but felt at times that life in the centres 
created a sense of dependence, while the chaotic situation of the camp in Italy led the 
evacuees to take the situation in their own hands in different occasions, at times with 
devastating results for everyone. 
Despite these differences, refugees shared common levels of stress and anxiety in both 
countries given by the worry for the situation back in Kosovo, the need to contact 
relatives and friends who had previously migrated to the UK or Italy, and, especially, the 
sense of anxiety about the future and the end of temporary protection. The combination 
of the experience in the reception centres and the anxiety about the end of protection 
together with the general situation in Kosovo and in the countries of exile had a major 
impact on Kosovar Albanians' return movements as I explain in the next chapter. 
Chapter 9 
Refugees and Return: choices in 
context 
9.1 Introduction 
So far in this thesis I have examined Kosovar Albanian refugees' position vis-a.-vis the 
conflict, their flight and their settlement in the country of exile. I have argued that these 
phases of the exile experience have an impact on refugees' choice with respect to return 
and are, therefore, important factors to consider when attempting to understand what 
influences their decision. 
In this chapter I complete the picture by examining the conditions in Kosovo from the 
end of the war until spring 2004, the repatriation policies set up for Kosovar refugees 
in the UK and in Italy, and the views of the refugees themselves on return. With the 
entire picture in place I then go on to present the conclusions that can be drawn from 
this study with respect to what influences the choice to return. 
I begin by providing an overview of the conditions of Kosovo from the end of the war 
until spring 2004 and a summary of the official position and recommendation of the 
UNHCR, UNMIK and ECRE about refugee repatriation to Kosovo. This places into 
perspective the position of governments in the countries of exile on Kosovar Albanian 
repatriation and refugees' concerns about conditions in post-war Kosovo. 
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Subsequently, I analyse in detail the UK and Italy's repatriation policies and 'voluntary' 
assisted return programmes for Kosovar Albanians focusing, especially, on the case of 
temporarily protected refugees who were the main recipients of these programmes. I 
examine the options they were given at the end of temporary protection, scrutinise their 
practical implications and provide an account of the opinion on the programmes of the 
refugees I interviewed in both countries. 
With an explanation of the conditions for return in both the country of origin and the 
countries of exile in place, I then turn my attention to the refugees' views on return. 
I draw from the interviews with Kosovar Albanian refugees in the UK and Italy and 
explore their opinion and their perspectives on the possibility to return to Kosovo within 
the larger context of the whole exile experience and their relationship with the conflict, 
their level of integration in exile, the repatriation policies of their country of exile and 
their personal background. 
Finally, I explain the relevance of the findings of the case study to the general debate 
on the factors that influence the choice to return or remain in the country of exile. This 
explanation brings together all the pieces of the exile experience, from flight to possible 
return, and provides a set of conclusions that can inform repatriation research in the 
more general context. 
9.2 Kosovo after the war: June 1999-2004 
An understanding of the development of the situation in Kosovo after the war ended 
and of its future prospects is central to any attempt to explain the return process and, 
especially, the position of governments in the countries of exile in relation to repatriation 
and refugees' concerns about conditions in the home country. In order to do so, two 
main points have to be considered: firstly, the way in which the security and socio-
economic conditions and the political situation of the region changed after the war and, 
secondly, the possible developments for the future. This section deals with the post-
conflict situation in Kosovo, highlighting some of the major problems the reconstruction 
presented and providing a brief overview of the main developments until spring 2004. 
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Moreover, it provides an account of the official position on return of the two main 
organisations that are officially involved with refugee issues in Kosovo, the UNHCR 
and UNMIK, and of the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), which 
represents the views on refugees and asylum issues of more than sixty organisations 
throughout twenty-five countries all over Europe. These organisations represented a 
point of reference for governments in countries of exile as they were key sources of 
information on the situation on the ground that were used within government policy 
documents when deciding about repatriation issues and attempting to justify policies. 
9.2.1 Peace agreement and the UN Resolution 1244 
In late April 1999, the resolution of the conflict did not seem at hand despite the fact that 
a month long bombing campaign had caused severe damage to the infrastructure and 
the economy of Serbia. The Independent International Commission on Kosovo (2000) 
explains that at the end of April the question of 'How are we going to end this war?' cir-
culated nervously within NATO. There were talks about ground invasion, but eventually 
the G-7 group of industrialised countries with Russia put together a seven-point peace 
plan which was accepted by Belgrade in early June. These points were included by the 
UN Security Council in Resolution 1244 that was passed on the 3rd of June 1999 and 
demanded the immediate end of violence and repression in Kosovo, the withdrawal from 
Kosovo of military, police and paramilitary forces, and the demilitarisation of the KLA. 
Moreover, it also asked for the safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons, 
for unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organisations, and encouraged a 
comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilisation of the crisis in 
the region (United Nations Security Council, 1999). While on the one hand, the resolu-
tion addressed many of the problems left by the war, on the other hand, it sidestepped 
the main issue of the status of Kosovo, which originally contributed to the development 
of the conflict unanswered and created the basis for further uncertainty about its future. , 
In fact, the text of the resolution includes a strong internal contradiction when calling 
for a commitment of all member states to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
Yugoslavia "Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and 
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territorial integrity of the FRY" and, at the same time, for "substantial autonomy and 
meaningful self-administration for Kosovo" (United Nations Security Council, 1999). 
Currently, this still represents the biggest challenge for the international community 
and the main threat to peace, as explained later in this chapter. 
9.2.2 The Aftermath of the War 
UN Resolution 1244 called for the establishment of an interim administration, to be de-
cided by the Security Council of the United Nations with the aim of ensuring conditions 
for a peaceful and normal life for all and facilitating a political process to determine 
Kosovo's future status. In particular, it established that the Secretary-General ap-
pointed a Special Representative to supervise the international civil presence in Kosovo 
and coordinate its activities with the operations of the military presence (KFOR) which 
was under the overall command of NATO. 
In practical terms, setting up an international civil administration was not an easy task 
for the UN. The scenario in Kosovo at the end of the war was completely different from 
any other post-conflict situations the UN had ever been involved with. Usually, they 
had been given the task to oversee transition of states in their entirety with a mandate 
limited in time (i.e. this was the case in Mozambique, Cambodia and even Bosnia) 
but this was not the case in Kosovo (Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 
2000). The unprecedented situation of administering an 'autonomous region' within a 
country for an unspecified period of time presented the UN with many new challenges 
and obstacles. Indeed, the problems appeared from the very start if we consider that it 
took them about two months to recruit enough personnel and set up an administrative 
apparatus capable to run Kosovo, leaving the province without a civil administration 
during the first most delicate post-conflict phase. As a matter of fact, the first months 
after the war were dominated by difficult events: further inter-ethnic tensions, the early 
massive return of refugees from neighbouring countries 1 , the presence of landmines and 
the general destruction of basic infrastructure. 
lIn the months following the war around 800,000 refugees returned. During the peak times there 
were up to 50,000 refugees returning everyday. 
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Contrary to the slow start of the UN administrative machine, NATO set up 'Operation 
Joint Guardian' and authorised the deployment of KFOR troops on the ground on 
the 10th of June 1999, just a week after the UN Security Council passed Resolution 
1244. KFOR troops were deployed on the ground two days later, they established 
the headquarters in Pristina/Prishtina and divided the area in five zones which were 
put under the control of different NATO's member states.2 The initial lack of a civil 
administration implied that for the first two months the KFOR had to respond to all 
sorts of problems beyond security issues as defined by their mandate3 . The report of 
the Independent International Commission on Kosovo highlighted the issue: 
"For the first two months there was not much civilian support from either the 
United Nations or the OSCE. Thus, the task of maintaining law and order, 
repairing local infrastructure and administering the region fell to the soldiers. 
They acted as policemen, repaired roads, bridges, and houses, ran prisons 
and hospitals and performed de-mining operations along major roads." (In-
dependent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000, p.105) 
Obviously, this situation created a few problems, since not only was it impossible for the 
KFOR personnel to focus on their mandate, but they were also often called to device 
improvised solutions when addressing problems they had not been trained for. 
Within this context and in the attempt to fill the political void left by the war, two 
main Kosovar Albanian polities were competing for the leadership of Kosovo. These 
were the parallel government of Ibrahim Rugova, and the self-proclaimed Provisional 
Government of Kosova4 (PGK) of Hashim Thaqi. In fact, Rugova's government, who 
2The Mitrovica/Mitrovice area, in the North, was under the control of France; the South, the area 
around Prizren/Prizren, was under the control of Germany. The area around Pec/Peja in the West 
was Italy's responsibility and the central area of Pristina/Prishtina was controlled by the UK, while the 
Eastern region around Gnjilane/Gjilian was under the control of the US 
3KFOR 's mandate included: Establish and maintain a secure environment for all citizens of Kosovo, 
contribute to a secure environment for the international civil implementation presence, other agencies 
and NGOs, and control the borders of FRY in Kosovo with Albania and FYROM until the arrival of 
the civilian UN mission. 
4The PGK was created by an agreement between all the major political parties of Kosova, Democratic 
League of Kosovo, Kosova Liberation Army, the Democratic United Movement and the representative 
of the Independents. This agreement was signed in Rambouillet France on February 23, 1999 by Dr. 
Rugova, for the LDK, r-.rr. Hashim Thaqi for the KLA, Dr. Rexhep Qosja for the UDM, and Mr. Veton 
Surroi for the Independents. It was established in exile on 2 April 1999 during the second week of 1'\;\TO 
bombing. 
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was elected as President of Kosovo by an unofficial Albanian electorate in 1992 and 
1998, was still in existence when the war ended, but remained mostly behind the scenes 
while the PGK, which had been constituted in March 1999 during the Rambouillet 
talks, established its authority. The latter had planned its future role during NATO's 
bombing campaign, including the establishment of local authorities and the organisation 
of a police force. Therefore, it was in a position to establish these authorities within 
days of the entry of KFOR troops into Kosovo. The PGK expected full recognition as a 
partner of the international community, but this was not the case. The UN objected to 
its legitimacy and on the 15th of December 1999 an agreement was reached between the 
UN, Thaqi's party of Democratic Progress of Kosovo (DPK) and other Kosovar Albanian 
parties which led to the abolition of the provisional government (and all other parallel 
structures such as the office of the 'president' held by Ibrahim Rugova), replacing it 
with a common Interim Administrative Council (lAC) and an executive Joint Interim 
Administrative Structure (JIAS) (International Crisis Group, 2000). This situation was 
generally accepted, but left many Kosovar Albanians disappointed as the decision to 
establish an interim UN-led administration was seen as an external imposition (Blumi, 
2002). This decision together with some of UNMIK's failures in the reconstruction of 
Kosovo and the unresolved problem of its future status undermined people's trust in 
the aims and doings of international organisations in Kosovo with consequences for the 
reconstruction process. 
Undoubtedly, while the past five years have seen some positive developments in Kosovo 
and some of the problems have been successfully tackled, many others have not been 
solved yet and new ones now trouble the area5 . Moreover, despite all efforts, recurrent 
tensions between the Serbian and Albanian population indicate how frail the political 
situation still is and the pending question of the future status of Kosovo keeps dominating 
the debate and overshadows much of the progress made so far. Below is a short account 
of the problems tackled by the international administration in Kosovo and a general 
evaluation of the achievements and problems related to the reconstruction of its physical 
and administrative infrastructures. 
5 A new problem Kosovo faces is the increasing trafficking of human beings since it has become both 
a destination and transit point for trafficking of women and girls for prostitution. 
Chapter 9 Refugees and Return: choices in context 259 
9.2.3 UNMIK's challenges and solutions 
The UN Special Representative of the Secretary General(SRSG) Bernard Kouchner6 was 
finally appointed on the 2nd of July 1999 and assumed his duties on the 15th of the same 
month. UNMIK administration faced a long list of problems from the very beginning 
of its activities. There were security and safety problems, given the risks of mined 
land and the reversed unstable interethnic tensions with revenge attacks from Kosovar 
Albanians on Serbs, Romas, other minorities and other Albanians suspected to have 
been collaborators of the regime. There were tensions at the borders with Macedonia 
and Serbia. There were basic problems with the reconstruction of both public and 
private infrastructures indispensable for re-establishing normal everyday life activities. 
Moreover, there was the issue of rebuilding civil society and planning the political future 
of Kosovo which presented a fundamental challenge for the reconstruction machine. 
Finally, given the situation established by resolution 1244, a further major problem 
emerged in the post-conflict reconstruction: the future status of Kosovo. 
All these issues were extremely important for refugees in two different phases: firstly, 
when taking a decision about return and, secondly, when having to face these problems 
upon return. At the same time the return of refugees had an impact on all these issues, 
as returnees could either put a strain on the poor remaining infrastructure, delaying the 
reconstruction and the efforts of rebuilding a peaceful civil society, or contribute towards 
its development. The summary of the main developments in Kosovo over the past five 
years provided below offers a basis for understanding the conditions in the country of 
origin that might have had and still have an impact on the refugees' decision to return. 
9.2.3.1 Infrastructures 
Major efforts have been done to rebuild the physical infrastructure of Kosovo. UNMIK 
has supported the reconstruction of domestic accommodations, which were mostly re-
built by people themselves, and has begun re-establishing civic structures like the police, 
6The following SRSGs have been Hans Haekerrup, Michael Steiner and Harri Holkeri. The current 
SRGS is S(ZIren Jessen-Petersen. 
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the judiciary7, the legal system, etc. Overall, water, electricity and heating supplies have 
improved greatly but are still not fully reliable. Most schools and hospitals have been 
reactivated, but facilities are generally basic. For example, the capacity of laboratories 
and x-ray departments in hospitals is limited. An international postal service is now 
operating, the telephone network (including mobile telephones) has been expanded and 
transportation is improving. Despite the fact that much progress has been made in all 
aspects of Kosovo's physical infrastructure, the general situation has not fully recovered 
and more work and efforts are required. However, given the general improvements, the 
focus of the work of the international community has shifted on institution building 
which presents a much bigger challenge. 
UNMIK is in charge of the civil administration while the Organisation for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSeE) is responsible for democratisation and institution-
building. Their aim is that of transferring power to provisional self-governing institu-
tions, pending a political settlement. In order to do this, having dismissed the PGK and 
all other parallel political structures that existed after the war, the first task was that 
of actually setting up provisional self-governing institutions. 
There have been three elections in Kosovo, the Municipal Assembly in October 2000 
and 2002, and the Kosovo Assembly in November 2001, and three main political parties 
confronted each other, the Democratic League of Kosova (LDK), the Democratic Party 
of Kosova (DPK) and the Alliance for the Future of Kosova. There has been considerable 
tension between the LDK and DPK at particular moments and this manifested itself 
in violence in the run up to the municipal elections in 2000. However, Kosovo's second 
municipal elections in 2002 were considered to be within 'European standards' despite 
the murder of the LDK mayor in Suva Reka/Suhareke and the several attacks on senior 
LDK members (some of which were connected to the trial of some ex-KLA members). In 
both elections the LDK scored a victory as it did in the elections for the Kosovo Assembly 
in 2001 where the party obtained 46% of the vote. Nevertheless, this was not enough 
to secure an overall majority and forced the LDK to enter a coalition with the other 
7UNMIK has devoted much attention to the reestablishment of an independent judicial system. 
They have faced several difficulties given the general climate of revenge which made it harder to recruit 
impartial personnel. Moreover, there have also been concerns that members of the judiciary could be 
subject to intimidation and harassment. 
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political parties. After four months of negotiations and political wrangling an agreement 
was reached with the DPK and two smaller parties (Alliance for the Future of Kosovo and 
Motherland). Ibrahim Rugova of the LDK was chosen as President of Kosovo, Bajram 
Rexhepi8 of the DPK was elected prime minister. Therefore, on the 4th of 1larch 
2002 the Assembly approved the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG). 
This was seen as a considerable step forward to transfer authority from UNMIK to 
Kosovo's elected representatives. However, according to the Constitutional Framework 
for Provisional Self Government9 signed by SRSG Hans Haekkerup in May 2001, the 
UN retained the final say in most important legislative matters and the new institutions 
are not allowed to declare independence. The next parliamentary elections have been 
scheduled by the United Nations SRSG on the 23rd of October 2004. 
Although some progress has been made towards transferring responsibilities from UN-
MIK to local authorities, there are still important issues to be resolved on this matter. 
Firstly, more efforts are required in order to establish representative and functioning in-
stitutions. In fact, the UN are concerned with the possible formation of separate, mono-
ethnic administrative institutions, which would represent an obstacle for the creation 
of a multi-ethnic Kosovo. They also consider violence against minorities and attempts 
to discourage minority participation in public life as a major obstacle. Secondly, the 
handover of power enhances tensions between the Kosovar Albanian and the Serbian 
communities. In fact, while the former welcome the transfer of power as an opportunity 
to expand autonomy, the latter see it as the beginning of a slide towards the indepen-
dence of Kosovo in which they would have little or no power at all. Thirdly, there is 
a lack of qualified people able to take over responsibilities within institutions as it is 
proved by the common failures to carry out satisfactorily the tasks already transferred. 
Even Prime Minister Bjaram Rexhepi has admitted that his government lacks a clear 
strategy for taking over responsibilities of UNMIK. Finally, there is the problem of the 
impact of the international community on the recruitment of personnel. In fact, it is 
8Bajram Rexhepi is regarded as a moderate within the DPK led by former KLA guerrilla leader 
Hashim Thaqi. 
9The Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self Government establishes the legal structure for 
the PISG and the Assembly. Chapter 5 of the constitution lists the competencies which were transferred 
to the PISG after the general elections. UNMIK retained control of the Competencies listed in chapter 
8, which include foreign affairs, monetary policy, justice and public order, and retained a veto over any 
measures that appear to violate UNSCR 1244. 
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hard to find motivated people to work for the provisional Kosovar government when an 
employee working for an international organisation earns twice the average government 
salary (European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity, 2004). 
Overall, over the past five years, undeniable progress have been made in Kosovo's post-
war reconstruction. The conditions of the physical infrastructures of the country have 
now improved considerably, though they have not recovered completely from the de-
struction caused by the war. The PISG and local municipalities have now taken on 
some of the administrative tasks, although their activities are limited by two main ob-
stacles, UNMIK retention of powers in many important areas as well as their own level 
of inefficiency in many of the areas under their control. Despite the work and the efforts 
in these areas, three major problems are still haunting Kosovo's reconstruction, its de-
velopment and, above all, peace: the economic situation, the level of security and the 
future status of Kosovo. 
9.2.3.2 Economy 
Kosovo has one of the highest rates of unemployment in South Eastern Europe and more 
than half of its people are living in poverty. The average salary of those who are working 
is 200 Euros per month. According to official statistics the unemployment rate is around 
57% and more than 70% of the youth aged 16-24 are unemployed (European Forum for 
Democracy and Solidarity, 2004). People of over 70 years old are given a pension which 
amounts to only about £10 per month. For those who have a job, there is no minimum 
wage and, with the exception of those paid by international organisations, wages are 
often paid with delay. Although there were some strikes in 2002, however, the situation 
offers little space for negotiation by labour organisations. Kosovo is still one of the 
poorest regions in Europe. The economy was reduced to near collapse by 10 years of 
deliberate neglect from Belgrade and the situation after the war was desperate. Before 
the conflict the agrarian sector had a major role in the economy and today it continues 
to provide support for a large percentage of the population. Similarly, another central 
contribution to the economy before the war was represented by the remittances from 
relatives abroad which continue to be a very important source of income today. The 
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main industries such as mining, metallurgy and related manufacturing enterprises, have 
not yet recovered since they were based around the Trepca mine complex which is now 
inactive (UK Country Information & Policy Unit, 2004). Currently, the economy is still 
dominated by the presence of international organisations and hundreds of NGOs that 
offer relatively high salaries to their paid staff. 
9.2.3.3 Internal security 
A combination of KFOR troops, UNMIK civilian police and local Kosovo Police Service 
(KPS) officers is in charge of security in Kosovo. Over the past five years the situation 
has remained generally tense; violence against ethnic minorities, suspected Albanian 
collaborators of the regime, politicians and journalists has been a constant of Kosovo's 
life with moments of intensified conflict at the border with the FYROM (especially in 
2001) and in the Mitrovica/Mitrovice10 area at the border with Serbia (especially in 
2004). 
Generally, the number of killings had begun to decrease between the year 2000 and 
200311 , with most attacks on Serbs and other minorities held to be ethnically motivated 
while the majority of the attacks on Albanians assumed to be due to family and economic 
rivalries, criminal activities or politics. However, in spring 2004 the situation exploded 
again during the ethnic unrest that took place between the 17th and the 19th of March 
2004 in northern Mitrovica/Mitrovice triggered by two incidents amplified in the media: 
the shooting of a young Kosovar Serb in the village of Caglavica (in the area around 
Pristina/Prishtina) on the 15th of March, which led to a blockade by Kosovo Serbs of 
the main Pristina-Skopje road just outside Pristina/Prishtina, and the death of at least 
two Kosovar Albanian children by drowning in the River Ibar near the town of Zubin 
Potok (Mitrovica/Mitrovice region) on the 16th (UN Secretary-General, 2004). 
The clashes following these events represented a serious setback to the stabilisation and 
laThe city is divided by the river Ibar and, until March 2004, 2,000 Albanians and 9,000 Serbs lived 
in the north bank, which was controlled by the latter, and more than 90,000 ethnic Albanians lived in 
and controlled the south side. 
llDuring the year 2000 245 civilians were killed, in 2001 a total of 136 and in 2002, a total of 68 (60 
ethnic Albanians, 6 ethnic Serbs and 2 of unknown ethnicity). In 2003, there were 72 murders (17 from 
ethnic minorities, of whom 13 were Serb and 4 of unknown ethnicity. 7 of the Serb murders were held 
to be ethnically motivated). 
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normalisation of Kosovo. During the clashes, 20 people lost their lives, both Kosovar 
Albanians and Serbs, over 900 persons were injured, around 700 houses belonging to 
minorities, mostly Kosovar Serbs, and 36 Orthodox churches, monasteries and other 
religious and cultural sites were damaged or destroyed. Some public facilities such as 
schools and health clinics were damaged as well. In addition, more than 4,000 individuals 
from various ethnic minorities, mostly Kosovar Serbs, were forcibly displaced within the 
region or sought refuge in Serbia/Montenegro or other destinations. Violence was also 
directed at UNMIK and KFOR forces and 65 international police officers, 58 KPS officers 
and 61 personnel of the KFOR suffered injuries. 
Therefore, the clashes did not only harm the relations between Serbs and Albanians 
even further, but also raised new issues about the safety of the personnel of international 
organisations in Kosovo and uncovered the widespread disappointment and resentment 
that part of the population had developed towards them. Moreover, the work they had 
done in the past five years was put under scrutiny. Analysts attributed blame to the 
international community for not having resolved the question of the status of Kosovo 
leaving it more in a state of prolonged ceasefire rather than peace. It was argued that 
delays in the talks about the future of the region not only invited more unrest in Kosovo, 
but also increased nationalist sentiments in Serbia 12 (European Forum for Democracy 
and Solidarity, 2004). 
9.2.3.4 The future status of Kosovo 
The unresolved question of the status of Kosovo has remained the main concern of the 
entire population of Kosovo, Serbia and the international community. The events of 
March 2004 were almost expected by those who knew and experienced the problems left 
by this unsolved matter. 
As explained earlier in this chapter, officially Kosovo is still part of the state of Serbia 
and Montenegro as an autonomous province, despite the fact that in practice it already 
12The Serbs in Serbia as well as in Kosovo harshly criticised the failure of UNMIK and KFOR to 
protect the Serb population in Kosovo. Especially the removal of control posts was a reason for concern, 
and at the funeral of a murdered Serb in June 2004 separate roads for Serbs from and to their enclaves 
ill Kosovo, were demanded. 
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has a de facto independence from Serbia. Obviously, discussing about this issue seems to 
bring the clock back to the early 1980s controversies about Kosovo's level of autonomy 
and possible independence, right where it all started. The Serbian government is a firm 
supporter of keeping Kosovo within the Serbian state, while the vast majority of Kosovar 
Albanians aspire to independence or union with Albania. 
According to the Independent International Commission on Kosovo (2000) there are 
five possibilities under discussion for the future of Kosovo: protectorate, partition, in-
dependence, conditional independence and autonomy within a democratic FRY. A pro-
tectorate, would mean the continuation of the current situation with UNMIK's admin-
istration remaining in Kosovo for an indefinite length of time. Partition, would imply 
the full acceptance that the Serbian people have a historical claim to continue to live 
in Kosovo but that it is impossible to think about Albanians and Serbs living in the 
same country. In few words, a partition negotiated between the Serbian authorities in 
Belgrade and the international community would ratify the de facto ethnic division of 
the province that has emerged since June 1999. Independence would finally meet the 
demands of the Kosovar Albanian majority and put an end to the UN protectorate, but 
would raise the fears that an independent Kosovo would trigger a chain reaction of de-
mands from Albanians in Macedonia, Montenegro and southern Serbia to join a Greater 
Albania (Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000). Furthermore, ethnic 
minorities in Kosovo are concerned that independence would be followed by their expul-
sion. Conditional independence is a solution based on the consideration that even after 
achieving independence, some supervisory international presence would be required at 
both administrative and military level to protect minorities. Finally, autonomy within a 
democratic FRY, which seems to be by far the preferred solution of many international 
players, assumes that Albanians, Serbs and other minorities which have been at war with 
each other for over ten years, can one day live peacefully within the same state. None 
of these options can be easily accepted by all parties involved and this makes achiev-
ing a solution all the more tense and politically charged. On the one hand, Serbian 
Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica has recently claimed to prefer the idea of partition of 
Kosovo in order to ensure autonomy and security for the Serbian minority. On the other 
hand both the Albanian leadership and UNMIK have rejected this solution considering , 
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an ethnically based partition unacceptable. Moreover, the plan would be difficult to 
implement since the Serbs live in several enclaves scattered across Kosovo and separat-
ing the Serb dominated northern part from the rest would also involve the partition of 
the valuable mines of the Mitrovica/Mitrovice area. The parties that represent Serbian 
interests in Kosovo, of which the largest is the Coalition Returning, want to keep Kosovo 
in the Union State of Serbia and Montenegro. Overall, calls for independence shake the 
international community since they fear further regional disintegration, political insta-
bility and possible eruption of violence. All Kosovar Albanian parties, including the 
LDK and the PDK, representing Kosovo's more than 90% Albanian majority, are in 
favour of independence. Kosovo's Prime Minister Rexhepi said that if the international 
community does not make clear progress on the matter, his government might call for a 
referendum on independence (European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity, 2004). 
In 2002, SRSG Steiner introduced the formula 'standards before status'13, this meant 
that certain established standards must be fulfilled in Kosovo before the start of the 
process for determining its status. Kosovar Albanians were disappointed once again, 
as they would have preferred to discuss about 'status before standards', leaders were 
especially worried about the lack of a specific time frame for these conditions to be 
reached. 
After the 2004 clashes, SRSG Rarri Rolkeri and Ibrahim Rugova launched the Kosovo 
Standards Implementation Plan which is a detailed policy plan indicating ways to achieve 
the goals set by the standards. It was also established that if the standards will be 
met by mid-2005, negotiations about Kosovo's status could begin. This could be the 
beginning of a real solution or the start of further clashes considering that, on the one 
hand, the Serbs worry that the achievement of standards and the deadline means that 
independence is inevitable while, on the other hand, Kosovar Albanians, seem satisfied 
about the fact that a date has finally been set. The future of Kosovo is still uncertain. 
Having explained some of the progress and the problems of post-war Kosovo, I provide 
next a summary of the official position and recommendations on refugee repatriation of 
13The standards are those laid down in UN Resolution 1244: the rule of law, freedom of movement, the 
return of refugees, functioning democratic institutions, economic progress, protection of private property, 
normalisation of relations with Belgrade and a properly constituted Kosovo Protection Corps. 
Chapter 9 Refugees and Return: choices in context 267 
the UNHCR, UNMIK and ECRE. 
9.2.4 UNHCR's position on return 
The UNHCR produced regular position papers and recommendations on return and 
on the continued need of protection for all refugees from Kosovo. The first official 
document was produced in October 1999 and was entitled 'Kosovo Albanians in Asylum 
Country: UNCHR Recommendations as Regards Returns'. It explained that given the 
withdrawal of Yugoslav forces and the deployment of KFOR forces into Kosovo in mid-
June 1999 the situation inside Kosovo for ethnic Albanians had improved considerably. 
Moreover, as of the 30th of July 1999, over 90% of the Kosovar Albanians who had fled 
the province earlier in 1998 and 1999 had already returned. It was, therefore, concluded 
by the UNHCR that in these circumstances, the majority of asylum claims submitted 
by Kosovar Albanians who left the province after July 1999 were not based on a well-
founded fear of persecution as defined in the 1951 Convention (UNHCR, 1999). 
This provided governments with a good basis for considering Kosovo a safe place for 
Kosovar Albanians and grounds for proceeding with repatriation or deportation of 
refugees disregarding the rest of the recommendations listed in the document. How-
ever, the position paper clarified that the situation was still 'violent and insecure', for 
both Kosovar Albanians and other ethnic groups, and that the massive early returns 
were not an indication of a safe situation on the ground but were caused by the poor 
conditions in which refugees were living in neighbouring countries, their fear that others 
might occupy their properties in their absence and the need to trace missing family 
members left behind in Kosovo. 
The document also specified that particular cases may still have been in need of pro-
tection, such as mixed families and people of mixed ethnic origin; draft age males who 
refused to participate in KLA military activities; those accused of collaborating with the 
Serbian or Yugoslavian forces 14 . The UNHCR also recommended that the special needs 
14The grounds upon which a person might have been accused to be a collaborator were not necessarily 
always based on reality. The fact that a person's house had not been burned or looted by Serbian or 
Yugoslav forces was consider as a good prove. It was then possible for a person who had nothing to do 
with the Serbian regime to fall victim. 
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of some specific categories of particularly vulnerable people should be taken into account 
in the context of return, even if they left Kosovo after the end of the war in mid-June. 
The examples listed in the document are: the (unaccompanied) elderly; unaccompanied 
minors; the handicapped and ill; traumatised individuals; female single heads of house-
holds (especially those without relatives in Kosovo). The final conclusion of this 1999 
document was that well-founded fear of persecution for Convention reasons might have 
still existed for Kosovar Albanians in Kosovo and, therefore, they should be given access 
to status determination procedures and have their claims carefully and individually con-
sidered. The document stated that given the circumstances, cessation of refugee status 
for Kosovar Albanian refugees was not possible and recommended that for temporarily 
protected people the possible withdrawal of protection should not lead to persons being 
involuntarily returned in an indiscriminate manner. Even in those cases in which people 
expressed their wish to return the organisation recommended that the time of returns 
should be carefully planned, taking into account both personal circumstances and the 
conditions on the ground in Kosovo. This included problems with the infrastructure 
and security issues such as: the availability of adequate shelter, food and other pro-
vision for basic needs; the functioning of health care and social services; the presence 
and effectiveness of police or other security forces; the level of violence prevalent in the 
province. 
The situation was reviewed every year and similar documents were prepared in 200015 (UN-
HeR, 2000), 2001 (UNHCR, 2001), 2002 (UNHCR, 2002) and 2003 (UNHCR, 2003). 
They reaffirmed that while most Kosovar Albanians were unlikely to face protection 
problems, there were specific categories of Kosovar Albanians who may have faced seri-
ous protection risks, including physical danger, if they returned home. The categories 
were still the same: those who originated from areas where they constitute an ethnic 
minority, those in mixed marriages, persons of mixed ethnicity and persons perceived 
to have been associated with the Serbian Regime after 1990. Once more, the UNHCR 
urged that states continued to provide international protection for Kosovars who had 
suffered particularly serious and traumatising experiences. 
15Two categories were added to the same groups described in the 1999 position paper for the year 
2000: those who were outspokenly critical of the former KLA or the PGK and members or supporters 
of political parties not aligned with the KLA or the PGK. 
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The final update of the position paper on continued protection needs was produced in 
August 2004 and reflected the problems following the clashes that took place in 1'larch of 
the same year. The UNHCR confirmed all the recommendations of the previous papers 
reaffirming that all minorities were still at risk of persecution, that particular groups 
of Kosovar Albanians had serious reasons for fearing persecution and that vulnerable 
groups of people should not be forced to return. Moreover, it claimed that given the 
violence that had erupted in March: 
"[ ... ]forced or compelled returns of members of Serb, Roma, Ashkaelia, Egyp-
tian and Kosovo Albanian minority communities should not take place. In 
addition to placing these persons in serious jeopardy, such returns could 
contribute to further destabilize the situation in Kosovo thus placing this 
environment at risk of new or increased inter-ethnic violence and renewed 
displacement. This risk is even higher where individuals may be forcibly 
returned to displacement into minority communities outside their place of 
origin." (UNHCR, 2004, p.8) 
The UNHCR has monitored the evolution of the situation for potential returnees in 
Kosovo over the past five years and has issued clear recommendations to host coun-
tries about repatriation. All the reports, year after year, described a similar picture: 
the situation for Kosovar Albanians in Kosovo had improved since the end of the war 
in 1999, however, it remained quite unstable and fragile. Therefore, the organisation 
recommended that not only ethnic minorities but also specific categories of Kosovar Al-
banians should not be forced to return and their asylum claims should be given the right 
amount of attention. Moreover, specific groups of vulnerable people should be given the 
opportunity to remain in exile as long as the infrastructure in Kosovo could not provide 
them with the necessary support. However, as discussed later in this chapter, European 
governments seemed to have listened only to the first point and forced repatriation of 
Kosovar Albanians was a regular feature of the post-war years. 
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9.2.5 UNMIK's position on return 
UNMIK's main concerns with regard to Kosovar Albanian refugees were related to the 
conditions returnees would find in Kosovo and the impact of their return on all aspects 
of the reconstruction and development of the region: housing, social assistance, the 
provision of health care, policing and education. 
In 2001, UNMIK prepared a briefing note to explain the situation found by those Kosovar 
Albanians who had already returned by April 2001 and listed the possible problems for 
the future. The document explains that despite the limited absorption capacity and 
shattered infrastructure in Kosovo, those Kosovar Albanians who had already returned 
had generally managed to find accommodation either in their original homes or with 
friends and relatives. However, it stresses that given the high numbers of returnees 
who had arrived over the past year, shelter possibilities were by then largely exhausted. 
The return of Kosovars without a house or a strong family or community support was 
considered as counterproductive to the ongoing reconstruction and had the potential to 
reverse the progress thus far made. 
Moreover, in the briefing note, the conditions of the health care system were also consid-
ered in relation to return. It explains that, by April 2001, the health services in Kosovo 
had recovered substantially but were unable to offer satisfactory care for complicated 
treatments or conditions requiring long-term care (i.e. cancer, all heart surgery, se-
vere and chronic mental illness and psycho-social disorders, HIV / AIDS). The document 
recommended that refugees treated for diseases that required intensive, complicated or 
sophisticated procedures should be given the opportunity to complete their treatment 
before returning to Kosovo and that those suffering from chronic illnesses, such as ad-
vanced and complicated heart and lung diseases, should not return. 
UNMIK recommended that repatriation programmes should be coordinated and phased 
to limit the difficulties that would have inevitably arisen when attempting to absorb 
returnees and avoid the return of members of vulnerable groups for whom assistance 
was unavailable. In any case, governments were urged to continue to give priority to 
voluntary returns. Furthermore, the problem of security was still high on the agenda, as 
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frequent outbreaks of ethnic violence in Kosovo, and in the region as a whole, continued 
to cause great concern for the overall stability of Kosovo. It was suggested that an 
escalation of the hostilities would require a reconsideration of both the province's capac-
ity to absorb returnees and the appropriateness of sending people back into a security 
situation that could potentially explode at anytime. 
In late 2001, as a response to the growing focus on minority returns in Kosovo, UNMIK 
established the Office of Returns and Communities with a mandate to coordinate mi-
nority returns. Moreover, in May 2002, the Office of the SRSG released a concept paper 
entitled 'The Right to Sustainable Return' which outlines basic humanitarian principles 
in relation to return, including the goal of creating a multi-ethnic Kosovo. The paper 
establishes basic principles which guide UNMIK's approach to both spontaneous or as-
sisted returns of internally displaced persons (IDP) and refugees. The guiding principles 
proposed are based upon international human rights and humanitarian standards, and 
were developed in consultation with UNHCR. The paper states that: 
"The role of UNMIK or any governmental authority is neither to mandate 
return locations nor to dictate to IDPs and refugees how and when they 
may return, but to facilitate the improvement of conditions so that IDPs 
and refugees have the opportunity to exercise the individual decision to re-
turn." (UNMIK, 2002b, p.4) 
The paper emphasises the need for ensuring the voluntary character of return movements 
and stresses the importance of guarantying the right to return in safety and dignity of 
all refugees. The principles outlined in the paper were meant to ensure that those 
individuals that decide to return are able to safely and sustainably do so. The main key 
points guiding UNMIK's approach to return are the following: the need of sustainable 
social and economic conditions for returnees; the use of a right-based approach to ensure 
that return is voluntary and sustainable; the importance of return to the specific place 
of origin; a bottom-up approach, involving the returnees in the decisions that affect their 
future; the engagement of the entire community in the return process and the promotion 
of inter-ethnic dialogue. 
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This paper was followed by three main UNMIK activities: the launch of the Task Force 
on Returns16 (TFR) , the publication of a Manual for Sustainable Return17 and the 
Rapid Response Returns Facility (RRRF) .18 
In the document '2003 Strategy for Sustainable Return', UNMIK outlines the future 
strategy on return and indicates three main challenges for the future: 
• "Security - creation of a safe and secure environment for all Kosovans 
regardeless of ethnicity. 
• Sustainability - enabling minorities and returnees to live in peace and 
participate fully in society. 
• Space - generating adequate housing for returnees." 
(UNMIK, 2002a, p.7) 
In conclusion, UNMIK's position on the return of refugees to Kosovo focused on three 
main aspects of the return process: refugees' right to return, their right to go back to a 
sustainable life in the country of origin and the need to organise and stage their repa-
triation. The government of the countries of exile were advised not to force refugees to 
return, to cooperate with the relevant institutions in Kosovo to make sure that repatria-
tion movements were organised, coordinated and in stages. Moreover, UNMIK mirrored 
the UNHCR worries about the volatile security situation in Kosovo and about the return 
of particularly vulnerable groups. 
9.2.6 ECRE's position on return 
The UNHCR and UNMIK's position on return were amplified in Europe by ECRE. In 
2000, in view of the approaching end of temporary protection for many Kosovar refugees 
in various European countries, the organisation produced a position paper on returns to 
16The TFR was launched in November 2002, it is chaired by the SRSG at the central level and has 
the authority to approve recommended return projects and allocate resources accordingly. 
17Published in January 2003, it is a practical guide for the implementation of the principles established 
in the position paper on the right to sustainable return. 
18The RRRF has been created in 2003 to provide housing assistance and socio-economic support to 
individuals and small groups returning to areas of Kosovo where they are a minority. 
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Kosovo based on reports of international organisations and NGOs. The paper expressed 
concerns for the number of forced repatriation that had already occurred in most EU 
member states and the possible increase in the following months. 
"ECRE urges states to fully observe UNMIK's recommendations as to the number and 
profile of individuals to be returned and as to the voluntariness of their return all 
, 
of which are necessary conditions for the sustainability of the repatriation process. 
Host states will be judged not only on their earlier generosity towards refugees, but 
also on their capacity to promote refugee repatriation in a dignified and humane man-
ner." (ECRE, 2000, p.3) 
ECRE underlined that the region was still unsafe, that returns should be staged in order 
to avoid the overburdening of Kosovo's capacity to integrate returnees and bringing 
further instability to the region. 
9.2.7 Summary 
This overview of the main developments in Kosovo over the past five years indicates 
that despite some obvious progress, regarding both the physical and administrative 
infrastructures, the situation is still quite precarious. UNMIK is still far from handing 
over full power to Kosovars, the security situation is still very fragile, the economy is weak 
and despite the new deadline set to reach the eight standards established by UNMIK, 
the future status of Kosovo is still quite uncertain. These conclusions substantiate 
some of the worries refugees expressed about their possible return to Kosovo during the 
interviews, as I explain later in the chapter. Moreover, they are reflected in the general 
chorus of international organisations, institutions on the ground and NGOs stating that 
the situation of Kosovo over the past years has continued to remain unstable, with 
security issues representing a main concern for the wellbeing of returnees in general and 
vulnerable groups in particular. It was amply recognised that the return of refugees 
had a central role in the development of Kosovo from a socio-economic point of view 
and, especially, from a political one; therefore, unless returns were organised and staged, 
they might become an obstacle to progress. These recommendations have been often 
disregarded by countries of exile that have either openly forced Kosovars to go back or 
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have created situations that left little choice to the refugees but to return. The following 
section offers an analysis of the specifics of the UK and Italy's repatriation policies for 
Kosovar Albanians. 
9.3 Repatriation policies and programmes in the UK and 
Italy 
In the following sections I examine the position of the UK and Italian governments on 
the repatriation of Kosovar Albanians in order to understand the political frame within 
which refugees approached the possibility to return. 
The analysis of the conditions for potential returnees in Kosovo and the recommenda-
tions of the main organisations involved with refugees' return discussed so far provide 
a valuable basis for the understanding of the position of countries of exile on Koso-
var Albanians' return. Moreover, some of the findings of the previous two chapters on 
the conditions in exile of both refugees who arrived independently and those who were 
evacuated, can help in placing their approach to return into perspective and provides 
important elements for a better understanding of the context of their choice. 
In each country section, I begin with an analysis of the specific repatriation policies 
for Kosovar Albanians and proceed with an examination of the return schemes and 
an account of the opinion of the refugees I interviewed on the programmes. Finally, I 
conclude with a comparison of the conditions for return in both countries. 
9.3.1 Repatriation of Kosovar Albanians from the UK 
On the 9th of May 2000 all Kosovars who had arrived in the UK under the Humanitarian 
Evacuation Programme received a letter from the Home Office saying that it was time 
for them to go home. The letter said: 
"The UNHCR has stated, most recently in its situation report of March 2000, 
that it is safe for the vast majority of Kosovan Albanians to return to Kosovo. 
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This is amply demonstrated by the one million who have voluntarily chosen 
to return from neighboring countries since July 1999. It was always the case 
that Kosovans granted temporary protection would be expected to go back 
once the war was over and won and was judged safe for them to do so. That 
time is now. The temporary protection regime will not be extended." (Brett, 
2000) 
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Despite the fact that the situation in Kosovo was not fully resolved yet, the Home Office 
supported this position referring to the early massive return from neighboring countries, 
which the UNHCR had already explained should not be construed as an indication of 
safe conditions in Kosovo, and the use of partial information derived from the UNHCR 
March 2000 report; the letter reestablished beyond doubts that refugees had always been 
expected to go back to Kosovo as soon as possible and that 'that time was now'. 
The expectation that at the end of the one year of ELR they would return home was 
also reinforced by the setting up of an Explore and Prepare scheme, later followed by 
a specific voluntary return programme, and a growing number of negative decisions on 
asylum claims and appeals by Kosovar Albanians, followed by removal19 or deportation. 
9.3.1.1 Explore and Prepare 
The programme Explore and Prepare run between December 1999 and April 2000, and 
was funded by the government and run by the 10M. It was open to all Kosovars who had 
ELR and were heads of households or community leaders, both women and men, but 
was available only to one person per family. Those undertaking the programme received 
already their return grant of 720 Deutschmarks, equivalent to approximately £250, dis-
tributed by 10M as soon as they arrived in Kosovo at Pristina/Prishtina airport. They 
received this sum just once and the rest of their family would eventually get their grant 
when they arrived in Kosovo as well. 
This programme was not intended by the government to offer the opportunity to visit 
19Deportation normally has the consequence that a person cannot return while the deportation order 
is in force, which normally is a minimum of three years, and it gives right to an in-country right of 
appeal; removal allows only an out-country right of appeal. 
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Kosovo to evaluate the situation and decide whether to return or not, but rather as a 
way for heads of households and community leaders to go and prepare for the eventual 
return of the rest of their family or community. An internal government document stated 
that: "Participants must be made aware that explore and prepare visits are to prepare 
for permanent return and not just about looking and seeing" . 
Also the letter addressed to the refugees stated that: 
"Many Kosovans have benefited from the 'Explore and Prepare' programme 
which we ran between December last year and April this year. This provided 
an opportunity for you to make advance preparations for the permanent 
return of your families. You are now expected to make preparations to 
return home by the end of your period of leave." (Brett, 2000) 
Despite the unmistakable goal of the government, the Explore and Prepare programme 
was welcomed by several NGOs, including the Refugee Council and Refugee Action, 
that interpreted the programme more as a chance for the refugees to take a better 
informed decision about return rather than a preparation for return itself. This view 
was supported by the fact that the scheme gave the opportunity to come back to the 
UK to the refugees and decide not to return to Kosovo. The Refugee Council expressed 
this judgment on the scheme which is in contrast with the position of the Home Office: 
"Explore-and-Prepare visits enable individuals to assess conditions in order to make an 
informed choice about when to return with other family members" (Refugee Council, 
1999b). 
However, in practical terms the main aim of the scheme remained return and this was 
clear even when looking at the difficulties involved if wanting to reenter the UK after 
visiting Kosovo: 
1. Refugees had been given ELR for 12 months and they had to make their return 
journey on Explore and Prepare within this 12 months; 
2. The UK government was not going to extend ELR in order for the refugees to take 
up Explore and Prepare; 
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3. If they left it too late to book on a return flight to the UK they would not have 
their ELR extended to enable them to reenter the UK on the Explore and Prepare 
programme. 
The risk of not being able to return to the UK worried refugees and many preferred not to 
take a chance. Furthermore, the risk of losing housing and welfare benefits while being 
away from the UK made the scheme particularly unattractive, since many reception 
centres might have closed in the meantime and benefits or job seekers allowance could 
have been stopped during the absence. 
"I wanted to go on this trip, but then I understood that I could lose all 
support if I went and decided to come back. There were so many things 
to do to make sure my family was ok here when I was out there, so many 
papers, so easy to make a mistake and I decided not to go. What if I made 
a mistake and they told me I could not come back here again? What if I 
find my life is still in danger? What if my family lost all support? No, I 
decide not to risk with my life and my family." Ardian (M, 30+, m, arr:1999, 
unemployed) 
A voiding these problems required special attention and preparation before refugees left 
to avoid remaining without support upon return to the UK, but the various options 
and provisions to prevent all this were complicated to follow. In order to overcome this, 
the Refugee Council prepared a detailed Bulletin on Explore and Prepare with all the 
necessary information for both service providers and refugees explaining all their options 
and indicating where to seek further help. It was mostly thanks to the help, advice and 
support provided by the NCO sector that many refugees actually managed to use the 
programme as a means to decide about return. 
The vast majority of the refugees I interviewed commented on the programme saying 
that it was useful for those people who had already planned to return to Kosovo or 
thought that they had no alternatives in the UK and feared deportation since their ELR 
period was close to expiring. For many this could have been a form of help to take an 
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informed decision on whether to stay or to go if the process to guarantee that they would 
still have a house and their benefits upon return was simpler to follow. Moreover, it 
seemed clear to many respondents that the scope of the programme was indeed to send 
them back for good. One of them commented that if it was organised to help them to 
decide about return the name of the programme would have been 'Explore and Decide', 
"if they called it Explore and Prepare", he said, "they have their reasons" . 
Overall, 192 families of the 423 that sent a representative on Explore and Prepare have 
returned permanently. According to the LG A 74% said that going on Explore and 
Prepare had been helpful in preparing to return to Kosovo. Coming back they reported 
about the conditions they found: around 35% of them found that their house had been 
totally destroyed, 53% said it was damaged or empty and only 12% of them found it 
intact; Moreover, only 14% reported that they had a job to go back to and 34% were 
still concerned about the lack of security in Kosovo (Refugee Council, 2000b). 
As the end of ELR approached, for many of those in the scheme who decided to come 
back to the UK a new chapter of their life in this country had begun their fight to stay. 
9.3.1.2 The end of ELR 
When the end of the year of temporary protection approached, refugees with ELR 
had three options in the UK: to apply for an extension of ELR, to submit an asylum 
claim or to return. Once ELR expired, if people had not lodged an ELR extension or 
asylum application, they were considered as 'overstayers', which was a criminal offence 
that stopped all their benefits and could lead to deportation. Those who had arrived 
independently in the UK and had had their asylum claim suspended in 1999 to receive 
12 months ELR in line with the evacuees, needed to resume their outstanding claim. 
If the extension of ELR was refused refugees could return 'voluntarily' to Kosovo, appeal, 
decide to submit an asylum claim or would have become 'overstayers'. Similarly, if 
asylum was refused they could return 'voluntarily' to Kosovo, appeal or would have 
become 'overstayers'. Once people were issued with a final refusal of their application 
they were given a date for removal providing instructions of when and where to go to 
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be sent back. If they did not attend the date of removal they became 'overstayers' and 
liable to arrest, detention and deportation. If deported they could not legally reenter 
the UK for several years. 
During the wait for a decision on their claims or appeals, refugees passed to different 
kinds of support system depending on various circumstances, with many passing to 
NASS. In any case, now that Kosovo was considered to be safe for Kosovar Albanian 
refugees the chances for their asylum claims to be accepted were very slim. 
"I have little hope; they say that now Kosovo is safe. I tell you, it is not 
safe at all, but they don't want us here, so it is safe. I am sure they will 
not accept my appeal, I am so unlucky! There is the election soon (2001) 
and they want to say to people that they are getting rid of asylum seekers." 
Petrit (M, 18, s, arr:1999, student) 
The Home Office statistics on the number of asylum applicants from SAM 20 that were 
refused asylum since the year 2000 confirm this fear, as Table 9.1 shows. 
I Year I Asylum Applications I Asylum Granted I Exceptional Leave I Refused Claims I 
1997 1865 1355 210 380 
1998 7395 935 75 565 
1999 11465 6290 85 460 
2000 6070 275 815 13830 
2001 3230 360 2060 9010 
2002 2265 225 825 2450 
2003 815 30 335 1625 
TABLE 9.1: Asylum statistics from SAM - Source: Home Office (Heath 24 August 
2004) 
According to Heath et al. (2004), there are good grounds to believe that the vast 
majority of the claims from FRY asylum seekers that were refused were actually from 
Kosovars. 
20 Serbia and Montenegro (SAM) replaced Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) from 5 February 
2003. SAM comprises the Republic of Serbia, the Republic of Montenegro, and the Province of Kosovo 
(administered by the UN on an interim basis since 1999). 
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9.3.1.3 ODA: Voluntary repatriation programme 
The Home Office's letter received by the refugees on the 9th of May 2000 explained 
that in view of the end of the one year ELR, the government had already organised a 
voluntary permanent return programme for both refugees who arrived under the HEP 
and those who arrived independently. The letter explained that approximately a flight 
per week had been organised to take them back and that arrangements had been made 
for them to have their possessions taken to Kosovo overland. The letter also indicated 
that the Home Office was aware that some refugees were still reluctant to return and, 
therefore, a new form of 'incentive' had been considered by raising the amount of the 
return grant from £250 to £400. 
The letter said: 
"We know that some of you still have reservations about when to return. To 
help you readjust to life in Kosovo, we decided to increase the return grant to 
1300 DM per person, with effect from the flight on 5th May. Kosovans who 
have previously benefited from E&P and received a grant of 720 DM will 
receive a 'top up' grant of 580 DM if they register by 10th June and return 
permanently before 25 June. We cannot guarantee any financial assistance 
after that date." (Brett, 2000) 
The return grant was part of a larger specific return programme that the Home Office 
Enforcement Policy Unit decided to fund. This was the Kosovan Voluntary Assisted 
Return Programme (KVARP) which was set up in June 1999 following the end of the 
hostility and the entry of the KFOR in Kosovo. This project was funded under a separate 
line of budget with respect to general voluntary return projects open to all refugees. It 
began to operate in August 1999 and ended on the 25th of June 2000 and was open to 
all Kosovars (REP and non-REP). The specific KVARP was named ODA, which means 
'Meeting Room' in Albanian, and was set up to work as an interagency project involving 
101\1 and Refugee Action. 
The role of 10M London was mostly that of providing specialised services for returnees 
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at the pre-departure and departure phase. Refugee Action, instead, offered adyice. 
information and counseling to individuals who were considering return. ODA provided 
information and advice on the situation in Kosovo including housing, available aid, 
education, medical services and security; immigration and family reunion; specialist 
advice for children; 'Explore and Prepare'; books, newspapers and internet access. 
According to official figures a total of 2,906 refugees returned to Kosovo through this 
programme, 2,396 evacuees and 510 of the refugees who had arrived independently. This 
represented around 50% of the evacuees and a very low percentage of the spontaneous 
arrivals. Nevertheless, this figure was generally perceived as a success by the govern-
ment and NGOs considering that this rate and speed of return was unprecedented on 
a programme of this nature. According to the Refugee Council (2000b) on the last six 
flights, 83 families said that they were returning because their ELR expired, they were 
refused extensions or were finding it too difficult to stay in the UK due to benefits being 
removed, therefore, they did not really have a choice about returning to Kosovo. Ac-
cording to the Refugee Council's survey the main reasons given for choosing to return 
to Kosovo after the expiry of ELR were: being reunited with family members, returning 
to the homeland, and starting to rebuild properties (Refugee Council, 2000b). 
Throughout the KVARP, the refugee sector maintained the position that returning 
should be voluntary and that there should be some planning for people for whom re-
turn was not an option. However,the voluntary nature of these returns was questionable 
considering that the options for those whose ELR expired and did not want to return 
were essentially limited to an individual claim for ELR extension or an asylum claim 
which had little chance to be accepted since Kosovo had been proclaimed to be safe for 
Kosovar Albanians. Moreover, the government's insistence that refugees should return 
aggravated the situation by putting further pressure on refugees while they were trying 
to take a decision. 
In mid-April 2000, the Home Secretary Straw affirmed that it was now broadly safe 
for Kosovars of Albanian extraction to go back to Kosovo and that their one year of 
temporary protection, which would have started to run out between April 28 and early 
June, was not going to be renewed unless there were exceptional circumstances. He 
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declared: "Enforcement action will be taken in due course against those who do not go 
back voluntarily" (Travis, 2000b). In his term the 'choice' was either return 'voluntarily' 
or be deported. 
It is indicative that the highest number of returns was from those who had arrived in 
the UK through the HEP and, therefore, had ELR, while of the over 10,000 spontaneous 
refugees only about 500 went back with the KVARP. According to Smart (2004) by 
August 2000, 2,396 evacuees had already returned and as of July 2003 only around 500 
of them were still in the UK. Some of the refugees that returned after the ODA project 
ended have used the general voluntary return programme for refugees of all nationality. 
Others have returned independently, but there are no records or statistics available on 
these cases. 
9.3.1.4 Deportation 
When the programme ended, the refugees who wanted assistance with their return could 
contact the general VARP, while those who stayed and were refused asylum or an ex-
tension of ELR faced the nightmare of removal or deportation. The KVARP finished on 
the 25th of June 2000, while on the 24th Travis reported in The Guardian the concerns 
of the Labour MP Neil Gerrard, member of the all-party group of MPs on refugees, who 
had visited Kosovo and saw that some families who had been in the UK were living 
in unsustainable conditions. Therefore, he urged the government not to force Koso-
var refugees back home. The article included also the government's answers to these 
concerns: 
"The immigration minister, Barbara Roche, said that it had been made clear 
at the time the Kosovan evacuees had come that it was only for 12 months 
and they would be expected to return as soon as it was safe. A Home Office 
spokeswoman said she did not anticipate that enforcement action would start 
after tomorrow. Those who had not yet left would be given the opportunity 
to go voluntarily although they would not be eligible for a £400 repatriation 
grant." (Travis, 2000a) 
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These official statements emphasise once more the fact that the 'choice' was between 
'voluntary' return or deportation. Among the refugees I interviewed, the vast majority 
of those who did not have refugee status or ILR were waiting for the final decision on 
their appeal or were fighting against deportation at the time of the interviews. These 
also included refugees whose specific conditions had been indicated by the UNHCR as 
particular valid reasons for continuous fear of persecution in Kosovo and whose claims 
had been rejected. For example, this was the case of Azim who is of mixed ethnic origin, 
or Petrit who comes from an area where Kosovar Albanians are a minority, or Stela who 
is considered a collaborator of the regime because she worked in a government office. 
"This government is more generous than others in Europe, but still I have 
the feeling that the people who process the applications are not prepared to 
do this job. I feel as if getting asylum is a matter of luck and chance, as if 
they play with ... , you know that flower (she referred to daisies) 'he loves me, 
he loves me not?' When I explain my fears, they tell me 'How can people in 
Kosovo know who you are and what job you did?' They do not understand 
the small reality of Kosovo and Prishtina. It is not like London! Then they 
say that if my husband has returned it means it is safe for me and my son 
to go as well. I know my people, I know how revenge works in Kosovo, they 
always try to hurt a blood related male of your family21, your father, brother, 
son. That is why my husband is not so much in danger, but my son is. They 
do not understand and they have refused my case two times." Stela (F, 50+, 
m, arr:1999, unemployed) 
During 2001 there was an escalation of removals22 to Kosovo, despite the fact that 
the UNHCR and UNMIK had warned that Kosovo was not a safe place yet and that 
it could not sustain large numbers of destitute returnees. According to the Refugee 
Council (2000a), between the 20th of March 2001 and 3rd of May 2001, the Home 
21 r-.,Ialcom (1998)explains that according to the Kanun, the traditional Albanian codes of law, honour 
is cleansed by killing any male member of the family of the original offender. . . 
220ften in order to remove people, the Immigration Service, sometimes accompanied by the pohce, 
visits the i'ndividual or family's home without notice, arrests them and conducts them to holding facilities 
where they are transferred to the custody of Wackenhut, the private security firm contracted to run in-
country escorting services for the Home Office (Home Affairs, 2003). 
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Office removed 254 people to Pristina/Prishtina on eight specially chartered flights and 
the process continued every month. There are no specific statistics available on the 
number of removals of Kosovar Albanians to Kosovo, however, the statistics of The 
Research Development and Statistics Directorate of the Home Office say that between 
May 2001 and April 2004 a total of 6,380 people were removed back to the FRY (based 
on statistics from RDS (2004)). It is plausible that a large majority of these were sent 
back to Kosovo. An Albanian interpreter who worked on charter flights to accompany 
people back to Albania and Kosovo, affirmed that during that time there were weekly 
flights full of people sent back to Kosovo. The flight would first land in Albania and 
leave some passengers there and then go to Kosovo to leave the others. In fact, since 
April 2000, both Kosovars and Albanians had been returned to the Balkans on charter 
flights on a weekly basis and this system was discussed as a good example of successful 
removals in front of the Home Affair Committee that prepared a report on Asylum 
Removals in 2003 (Home Affairs, 2003). Evaluating the problems related to the use 
of commercial airlines and the costs of charter flights for few individuals, a member of 
Loss Prevention International, a company hired by the government to escort refused 
immigrants on commercial flights, said to the committee that the cost per head of 
removing an Albanian or a Kosovar using a charter flight is one-tenth of that using 
a scheduled one when a group of people are sent together on the same flight. The 
committee notes on its report that this witness also explained that removal with a 
charter flight is more 'humane' because, as he put it: "the whole thing is done without 
being in the public eye and therefore the whole temperature of the operation is reduced 
considerably" (Home Affairs, 2003). The 'reduced temperature' regarded the level of 
visibility of the operations and, therefore, media attention, however, sources revealed 
that the situation on the flights was often 'very heated' indeed. In some cases the flight 
would be quiet and people looked resigned to their destiny, but in many other cases 
there were protests and attempts to resist. 
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9.3.1.5 Refugees' opinion on ODA 
The majority of the interviewees had heard about the KVARP and thought that the 
scheme was useful to help those refugees who had decided to go, or had no other choice 
but return, to plan their trip. They also welcomed the government return grant saying 
that this could allow people to have a decent start once in Kosovo but they thought 
that the amount was not a significant contribution especially for those whose houses 
had been totally or partially destroyed and had no job to go back to. Some of them 
were also concerned that the one-off grant from the UK government could impede the 
returnees to qualify for other forms of assistance in Kosovo. 
"If they give you this money what can you do? They help, but you cannot 
support your family for a year or rebuild a house. Yes, it is a good start, 
but then? There are no jobs to go back to. How do you keep going? I also 
heard that if you take money from here to Kosova, the organisations there 
do not help you because you have something, even if this something is gone 
in a minute!" Juliana (F, 30+, m, arr:1999, unemployed) 
As a matter of fact, in most areas returnees did not qualify for food aid because they had 
received return grants, even a delegation of ODA who visited Kosovo in April 2000 to 
assess the conditions on the ground, indicated this problem: "In most areas, returnees 
are considered not to qualify for food aid, however vulnerable the may otherwise be, 
because they have a return grant" (ODA, 2000, p.4). 
According to the refugees, the majority of their co-nationals who wanted to return as 
soon as possible to Kosovo wished to rejoin other families and friends from whom they 
had been separated at the time of the flight or the evacuation. Others, wanted to go 
and take care of their property with the help of other relatives who remained in the UK; 
many were children who did not have much say in the family's decision while the elderly 
simply could not cope with life in the UK because of language barriers and less able to 
adapt to a new society. 
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Many interviewees were concerned about the many refugees who they thought were re-
turning prematurely simply because they could not stay in the UK after their permission 
expired. They explained that the reason for not using the programme was a general lack 
of intention to return. They were worried about their safety, the lack of medical and ed-
ucational structures, and the general political and economic situation in Kosovo. Those 
who were waiting for a decision on their appeal and feared a possible deportation were 
particularly concerned about those people who returned because of a lack of alterna-
tives to stay and were critical of the pressure received through the advertisement of the 
KVARP for people to go on the programme. 
"Can they guarantee safety for people's lives, I do not think so! So why do 
they keep advertising this programme, they shouldn't." Alban (M, 20+, m, 
arr:1999, student) 
In conclusion, the main reasons for not using the voluntary assisted repatriation pro-
gramme, was a general fear for their lives, the general lack of wish to return and the 
conviction that the financial support offered by the scheme was not sufficient and was, 
actually, an impediment to receiving further help in Kosovo. 
9.3.2 Repatriation of Kosovar Albanians from Italy 
As explained in the previous chapter on the evacuation of Kosovar Albanians, the Italian 
government had been very clear about the fact that evacuees from Kosovo were receiving 
a temporary permission to stay that was expected to lead to return. The final minis-
terial decree defining the terms for the cessation of temporary protection of September 
2000 considered two main options: assisted repatriation or removal. However, as a re-
sult of the pressure exercised by advocacy groups and NGOs, the same document gave 
the opportunity to temporarily protected Kosovars to stay with a different form of res-
idence permit. Therefore, the options were either submitting an asylum claim, asking 
for a humanitarian residence permit or proving to have a job and becoming a 'labour 
migrant' (Amore, 2002a). 
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As I explain below, a particular event characterises the position of the Italian govern-
ment vis-a.-vis the end of the war in Kosovo, this is the apparent early request of the 
evacuees who were in the reception centre in Comiso to be sent back, before the govern-
ment had even expressed an official position on repatriation to Kosovo. I question this 
interpretation of the early repatriation of evacuees from Comiso's reception centre later 
in the chapter, however, this gave the government authority to claim that 'return' was 
what refugees were longing for and that it was safe for them to return. 
Before analysing the specific case of refugees in Comiso's reception centres and the 
assisted repatriation programme, I explain below the general options refugees had at 
the end of temporary protection. 
9.3.2.1 The end of Temporary protection 
As mentioned before, the options after temporary protection ended were either obtaining 
refugee status or a humanitarian residence permit or receiving a residence permit linked 
to employment; I explore below the implications of each option. 
With respect to the first option of submitting an asylum claim, the end of NATO's 
intervention in Kosovo and the international presence in the area made an individual 
asylum claim very difficult since the area was then officially considered 'safe' by the 
government. Therefore, refugees had high risks to have their claim rejected. 
The second option, the humanitarian residency permit, gives access to health assistance, 
education and employment for six months renewable up to one year. The permit can 
be further extended provided that the person can prove to have a job. In this case, this 
kind of permit represented de facto another form of temporary answer to the problem 
and prolonged the limbo in which ex-temporarily protected people had lived until then, 
continuing to worry about extension of the permits and about the possibility that they 
might not be renewed. 
The third option linked to a job placement is the most interesting one. The lack of 
quantitative data should not prevent us from considering this as the most 'successful' 
one. For the majority of Kosovar Albanian refugees this sounded as a natural step 
288 Chapter 9 Refugees and Return: choices in context 
considering that before the cessation of temporary protection status they had already 
found a job. In this case they could stay in Italy but the state did not consider them 
to be refugees anymore. The switch from refugees to 'labour migrants' on paper made 
them subject to the Aliens Law and this had consequences for them. For example, the 
changes and tougher measures introduced by the new Bossi-Fini law brought back the 
fear of deportation. The law was approved in 2002 and one of the crucial points that 
affect particularly de facto refugees is that the law introduces the possibility to deny the 
renewal of the residence permit to a migrant who has lost his job after six months of 
unemployment, which implies the risk of expulsion. For all expulsions, the law makes 
it compulsory that they be immediately enforced, regardless of whether it is likely that 
the person receiving the expulsion order may abscond. At the time of the fieldwork, 
refugees were very worried about the changes introduced by this restrictive immigration 
law and worried especially about this point. However, many were confident that with 
the support of their strong network if a Kosovar Albanian lost his/her job, he/she would 
be able to find another one within six months. 
With an explanation of the options given to all temporarily protected Kosovar Albanian 
refugees in Italy in place, I now focus on the specific case of the evacuees who were 
hosted in the reception camp in Comiso and to their particular return. 
9.3.2.2 Repatriation from the refugee camp in Comiso 
Approximately a month after evacuees first arrived in the reception camp in Comiso, 
they finally received the necessary documents that allowed them to leave the camp and 
immediately began to do so. By the 20th of June the estimated number of people who 
had already left was 600 (Cabibbo, 1999a). One of the volunteers who worked in the 
camp explained that CARITAS had managed to organise three minibuses to take the 
volunteers back and forth from the camp and to take the refugees outside to special 
medical appointments or for other needs. However, they were soon asked by refugees to 
transport them to train and bus stations to leave or to meet relatives that had come to 
pick them up, with the main destinations being Germany, Switzerland and the North 
of Italy. While there are no official records of the spontaneous departures from Comiso, 
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since people were free to leave the camp at any time, UNHCR officials estimated that in 
all between 1800 and 2000 people from the camp in Comiso headed North. Clearly, the 
situation was not under control and there were cases of people who left the camp with 
suitcases and provisions only to return a few days later empty handed. The hypothesis 
was that they might have been victims of criminal organisations that had managed to 
reach the camp with false promises of taking them to Germany or Switzerland (Cabibbo, 
1999a) . 
In Comiso, refugees seemed to have the same urge to return as many of those who 
returned immediately after the war ended from Kosovo's neighbouring countries. In 
early July, the Minister of Interior visited the camp where the refugee representatives 
stated that they wanted to go back as soon as possible, provided that the main cities were 
safe. Complaints were also raised about the support provided by the Italian government, 
because they had heard from relatives that refugees in other states were given more 
financial support with cash, while Italy did not give them any. During her visit, the 
Minister of Interior replied by saying that if the refugees wanted to go back on their 
own initiative they were free to go, but that the government wanted to make sure that 
the situation was safe and that mines were cleared before taking the responsibility of 
flying them back. She was confident, though, that it was only a matter of days before 
they would be ready to organise the first returns (Cabibbo, 1999c). Indeed, the first 
group of 580 people left on the 6th of July 1999 while the last refugees left Comiso at 
the end of August 1999, reaching the airport in Catania on military buses and being 
flown on military planes back to Scopje. Once they arrived, they crossed the border 
and NATO soldiers escorted them to their city or village of origin (Iozzia, 1999). Only 
about 200 people decided to stay in Italy and requested to be taken to the North where 
the majority of the Kosovar Albanians who had arrived spontaneously throughout the 
1990s had settled (Cabibbo, 1999b; Schembri, 1999b). 
These early mass repatriations from Comiso were immediately questioned by some of 
the NGOs and voluntary associations working in the camp. Their doubts were fuelled by 
the following considerations: the refugees left months before the end of the temporary 
protection status which lasted until December 1999 (and was later renewed until the 30th 
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of June 2000); they did not apply for other kinds of permit to stay in the country such 
as a study visa, a work permit or asylum; and, some of the problems in the camp,which 
I explained in the previous chapters, had made their life difficult. It was argued that 
the situation in Kosovo was far from safe and that the refugees were not sufficiently 
supported so as to be able to take an informed decision. In addition, they also criticised 
the lack of preparation in view of return and support for reintegration for what was a 
very vulnerable population constituted mostly of women and children. According to the 
Italian Consortium of Solidarity (lCS), hundreds of refugees in Comiso never asked to 
return or clearly stated that they did not want to return, but repatriation was presented 
to them and perceived by them as an unavoidable necessity (La Repubblica, 1999). It 
was pointed out that the leaflets distributed to the refugees in the camp in Comiso 
omitted all information about the various possibilities to prolong their stay in Italy and 
that all the problems they faced in the camp acted as a push to leave. Having a better 
understanding of the full reasons behind the early repatriation of the refugees from 
Comiso would require a study of the returnees' account. Nevertheless, the questions 
raised by NGOs regarding the premature departures from Comiso and their specific 
observations acquire further validity when examined within the context of the reaction 
of the remaining population of Kosovar Albanian refugees in Italy, considering that the 
overwhelming majority did not choose to participate in the 10M voluntary repatriation 
programme that was set up at a later stage. 
9.3.2.3 10M voluntary assisted return programme 
As explained earlier in the thesis, the Italian government had included provisions for an 
assisted return programme in the ministerial decree that extended temporary protection 
and established that 10M would run the programme. The first phase of 10M's work, 
from April to May 2000, entailed a survey of the Kosovar population in Italy with the aim 
of collecting useful information about their inclinations towards return and understand-
ing their needs for an effective assisted repatriation. The 10M research team selected 
a representative sample of the Kosovar population which had arrived in Italy between 
June 1998 and December 1999. The sample included 555 heads of families and obtained 
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information for a total of 1,100 people. A part of the population was reached through 
reception centres, local authorities and police headquarters while 10NI's personnel inter-
viewed directly those refugees who were staying in 'non-assisted' accommodation (1011, 
2000a). According to 10M (10M, 2000a), the response of the refugees to the survey was 
satisfactory; however, many people were reluctant to answer for fear of forced repatri-
ation. The survey concluded that there was a clear lack of propensity towards return 
among the Kosovars who were still in Italy with temporary protection. Only 5.6% of the 
interviewees seemed willing to consider return. The reasons that justified the decision 
not to go back were varied; at the top of the list was the lack of security in the region, 
followed by a lack of housing and employment opportunities. It was not surprising that 
when the repatriation programme started only 120 families decided to take part in it. 
After the survey, 10M submitted a project proposal to the government for the volun-
tary assisted repatriation of refugees with temporary protection from the Balkans. The 
programme included logistic assistance to return and economic incentives to support 
the socio-economic reintegration of the refugees in Kosovo. The government supported 
the programme, which was financed by both the Ministry of Interior and the Foreign 
Ministry, and started in September 2000 and finished in July 2001. It was carried out 
in collaboration with various actors in Italy and in Kosovo (UNHCR, local adminis-
trations, reception centres, NGOs, UNMIK, OSCE), and included a list of preliminary 
activities: a campaign to inform the refugees about the programme and its benefits; 
research in Kosovo to check the general state and the safety of certain specific areas; 
the registration of the refugees who wanted to use the programme; the organisation of 
the trip from Italy to Kosovo; the setting up of the initial financial contribution for the 
move and the first needs upon return. As soon as the refugees arrived in Kosovo, the 
programme of assistance to reintegration was taken over by 10M's offices in the region. 
About 120 families, for a total of 404 individuals, used the programme and after the 
first two months in Kosovo, 10M examined their conditions in order to organise the dis-
tribution of the financial assistance provided by the Italian government that was about 
3,000,000 liras (1,500 Euros) per family. The criteria used to select the families took the 
following points into account: 
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• the composition of each family (in order to favour large families or families with 
the highest number of under 14 years old members); 
• the destination of the contribution to reintegration (in order to favour projects 
sustainable in time and able to generate an income); 
• the distribution in the territory (in order to favour the areas mostly destroyed by 
the war). (IONI, 2000b) 
The money was given in two instalments, 60% after the project had been approved 
by 10M and 40% after 10M monitored what had been achieved with the first sum. 
According to 10M's final report 47% of the families used the money to buy basic furniture 
(beds, cookers, boilers, etc), 34% used them to fix or reconstruct their houses, 11% 
to start or improve a business and 8% for other purposes, such as medical assistance 
or education (10M, 2000b). This shows that overall, 81% of the financial help did 
not contribute to the improvement or the development of projects that could generate 
income, but went to cover initial basic needs. 
In order to understand the reasons why only 404 refugees out of the thousands Koso-
var Albanians still remaining in Italy used the 10M programme to return, I asked my 
respondents to give me their opinions on the scheme. 
9.3.2.4 Refugees' opinion on the 10M return programme 
The general reason for not having taken part in the 10M return scheme was a general 
lack of intention to return to Kosovo (as the 10M survey had already emphasised). Few 
respondents were not aware of the existence of the 10M programme (six of them), the 
rest had either heard about it or had been interviewed for the initial 10M survey. 
Generally, people did not trust the scheme and were afraid that it could be a way to 
hide forcible repatriation. According to some of the leaders of the Kosovar Albanian 
community, the programme was pushing for people to return and this was seen with 
suspicion. For example, even the Kosovar Albanian interpreters employed by 10M to 
carry out the survey and collect the data of those who took part in the programme 
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were mistrusted by many people in the community. Overall, the idea of registering with 
an organisation and leaving other people in charge of organising the whole trip was 
not appealing to many refugees and was seen as yet again a loss of power and control 
over their own lives. Those who expressed the wish to return one day, admitted that 
they would welcome some assistance eventually, but would want to be in charge of their 
decision and establish independently when and how to go. One of the interviewees said 
that he did not want anyone to tell him what to do with his life; going back to Kosovo 
was a dream of his, but he was the only person who had the right to establish when it 
was safe and appropriate for him to go. 
"Non voglio che nessuno mi dica cos a devo fare della mia vita. Tornare in 
Kosova e un mio grande sogno, rna devo stabilirlo io quando la situazione e 
sicura e ci sono Ie condizioni necessarie per tornare." Muhamet (M, 40+, m, 
arr:1994, factory worker) 
The financial incentives for reintegration were considered quite insignificant. There were 
different perceptions of the actual amount given per family; however, everyone agreed 
that few million liras could not be enough to start a new life in Kosovo in the long term. 
Considering the level of destruction in the region and the poor economic situation, 
refugees believed that the financial support offered by the reintegration scheme was not 
enough to guarantee a sustainable existence in Kosovo. They considered the general 
costs of repairing/reconstructing a house and setting up an activity that could support 
a family and concluded that it required much more than what the Italian government 
offered. 
A woman explained that she was not sure about the actual amount they were giving, 
maybe one or two million liras. She had the perception that people in Italy thought 
that this money would be a lot in Kosovo, but she said that it was nothing when you 
start thinking about building a house, furnishing it and setting up an activity to feed 
the family. 
"Ti danno dei soldi, non so bene quanti. Uno 0 due milioni! Qui gli sembra 
che in Kosova questi soldi sono tanti, rna non sono tanti per niente se devi 
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rifarti la casa, comprare i mobili, metter su una attivita per mantenere la 
famiglia." Hana (F, 50+, m, arr:1998, factory worker) 
As for the refugees who had returned, the interviewees thought that the refugees in 
Comiso were a particularly vulnerable group. They were aware of the fact that they were 
mostly women and children and thought that they returned because they did not have 
anyone who could help them in Italy. Similarly, the majority of those who returned with 
the 10M scheme had no one to help them settling in Italy. Nevertheless, in some cases, 
although they had families or friends in the country, they returned because it would have 
been easier to help them by sending remittances once they were back in Kosovo rather 
than support them in Italy. In certain cases the returnees also had the task of taking 
care of the properties of those who had remained in Italy. Some interviewees added 
that some of those who returned with the scheme were professionals, especially doctors, 
nurses and teachers, who felt a moral responsibility to go back as soon as possible to 
help with the reconstruction. 
One of the leaders of the community in Italy, said that another problem with the pro-
gramme was the fact that it was limited to a set time frame. Refugees had to register 
within a specific date (30th of September 2000) to be considered for assistance and this 
automatically excluded many people who were not ready to return at that time, but 
might feel safer and better prepared to go home some months later. 
In conclusion, the main reasons for not adhering to the 10M voluntary assisted repa-
triation programme were the general lack of intention to return in the particular time 
established by the scheme or in the near future, a lack of trust in the ultimate goals of the 
government and the 10M, and the belief that the financial support was not significant 
enough to risk the consequences of a premature return. 
9.3.3 Comparing Repatriation Policies and Programmes 
The voluntary return programmes for Kosovar Albanian refugees in the UK and Italy 
were mainly targeted at temporarily protected people, although in the UK they were 
open to all refugees. This seems to show that, despite the fact that the number of 
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Kosovar Albanians who arrived in both countries independently was higher than those 
of the evacuees23 , governments were under much more pressure to show that temporary 
protection was followed by return as they had originally promised to their electorate at 
the time of the crisis, than to actually send as many people as possible back or create 
the right conditions to achieve a larger and sustainable return movement. Moreover, 
given the official humanitarian rhetoric used to support the war and the crucial media 
attention received by the expelled refugees during the acute phase of the crisis, the 
possibility to show a high number of returns within a short timescale, contributed to 
define the success of NATO's intervention and justify it. Return operations in Kosovo 
have been defined as 'successful' by the whole international community and by specific 
governments, including the UK and Italy. The main indicators considered have been 
the high number of returnees and the relatively early time of repatriations rather than 
the quality of life of the returnees, the effects of mass return flows on Kosovo post-war 
reconstruction, the effects on the inter-ethnic dialogue, etc .. As discussed earlier in this 
chapter, most evidence shows that much work needs to be done in these areas and that 
conditions are far from indicating a full 'success' in a wider sense. 
In both, the UK and Italy, the specific return programmes for Kosovar refugees provided 
some help to those refugees who wanted to return. However, given the conditions in 
exile there are strong doubts about the voluntary nature of their decision. Despite the 
UNHCR and UNMIK recommendations against forced and induced repatriation, both 
countries promoted and encouraged Kosovar Albanians to return after the war ended. 
Italy seems to have given refugees more options to stay than the UK since it gave 
refugees the opportunity to obtain a residence permit in relation to their employment 
situation. The UK forced some refugees to go back on the basis that Kosovo was 
now a safe place for them and, therefore, they did not qualify for refuge status or an 
extension of their leave to remain. This concerned those refugees who had temporary 
protection or were still waiting for an answer on their asylum claims, while refugees who 
had obtained a stable status were not put under the same pressure. As a matter of 
fact, the refugees who had been evacuated to the UK or Italy and those who arrived 
23 As explain earlier in the thesis, there are no specific statistics on independent arrivals of Kosovar 
Albanians in Italy and the UK, but reliable estimates support this assumption. 
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spontaneously during the refugee crisis and received temporary protection, had been 
accepted with the understanding that they would go back as soon as it was safe for 
them to return. The main problem was the fact that in many cases the definitions of a 
'safe' country coming from host countries' governments, international organisations and 
refugees did not coincide. 
As a result of these policies, the majority of those who went back with the return 
programmes were those who had left Kosovo during the acute crisis, had been through 
the worse violent phases of the conflict and were in the most vulnerable position in the 
country of exile. Not only were these refugees not in the best position to take a decision 
about the appropriateness for them to return in that given moment and experienced the 
consequences of an early repatriation that often meant living in fear and destitution, but 
their early return had consequences for the reconstruction of Kosovo as well, as UNMIK 
statements explained. 
Table 9.2 provides a summary of the different options refugees had at the end of the 
Kosovo war in the UK and Italy. It distinguishes between temporarily protected refugees 
and refugees with a stable position in the country of exile since their status determined 
the options available to them. The table also summarizes the possible options for return. 
In the UK the 'choice' was reduced in many cases to 'voluntary return' or 'removal' 
given the low success rate of asylum claims and requests for ELR extension. This meant 
that refugees did not have a choice about whether to return or not, but only about how 
to repatriate: on a voluntary return programme, independently, or deported by the UK 
authorities. In Italy the main options were 'return', 'removal' or 'becoming officially a 
labour migrant'. 
Refugees thought that the programmes were stressing the fact that the government 
wanted them to return and felt pressurised to do so. They worried about those who had 
returned because they believed that Kosovo was not safe yet and that those who went on 
the programmes were mostly very vulnerable groups of people who did not have enough 
resources to manage to stay. However, they thought that the schemes provided good 
support for those refugees who really wanted to go, but in any case thought that the 
financial support was not sufficient to restart a good life back home and could actually 
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exclude the possibility for returnees to be helped by organisations in Kosovo. For those 
who had a stable position in the UK or Italy, repatriation was a personal matter, they 
had the possibility to be in charge of their decision and organisation of their possible 
return and thought that this was how it should have been for everyone. 
I , 
Status Options at the 
end of the war 
United Kingdom 
TP l.Apply for ex-
tension of ELR 
Refugee 
Status, 
ILR, Citi-
zenship 
Italy 
TP 
Evacuees 
from 
Comiso 
Refugee 
Status, 
Work Per-
mit 
2.Submit an 
Asylum Claim 
3. Return 
Remain III the 
UK or return to 
Kosovo 
1. Submit an 
asylum claim 
2.Apply for a 
humanitarian res-
idence permit 
3.Apply for 
residence permit 
for employment 
reasons 
As above, but 
these options 
were not clearly 
explained to 
refugees 
Stay In Italy 
or return to 
Kosovo. Those 
who remained in 
Italy with a work 
permit became 
subject to general 
Aliens law 
Modes of Return 
ODA, Kosovan Voluntary Assisted Return 
Programme which run between August 1999 
and June 2000. Refugees taking this op-
tion received a grant of £250-£400 (in total 
2,396 refugees returned with ODA, around 
50% of the evacuee population III the UK). 
Voluntary Return Programme (VRP) 
Removal or Deportation, if their claims and 
appeals for ELR extension of asylum were refused. 
Independent Return 
ODA (only 510 refugees who had arrived 
independently returned with the programme). 
VRP 
Independent Return 
10M return programme which run between 
September 2000 and July 2001.Refugees taking 
this option received a grant of 1500 euros I?er 
family (in total 120 families for a total of 404 lll-
dividuals used the programme, this wa about 16% 
of the temporarily protected Kosovars in Italy). 
Independent return 
Military flights to Kosovo in July-August 1999 
(more than 3000 people carried). 
Return independently 
TABLE 9.2: Refugees' options at the end of the war 
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9.4 Refugees and Return 
At the time of the fieldwork none of the respondents thought that returning to Kosovo 
was a viable option in the near future, some of them indicated that they might return 
one day while others excluded this possibility completely. This was the case of refugees 
who had experienced terrible violence and felt that life in Kosovo would have been 
a continuous reminder of their suffering, some people of mix ethnic origin or in mix 
marriages who felt they would never be fully accepted in Kosovo's ethnically separated 
society and young people who had grown up in exile and could not imagine living in 
Kosovo. Moreover, while those who had managed to settle with a stable position in the 
UK and in Italy, (either because they had received ILR, refugee status, citizenship or 
a permission to stay linked to their job) were more open to discuss the possibility of 
returning in the future. In the UK those who were still waiting for a final decision on 
their claim or appeals tended to exclude categorically the possibility that they might 
return in the near future of their own initiative. This was due to the fact that in fear 
of deportation, they seemed to want to stress the risks for their life if forced to return 
back to Kosovo . 
Overall, respondents listed various reasons for not wanting to return to Kosovo in the 
near future, some of the main general reasons were shared by all of them while others 
were more specific to particular circumstances. Although the qualitative nature of this 
research does not lend statistical validity to the findings, the data collected does provide 
an indication of the main reasons for which refugees were not considering return. 
9.4.1 Security issues 
The first reasons for concern were related to security issues as refugees worried first and 
foremost about possible future outbreaks of violence and had doubts about the future 
stability of Kosovo. They were well informed about the continuous clashes in various 
part of the province, the difficulties encountered by the international forces to keep the 
situation under control and the rising level of criminality. Not only did they follow the 
news in the country of exile and received direct information from relatives and friends 
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who were in Kosovo, but they also followed the more detailed news reports on the 
Kosovar television and, in many cases, used the internet to look for further information. 
There was a general consensus that Kosovo was not a safe place yet. 
"Kosovo is not safe at the moment. There are still clashes at the borders and 
then there is no police, no legal system. How can a place where they need 
to keep so many soldiers be considered safe? Have you looked at the British 
Foreign Ministry's website? They advise their people not to go because 
Kosovo is so dangerous, but then to us they say that everything is fine and 
we must go." Rezar (M, 40+, s, arr:1997, mechanic) 
Rezar was right, as the British Foreign Ministry's advised British citizens "against all 
travel" to Kosovo. I last visited the website in September 2004 and Kosovo was still 
listed among the dangerous countries to avoid. The British Foreign & Commonwealth 
Office's website as of September 2004 stated: 
"Because of continuing tensions, we advise against all but essential travel 
to Kosovo. Serious incidents of ethnically motivated and extremist violence 
continue. Most recently, on 17 March 2004, there were violent clashes in 
Mitrovica (Northern Kosovo) which sparked sporadic incidents of violence 
throughout Kosovo, resulting in 19 fatalities (11 Albanian, 8 Serb) and over 
900 other casualties. The Kosovo Assembly elections on 23 October 2004 
may heighten ethnic tensions. [ ... ] 
Despite the presence of Kosovo Force (KFOR), there are still significant 
dangers in Kosovo, including residual mines and other unexploded ordnance 
in some areas. In the event of civil disorder, you are strongly advised to stay 
at home and restrict your movements as much as possible, especially after 
dark." (British Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2004) 
This supports Rezar's worries and observations, and indicates that they would be still 
valid today (2004). The refugees' fear of possible outbreaks of violence and clashes was 
confirmed to be well founded by the various violent episodes that have continued to take 
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place in Kosovo up until spring 2004. Moreover, respondents thought that even if at 
present the situation might have been considered relatively safe, in the future the unre-
solved question of Kosovo's status and the eventual departure of the international forces 
might lead to the explosion of a new conflict. They did not want to risk experiencing 
once more the violence that had already pushed them outside of Kosovo the first time. 
Drita thought that Kosovo was not very safe at the time of the interview but that until 
international forces were deployed there the situation was more or less under control. 
She worried about possible security problems the moment KFOR would leave. She said 
that the fact that some Serbs were still in Kosovo was not reassuring for her, since, has 
she put it, "their head is the same, these people do not change" . 
"Adesso la situazione in Kosovo non e molto sicura, rna almeno fino a quando 
ci sono quelli della NATO e un po' sotto controllo. Ma dobbiamo pensare 
che un giorno andranno via ed e questo che mi preoccupa. Ci so no ancora 
dei Serbi in Kosovo, io Ii conosco quelli! La loro testa e la stessa di prima 
della guerra, questa gente non cambia. Dio sa che puo succedere!" Drita (F, 
30+, m, arr:1994, factory worker) 
Those Kosovar Albanians who came from areas where they were still a minority, those 
of mixed ethnicity or in a mixed marriage, and those who were suspected of being 
collaborators of the Serbs had specific fear for their safety in Kosovo and, as explained 
earlier, their worries were recognised by the UNHCR and UNMIK that considered them 
to be particular targets of persecution. 
For everyone I interviewed, staying in the country of exile meant living in a safe envi-
ronment with no fear for the present or the future. 
"Here we are safe. Nobody is coming after us because of who we are. If 
we keep out of trouble we are left in peace. There are so many people 
from different nationalities here and being Albanian does not mean troubles 
anymore." Zenel (M, 40+, m, arr:1999, unemployed) 
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Some people were concerned about racism in exile, but overall the likelihood of racist 
attacks in the UK or Italy was very small compared to the risks they would run in 
Kosovo. Jetmir was worried about the anti-immigration agenda of the Italian Northern 
League and pointed out that being a Southerner, I should be in a position to understand 
what he was talking about. He said that in order to avoid troubles they tried to keep 
a low profile not to attract attention, but that this did not compare to the fear and 
continuous tensions they would face in Kosovo because of the Serbs, other Albanians 
from different political parties or, simply, criminals. 
"Qui abbiamo paura della Lega Nord. Sono razzisti, ce l'hanno contro gli 
immigrati, stranieri e anche quelli del Sud Italia, 10 sai bene anche tu! Allora 
cerchiamo di non dare nell'occhio e non attirare attenzione. Ma in Kossovo 
e diverso, la dobbiamo preoccuparci ogni momento dei Serbi e altri Albanesi 
di partiti politici diversi e anche dei criminali." Jetmir (M, 40+, m, arr:1995, 
unemployed) 
Obviously, in the UK, the refugees who were worried about deportation did not feel safe. 
"In Kosovo we were living in fear everyday. We came here to be safe, we are 
not criminals. And here we are living in fear again, waiting for them to send 
us back." Juliana (F, 30+, m, arr:1999, unemployed) 
9.4.2 Economic conditions and infrastructures 
Other important factors that discouraged people from going back were the badly dam-
aged infrastructures and the poor economic conditions of Kosovo. 
Many respondents had lost their houses in Kosovo and felt they could not start con-
sidering return until their house was rebuilt or, at least, until they had saved enough 
money to do so. Having lost the house in Kosovo was clearly holding back many people 
who felt that they could not go back unless they had rebuilt their property and had a 
place they could call home. Arjan said that his family was working very hard in Italy 
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to be able to save enough money to use to rebuild their house so that, as soon as it was 
safe for them, they could return. He explained that they would not qualify for external 
grants since they were working in Italy and, therefore, it was all up to them. 
"Sto lavorando qui, la mia famiglia, 0 meglio quello che e rimasto della mia 
famiglia, sta lavorando tanto per mettere dei soldi da parte per ricostruire 
la nostra casa e tornare non appena la situazione e pili sicura per noi. Vedi, 
siccome, siamo qui e lavoriamo, non ci possono dare contributi per la casa 
in Kosovo, ci dobbiamo pensare noi." Arjan (M, 20+, s, arr:1998, factory 
worker) 
Since houses were purposely destroyed during violent attacks, often under their own eyes, 
while some of their relatives were killed, raped, beaten or expelled, for many Kosovar 
Albanians rebuilding the house was not only a matter of necessity, but also a part of 
the grieving process and a sign of personal resilience. Ermal and his ninety years old 
grandmother showed me the pictures of their house before and after the war. The old 
lady held back her tears and smiled when pointing at the picture of their beautiful house 
and the flower filled garden of the two first pictures. Ermal explained that those were the 
only pictures of the house before the war that they had managed to save. The garden 
was the family's favourite place and every Sunday they used to take care of it together 
under the directions of his grandfather. He was shot in that same garden during the 
war. When we looked at the pictures of the house and the garden totally destroyed, 
they were both very distressed and Ermal said that though they kept looking at those 
pictures all the time, they could just not get used to them. They felt it was their duty 
to go back as soon as possible, rebuild the house and replant the garden in memory of 
his grandfather, but his grandmother was worried that she would not live long enough 
to see it. 
Public services were also a reason for concern for respondents, with the main problems 
being the poor conditions of the health services and schools. 
"My youngest son is going to school here, the teachers are fantastic and the 
school is very good. He is doing very well and at the end of his first year 
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he was already at the level of the other students. He had a hard time when 
he was a child during the war in Kosovo, and if we have to go back now I 
worry about his mental health and his education. The situation is not safe 
at all and the schools are really too basic there." Stela (F, 50+, m, arr:1999, 
unemployed) 
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The poor economy added further doubts to the possibility of return. Refugees were 
worried because many of them knew that they would have no jobs to go back to if they 
returned. Edlira was trying to advise other Kosovar Albanians not to return because 
she thought that it was not the time to return yet since there was not a state they could 
trust in Kosovo; to make it possible to return they would need a stable accountable 
State, a different environment and a job. 
"10 10 dieo a tutti: rna dove andate? Non e tempo di tornare. Non c' e uno 
stato di cui potersi fidare. Per tornare ci vuole prima uno stato stabile ed 
affidabile, un clima diverso e un lavoro." Edlira (F, 18, s, arr:1992, student) 
The idea of going back and not being able to make a living and provide for their own 
needs represented a great obstacle to return for both those who were satisfied with their 
life in exile and those who were not. For example, Alban was satisfied with his job and 
his life in the UK and wanted to stay: 
"There is no job in Kosovo to go back to, 60% of the people are unemployed. 
Here I have a good job, it gives me enough to live and support my family. 
I am even saving to rebuild the house in Kosovo. I have my dignity, there 
what do I do? How do I buy food for my kids?" Alban (:Nl, 20+, m, arr:1999, 
student) 
On the contrary, Saimir was not happy with the life of his family in Italy, but nevertheless 
he thought it was better than in Kosovo where they had no house left and no job to go 
back to. In any case, even if they found a job, salaries were too low while prices were as 
high as in Italy. 
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"Questa non e vita, non viviamo bene qua! Mi piacerebbe tornare perche 
cosl non e bello vivere! Ma la situazine in Kosovo non e buona ancora. Non 
abbiamo casa, illavoro non si trova e se si trova la paga e troppo bassa e la 
vita e cara come qua." Saimir (M, 30+, m, arr:1991, shepherd) 
Overall, people were disappointed with the little progress the economy in Kosovo had 
made and blamed the international community and UNMIK for it. One of the leaders 
of the community explained that the vast majority of those who returned permanently, 
or for a visit, expected that with the help of the international community Kosovo could 
become, as he put it, 'the Switzerland of the Balkans'. They felt that more money 
should have been invested in the reconstruction of the infrastructure and in support of 
business that could create job opportunities. People believed that the bureaucracy of 
the international organisations was 'swallowing' all the money: 
"They (employees of international organisations) have extraordinary salaries, 
expensive cars and satellite phones! Our people are starving and living 
thanks to our help as usual. If we join them and return, who is going to 
send us money?" Mitat (M, 40+, s, arr:1998, unemployed) 
Those refugees who had completed further education, whether in Kosovo or in exile, 
thought they would have good chances to find employment if they returned, while those 
who had not studied and had limited skills felt they would not find a job. 
Denisa claimed that working in Kosovo for her and her husband would not be that 
difficult because they were educated people and both international organisations and 
newly born local institutions would need them, however, according to her for uneducated 
people finding employment in Kosovo was really hard. In fact, Idlir felt that because of 
his lack of education he would definitely be unemployed in Kosovo. 
"Ho solo la licenza elementare, se torno resto di sicuro disoccupato." Idlir 
(M, 20+, s, arr:1994, factory worker) 
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Some refugees had also tried to find investors in the country of exile willing to start doing 
business in Kosovo; Jetmir said that with 1,000,000 liras they could start up a factory 
there, but though people showed interest in the possibility, the security problems, the 
instability of Kosovo and the lack of developed infrastructure stopped them from going 
ahead. 
At this point, the three main reasons indicated by interviewees for not returning to 
Kosovo are very practical ones, lack of security, lack of adequate infrastructure and 
lack of employment opportunities. These leads us towards two observations: first, that 
these are relatively measurable factors that allow refugees to evaluate the costs and 
benefits of staying in exile or returning and decide what option is most convenient on 
this basis. However, the data also show that this is not always the case as other factors 
play an important role in the decision-making process either way, so that some people 
might return even if Kosovo for them is less safe than the country of exile, while others 
exclude returning a priori regardless of these factors; second, these factors could change 
and conditions could improve, therefore we might assume that if the security problem 
was solved, infrastructure were satisfactorily restored and employment opportunities 
increased notably, more refugees should tend to prefer return over settlement, but again 
the data indicate that this is not always the case. Below I examine these two points in 
more detail, relating them to the result of the interviews with respect to questions on 
the sense of 'duty' to return, the feeling towards a place to call 'home' and the long-term 
plan for the future of the refugees. 
9.4.3 Return: a sense of duty 
Given the cause of the Kosovar Albanian population asking for the right to be in and 
govern in Kosovo, the general commitment of the Diaspora to support the cause, the 
experience of expulsion and ethnic cleansing, there was a widespread assumption by 
the international community that return to Kosovo was what all the refugees wanted. 
I asked my repsondents whether they thought they had a 'duty' to return and their 
answers varied according to their experiences and circumstance. 
The leaders of the community and those refugees who were actively engaged in politics 
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felt that it was their duty to return, though they thought that the right moment for 
them had not come yet, both for personal reasons and for what they could still contribute 
to the cause from abroad. Behar affirmed with an authoritative tone that all Kosovar 
Albanians feel a duty to return and added that they learnt their nationalism from the 
Serbs. 
"Tutti noi Kosovari sentiamo un dovere forte di tornare. Abbiamo imparato 
dai Serbia a essere nazionalisti." Behar (M, 30+, m, arr:1991, construction 
si te manager) 
However, this was not what all the respondents thought. There was another category 
of people who felt a stronger duty to return than others. These were some of those 
refugees who felt their specific professional skills could have been of great help to the 
reconstruction of Kosovo and the wellbeing of its populations. In many cases, these 
were among the first categories of people who proactively decided to return, at times 
disregarding their own personal risks and their family situation. For example, Stela's 
husband who is a doctor returned as soon as possible despite the fact that all his family 
remained in the UK and that his wife and his younger child could not return because 
she was considered a collaborator of the Serbian regime. 
"When my husband heard on the Kosovar television that the country was 
praying for doctors to go back he went to aDA and asked to be sent back and 
left in September 1999. After thirty years of marriage we were separated! I 
understand him, his job is not normal, is more like a mission. He said when 
it is safe we can join him. That moment has not come, it is not safe." Stela 
(F, 50+, m, arr:1999, unemployed) 
Some of those who were in this position but had not returned yet felt guilty about 
it. This is the case of Arjan who is a nurse. He considered it a duty for those in his 
profession to contribute to the cause and felt guilty about not having joined the KLA 
first, and postponing his return now. In both cases, he said he knew he could have been 
very helpful, but he did not want to risk his life. 
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"Mi sento in colpa, non solo non sono andato con l'UCK, rna adesso sono 
ancora qua. Come infermiere sarei stato veramente utile all'UCK e adesso 
gli ospedali che hanno ricominciato a funzionare hanno bisogno. Ma io non 
me la sento di rischiare la vita cosl." Arjan (M, 20+, s, arr:1998, factory 
worker) 
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Others, in this position had gone through different emotional stages to understand what 
to do, but had come to terms with the fact that the ultimate moral duty imposed by 
their profession was that of helping other human beings regardless of their nationality. 
"Thanks to counseling I realised that what matters for me is to do something 
constructive for society but it doesn't matter where I do it." Orner (M, 30+, 
m, arr:1990, engineer) 
The respondents who said that they did not consider return as a duty were people who 
did not feel a strong attachment to the national group and saw themselves as citizens 
of the world, or some of those who had been victims of violence before the flight. 
In the first case, these were generally younger people who had been concerned about 
human rights abuses against Kosovar Albanians during the war and cared about the 
future of Kosovo, but did not give predominant importance to their national identity. 
In the second case, the respondents had been victims of violence or had witnessed the 
killing of their families and friends, and thought that they had already paid the highest 
price for the national cause. They felt they had the right to attempt to rebuild their 
lives elsewhere. For example, this was the case of Tonin who had reached his brother in 
Italy after he had managed to escape the massacre of his entire village. Over 150 people 
were killed under his eyes and just talking about it was causing him terrible distress. 
Since the war ended he had gone back to Kosovo once, to bury some of his relatives 
whose bodies had been found. Going back for him was hard, seeing the place of the 
massacre again brought all memories back and he decided that he could never return 
there for good and go through the same pain every day. He felt his family had already 
paid a very high price during the war and now he had the right to try to have a new 
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life. He was still mourning and had nightmares every night, but at least in the morning 
he woke up to his new life. 
"Quando sono tornato ho rivisto tutta la scena, tutti i morti. Non potrei 
mai tornare e rivivere ogni giorno questo dolore. La mia famiglia ha pagato 
un prezzo troppo alto per questa guerra, ora io ho il diritto di cercare di 
ricominciare. Ho ancora incubi ogni notte, rna almeno la mattina quando 
apro gli occhi ho davanti la mia nuova vita." Tonin (M, 20+, s, arr:1999, 
builder) 
Overall, the sense of duty to return depended on the refugees' commitment to the 
political cause of the Albanian population of Kosovo, their profession and their personal 
experience. 
9.4.4 Feeling at home 
Respondents gave three different answers when I asked them to explain where they felt 
their home was: for some it was Kosovo, for others the UK or Italy were their new home, 
for the rest it was both Kosovo and the UK or Italy. 
Different people said that Kosovo was their home and gave different reasons for it. We 
can roughly distinguish three main groups: politically active refugees, elderly people 
and people not fully integrated in the country of exile. 
The respondents who were politically active and involved with the cause said that Kosovo 
was home, independently of their personal background, their status and conditions in 
exile. 
"I am really fine here, but home is in Kosovo. That is what I have been 
fighting for and living for, to protect my home." Jalal (M, 40+, m, arr:1996, 
shop assistant) 
For the elderly people who struggled to adapt to life in the country of exile Kosovo was 
undoubtedly their home. They hoped to go back as soon as possible and they wished to 
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die and be buried there. Ermal's grandmother spent all day talking about 'home' and 
she hoped to be able to live long enough to go back and die in Kosovo. An old man in 
the UK told me: 
"Home? At the moment it is here, but to die it is there!" Agim (M, 80+, 
m, arr:1999, retired) 
Kosovo was home also for those people who were not fully integrated in the society of 
the country of exile, who could not speak the language very well, did not have a job or a 
well-developed social network, and for those whose standards of life in exile were lower 
than the ones they had in Kosovo before the war. These refugees felt that they did not 
belong in the UK or Italy and considered Kosovo as their only home. 
Home was either the country of exile or both Kosovo and the UK/Italy for the majority 
of the refugees who left Kosovo in their childhood or early youth and grew up in exile, 
the respondents who had decided that they did not want to return to live to Kosovo at 
any time in the future and those Kosovar Albanians who were integrated in the UK or 
Italy. 
"In this country (UK) I have had the worst and the best time of my life, I 
was so young when I arrived! I belong here, this is my home. Here is where 
I became a man." Drin (M, 30+, m, arr:1992, social worker) 
Edlira was only six when her family escaped to Italy, she knows Kosovo through the 
memories of her parents, the news and the few visits she has managed to make. She 
wished she could have spent her childhood there like her mother. She feels strongly 
about her Kosovar Albanian identity, but she feels that she does not belong there. She 
claimed that Kosovar society is not very liberal with young people, especially girls, and 
she prefers to stay in Italy were she feels free to do whatever she wants. She did not 
exclude return completely though, her words were "Never say never!". 
For others, understanding where 'home' is was a difficult journey. This was the case of 
those people who had been in exile for a long time focusing their lives on the homeland 
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project in Kosovo and their eventual return, but realised,that they did not belong there 
anymore when they finally got the chance to go and visit. The experience of exile had 
changed them without them realising, the memory of Kosovo did not correspond to the 
new reality they saw and their conationals did not respond to their return in the way 
they expected them to. One interviewee more than others, among similar cases, opened 
herself to the point of explaining the mental shock and disoriented feeling that came 
from realising that 'home' is no longer 'home'. Denisa had left Kosovo in the early 1990s 
and had managed to go back for a visit two weeks after NATO's bombing campaign 
ended and stayed for three months. During her six years in the UK she had thought 
about doing and learning things that she could then use in Kosovo when she returned. 
Her urge to go was so strong that she went so soon even though she knew it was still 
very dangerous. However, after the first couple of weeks she begun to realise that it was 
not what she expected. 
"Everyone was telling me the story of what they had been through; I heard 
those stories one hundred times all over again! At one point I started to resent 
them because they never asked about me and what I had been through in 
exile, the hard times, the fear, the anxiety! I felt we were rejected because 
we were seen as those who had left and did not see the atrocity happening. 
Our suffering abroad did not count. I also felt my good intention to return 
and try to set up a business there was not welcome. They told me that I had 
to stay in London because I had a good job there. 'You escaped the worst 
time and now you come back and with your good English you are going to 
take jobs away from us?' It was a shock; the people I had worried about for 
so long rejected me." Denisa (F, 30+, s, arr:1990, beautician) 
Denisa came back from her visit disoriented and felt the need to go for a visit another 
time in the hope that, with the situation improving, things would change for her. Not 
only this did not happen, but she also realised that she would not be happy there because 
exile had changed her. 
"In London I am an independent young woman. I am single, I work and 
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support myself, have a social life and freedom. During my visits (to Kosovo) 
I understood that it is still hard for a 29 year old single woman with my 
degree of independency to live in that society and be respected. When I 
came back from my last trip I was even more in shock. I had lived all those 
years in London considering Kosovo to be my home and thinking of going 
back, now I knew it was not possible I couldn't go on living torn between two 
places. I fell into depression and finally went to counseling. It is only thanks 
to counseling that I have accepted that this is my home now." Denisa (F, 
30+, s, arr:1990, beautician) 
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For some of the people who considered themselves to be well integrated in the society of 
the country of exile but felt also a strong attachment to Kosovo, 'home' was both Kosovo 
and the UK or Italy. This was more often the case in Italy though, where given the 
circumstances, such as the kind of residence permit refugees had and the geographical 
vicinity to Kosovo, people had managed to keep a closer relation with the country of 
origin over the years as explained in the chapter on settlement. Drita explained that 
their family's life was divided between Italy and Kosovo and, therefore, she felt at home 
in both places. She said that if one day she will return to Kosovo, part of her will remain 
in Italy. 
"La nostra vita e divisa in due, un pochino in Kosovo, un pochino qui. Mi 
sento a casa sia qua che la, rna se un giorno tornero per sempre in Kosovo, 
una parte del mio spirito rimarra qua di sicuro." Drita (F, 30+, m, arr:1994, 
factory worker) 
Another refugee gave me an example of the way he felt referring to the television adver-
tisement of a vanilla and chocolate ice-cream whose slogan, in a funny anglicised Italian, 
was "Two gust is is megli che one!", two tastes are better than one. He felt that having 
two places to call home was an advantage in his life as he could try to get the best out 
of both countries. 
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9.4.5 Plans for the future 
Respondents had different views about their future, some refugees had made plans and 
established goals to achieve, others felt they could not have long-term projects and lived 
day by day. Making plans for the future was difficult for those refugees who were still 
waiting for a decision on their asylum claims and feared deportation. They felt their 
future was in the hands of the government of the country of exile. They wished to be 
able to stay in the UK or Italy and manage to rebuild their lives. Some of them tried 
to think about what to do in case they would be allowed to stay or forced to leave. 
"If we will be able to stay here, my husband (who was in Kosovo) will come 
to visit us three times per year and try to retire in five years to join us. If we 
can't stay we have to move to a different country, because we cannot go back 
to Kosovo. Maybe Macedonia, if the situation gets better there, or France. 
You see, my daughter lives there." Stela (F, 50+, m, arr:1999, unemployed) 
The refugees who had decided that they would never return to Kosovo and had a stable 
position in the UK or Italy planned for their life there, making various plans about 
work, study, family, etc .. The refugees who hoped to return to Kosovo as soon as the 
conditions would allow them to, were trying to save money to be able to rebuild their 
house and start some kind of activities that could support them after return. They were 
not sure about when this might be possible, but they felt they had to be prepared for it. 
Floresha said that they had already bought a piece of land in Kosovo in order to build 
a house there because they hoped to be able to go one day. She thought that it was a 
matter of years before they could be able to feel safe again in Kosovo, but they wanted 
to be ready for that moment. 
"Abbiamo comprato un pezzo di terra vicino a Prishtina e abbiamo inten-
zione di costruire una casa lao Speriamo di poter andare un giorno, rna 
passeranno degli anni prima di sentirci al sicuro completamente lao La situ-
azione politica si deve stabilizzare prima. Ma meglio essere pronti." Floresha 
(F, 40+, m, arr:1998, factory worker) 
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The refugees who felt they belonged to both places, Kosovo and the UK or Italy, imagined 
their future divided between the two. Generally, they considered the country of exile as 
their main place of residence and planned to go to Kosovo as often as possible and start 
investing there as soon as conditions improved. This was more common in Italy were 
many refugees had already lived a transnational existence over the years, they planned 
and wished to be able to continue to do so even in the future. Drita explained that her 
family wanted to rebuild the house in Kosovo because they might return to Kosovo one 
day, but they also wanted to keep their house in Italy considering that their children 
were growing up there and might need it. She said that their friends would all be in 
Italy and that they wished they could go to university there. She saw the future split 
between the two places. 
"N oi vogliamo ricostruire la casa in Kosovo, rna vogliamo tenere la casa 
anche qui. Vedi, noi magari un giorno si ritorna pure, rna i bambini stanno 
crescendo qui, la casa puo servire a loro. Fra qualche anno avranno tutti 
gli amici qui e poi vogliamo mandarli all'universita. Qui ho gia chiesto e mi 
dicono che siamo fortunati perche l'universita e una delle migliori d'Italia. 
Insomma, il futuro 10 vedo un po' qua, un po' la." Drita (F, 30+, m, arr:1994, 
factory worker) 
In conclusion, refugees' attitudes towards return and their plans for the future depended 
on their legal position and their level of integration in the country of exile, on the 
conditions in the country of origin and their personal background. These in turn were 
linked to the time of the flight, the reception, integration and repatriation policies of 
the country of exile, their relationship with the conflict in the country of origin, the 
post-war situation of Kosovo and its reconstruction. 
9.5 Understanding return 
This comparative study of Kosovar Albanian refugees in the UK and Italy has enabled 
me to analyse the impact of two different exile contexts and asylum policies OIl the 
settlement and return of a group of refugees who escaped from the same conflict. 
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The findings reinforce the idea that, despite the refugees' similar background, the dif-
ferent context in the countries of exile has a great influence on the choices available to 
them when settling and when deciding about return. The geographical position of the 
country of exile, the position of its government vis-a.-vis the conflict, its asylum policies 
and the public views on refugees in general, and on the specific conflict in particular, are 
among the most influential factors in exile. For example, in the case of Kosovar Albani-
ans, the refugees who were politically active were more likely to be able to fully engage 
with their homeland project in Italy. There, they settled mostly with work permits 
that allowed them to travel to meet other members of the Diaspora abroad and, given 
also the geographical proximity of the two places, go back to Kosovo for quick visits. 
For many refugees, this led the foundation of a transnational existence which is their 
current choice as opposed to return or local integration. On the contrary, in the UK, 
the prolonged condition of being an asylum seeker restricted the possibility to travel to 
other countries to meet other members of the Diaspora and, together with the distance 
between the UK and Kosovo, made even short visits to the country of origin impossible. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that many refugees who were politically committed to 
the cause had more difficulties in continuing their interaction with the conflict and with 
society in Kosovo over the years and, in some cases, felt like strangers when they finally 
managed to visit. 
Another factor contributing to the decision of refugees on return is the condition of the 
country of exile at the end of the conflict. The study of the Kosovo case has highlighted 
the importance of the post-war context in the country of exile for both countries of 
origin and refugees. On the one hand, refugees' chances to decide about return and 
their decision itself were influenced by the position of the country of exile in relation to 
the post-war conditions in Kosovo. For example, the political claim that Kosovo was a 
safe country had serious consequences for the evaluation of asylum claims and appeals 
and had an impact also on the government's policies on the end of temporary protection 
and repatriation. On the other hand, their choice was also influenced by the level of 
security and stability in the country of origin, the conditions of the infrastructures and 
the economy which can encourage or discourage return. 
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These findings indicate the relevance of both, the country of exile factors and the country 
of origin factors, in refugees' decision to return. However, this should not mislead us to 
believing that refugees' choice on return is limited to a costs-benefits evaluation of the 
conditions in these two contexts or to thinking that both the country of exile and the 
country of origin exercise a deterministic impact on their choice. 
9.5.1 A Rational Choice? 
In Chapter :3 of this thesis, I claimed that in order to understand refugees' decision-
making processes on return, the current models available based on rational choice the-
ory cannot explain the whole complexity of the issue. The results of the interviews 
with refugees show that while there are practical measurable factors that influence the 
refugees' decision-making process (the level of security, the economic conditions, the 
state of the infrastructures) there is also an important range of other factors that at 
times can have an even more influential weight in the process (political commitment, 
sense of duty, fear, sense of belonging, etc.). The findings of this research confirm that 
an approach based solely on rational choice theory does not adequately explain the many 
cases in which refugees seem to choose against any 'rational' costs-benefits analysis. A 
good example is that of doctors wanting to return out of a sense of duty despite the 
possibility to remain in exile and the highly dangerous situation they might find in the 
country of origin. The results also reinforce the idea that refugees cannot be considered 
like labour migrants when examining return as I argued through the literature review 
in Chapter 3. They emphasize that many relevant factors influencing their decision and 
attitudes towards return are particular to the condition of the refugee, like the political 
commitment for the national cause pushing them to return or the fear of a new escalation 
of violence that refrains them from going. 
9.5.2 Freedom and constraints 
In Chapters 3 and 4, I argued for the benefits of researching refugees' decision on return 
within the context of the interaction between structure and agency, using Archer's ana-
lytical dualism and morphogenetic approach in order to explore the interaction between 
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the refugees, the country of origin and the country of exile. The views on choice, freedom 
and constraint suggested by this approach enabled me to analyse refugee policies and 
other structural factors influencing refugees' choice on return as possible enablement or 
constraint to their projects and this has shown to be an effective way of highlighting the 
ways in which different refugees respond to similar conditions. For instance, Explore and 
Prepare visits and repatriation programmes, despite their pitfalls, have represented an 
enablement for the refugees who wanted to return and could find some level of support 
in these schemes; however, they represented an obstacle to those who wanted to remain 
since governments often used these programmes as an alternative to deportation, stress-
ing that it was time for them to go and showing to the public that refugees were given 
a 'choice'. In practice, this was not a choice about returning or remaining in exile at 
all, but only a choice about the way to travel back to Kosovo. On the other hand, good 
settlement policies and a stable status, enabled people to make a 'freer' choice about 
return and opened new options for them, such as the possibility to live a transnational 
existence between the two countries. 
The context for the choice itself emerges from the interaction between country of exile, 
country of origin and refugees throughout the whole experience of exile, from the early 
moment of the flight to the moment the decision is taken, and influences also the kind of 
'choice' refugees have to make about return. In the thesis I used the distinction suggested 
by Kunz (1973) between anticipatory and acute refugees in order to understand the 
impact of the whole exile experience on return, which has offered a useful tool for 
exploring these relations in the case of Kosovar Albanian refugees. In Chapter 5, 6 
and 7, I related his typology to flight and settlement. I explained that anticipatory 
Kosovar Albanian refugees escaped for fear of persecution before the violence of the 
conflict escalated and in most cases they were politically committed to the cause of 
Kosovo. The time of their flight determined the moment they arrived in the country of 
exile and, therefore, the kind of asylum system they found. In addition, their political 
commitment to the cause of Kosovar Albanians and their personal background influenced 
the way in which they interacted with the country of exile. By the end of the war, when 
repatriation programmes started, they had spent a relatively long time in exile and, 
therefore, many of them had achieved a stable legal position and a satisfactory degree 
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of integration. This implied that they had all the options in relation to return at their 
disposal: continuing their life in the country of exile, return or attempting to live a 
transnational existence. 
Acute refugees, on the other hand, left Kosovo in order to escape the immediate danger 
brought by the escalation of the violence and the war. In the vast majority of cases, they 
fled to safety in a neighbouring country and many of them migrated further to a different 
one, either independently or through the evacuation programme. In both cases, they 
arrived in the UK and Italy when the government was either beginning to get involved 
with the situation in Kosovo or was already supporting NATO's bombing campaign. As 
with anticipatory refugees, the time of their flight determined the moment they entered 
the country of exile and the kind of protection they obtained, which in the vast majority 
of cases was temporary protection. When the war ended repatriation programmes were 
organised with the scope to send them back. They had spent a relatively short time 
in exile and, given the kind of protection they received, they were less likely to have 
achieved a satisfactory degree of integration. In practical terms, they had a limited 
choice in relation to return. They could submit an asylum claim, return 'voluntarily' or 
risk deportation. Given the low acceptance rate of asylum applications from Kosovar 
Albanians after the end of the war, this often meant that they did not have a choice 
about whether to stay or return, but only about the way to return. 
Given this context it is clear that as far as the possibility of choosing to remain or to 
return is concerned, refugees who have a stable position in the country of exile and 
a satisfactory level of integration also have more possibilities to remain if they chose 
to, therefore, their choice to return is not influenced by the impossibility or perceived 
difficulty to do otherwise. On the contrary, refugees who have an unstable legal position 
in the country of exile and have not achieved a satisfactory level of integration are more 
likely to be confronted by a limited set of options when deciding whether to stay or to 
return. This makes it more difficult to understand whether they are returning because 
they could not do otherwise or because they want to. I clarify that the above conclusions 
only explain the way in which the general experience of exile leads to different kinds of 
choice with regard to return, but do not assume that all refugees belonging to the first 
318 Chapter 9 Refugees and Return: choices in context 
group do not repatriate or that all refugees in the second group oppose return. 
In order to explain the way in which refugees relate to these possibilities and understand 
their choice, Archer's distinction between Person, Actor and Agency indicated that we 
can study refugee repatriation decision-making processes at level of the Actor and the 
Agency and attempt to construct models that could predict certain patterns of behavior, 
but that, however, we cannot explain how within the same group of agents, two actors 
occupying similar roles take opposite decisions. With a sociological study of this kind, it 
is possible to claim that refugees who are committed to the homeland project are more 
likely to feel a duty to return and do so as soon as possible, but we cannot explain why 
two people who have witnessed the massacre of their families will be influenced by this 
experience in a different way, with one person not feeling able to return and live in the 
place where the atrocities happened, and the other wishing to return, rebuild and honor 
the victims with his/her resilience. 
These are the differences that the human person brings to the choice and suggest that 
ultimately the focus should be on providing human beings with enough support to fulfill 
their projects, whatever these are. 
9.5.3 Using the morphogenetic approach to study return 
So far I have highlighted some of the main benefits of studying refugees' decision on 
return within the structure and agency debate, using analytical dualism and Archer's 
morphogenetic approach. Here I point at some further advantages and some of the 
difficulties this has implied in order to inform future research on repatriation . 
As explained earlier in the thesis, Archer's analytical dualism is the foundation of the 
development of a three-part cycle composed of: structural 'conditioning' at stage TI, 
where a given structure conditions, but does not determine, the social interaction taking 
place at stage T2. At stage T2 this social interaction takes place because of actions 
oriented towards the realisation of the interests and needs of current agents and results 
in either structural elaboration (morphogenesis) or reproduction (morphostasis) at stage 
T3. 
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When researching refugee issues the picture is more complex because two different struc-
tural contexts have to be examined, the country of exile and the country of origin. The 
morphogenetic cycle begins at stage Tl when refugees, as the result of their interac-
tion with the conflict, flee from the country of origin and arrive in the country of exile. 
There they find an asylum and immigration system which is the result of previous mor-
phogenetic/static cycles of refugees and migrants interacting with the structures of the 
country of exile. At stage T2 refugees interact directly with the policies and the environ-
ment in the country of exile (understanding how the system works, trying to understand 
how to settle, etc.) and interact from a distance with the conflict in the country of origin 
(by setting up parallel government structures in exile, sending remittances, supporting 
the military organisations, raising the profile of their cause, etc.). At stage T3 we can 
have morphogenesis and/or morphostasis in both contexts. For example, in the country 
of exile the interaction can lead to a change in the asylum system or to the maintenance 
of general public views on refugees while in the country of exile this can contribute to a 
complete or partial regime change or the maintenance of the status quo. 
This makes the application of this methodology all the more difficult as two parallel 
cycles need to be considered. Moreover, in practical terms, when researching refugee 
issues and analysing different waves of refugees we are faced with the overlap of different 
temporal cycles. On the one hand, this complicates the picture even further, but on the 
other hand, it also enables the researcher to capture the inevitable complexity of the 
phenomenon. This has been the case when differentiating between the interaction of 
different waves of Kosovar Albanian refugees, both in the UK and Italy, with the exile 
context. 
Given the need to analyse the interaction between refugees and two structural con-
texts the one in exile and the one in the country of origin, Archer's concept of double-
, 
morphogenesis becomes a 'triple morphogenesis' in refugee issues. This is the process 
by which people bring about social transformation in both contexts they interact with 
and which is, at the same time, responsible for the systematic transformation of their 
agency. This idea of triple morphogenesis has especially helped understanding the ways 
in which: the experience of receiving and hosting refugees has or has not changed the 
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country of exile, the experience of interacting with the exile community and returnees 
has or has not changed the country of origin and the experience of exile has or has not 
changed refugees. 
The interaction between Kosovar Albanian refugees and the country of exile has strength-
ened the idea of repatriation as the best solution to refugee displacement. The fact that 
Kosovar Albanians have returned relatively early to Kosovo has been used as a way to 
demonstrate that all refugees want to return and that repatriation is the best solution. It 
has also reinforced the idea that temporary forms of protection can serve two purposes: 
showing solidarity and high moral standard by offering refuge to people in need, while 
guaranteeing that they will not stay. Obviously, this view of repatriation has emerged 
in spite of the refugees' efforts to resist deportation (in the UK), the doubtful conditions 
under which they were asked to return 'voluntarily' and the clear fact that few of the 
refugees who had a stable position in exile took part in the repatriation schemes sup-
ported by governments. In the UK, following the model used with Kosovar Albanians, 
a similar repatriation scheme has been used with Afghan refugees. Following military 
intervention in Afghanistan and the fall of the Taliban regime in late 2001, Britain 
stopped granting refugee status to Afghans. They were offered a repatriation scheme 
which started in April 2002 and lasted for six-months which was followed by forcible 
repatriation, for those who did not decide to go 'voluntarily'. A similar situation has 
more recently developed for Iraqi refugees as well. 
The refugees' interaction with the conflict has contributed to the change of regime. Their 
work to support financially the community in Kosovo, their political initiatives, both 
non-violent and military ones, the efforts to bring the issue to the top of the international 
political agenda have all contributed to a change of scenario in Kosovo. 
The experience of exile and the interaction with the country of exile and the country 
of origin has changed refugees as social actors and as agents, in Archer's sense, as 
collectivities sharing similar life chances. I have presented some example of refugees 
whose lives changed because of the different situations they found themselves in when in 
exile. The changing experience of women interacting with the British society who became 
more empowered and independent or the instance of those refugees whose education and 
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career plans were transformed by the lack of opportunities in Italy are good examples. 
The interaction with the country of exile and Kosovo has also changed Kosovar Albanians 
as collectivities. An example is that of the Kosovar Albanian refugee community in Italy 
which has undergone a change in the mode of settlement. This was a community whose 
life in Italy developed along the terms set out by Joly's Odyssean type. They were 
actively involved with the cause in Kosovo and settled focusing on the pursuit of their 
homeland project. As I explained in Chapter 7, conditions in Italy were favourable to 
this project as their official position of 'economic migrants' gave them the chance to 
travel, return to Kosovo for quick visits and meet with other members of the community 
abroad. However, despite the end of the war and the withdrawal of Serbian forces from 
Kosovo, the area is still unstable and the future is uncertain. Therefore, they have now 
realised that return is not an immediate option for them and that being in Italy allows 
them to live a transnational existence. This has changed their mode of settlement and 
they have now begun to direct their attention to improving conditions for the community 
in Italy, while continuing to get involved with the situation in Kosovo. This suggests 
the emergence of a new type along Joly's Rubicon and Odyssean, which I call Janusian, 
whose settlement is oriented towards both improving conditions in exile and pursuing 
their project of society in the country of origin. 
In conclusion, this thesis represents one of the first attempts to apply this methodology 
to a specific research issue and the first effort to use this framework in the study of refugee 
issues. Both the complexity of the methodology and the complexity of the research topic 
make its application all the more difficult, however, this study has proved some of the 
advantages of this approach in refugee studies and encourages further attempts. 
9.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter I focused on different issues which are relevant to the study of refugees' 
attitudes towards return. I began with an overview of Kosovo post-war conditions and 
the official position of the UNHCR and UNMIK on the return of Kosovar Albanian 
refugees. I then analysed the position of the UK and Italian governments on Kosovar 
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Albanians' return focusing on the options available to temporarily protected refugees 
at the end of protection and the return schemes set up for them. Having explained 
conditions for return in both the country of origin and the country of exile I, then, 
explored the attitudes of the refugees I interviewed in both countries vis-a.-vis return. I 
focused on the general reasons for postponing or excluding return, their sense of duty 
and responsibility towards Kosovo, their sense of belonging and their future plans. In 
the final part of the chapter, I provided a general summary and a further analysis of the 
findings of the comparative case study of Kosovar Albanian refugees in the UK and Italy 
in relation to the general debate on the factors that influence their decision about return 
and drew some conclusions that can inform repatriation research in a wider context. I 
avoid here a further summary of these conclusions, since it is dealt with in the next, 
final chapter of the thesis. 
Chapter 10 
Summary and Contributions 
10.1 Summary 
In recent years refugee repatriation has moved to the fore of the debate on appropri-
ate solutions to the issues of asylum and immigration. Governments have increasingly 
promoted it as the 'ideal' solution for refugees, representing it as their inherent wish. 
They have used such rhetoric to justify the imposition of increasingly more restrictive 
asylum and immigration policies, which typically leave refugees with little choice but to 
repatriate. 
Within this context, in this thesis I examined refugees' attitudes towards return and 
investigated the factors that influence their decision-making process in order to probe 
the validity of the assumption that all refugees want to return and identify the optimal 
conditions under which refugees can decide whether to return or remain in the country 
of exile. 
In order to set the background for this study, I began the thesis with a brief overview 
of the changing political role of repatriation over the past three decades, examining 
the general conditions under which it began to be promoted as the best solution to 
refugee displacement and the ways in which it has played an increasingly central role 
in Western European countries' asylum policies. I explained that as of the 1980s, and 
particularly during the 1990s, governments have combined the promotion of repatriation 
323 
324 Chapter 10 Summary and Contributions 
with progressively stricter asylum policies and temporary forms of protection in an 
attempt to reduce the numbers of asylum claimants, justifying their actions through 
a rhetoric that promoted the idea that all refugees want to go home. These latest 
developments made an investigation into the factors that influence refugees' decisions 
all the more relevant and necessary. 
In order to study the issue I combined the development of a theoretical framework for 
understanding refugee repatriation with the comparative study of Kosovar Albanians in 
Italy and the UK. The case of Kosovar Albanians is often used as both justification and 
illustration of the 'success' of European governments' repatriation policies due to the 
high number of Kosovar Albanians that have repatriated. This made it a particularly 
suitable case for questioning the very claim it is meant to support. Furthermore, a 
comparative study of this case enabled me to examine the effects of differing contexts 
in exile on a group of people who escaped from the same conflict. 
In Chapter ;3 the literature review on return migration and refugee repatriation high-
lighted the need for further research on issues related to refugee repatriation in gen-
eral and indicated the limitations of the predominantly empirical or descriptive existing 
studies underlining the lack of in-depth qualitative analysis and theoretical synthesis. In 
response, I developed a theoretical framework that enabled me to capture the complex-
ity of refugees' decision making process vis-a-vis return. The aim was that of avoiding 
three main common pitfalls in refugee research on return: 
• firstly, considering refugee repatriation as being the same as any other type of 
return migration; 
• secondly, considering refugees' decision-making process as a mere exercise of costs-
benefits analysis; 
• thirdly, analysing refugees as passive recipients of repatriation policies. 
I argued that refugee repatriation should be considered as a special case requiring a 
specific approach within the larger study of return migration, questioning the view of 
Koser (1993) that refugees behave as any other kind of migrant when it comes to the 
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decision to return. Referring to the position of authors, such as Joly (2002), Kunz 
(1973) and Schuster (1998), who recognise that the set of experiences that cause a 
refugee to migrate and shape his/her life in the host country are inherently different 
from those of other migrants, I maintained that these differences also influence the 
way in which a refugee relates to return. Subsequently, through the review of the 
study on refugee repatriation by Cuny and Stein (1991), the Kinetic model of Kunz 
(1973) and the typology of refugees in the land of exile of Joly (2002) I established 
that there are major gains in contextualising refugees' attitudes towards return and 
studying repatriation in connection with the experiences that have preceded it in order 
to have a deeper understanding of its dynamics and its underpinnings. Then I examined 
the information and decision-making models of Koser (1993) and Collins (1996) and 
indicated the shortcomings of a utilitarian approach to the study of refugees' decisions-
making processes in relation to return. I argued that the use of a gain/loss paradigm 
based on rational choice theory when studying refugees' choice to settle or repatriate 
does not adequately capture the entire range of factors (beliefs, fears and emotional 
factors) or provide a satisfactory account of the complexities of the issue. I concluded 
that since the main issue behind this kind of debate is the larger sociological question 
about 'freedom and constraint', we needed to engage in a more sophisticated account 
of human beings' relations with the world and develop a more appropriate link between 
social action and social context when researching refugees and return. Based on this 
understanding and following a review of the main approaches on structure and agency, 
I proposed Archer's morphogenetic approach as the most suitable. 
In Chapter 4, I expanded on Archer's methodological approach outlining some specific 
ideas of her work and their relevance to the analysis of refugee-related issues. Ana-
lytical dualism, through its formulation in the morphogenetic approach proposing the 
analysis of the structure and agency interaction through a three parts cycle, enables the 
examination of the complex relations between refugees, the conflict in the country of 
origin and the situation in the country of exile. Double morphogenesis can provide an 
account of the way in which refugees undergo changes themselves while interacting with 
the country of exile and altering or reproducing some of its structures. Asylum policies, 
and specifically repatriation policies, can be considered as forms of enablement or as 
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constraints to refugees' projects depending on different perspectives. Finally, Archer's 
stratified view of agency with its three levels of Human Person, Agent and Actor, en-
ables us to acknowledge the individual character of refugees at their level of Human 
Persons, while considering their position within a given social contexts as Agents and 
Social Actors. 
Based on the grounding provided by Archer, I then outlined the practical aspects of 
the research, providing an account of the research methods adopted. In short, I used 
a multidisciplinary approach combining interviews with refugees in the UK and Italy, 
interviews with policy makers, representatives of NGOs, international organisations and 
community leaders, alongside secondary analysis and documentary analysis. This al-
lowed me to explore both the structural context in the country of origin and in the 
country of exile, and the refugees' perspectives in relation to them. 
Given the complexity of refugee repatriation I examined two parallel cycles of interaction 
analysing refugees' direct engagement with the policies and the environment in the 
country of exile and their continous interaction with the conflict in the country of origin 
even during exile. Moreover, I presented general overviews of the ways in which previous 
cycles of interaction led to the development of the conflict, which caused the refugees 
to flee from the country of origin, and of the interaction between other refugees and 
the policy and society of the country of exile, which set the context Kosovar Albanian 
refugees faced upon arrival in the country of exile. 
I began the analysis of the case study by examining the historical background to the 
conflict in exile and exploring the refugees' position within it in order to understand 
how this influenced their flight and their mode of settlement. I then focused on their 
interaction with the policies and society in the country of exile and investigated how 
their positioning vis-a.-vis the conflict impacted on their settlement and compared the 
way in which the two different contexts in the UK and Italy shaped their settlement 
in different ways. The case of refugees who were flown in to the UK or Italy through 
the Humanitarian Evacuation Programme in 1999 was examined separately in order to 
explore the impact of particular reception policies and conditions in exile on the return of 
Kosovar Albanian refugees. Finally, I focused on the analysis of the situation in Kosovo 
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after the war, return policies and refugees' attitudes towards return, which represents 
the kernel of the thesis. 
The results of the research were presented through a division along the lines of: conflict 
and reasons for flight; settlement of refugees who arrived independently in the UK and 
Italy; experience of evacuees in the UK and Italy; and, finally, an analysis of return 
policies and refugees' attitudes towards return. 
The conflict and the reasons for the flight 
In Chapter 5, I explained that the history of Serbian-Albanian relations in Kosovo in the 
twentieth century was characterised by inter-ethnic tensions and divisions which often 
exploded into conflict involving the migration or forced migration of the two groups. 
I explained that different political developments in Kosovo led to different waves of 
Kosovar Albanian emigration and influenced the way in which the community settled 
in exile. I focused on the 1990s through both the historical analysis of the events in 
Kosovo and the results of the interviews. I distinguished between refugees who escaped 
because their political engagement with the conflict made them fear persecution and 
those who were targets of persecution simply because of their ethnicity. I explained how, 
during the 1990s, some of the emigration waves out of Kosovo bear the characteristics of 
anticipatory refugee movements. People left their home country before the deterioration 
of the military or political situation of the late 1990s, because they felt their life was in 
danger. This group included political activists (members of political parties, members 
of the parallel Kosovo Albanian government, students, journalists, etc.) and people 
who were specific targets of persecution (the youth, civil servants, doctors, teachers, 
professors, journalists, miners dismissed from their jobs because of their ethnicity). With 
the escalation of the conflict in 1998 and 1999, acute refugee movements left Kosovo. 
This was the case of people fleeing in mass or in groups, in order to escape the immediate 
violence brought by the war to their doorstep or because of the direct expulsion at the 
hand of the Serbian police. These refugees run to safety in neighbouring countries and, 
at a later stage, some of them re-emigrated to a different country either independently 
or through the evacuation programme set up by 10M for refugees in Macedonia. 
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I examined the experience of reception and settlement of refugees who arrived indepen-
dently in the UK and Italy throughout the 1990s respectively in Chapter 6 and 7, and 
those who were evacuated in 1999 in Chapter 8. 
Kosovar Albanian refugees in the UK and Italy: spontaneous arrivals 
In Chapter 6 and 7, the analysis of Kosovar Albanians settlement in the UK and in Italy 
indicated how the time of arrival often determined the kind of conditions they found in 
exile and highlighted the relevance of the refugees' personal background and positioning 
in relation to the conflict on their way of interacting with society in the country of exile. 
In the UK, Kosovar Albanians generally found a structured asylum reception system 
which provided them with some kind of support, at the same time this limited their 
actions. The assistance received by asylum seekers offered some degree of minimum 
support, however, in the long run, it did not facilitate their integration by prolonging 
a state of uncertainty and promoting dependence. On the contrary, in Italy, they were 
confronted with a general lack of structures supporting asylum seekers and immigrants 
which made life tougher, especially at the beginning. However, this also allowed them 
more space for action. In both cases the most resourceful refugees had more chances to 
integrate: in the UK they could more easily understand the way in which the system 
worked and try to get the best out of it; in Italy they had more chances to overcome 
the problems created by the total lack of support and find alternative ways to support 
themselves. 
Kosovar Albanians as a community had different modes of settlement in the UK and in 
Italy. In the UK the various community organisations focused their activities towards 
improving the conditions of Kosovar Albanians in the UK, while much less was done 
to raise the profile of the crisis in Kosovo. This depended on the individual refugees, 
but especially on the problems given by the geographical distance from Kosovo and 
their prolonged life as asylum seekers that made contact with other refugee communities 
abroad and travelling to Kosovo very difficult. In Italy, instead, the general conditions 
enabled them to organise activities with the aim of bringing the case of the oppression of 
the Albanian population in Kosovo to the attention of the Italian government and public 
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opinion and contributing to the running of the Albanian parallel structures in Kosovo 
before the war and during the reconstruction afterwards. Only recently the community 
has begun to organise collectively to improve the conditions for Kosovar Albanians in 
Italy. 
The experience of evacuees in the UK and Italy 
The case of the refugees evacuated to the UK and Italy was particularly interesting 
since it clearly demonstrated the impact of asylum policies on refugees. The initial 
response of the UK and Italy to the acute refugee crisis that exploded during NATO's 
bombing campaign was the promotion of reception in the region in line with other EU 
countries. However, with the crisis reaching worrying proportions, especially in the 
FYROM, both governments reluctantly accepted to host quotas of evacuees. They set 
up special reception programmes for them and received the refugees with the clear intent 
of sending them back to Kosovo as soon as possible. In the UK they were given a special 
kind of ELR, while in Italy they were offered a 'choice' between submitting an asylum 
claim, and, therefore, waiting for a long time with no support at all and no right to work, 
or temporary protection. In both countries Kosovar Albanian evacuees had temporary 
protection. 
In Italy, despite the original good intentions to help the refugees to make the most out of 
their stay and prepare them for their eventual return, the reception of over 5,000 Kosovar 
Albanian evacuees in the former NATO's base in Comiso presented major problems. The 
high number of evacuees put the structure and the organisation of the centre under strain 
and a lack of coordination between the actors involved and a lack or misuse of resources 
made the situation even more difficult. Life for the refugees in the camp was difficult 
and, generally, solutions to their problems came too late when they had already started 
to leave the camp. 
In the UK a special programme was set up for the evacuees, the Kosovo Programme, 
which was a reception system based on the long experience of the various actors involved 
with refugees. Kosovar Albanian evacuees were spread throughout the country, so that 
each reception centre received a manageable number of refugees and the programme 
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run very well with the satisfaction of all the agencies and the people involved, including 
refugees. However, when the end of temporary protection approached, the refugees 
began to be moved out of the centres into independent accommodations and when 
the whole programme ended, the special network of support to whom they had grown 
accustomed was shut; therefore, they had to turn to the general national asylum system. 
This left many of them disoriented as for the first time they faced many of the problems 
asylum seekers are generally confronted with immediately upon arrival without any 
special kind of support. 
In both countries refugees experienced the stress and anxiety caused by the trauma 
of the violence they escaped from and the worry for the situation back in Kosovo. 
Moreover, they were anxious about their own future and, especially, the end of temporary 
protection. 
Refugees and Return 
In order to understand the context within which Kosovar Albanian refugees had to 
decide whether to remain in the country of exile or return, in Chapter 9, I considered 
the post-war situation in Kosovo and the position of the UK and Italian governments 
on their repatriation, including the return schemes set up for them. 
I presented a brief overview of the conditions in Kosovo from the end of the war until 
spring 2004 and explained that, despite general improvements, the situation is still un-
safe and the economy is still weak with an unemployment rate of around 60%. Moreover, 
the unresolved issue of the future status of Kosovo has turned the region into 'a pressure 
cooker' since violence might erupt again anytime. Different parties, the Serbian gov-
ernment, Kosovar Serbs, Kosovar Albanians and the international community all seem 
to prefer different solutions for the status of Kosovo and this creates further political 
tension. I explained that the UNHCR and UNMIK's various reports, having taken these 
problems into consideration, recommended that governments hosting refugees should 
not force Kosovar Albanians to return. They also indicated specific groups of refugees 
who were in particular danger of persecution if they returned and groups of vulnerable 
people who would not find the necessary care in Kosovo. 
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I demonstrated that, despite the fact that problems in Kosovo were not fully resolved yet 
after the war ended and regardless of the recommendations of international organisations 
working on the ground, governments have put pressure on refugees to return or forced 
them to repatriate. In the UK this was clearly stated by the Home Secretary in several 
public occasions and translated into a lower acceptance rate of asylum claims for Kosovar 
refugees in the year 2000 and 2001. In Italy, the unique case of the evacuees who returned 
within the first two months following the end of the war without any form of support, 
highlighted how keen the government was to show that, as promised, they were not going 
to stay. 
Both countries organised return programmes which offered refugees grants to return. 
These were mostly targeted at temporarily protected refugees and had as the main goal 
that of maintaining the promises given to the electorate at the time of the refugee crisis 
in 1999 that Kosovar refugees were not going to remain. They were often used as an 
alternative to deportation and were represented as support to the refugees to return, as 
this was meant to be what they all wanted. 
Overall, the study of Kosovar Albanian refugees, which has been portrayed as a success 
repatriation story, proves that this claim is unfounded as not all refugees want to return 
to the country of origin. The early repatriation of Kosovar Albanians was due to a 
combination of factors which cannot be held neither as an example of good practice nor 
as a full success story beyond a purely numerical point of view. The UNHCR explained 
that refugees returned in mass from camps in neighbouring countries for various reasons 
(poor conditions in the camp, worries for members of the family they left behind, worries 
that someone might occupy their house, worries for the approaching of winter) which 
do not indicate that Kosovo was a safe country and that return was their ultimate wish 
at that point. The analysis of the situation in the UK and Italy indicates that the vast 
majority of those who returned under the 'voluntary' repatriation programmes were 
refugees who had been given temporary protection or received a negative decision on 
their asylum claim. In Italy, the mass return of the refugees from the reception centre 
in Comiso has been at the centre of controversies over the standard of reception and the 
level of information about the different possibilities for the post-temporary protection 
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phase provided to the evacuees. Similarly to the case of the thousands who returned 
immediately after the war from camps in neighbouring countries, refugees from the 
Comiso base returned too soon without any support scheme in place. Of the remaining 
Kosovar Albanian population in Italy a few hundreds went back with the voluntary 
return programme, while the rest have decided to remain or return independently (figures 
on this case are not available). In the UK the conditions of Kosovar Albanian refugees 
with temporary protection or with a rejected asylum or ELR extension application 
restricted their choices to either returning with the scheme, independently or through 
deportation. There have been cases of people appealing and opposing deportation, but 
the government has continued to forcibly repatriate them. 
In both countries, the refugees who had a stable position in the country of exile had the 
opportunity to choose about return without the pressure or threat of deportation. The 
interviewees in this position have clearly indicated that various factors related to condi-
tions in exile and in post-war Kosovo and their personal relationship with them have had 
an impact on their decision. Although we can easily claim that security, the conditions 
of the infrastructures and the political and economic stability of the country of origin 
are among the most apparent concerns that stop refugees from considering return, there 
are other elements that playa relevant part in the decision-making process, which can-
not be measured and are more related to the personal situation of different individuals. 
This implies that while host governments can intervene to improve conditions both in 
exile (with better asylum policies, fighting racism against asylum seekers, etc.) and in 
the country of origin (by aiding to achieve more durable safe and stable conditions) 
in order to contribute to the creation of optimal conditions under which refugees can 
decide about return, they should refrain from fostering situations that constrain their 
choices or divert it only towards the modality of return, rather than the actual decision 
on whether to return or to stay. 
Moreover, the use of repatriation within the frame of new restrictive asylum policies 
risks causing the premature return of vulnerable groups of refugees in need of particular 
support and protection. In Chapter 6 and 7, I discussed the study of refugees' flight by 
Van Hear (2004), where he affirms that with the international migration regime becoming 
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more stringent the ability for refugees to flee at a given moment and reach certain 
destinations has become more and more connected to their resources (economic/financial 
capital, cultural/information capital, social and human capital). I have argued that this 
has also an impact on their ability to settle and integrate in the country of exile and 
the findings of this research indicate that this is also relevant in relation to return. First 
of all, in the case of Kosovar Albanian refugees, people with more resources managed 
to leave at an earlier stage before violence escalated and by the end of the conflict 
they had, generally, achieved a more stable position in the country of exile. This gave 
them the opportunity to decide about return without the pressure given by an unstable 
temporary status and their experience in exile had often provided them with more 
resources. The refugees who left during the acute phase of the conflict were often people 
with less economic, social and human resources and their temporary reception in exile 
often impeded their integration and restricted the terms of their choice. ~Iirroring the 
situation at the time of the flight, better resourced refugees have better chances to find 
themselves in a position to decide about their return, to make the most out of it or 
resist the pressures from governments. Overall, the analysis of the factors that influence 
the decision-making process with regards to return reveals that although some general 
predictions can be made, as we discussed so far, they must be done within a context 
that takes into account the entire experience of exile, from the pre-conflict situation up 
to flight and exile, while allowing space for the individual differences that each person 
brings to bear. 
10.2 Contributions 
In the thesis I presented a unique insight in the refugees' attitudes towards return and 
their perspective on the factors that influence their decision. This represents one of 
the few academic efforts to study both the repatriation policy context and the refugees' 
perspective on return through a qualitative study. Therefore, it marks a distinctive 
contribution to the study of refugee repatriation. 
I contributed to the academic debate on the distinctions between refugees and labour 
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migrants. Both through the literature review and the findings in the field I demonstrated 
that the differences that characterise the two groups at the moment of migration also 
distinguish them at the time of return. Refugees have to deal with issues specific to 
their conditions (traumas, the post-conflict situation in the country of origin, security 
issues, etc.), both when deciding about return and when actually repatriating. 
I developed a new theoretical and methodological approach to refugee repatriation based 
on Archer's form of sociological realism and her morphogenetic model. This formed the 
methodological framework that guided both the collection of data and the focus of the 
analysis allowing me to highlight the complexity of refugees' decision-making processes 
in relation to return. In the thesis, I indicated the advantages of using such an approach 
when studying refugees' interaction with both the country of origin and the country 
of exile and explored the way in which this has an influence on their decision-making 
process vis-a.-vis return. 
The thesis has also drawn on previous studies of refugee flight, settlement and return, 
which argue for the advantage of analysing refugees' flight and settlement in relation to 
the whole chain of events that characterise the experience of exile. I demonstrated the 
gains of using this approach when studying return and indicated the way in which the 
examination of repatriation in connection with the events preceding it can contribute to 
a better understanding of refugees' choice. 
Through the use of Archer's concept of double morphogenesis I indicated the relevance 
of studying the way in which the experience of exile and the interaction with the country 
of origin and exile produce changes in the refugees. This approach has helped me to 
understand the way in which the initial positioning vis-a.-vis the conflict and the original 
intentions about return can change while in exile. 
Through the analysis of the specific case of Kosovar Albanians I further developed Joly's 
typology of refugees in the land of exile adding the J anusian type to the Odyssean and 
Rubicon ones. As I explained, Janusian refugees develop a mode of settlement which 
is both oriented at improving the conditions for the community in the country of exile 
and achieving their homeland project, making their overarching goal that of achieving 
a transnational existence between the two countries. 
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The specific case study of Kosovar Albanian refugees has also contributed to the general 
study of refugees in the UK and in Italy and the comparative perspective has highlighted 
the impact of different policies on both refugee settlement and return choice. 
This research has demonstrated that the assumption that every refugee wants to return 
is not valid and, therefore, cannot be a good reason for supporting restrictive asylum 
policies. 
Finally, the thesis has indicated that the optimal conditions under which refugees should 
choose whether to return are a stable position and the opportunity to stay in the country 
of exile, and safe and stable conditions in the country of origin. Repatriation should be 
part of a toolkit of solutions to refugee displacement available to refugees when making 
their choices and planning for their future. 
10.3 Further work 
This thesis is one of the few attempts to use Archer's morphogenetic approach to a 
specific research case and is the first effort to use this framework in the study of refugee 
issues. As I explained in the thesis, this is a complex methodology and its application to 
a specific research topic is challenging as the researcher is called to analyse a multiplicity 
of parallel and subsequent cycles of interactions; however, this study has proved some 
of the advantages of using this methodology in refugee studies and encourages further 
attempts. The use of this framework in the analysis of other topics could strengthen 
the relevance of its application to empirical studies, as this thesis has done, or highlight 
possible limitations that might arise from its application to other refugee related issues. 
As explained in Chapter 4, the original research design of this thesis included fieldwork 
in Kosovo to interview returnees, however, issues of security made it impossible for me 
to secure funding and carry out that part of the research. Although, the fieldwork 
in the UK and Italy has provided sufficient data for exploring the main aim of this 
thesis, refugees' attitudes towards return and the factors that influence their choice, 
further research on the post-return situation would add a further perspective on refugee 
repatriation through the analysis of returnees' opinions on their choice after return and 
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the impact of their return on the reconstruction of Kosovo. 
A suggestion for a further study to complete and advance the findings of this thesis 
would be the evaluation of the situation in the future. A study of the same refugees in 
the UK and Italy in about five years from the time of my fieldwork, could help us to 
find out if refugees have managed to achieve their projects, whether that is returning to 
Kosovo and starting a new life there, reaching full integration in the country of exile or 
developing a transnational life between the two countries. 
The current political role of repatriation has a tremendous effect on refugees' lives in exile 
and on their possibility to choose about their future. This makes it all the more impor-
tant for academics to attempt to study the dynamics underpinning the various facets of 
this phenomenon in order to provide well grounded answers to the many questions that 
current repatriation policies raise. This thesis is a step in this direction and a call for 
a more principled approach to the subject that takes into account its multidimensional 
character. 
Appendix A 
Intervie-w Guidelines 
Date, time and place: 
Persons present (male/female, age): 
PERSONAL DATA: 
REFUGEE STATUS: 
Life Before the conflict 
What part of Kosovo are you from? 
Rural/urban? 
How was your life before the conflict? 
Education? 
Employment? 
Housing? 
Friends social life? 
What was the family situation (parents, brothers/sisters) were you already married? 
And did you have children? 
Any family or friends living abroad? 
Involved politically or socially in the local community? 
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During the conflict 
When do you think the problems started for Kosovo? 
How did your life change? 
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When was the conflict perceived personally as a threat? 
When did you think about leaving? 
Did the conflict arrived in the area were you lived? 
Did you experience it directly? 
Did you loose anybody or anything? what and who? 
The Flight 
When and how did you decide to flee? 
Were there any alternatives? 
How did you flee? 
With whom (families and friends)? 
Did you have time to plan the flight (Date, transportation, destination, take goods and 
documents) ? 
Any idea of what would happen next? 
Hope to go back as soon as possible/ hope to find a good place abroad to start a new 
life/ hope to reach some families? 
Left anybody behind? 
What were the main worries? 
Only for evacuees 
Refugee camp in neighbouring country 
In which camp did you arrive to? 
Why that camp (nearest, told to go there, by chance, etc)? 
If you left in a group, did the group remain together? 
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What were the conditions in the camp? 
Any news about home? 
Why did you leave the camp to come here)UK/Italy? 
Did you personally decide to come to England/Italy? 
If yes or no, why? 
Did you have any alternatives? 
How did you get to England/Italy? 
Where you separated from families or friends? 
Whom? 
If yes, did you manage to know where the other were taken to? 
In the host country - Reception centre evacuation programme 
Where were you taken to in the new country? 
Did you know anyone in the country that you could contact? 
How was the reception centre organised? 
339 
Accommodation, food, clothing, health, legal advice, education, social event (TV ra-
dio)? 
What were the good aspects and the bad aspects of the centre? 
When did you understand what were your rights? 
Did you organise yourselves in a group? 
Any key figure or leader to refer to among you? 
Were you involved in the activities? 
Did you formally complain about anything? 
What were the major needs and worries? 
Who helped you in the centre - social Workers, doctors? 
What was explained to you about your status and by whom? 
While in the centre what did you think about the future? 
What did you think it would happen when the bombing was over? 
Did anybody talk to you about the options available? 
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If yes, Who and How? 
Did you apply for asylum? When? 
Did you think you would be deported or allowed to stay? 
When did you hear of the decision about your application and what was it? 
Only for refugees spontaneously arrivals 
Independent Arrival 
Did you plan to come to the UK/Italy? 
Any connections in the country ( friends/families)? 
Who helped you when you arrived? 
What kind of help did you get? 
Did you apply for asylum at the border on arrival or later? 
Were you helped by any refugee agency? 
What were the main problems when you arrived here? 
Settlement 
Did you receive help from social workers, local councilor local communities? 
How would you change the system if you could? 
Did you receive help from social workers, local councilor local communities? 
How would you change the system if you could? 
Housing 
Why did you settle in a particular place? 
How did you find the accommodation? 
Did you change several accommodations? 
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Are you close to friends and families? 
How is the standard of the accommodation? 
Legal advice 
What was your first legal status in this country? 
Did anybody help you with the application? Did you go to a lawyer? 
Are you satisfied with the help you received? Are you happy with your lawyer? 
What is the history of your legal status up to now? 
Health Situation 
Did you receive medical help? 
Were you happy with the help you received? 
How easy it is for you to see a doctor? 
Is there a procedure you have to follow to see a doctor? 
Employment 
Do you have a work permit? 
When did you get it? 
How easy was it to find a job? What are the main problems encountered? 
Do you do any voluntary work? 
Language - Education 
Did you speak English/Italian before you arrived? 
If yes-How was your standard? 
If not- how did you learn? 
Did you attend classes? 
Could you access education? 
How crucial is speaking the language for you? 
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Social Life 
Do you have more English/Italian or Kosovar friends? 
Do you ever feel isolated? 
Are you active in Kosovar Albanian or Albanian organisations? 
Which ones? 
What is the difference, if there is one, between the Albanian and the Kosovar Albanian 
organisations? 
Are you involved with British/Italian organisations? 
What are the activities you take part into? 
Are you active in politics? 
How have you contributed to the cause of Kosovar Albanians in Kosovo? 
Racism & Discrimination 
Have you experienced any form of racism in England/ Italy? 
Have you faced discrimination by authorities or otherwise? 
When and how did it happen? 
What do you think people in this country think about Kosovo and Kosovar Albanians? 
Refugee attitude towards the conflict 
When do you think the conflict has finished? 
Do you think it is now a safe country? What is your opinion about the NATO's bombing 
campaign? 
How would you define the situation in the country since the NATO bombing finished? 
Information Sources 
Where do you get your information from? 
Do you have direct information from home? 
Do you still are in touch with relatives and friends there? 
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Letters, telephone? 
Is it difficult or easy to keep in touch? 
Home 
What is home for you? 
Is there only one home? 
Where do you feel at home now? 
Return with permanent status 
Your attitudes towards return? 
Why do you want to stay here? 
Do you think you will ever repatriate at some point? 
Under which circumstances? 
How have you decided? 
What factors have been more influential in your decision? 
3~3 
If you went back now what do you think could happen to you and how would your life 
be? 
Would you have a house, a job, health facilities, social life, education opportunities, 
families network? 
What Kosovo would you go back to? How has the exile experience changed you? 
How has Kosovo changed? 
Do you think that for certain people returning is considered an act of loyalty towards 
Kosovo? 
If you went for a short visit Where did you go? Any feedback from your experience? 
Only for refugees in the UK 
Did you go on the Explore and Prepare programme? 
If yes, why did you decide not to remain in Kosovo? 
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If not, did anyone of your family go on the programme? 
Why did you decide not to go? 
Did you hear about the ODA return project? 
How did you come to know about it? 
What was explained to you? Why and how did you decide not to go on the programme? 
What do you think about it and the kind of support it offers? 
Were you given other options settlement, resettlement? 
What do you think about the reasons of those who went on the programme? 
Only for refugees in Italy 
Did you hear about the 10M return project? 
How did you come to know about it? 
What was explained to you and the kind of support it offers? Why and how did you 
decide not to go on the programme? 
What do you think about it? 
Were you given other options settlement, resettlement? 
What do you think about the reasons of those who went on the programme? 
Future Plans 
Before the war what was your project about the future? 
How has the war, the exile experience and the life in this country modified that project? 
What is your plan for the future now? How do you think British/Italian asylum policies 
have influenced your plans? 
How do you think that social difficulties in this country have influenced you? 
Would you like to have English/Italian citizenship? 
Could you give examples of good and bad aspects of staying in England/Italy? 
and about the English/Italian societies? 
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Second Generation 
Do your children speak Albanian? 
Do you think it is important for them to know Albanian? 
Do you want your children to become English/Italian citizens? 
Who are their friends (other kosovars/ English/Italian children, other refugees)? 
Futures plan for you children? 
Final 
Is there anything I have left out? 
Or something you would like to add? 
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Appendix C 
Letter of Information 
I am a PhD student at the Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations, University of 
Warwick, and Prof. Daniele Joly is my supervisor. 
My study deals with refugee repatriation movements from the European Union. The the-
sis focuses on the specific experience of Kosovar Albanian refugees in Italy and Britain, 
and the research gives fundamental importance to the opinion of the refugees them-
selves. The aim of the study is that of understanding the main factors that influence the 
decision of the refugees to stay in exile or go back to the place of origin. The project is 
funded by the Economic and Social Research Council and by the University of Warwick. 
I am going to conduct fieldwork in the UK and Italy where I intent to talk to policy 
makers, NCO representatives and, especially, refugees. 
It is of great importance for my research that I talk with refugees willing to collaborate 
to the project and I would very much appreciate your help and cooperation. If you 
decide to be interviewed for the study, you can suggest a place and a date for a meeting. 
An interview takes about 1.30 hr and I would be grateful if you could raise any need for 
an interpreter in advance. 
Of course, I can provide proof of my position at the University of Warwick and explain 
what my project is about in more details. I am also very aware of the highly sensitive 
nature of the subject I wish to tackle in the interview and I know about the delicate 
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ethical issues related to it. This is why I am willing to provide each interviewee with 
written guarantees about the anonymity and confidentiality of the data obtained during 
the interview. 
Your participation in this study is strictly voluntary. You may withdraw your participa-
tion at any time. Your decision as to whether to participate or not will have no effect on 
any benefits you now receive or may wish to receive in the future from any agency. For 
answers to questions pertaining to the research or research participants' rights, contact 
the Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations at the address mentioned above or Prof. 
Joly directly at the e-mail address:D.S.Joly@warwick.ac.uk. 
Katia Amore 
Appendix D 
Letter of Consent 
University of Warwick 
Letter of Informed Consent 
Date 
In signing this consent form, I, ........................ , agree to volunteer in the Graduate 
Studies research project being conducted by Katia Amore. 
I understand that the research being conducted relates to the experiences of Kosovar Al-
banian refugees in the UK/Italy and their approach to the idea of returning to Kosovo. I 
understand that excerpts from my written transcripts and tape-recorded verbal commu-
nications with the researcher will be studied and may be quoted in a doctoral dissertation 
and in future papers, journal articles and books that will be written by the researcher. 
I grant authorization for the use of the above information with the full understanding 
that my anonymity and confidentiality will be preserved at all times. I understand that 
my full name or other identifying information will never be disclosed or referenced in 
any way in any written or verbal context. I understand that transcripts, both paper and 
floppy disk versions, will be secured in the privacy of the researcher's home office. 
I understand that my participation is entirely voluntary and that I may withdraw my 
permission to participate in this study without explanation at any point. 
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I grant permission to use one of the following: 
My first name only 
Only a pseudonym 
Signature ....................... . 
Date .................... ·.······· 
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